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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is intended to assess the contribution of British direct 
investment to the economic development of Nigeria between 1955 and 1972. 
Chapter One establishes the background to the study by considering the 
main features of the Nigerian economy, the determinants of economic 
development and the natural inducements for foreign investments in 
Nigeria. In Chapter Two, the level and the sectoral distribution of 
British investment in Nigeria are discussed. It is found that Britain 
accounted for over half of the total foreign investment in Nigeria 
during the period, and that over two-thirds of British direct investment 
was concentrated in the petroleum industry. Chapter Three discusses 
the significance of British direct investment in the agricultural sector. 
It is shown that the level of direct investment in the sector was very 
low because of the prohibitive policy of the British Colonial Government 
with regard to foreign ownership of land in Nigeria and, later, because 
the repressive pricing policy of the Nigerian Marketing Boards discouraged 
British investors. The most important feature of British direct invest- 
ment in Nigerian agriculture during the period was the indirect nature of 
its contribution, which proved particularly significant in tobacco growing. 
Chapter Four discusses the manufacturing industry, whose development 
and growth received the greatest priority in the Government's policies 
during the period. Perhaps the most important feature of British direct 
investment in the manufacturing sector was the concentration of the largest 
proportion on consumer non-durable goods with little associated linkage 
effects. Chapter Five discusses the petroleum industry. 
Apart from 
being the industry with the most rapid growth-rate in Nigeria, it was 
also the most important absorber of foreign capital during 
the period. 
(ii) 
British direct investment dominated the industry and British oil investors 
performed the Schumpeterian entrepreneurial function of pioneering the 
industry. It is argued that the low price paid for Nigerian crude oil 
before 1970 was due to the ignorance of Nigerians about the complexities 
of the oil industry and the economic power of the oil companies which 
enhanced their bargaining power. It is also shown that British direct 
investment in the petroleum industry was of particular importance in 
its contribution to the Nigerian balance of payments. Chapter Six 
discusses the role of British direct investment as a vehicle for the, 
transfer of technology and managerial skills to Nigeria. In Chapter Seven, 
all the major obstacles to British investment are discussed. In 
Chapter Eight, the main conclusions regarding the benefits, limitations of 
investments and the importance of the Nigerian Government's policies are 
indicated. 
III 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Abstract 00 40 0"000 
List of tables 
000000"" 
60"000 40 0040000 
List of figures and maps 
(a) The Growth of the GDP .. 0. e, 0.002 
S000*00000 
S. .. 
.".. 
Abbreviations 00 00 00 0* 0* .. 00 VO .ov 
Acknowledgements 0900000""009 
CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
""000" 41 "00 
09 00 0000 
0000 
0000 
1. The main features of the Nigerian Economy .... 2 
(b) Capital Formation .. 
II 
IV 
IV 
VI 
1 
6 
(c) Employment Level and Distribution .. 9 
(d) Nigerian Exports .. 90 .... .. 14 
(e) National Income and its Distribution 09 16 
2. The Necessity for and the Determinants of 
rapid Economic Development in Nigeria 00 
3. The Natural Inducements for Foreign Direct 
Investments 
...... 00 0* so 09 
00 
40 * 
18 
26 
(a) Natural Resources .... 
40 9 27 
(b) Infrastructure 00 .. 
66 
.... .. 29 
(c) The Size of the Nigerian Market .... 31 
(d) Investment Agencies .... .... 32 
4. Conclusion .... 
00 
10,11 00 00 00 35 
CHAPTER II - THE MAGNITUDE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRITISH 
DIRECT INVESTMENT .. 00 .. of 00 37 
1. The Magnitude of Investment .... .... 37 
2. Sectoral Distribution of Cumulative Investment .. 41 
3. Net U. K. Direct Investment .... .... .. 
43 
4. Sectoral Distribution of U. K. net Investment 
5. Components of U. K. net Investment 
The Motivation to Invest 
00 
". 0S. 00 
0000000000 
7. British Investment in Distribution .0.000 
8. Conclusion 
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
45 
48 
58 
62 
64 
Page 
CHAPTER III - BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 00 00 ., 
s" 
to The Agricultural Sector in the Nigerian Economy .. 66 
2. The role of agriculture in the Economic 
Development of Nigeria .... .. 
3. British Investment in Nigerian Agriculture 
4. The state of Nigerian agriculture 
.. 66 
es 70 
"" o" 81 
00e00" 
5. Obstacles to Agricultural Development 
6. The future of Nigerian Agriculture 
0 40 0" 
0000 
o" 100 
106 
114 
7. The future role of British Direct Investment 
in Nigerian Agriculture .... 0... .. 120 
8. Conclusion .... .. 9... .. 124b 
CHAPTER IV - BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 400 00 00 ". 128 
1. Introduction 00000"0 40 "00000 
Why manufacturing? "4000"00000 to 
3. The level of manufacturing in Nigeria 00 
4. The Magnitude of British Investment in the 
Manufacturing sector 
go 
00 go 00000" 
5. The U. K. major investors .. 00 040 .. 
400 
(a) The United Africa Company Ltd. .. 0000 
(b) Redeployment in merchant firms .... .. 
(c) Redeployment in the UAC Group ... 
(d) Commonwealth Development Corporation 
(e) The Nigerian Tobacco Company 
(f) Other British investors 
00 
41 "0000 
0""00000 
6. The contribution of manufacturing investment 
to the Nigerian economy 
7. The linkage effects 
0000090" 
"ý"o "0"0 41 0 
8. Government's Industrial Policy and Incentives 
9. Conclusion 00 00 00 90 00 00 .. 
00*0 
"0 128 
"" 129 
.. 133 
.. 136 
.. 138 
.. 138 
.. 140 
.. 142 
.. 149 
.. 152 
.. 154 
co 156 
.. 170 
,. 174 
185 
Page 
8. Research and Development in Nigeria . 
9. Training in Nigeria .. 
00O0 
00"0090" 
,. 291 
"o 300 
10. The effectiveness of policies for the transfer 
of technical and managerial skills to Nigeria .o.. 303 
11. Conclusion .. "O000f" IN 
0000000e 3071 
CHAPTER VII - OBSTACLES TO BRITISH INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA .. 309 
1. The major advantages British companies enjoy 
in Nigeria .. 00"0f0000"0000 
2. The business practices of British firms and 
their effects .. 40 . 
3. Position without responsibility 
4. The major barriers to entry 
00 
"00000 
.. 0.00 40 0 
5. The major obstacles associated with Nigeria 40 0 
"s 309 
/ 
.. 311 
.. 315 
319 
321 
Decree No. 4: Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 327 
(a) The main provisions of Decree No. 4 .... 327 
7. Conclusion .. 00 .... 
00 06 .. a*0* 350 
CHAPTER VIII - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .. 
00 00 90 .0 35Oa 
1. The overall benefits of British Direct 
Investment to the Nigerian Economy .. 0. 
00 .. 351 
2. The limitations of Direct Investment .... .. 358 
The effectiveness of U. K. and Nigerian Government's 
policies towards British Direct Investment in Nigeria 360 
4. The future role of British direct Investment in the 
Economic Development of Nigeria as .. 0* oo 
365 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 00 00 06 00 
00 40 40 00" 40 90 .. 368 
Page 
CHAPTER V- BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY .o00*, * 00 00 190 
1. Introduction 
0.0.......,, 00 
190 
2. The British oil investors ,0., 04) 0 192 
3. The distribution of oil concessions among the 
oil companies go 00 .,  193 
4. Oil Production and Export by Shell-BP 0. .. 198 
5. Nigerian crude oil exports and their destination 
6. British investment in the petroleum industry and 
its contribution to the Nigerian economy .. 212 
(a) Employment, wages and salaries .0. o.. 213 
(b) The Linkage effects .,.. ..,. 215 
(c) The contribution to Government revenue ., 224 
(d) Contribution to foreign exchange and 
balance of payments .. 227 
7. National Policies for the Petroleum Industry .. 232 
8. Participation by the Nigerian Government in 
oil exploration .. 00 .... .0 .0 "0 
237 
9, Fuel Policy in Nigeria and the world energy crisis 242 
10. Conclusion 
.0 go """" 00 66 90 00 
252 
CHAPTER VI - BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE TRANSFER 
OF TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS TO NIGERIA 255 
1. Introduction .... .. 040 00 .. 255 
2. Foreign technology in Nigeria through British 
Direct Investment .. 09 00 .... .. 257 
3. Research efforts of British companies in Nigeria 259 
4. Licensing agreements .... .... .... 265 
5. Learning by doing through training within and 
without British companies .... .... *Q 268 
6. Other contributions to science, management and 
technical education in Nigeria by British 
companies 00 .... "" 0. "" 0"0a 2 76 
7. Obstacles to the transfer of technology and 
managerial skills to Nigeria by British companies 279 
IV 
LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1.1 Value at constant prices and growth rates 
of the GDP 1962-1971 3 
Table 1.2 Gross Domestic Product at factor cost constant 
prices 1962-1972 4 
Table 1.3 Gross Capital Formation by assets 1959-1972 6 
Table 1.4 Output and Investment 1962-1972 8 
Table 1.5 Distribution of Gainful Employment by sectors 
1966-1967 10 
Table 1.6 Employment situation in 1970 11 
Table 1.7 Sectoral Distribution of wage employment in 
1964 13 
Table 1.8 Sectoral Distribution of Nigeria's Exports 
1964-1971 14 
Table 1.9 Projected Gross Domestic Savings 1970-1974 22 
Table 1.10 Mineral Production 1960-1970 27 
Table 2.1 Book values of Cumulative Investment of 
the U. K. and Total foreign Investment 
in Nigeria 
Table 2.2 Changes in Cumulative Investment by Origin 
1962-1968 
Table 2.3 Sectoral Distribution of Cumulative 
Investment 1962-1968 
38 
39 
42 
Table 2.4 Net flow of U. K. and Total foreign Investment 
1961-1968 43 
Table 2.5 U. K. Net Investment flows to Nigeria 1963-1970 45 
Table 2.6 Sectoral Distribution of U. K. net Investment 
in Nigeria 46 
Table 2.7 Net Investment Flow of the U. K. Oil 
Companies 1963-1968 47 
Table 2.8 Component of U. K. Net Investment in Nigeria 
1958-1964 48 
Table 2.9 Components of U. K. Net Capital inflow to 
Nigeria 1961-1968 49 
Table 2.10 Sectoral Distribution of the total value of 
U. K. Investment in Nigeria at the end of 1968 63 
IV 
Table 3.1 Exports of Major agricultural products 
1962-1970 
Page 
66 
Table 3.2 Changes in the value of major agricultural 
Exports 1962-1970 67 
Table 3.3 Exports of Major Agricultural Productions 
(Quantities) 68 
Table 3.4 Food Consumption in Nigeria and Advanced 
Countries 72 
Table 3.5 Food Consumption in Nigeria 1963-1980 73 
Table 3.6 U. K. Plantations in Nigeria 1905-1960 82 
Table 3.7 Functional Distribution of CDC's Investment 
1959-1971 96 
Table 3.8 CDC's operations in Nigeria as at 
31st December, 1971 97 
Table 3.9 Sectoral Performance: Agriculture 1970-1971 103 
Table 3.10 Commercial bank loans and advances to 
agriculture 112 
Table 3.11 Soil Potentiality classes in Nigeria 118 
Table 3.12 Present Soil productivity classes in Nigeria 118 
Table 3.13 Investment in Agriculture 1963-1980 119 
Table 4.1 Cumulative foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector 1962-1968 134 
Table 4.2 Value added by the manufacturing sector 
1958-1968 135 
Table 4.3 Net flow of foreign investment to the 
manufacturing sector 137 
Table 4.4 Capital Expenditure by the UAC Group and 
other Unilever Associated Companies 
1951-1964 139 
Table 4.5 Industrial Investments of the UAC Group 
of Companies 144 
Table 4.6 UAC Group: African and European Managerial 
Staff 147 
Table 4.7 CDC's operations in Nigeria's Commerce and 
Industry in 1971 149 
Table 4.8 NTC at a glance from 1959 to 1966 
Table 4.9 The Industrial Sector at a glance 1965-1971 
153 
158 
IV 
Page 
Table 4.10 Indices of domestic production and imports 
of selected manufactures 160 
Table 4.11 Imports by major groups 1963-1971 161 
Table 4.12 Imports by major groups in percentages 162 
Table 4.13 Nigeria's total exports and exports of 
manufactures 1964-1971 166 
Table 4,14 Nigerian Government's current revenue 
1961-1970 170 
Table 4.15 Total public sector Capital Expenditure 
on Industries 1970-1974 184 
Table 5.1 World oil Production in 1970 191 
Table 5.5 Oil concessions held by Petroleum Companies 
in Nigeria in 1972 196 
Table 5.6 Crude oil production in Nigeria by 
companies 1958-1971 203 
Table 5.7 Distribution of crude oil production within 
the States 205 
Table 5.8 Crude Oil exports of Nigeria 1960-1971 210 
Table 5.9 Exports of crude oil to the U. K., Germany 
and Benelux 211 
Table 5.10 Nigerian crude oil exports 1966-1971 211 
Table 5.11 Levels of employment in the Nigerian 
Petroleum exploring and producing 
industry, 1964-1967 214 
Table 5.12 Local Expenditures of Shell-BP, 1958-1964 216 
Table 5.13 Selected ancillary firms' receipts from 
the petroleum industry paid abroad and 
paid locally by ownership of firms in 
1965 217 
Table 5.14 Effects of oil refinery on oil imports 221 
Table 5.15 Government's revenue from the petroleum 
industry 1961-1970 225 
Table 5.16 Government's revenue from the petroleum 
industry 1968-1971 225 
Table 5.17 Shell-BP's payments to the Nigerian 
government in 1970 226 
Table 5.18 The contribution of the petroleum industry 
to the Nigerian balance of payments 228 
Table 5.19 The impact of crude oil on Nigeria's 
overall balance of payments 1967-1971 229 
IV 
Table 5,20 The contribution of Shell-BP to 
Nigeria's balance of payments 
1938-1964 
Page 
231 
Table 5.21 Sources of energy consumption in 
Nigeria 1963-1971 243 
Table 5.22 Energy production and consumption 
in selected countries 247 
Table 6.1 Numbers and values of British Direct 
Investments by form of organization 
at the end of 1968 260 
Table 6.2 Royalty payments by Nigeria to U. K. 266 
Table 6.3 The UAC Group technical training 
schools in Nigeria, 1958 270 
Table 6.4 Nigerian staff of UAC undertaking 
training in 1969 273 
Table 6.5 National expenditure on Science and 
Technology by selected countries 293 
Table 6.6 The Stock of manpower for Science and 
Technology 294 
LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS 
Map of Nigeria 
Figure 1.1 Nigerian Exports 
Figure 3.1 Aggregate index of output of agricult- 
ural export commodities 
la 
16a 
104a 
Figure 4.1 Index of manufacturing production 135a 
Figure 4.2 Indices of manufacturing production 
and imports of capital goods and 
raw materials 162a 
Figure 5.1 Crude-oil production in Nigeria 
1958-1970 190a 
Map of Shell-BP's area of operation 201a 
(v) 
A. P. C. M., 
C. B. I., 
C. B. N., 
C. D. C., 
F. A. Q., 
I. B. R. D., 
G. D. P., 
I. F. C., 
M. P. E., 
N. J. E. S. S., 
N. I. B. D., 
N. T. C., 
U. A. C. 9 
U. N., 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers. 
Confederation of British Industries. 
Central Bank of Nigeria. 
Commonwealth Development Corporation. 
Food and Agricultural Organization. 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
Gross Domestic Product. 
International Finance Corporation. 
Multinational Private Enterprise. 
Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies. 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. 
Nigerian Tobacco Company. 
United Africa Company. 
United Nations. 
(vi) 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In making this study, I have been supported by many people and 
institutions, only few of whom can be mentioned in the acknowledgement. 
First of all, I thank the Federal Government of Nigeria for offering me 
a scholarship, without which this study could never have been under- 
taken. While in Nigeria, I was greatly assisted by the Director of 
Research at the Central Bank of Nigeria and by a large number of Nigerian 
managers employed by British companies. 
In England, many officials of British companies and public bodies, 
especially Mr. Buckle and Mr. P. A. Arden-Clarke of the UAC Ltd. and 
Mr. Stocker of the Commonwealth Development Corporation have been very 
co-operative in interviews and in the supply of booklets and statistical 
materials for this study. In addition, the officials of the Institute 
of Petroleum in London and the Statistical Section of the Board of Trade 
have been generous in the supply of essential information. 
At Keele University, Mr. P. Gay of the Department of Economics, 
Mrs. Sue Gay and Mrs. E. Mortimer of the Department of Sociology have 
been very kind in reading some parts of the thesis and suggesting improve- 
ments. Mr. Peter Lawrence of the Department of Economics assisted me 
greatly in the arrangement of some chapters and with his helpful and 
critical comments. Undoubtedly, my greatest debt is to my supervisors, 
Mr. S. A. Hussain and Professor L. Fishman, whose suggestions concerning 
presentation and style, critical encouragement and constructive criticisms 
and, above all, the bringing to my notice of relevant books, articles 
and newspaper cuttings are everything a student could have hoped for 
in thorough supervision. 
I cannot close without expressing my gratitude to my family, especially 
Bidemi, Bimpe and Lape Awojinrin for sending relevant articles in newspapers 
and other publications to me regularly, and for bearing the brunt of 
deprivation during my stay in England. I am also grateful to 
Miss Anne Pearson who undertook the typing of the text with patience. 
Responsibility for errors and the opinions expressed is exclusively 
( vi ) 
mine. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTR0DUCT10N 
This chapter is essentially introductory and is intended to 
provide a background for analysing British direct investments in 
Nigeria. Attention will, therefore, be focussed on the past per- 
formance of the Nigerian economy. Nigeria has an area of 356,669 
square miles, which is slightly larger than the combined areas of 
France, West Germany and Italy, or about four times the size of the 
United Kingdom. Nigeria is situated in West Africa and it is 
bounded on the West and North by the Republics of Dahomey and Niger, 
on the East by the Republic of Cameroons, and on the South by the 
Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. Nigeria's broad frontiers 
cut across all the wide horizontal bands of climate and vegetation 
characteristic of West Africa. The coastline is intersected by an 
intricate network of creeks and rivers, and by the great Niger Delta. 
For most of its length it consists of a sandy beach backed by a belt 
of mangrove swamp. Beyond this there is a zone of tropical forest 
in undulating country with scattered hills, then the country becomes 
an open savannah and stretches to the arid edge of the desert in the 
extreme north. The mean maximum temperature is about 870 Fahrenheit 
in the coastal belt and about 94° in the north. Nigeria has two 
main seasons: the rainy season and the dry season. The rainy season 
varies from May to October inland but shortens from June to September 
in the north. The dry season normally begins in November except in 
the north, where it starts in October and ends in April. Near the 
coast, it is usual to have some rain in all months, but in the north 
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the dry season is normally one of complete drought. 
Nigeria is the largest among the British ex-colonies in Africa 
and accounts for nearly half of the total population of these ex- 
colonies. On October 1,1960, Nigeria became politically independent 
and three years later, it became a Federal Republic within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. Nigeria is Africa's most populous country. 
Its population represents nearly one-quarter of the total population 
of Africa. Nigeria's current population is estimated to be over 
60 million. 
THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
Although Nigeria is big in size and has the largest population 
in Africa, it is nevertheless not a major economic power. Nigeria 
has not made rapid progress in the development of its backward economy 
despite its abundant human and natural resources. A run-down of the 
main features of the economy will confirm this, while at the same time 
emphasizing the intricate development problems which the country will 
face in the near future. The features of the Nigerian economy which 
are of particular importance to our analysis are those which throw 
light on the strength and weaknesses of the economy, and also enable 
us to put into real perspective the importance of international direct 
investments in the Nigerian economy. Such features include the growth 
of the GDP, the components of capital formation, the sectoral distribu- 
tion of exports and the employment situation in the country. 
THE GROWTH OF THE GDP 
An important indicator of a country's economic performance is the 
value of its total production of goods and services. Nigeria's gross 
domestic product grew rapidly from £687.1 million in 1950 to £898.1 million 
3 
in 1955. Between 1955 and 1960, the gross domestic product of Nigeria 
grew very slowly from £898.1 million in 1955 to £918.9 million in 1960 
as a result of the sluggish rate of growth in the agricultural sector. 
At the end of 1960, the GDP was 33.7 per cent higher than the 1950 
level and the average annual rate of growth of the GDP during the 
1950-1960 period was about 3 per cent. Since 1961, Nigeria's GDP 
has been growing more rapidly than ever before. Table 1.1 below 
shows the value at constant prices and the growth rates of the gross 
domestic product of Nigeria since 1962. 
TABLE 1.1 
VALUE AT CONSTANT PRICES AND GROWTH RATES OF THE GDP 1962-1971 
YEAR. VALUE (N 'MILLION) GROWTH RATE (PER CENT 
1962-63 1315.4 - 
1963-64 1425.7 8.4 
1964-65 1463.4 2.6 
1965-66 1543.0 5.4 
1966-67 1583.1 2.6 
1967-68 1506.8 - 4.8 
1968-69 1530.8 - 0.2 
1969-70 1699.9 13.0 
1970-71 1863.5 9.6 
SOURCE: ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL REVIEW 1971, Federal Ministry of 
Information, Lagos, 1972. 
Nigeria's gross domestic product grew fairly steadily from the 
period after independence in 1960 until the first quarter of 1966. 
With the beginning of hostilities and the subsequent civil war from 
1967 to early 1970, economic activities were adversely affected; 
this ultimately resulted in a negative growth in the gross domestic 
product during 1967 to 1969. With the cessation of hostilities, 
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economic activity picked up and a growth rate of 13 per cent was 
recorded in 1969-70, which was the highest ever recorded in Nigerian 
history. This high rate of growth is also partially due to the fact 
that the national income in the years 1967-1969 declined. Over the 
1962-71 period, Nigeria's gross domestic product grew at an annual 
average of 5.6 per cent. In 1970-71 the GDP was 41.6 per cent higher 
than the 1962-63 level. 
The bulk of Nigeria's output has always come from the agricultural 
sector. During the 1950-1960 period, the agricultural sector contri- 
buted an average of about 65 per cent to the gross domestic product. 
Since 1961 the percentage proportion of the GDP emanating from the 
agricultural sector has been falling as a result of the rapid develop- 
ment in other sectors of the economy. Table 1.2 below shows the break- 
down of the sectoral contributions to the GDP from 1962-63 to 1971-72. 
TABLE 1.2 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST CONSTANT PRICES (PER CENT) 
SECTORS 
1962 
-63 
1963 
-64 
1964 
-65 
1965 
-66 
1966 
-67 
1967 
-68 
1970 
-71 
1971 
-72 
Agriculture 61.2 61.1 59.2 56.4 54.9 55.9 44.8 41.8 
Mining 2.0 2.2 3.2 5.3 7.2 3.5 14.8 18.5 
Manufacturing and Crafts 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.9 5.9 7.4 8.2 8.5 
Electricity & Water Supply 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Building and Construction 4.4 4.6 4.4 5.2 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.9 
Distribution 12.2 12.7 13.3 13.1 12.7 13.3 11.8 11.5 
Transport 4.2 4.3 4.0 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.7 
Communication 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 
Ot'hers5 9.2 8.7 9.2 9.0 9.5 10.3 11.2 10.7 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SOURCES: 1. SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1970. 
2. SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, FIRST PROGRESS 
REPORT, Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1972. 
NOTES: *: Estimates 
a: Includes general government, education, health and other 
services. 
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Agriculture was and still is the dominant sector in the Nigerian 
economy, contributing over 65 per cent of the GDP in 1960. However, 
the percentage contribution of agriculture to the GDP has been falling 
since 1962-63 due to the rapid development in mining and manufacturing. 
Despite the sluggish performance of the agricultural sector during the 
1961-70 period, the sector nevertheless accounted for over half of the 
GDP in 1970. According to the estimates for the 1970-72 period, the 
agricultural contribution to the GDP was still the most important. 
During the 1960-70 period, agriculture contributed an annual average 
of 59 per cent to the GDP. Next in importance to agriculture before 
1970 was distribution which contributed an average of 13 per cent per 
annum to the GDP during the 1960-70 period. Since 1971, distribution 
has become the third most important contributor to the GDP, thus losing 
its place to mining. The mining sector has become an important 
contributor to the GDP with a rapid rise in the production and export 
of crude petroleum. From a low level of 2 per cent in 1962-63, the 
mining sector has grown so rapidly as to contribute nearly 20 per cent 
of the Nigerian GDP in 1972. The petroleum sector is largely responsible 
for the mining sector's contribution to the GDP, accounting for over 
90 per cent of the sector's contribution to it. Although the contri- 
bution of the manufacturing sector to the GDP has been rising since 
1960 when the sector contributed about 1.5 per cent of the GDP, at 
the end of 1970 less than 10 per cent of the GDP derived from the 
sector. During the 1955-72 period, the most rapidly growing sectors 
of the Nigerian economy in order of importance were mining and manu- 
facturing, and these sectors were dominated by British investors, 
as will be shown in the later part of the thesis. 
6 
CAPITAL FORMATION 
Perhaps more revealing than any other key indicator of the 
performance of the Nigerian economy during the last two decades has 
been the rate of capital formation. Gross capital formation in 
Nigeria increased more than four-fold between 1950 and 1955 from 
£18 million in 1950 to £78.4 million in 1955. At the end of 1960, 
gross capital formation in Nigeria has increased to £129.2 million. 
During the 1960-1970 period, capital formation increased nearly 
three-fold. However, more useful than the absolute level of capital 
formation are the changes in its structure because these provide a 
useful insight into the development of the economy as a whole. 
Table 1.3 below shows the breakdown of the gross capital formation of 
Nigeria by types of asset. 
TABLE 1.3 
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION BY ASSETS 1959-1972 (PERCENTAGES) 
TYPE OF ASSET 1959 1961 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968, 1970 1971 
/68 
-/69 
/71 /72 
Land, Agriculture & 
Mining 9.4 19.8 18.9 15.7 14.8 13.2 11.1 9.6 8.2 
Buildings 35.3 30.1 30.2 24.2 24.0 20.3 21.0 
Civil Engineering Wks. 22.8 19.5 21.0 20.3 21.6 18.8 17.2 37.9 38.1 
Plant, Machinery and 
Equipment 25.4 23.1 22.1 29.4 31.7 40.1 43.2) 
Transport Equipment 7.1 7.5 7.8 10.4 8.0 7.6 7.5) 52.5 53.7 
TOTAL (NL MILLION) 122.8 152.5 177.0 234.1 242.4 198.4 207.2 381.3 465.4 
PRIVATE SECTOR 49.6 60.5 64.2 64.2 62.5 68.6 66.4 65.6 - 
PUBLIC SECTOR 50.4 39.5 35.8 35.8 37.5 31.4 33.6 34.4 - 
SOURCES: 1. DIGEST OF STATISTICS, JAN. 1968 & JULY 1972, Federal Office 
of Statistics, Lagos. 
2. SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1970. 
3. SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, FIRST PROGRESS 
REPORT, Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1973. 
NOTES: a: Does not cover the three Eastern States. 
b: Estimates. 
7 
The dominance of buildings and civil engineering works combined, as 
the most important source of capital formation between 1961 and 1965, 
is clearly shown in Table 1.3. The emphasis on buildings and construction 
began in 1950 and during the 1950-1960 period buildings and construction 
combined accounted for over half of the total expenditure on fixed assets. 
The building boom which began in the 1950's continued until early 1966 
and, as a consequence, capital formation during this period was heavily 
biassed in favour of residential construction rather than of expanding 
the productive capacity of the economy. Investments in plant, machinery 
and equipment largely undertaken by foreign investors, which formed 
about one-quarter of total investment expenditure during the 1950-1960 
period, have become the most important source of capital formation in 
Nigeria. The rapid pace of industrial and petroleum development after 
1960 necessitated large capital investment on plant, machinery and equip- 
ment. Investments in land, agriculture and mining development made 
their highest percentage contribution to capital formation in 1961, 
after which period the percentage contribution has been falling due to 
the sluggish pace of agricultural development. 
Another important revelation from Table 1.3 is the dominant position 
of the private sector as the most important source of capital formation. 
Before 1960, the public sector contributed more to capital formation 
than the private sector and the reason for this was the high level of 
investments in building, construction and in the agricultural sector 
by the regional and Federal governments. At the same time, Nigerian 
industrial development before 1960 was slow and the general level of 
agricultural, mining and industrial investments undertaken by the 
private sector was very low. After 1960, the rapidly growing markets 
of Nigeria resulting from a growing population with rising incomes, 
and government incentives spurred private investors both indigenous 
and foreign to a high level of investment activities in order 
to take 
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the available opportunities for making high profits. As a consequence, 
between 1960 and 1972, investments by the private sector accounted for 
an annual average of over 64 per cent of the total gross capital forma- 
tion. Although the public sector is still an important source of 
capital formation, nevertheless its contribution has fallen from 
50.4 per cent of the total in 1959 to about 35 per cent in 1971-72. 
More important than the absolute level of capital formation is 
the proportion of the current output which is invested to increase 
the level of output in the future. Table 1.4 below compares output 
with investment. 
TABLE 1.4 
OUTPUT AND INVESTMENT (AT CURRENT FACTOR PRICES) 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT INVESTMENT INVESTMENT AS 
PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE A PERCENTAGE 
YEAR AMOUNT (&M) CHANGE AMOUNT (LIVi) CHANGE OF GDP 
1962 1315.4 - 159.9 - 12.20 
1963 1403.2 6.7 177.0 10.6 12.60 
1964 1457.0 3.8 195.0 10.2 13.40 
1965 1540.3 5.7 234.1 20.0 15.18 
1966 1605.0 14.2 242.4 3.7 15.14 
1967/68 1301.2 - 198.4 - 15.20 
1968/69a 1358.6 4.4 207.2 4.4 15.30 
1970/71 1995.9 - 381.3 - 19.10 
1971/72 2234.9 12.0 465.4 22.1 20.80 
SOURCES: SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1970. 
2. SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, FIRST PROGRESS 
REPORT, Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1973. 
NOTE: a: Does not include the three Eastern States. 
Between 1962 and 1966 investment grew at an - average of 11 per cent 
per annum, while the GDP grew at an annual average of 
8.5 per cent. 
In 1965, while a 20 per cent increase in investment resulted 
in only 
a 5.7 per cent increase in the GDP, a 3.7 per cent 
increase in investment 
in 1966 resulted in a 14.2 per cent increase in 
the GDP. This difference 
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can be explained by a higher productivity of capital in 1966 resulting 
from fuller utilisation of installed capacity which increased output with 
little or no additional investment. In addition, there is also the time- 
lag between investment and output which might delay the resulting output 
from the 1965 investment until 1966. The Nigerian civil war severely 
affected investment and output between 1967 and early 1970 throughout 
Nigeria, especially in the three Eastern States, and this makes comparison 
with the previous years not a useful exercise. Since the end of the 
war in 1970, the level of investment has increased, thus resulting in 
an increase in the level of output. The annual level of investment as 
a percentage of GDP was, on the average, about 15 per cent between 1962 
and 1972. The high proportion of the GDP devoted to capital formation 
after 1969 was due to the high level of economic activities since the 
end of the civil war. Investment plans held back during the war were 
executed to take advantage of the shortages in consumer goods experienced 
in Nigeria since 1970. 
EMPLOYMENT LEVEL AND DISTRIBUTION 
The agricultural sector is the backbone of the Nigerian economy 
in many respects. The sector is the most important generator of employ- 
ment in the Nigerian economy. Table 1.5 shows the distribution of gainful 
employment in Nigeria in 1966-67. 
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TABLE 1.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT BY SECTORS 1966-67 
OCCUPATION PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
Agriculture 71.9 
Manufacturing 9.6 
Construction 0,6 
Commerce 12.9 
Transport and Communications 0.8 
Services 3.9 
Others 0.2 
TOTAL 100.0 
SOURCE: ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL REVIEW 1970, Federal Ministry of 
Information, Lagos, 1971. 
Approximately 72 per cent of the gainfully employed population of 
Nigeria was engaged in agriculture in 1966-67. Commerce and manu- 
facturing provided 12.9 per cent and 9.6 per cent respectively of the 
total gainful employment in 1966-67. The three sectors - agriculture, 
commerce and manufacturing - combined provided over 94 per cent of 
the gainful employment in Nigeria. The relationship between Tables 1.2 
and 1.5 is worth noting. Those sectors of the Nigerian economy which 
contributed most to the GDP in Table 1.2 also provided the largest 
part of the gainful employment. The only exception to this observa- 
tion is mining which has been contributing a sizeable part of the GOP 
in recent years but provides only a negligible proportion of the gainful 
employment, classed under "Others" in Table 1.5. The reason 
for this 
is the fact that mining is capital-intensive by nature and as a con- 
sequence only very few people can be employed. 
Agriculture, commerce 
and manufacturing together not only provided over 
90 per cent of the 
total gainful employment in Nigeria, but they also contributed an annual 
average of 75 per cent of the GDP during 
the 1962-1972 period. 
11 
The leading role of the agricultural sector as the major generator 
of employment has not changed significantly since 1966-67, as Table 1.6 
below will show. 
TABLE 1.6 
EMPLOYMENT SITUATION IN 1970a 
CATEGORY NO. OF PERSONS (MILLIONS) 
Labour Force 26.084 (100 per cent) 
Unemployment Gap 2.030 (7.8 per cent) 
Gainful Occupation 24.054 (92.2 per cent) 
(a) Agriculture 16.790 
(b) Non-Agriculture 7.264 
Wage Employment 1.385 (5.7 per cent) 
Self-employed 22.669 (94.3 per cent) 
SOURCE: ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL REVIEW 1970, Federal Ministry of 
Information, Lagos, 1971. 
NOTE: a: Employment does not necessarily refer to wage employment. 
The agricultural sector still provided approximately 70 per cent of 
the gainful employment in 1970 despite the increased activities in 
the other sectors of the Nigerian economy. 
The total unemployed in 1970 was put as over 2 million people, 
which was 7.8 per cent of the labour force for the year. The existence 
of a large pool of healthy people capable and willing to work who are 
without any employment is one of the most intractable problems of 
Nigeria. The figure of 2 million seems to be an understatement of 
the level of unemployment in Nigeria in 1970. There are two major 
problems associated with how to estimate the level of unemployment 
in Nigeria. The first problem is the "non-existence of the market 
for labour" in rural areas and smaller towns which prevents the 
establishment of employment exchanges in 
these areas. The second 
problem concerns how to estimate the number of unemployed 
in the 
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big towns where the employment exchanges are located, since many people, 
although unemployed, do not register in the labour exchanges. There 
are two reasons why those unemployed may not register in the labour 
exchanges. The first is that many people are not aware of the existence 
of the labour exchanges, and second, in most cases, the labour exchanges 
are not helpful in finding jobs for people and therefore many people 
who know about their existence do not use their facilities. 
Even if we accept the unemployment figure in Table 1.6, the fact 
still remains that the level of unemployment is high. In a country 
like Nigeria where there are neither social security payments nor 
unemployment benefits, an unemployment level of 2 million must have a 
serious restricting effect on the purchasing power of the unemployed 
and their dependants, thus having a damping-down effect on the level 
of demand in the economy as a whole. 
Another feature of the Nigerian economy is the small proportion 
of the gainfully employed in wage employment. Table 1.7 which follows 
shows the sectoral distribution of wage employment in 1964. In 1964, 
only 561,534 people were in wage employment in Nigeria. Wage employ- 
ment more than doubled between 1964 and 1970, but despite the increase, 
only 5.7 per cent of those in gainful occupation in 1970 were in wage 
employment. The remaining 94.3 per cent who were self-employed were 
mainly people engaged in subsistence agriculture, petty traders, 
retailers and rural craftsmen. There are two main reasons why the 
proportion of self-employed is so high in Nigeria. The first reason 
is that the Nigerian economy is dominated by primary production and 
services industries which are in turn dominated by family labour. 
Nigerian agriculture is not organized on a professional and commercial 
basis and as a consequence there is limited wage employment in 
the sector. 
Out of the 6.3 per cent of the wage employment in agriculture 
in 1964, 
the Government and public corporations accounted for over 90 per cent. 
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The second reason is the slow growth of wage employment in other sectors 
of the Nigerian economy. The manufacturing sector which normally 
provides substantial wage employment in developed countries is still 
in its infancy in Nigeria. Despite the rapid increase in investments 
in the sector since 1964, only 150,000 people are presently engaged 
in the sector due to the high level capital-intensive technology adopted 
by industrialists, especially foreign investors. 
TABLE 1.7 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF WAGE EMPLOYMENT IN 1964 
a NON- b 0 
INDUSTRY GROUP GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing 17,876 17,240 35,116 6.3 
Mining and quarrying 216 50,819 51,035 9.1 
Manufacturing 3,716 58,148 61,864 11.0 
Construction 28,006 50,014 78,020 13.9 
Electricity 4,614 10,325 149,39 2.7 
Commerce 855 44,310 45,165 8.0 
Transport & Communica- 
tions 17,851 40,217 58,068 10.3 
Services 147,308 70,019 217,327 38.7 
TOTAL 220,442 341,092 561,534 100.0 
SOURCE: DIGEST OF STATISTICS, VOL. 17, NO. 1, JAN. 1968, Federal 
Office of Statistics, Lagos. 
NOTES: a: Includes Federal, State and Local Governments. 
b: Includes Public Corporations. 
Another important revelation in Table 1.7 is the importance of the public 
sector as a provider of wage employment. In 1964, the various govern- 
ments of Nigeria provided 39.3 per cent of the wage employment for 
the 
year. When the number of people employed in public corporations 
is 
added to those employed by the various governments, the 
importance of 
the public sector as a generator of wage employment cannot 
be doubted. 
With the division of Nigeria into twelve States since 1967 and the 
establishment of several public corporations at 
Federal and States level, 
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the expansion of wage employment in the public sector has been remark- 
able. 
NIGERIAN EXPORTS 
Just as the agricultural sector is the main generator of employment 
in the Nigerian economy, the sector has also, until recently, provided 
the largest part of Nigerian exports. Table 1.8 below shows the 
sectoral distribution of the value of Nigeria's exports from 1964 to 1971. 
TABLE 1.8 
SECTORAE DISTRIBUTION OF NIG'ERIA'S EXPORTS 1964-71 (PERCENTAGES) 
COMMODITY SECTORS 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural 
Products 69.6 60.1 50.5 53.2 65.0 45.3 30.0 19.0 
Manufactures 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 7.4 3.5 
Minerals & Products 20.8 30.9 37.9 35.3 24.2 45.2 57.8 73.4 
Others 8.6 8.0 10.5 10.4 9.7 8.6 4.8 4.1 
TOTAL EXPORTS 
(NLIIILLI0N) 214.7 268.4 283.1 241.8 211.1 318.2 442.7 648.7 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA; ANNUAL REPORTS, 1966-1971. 
In 1964 the agricultural sector accounted for nearly 70 per cent of 
Nigeria's total exports, after which period agricultural exports fell 
continuously both in absolute and in percentage terms until 1967 and 
rose again in 1968. The rapid fall in agricultural exports after 1965 
can be explained in terms of the political troubles in the country, 
during which period the railway lines were disrupted. It was not 
until the Federal Army had captured a sizeable part of the fighting 
areas where the railway lines were located that the backlog of agri- 
cultural products began to be moved to the ports in the south for 
subsequent exportation to overseas markets. Although agricultural 
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exports have continued to rise in value since 1968, nevertheless the 
percentage share of such exports has been falling since 1969 as a 
result of an increase in the percentage contribution from minerals. 
The exports of manufactures have always been a minute proportion of 
Nigeria's total exports. The percentage contribution of such exports 
remained almost constant between 1964 and 1968. Although the value 
of the exports of manufactures fell in 1967 and 1968 in response to 
the Nigerian civil war, nevertheless the manufacturing sector was 
able to maintain its percentage share in total exports as a result 
of the fall in the value of total exports for the two years. The 
sudden increase in the value of the exports of manufactures as reported 
by statistics in 1970 and 1971, which resulted in the percentage 
increase in the contribution to total exports, was due to the adoption 
of a new method of classifying exports. The exports of processed 
agricultural products which were previously classified as agricultural 
exports began to be classified as manufactures and semi-manufactures 
after 1969. If the old classification were to be adopted the total 
exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures for 1970 and 1971 would 
be approximately £9 million instead of the £55.5 million recorded 
in 
Table 1.8 for the two years. The changes in the method of classifica- 
tion also partly account for the fact that the share of agricultural 
exports has fallen so fast since 1969. 
The most rapid increase in the commodity sectors of 
Nigerian 
exports occurred in the exports of minerals and mineral products 
of 
which crude petroleum accounted for over 
90 per cent. The upward 
trend in the exports of minerals since 1964 was checked 
by the outbreak 
of the Nigerian civil war in 1967 which severely 
paralyzed the production 
and export of crude oil in 1967 and 
1968. When the oil companies 
resumed production in 1969, oil exports rose 
and have been rising very 
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rapidly since 1970 with the resumption of full production in the oil 
fields. 1 Figure 1.1 shows the movement in the three main commodity 
sectors of Nigerian exports. An increase in the percentage contribu- 
tion by mineral exports to total exports has been and will continue 
to be associated with a decrease in the percentage contribution of 
the agricultural exports to total exports and vice versa. 
NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS DISTRIBUTION 
A rapidly increasing level of investment accompanied by a steady 
growth in domestic production may seem to be an impressive performance 
by Nigeria, especially when the Development Decade of 1960-1970 envisaged 
a target growth rate of 5 per cent for the Gross National product of the 
less developed countries2 and Nigeria was able to achieve an average 
annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent during the period. However, when 
the annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent in the Nigerian Gross Domestic 
Product is compared with an estimated population growth rate of 
2.5 per cent per annum, it becomes very clear that the per capita 
income of Nigeria only grew at an annual average of 2 to 3 per cent. 
The per capita income of Nigeria is one of the lowest in the world, 
representing about 50 per cent of the average for the African continent 
and about 40 per cent of the average for the less developed countries. 
In 1958, the per capita income of Nigeria was only #49 and by 1966 it 
has only increased to/Y66 
3. 
bore 
will be said about the effect of the Nigerian civil war 
on the production and the export of crude oil in Chapter V. 
2C. 
Legum, "The First U. N. Development Decade and its Lessons 
for the 1970's", Praeger Publishers, New York, 1970. 
3Year Book of National Accounts Statistics, Vol. II9 1970, 
United Nations, New York, 1970. 
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Due to the controversy about the reliability of the 1963 census figures 
of Nigeria, no attempt has been made in recent years to estimate the 
per capita income of the country. Until such time when the results 
of the 1973 census will be available to throw light on the per capita 
income of Nigeria, it will suffice to say that the per capita income 
of the country is very low. 
If the per capita income of a country is very low, as in the case 
of Nigeria, and the national income is evenly distributed among the 
population, although there will still be poverty in the country, a 
large proportion of the population will be able to afford the basic 
necessities of life. The national income of Nigeria is, however, 
concentrated in a few hands. Although no attempt has been made to 
investigate the distribution of income in Nigeria, there are some 
isolated regional statistics on the distribution of income which could 
shed some light on income distribution in the country as a whole. 
Addressing the graduation ceremony of the University of Ife in Nigeria, 
the Chancellor of the University, Chief Obafemi Amolowo, observed that 
"in the Western State where the standard of living was among the highest, 
71 per cent of the people were within a 'nominal' income range of £1 - £50 
per annum in 1971, while 28 per cent were in the £51 - £100 range. And 
the position had not changed substantially since then". 
4 
The concentra- 
tion of the national income of Nigeria in a few hands has very serious 
implications for economic development. The rich in Nigeria have a 
conspicuous consumption habit for goods with a high import content. 
Many wealthy Nigerians lavish their money on very expensive cars, 
jewels, 
foreign travel and imported clothes, which leak the existing meagre 
development resources of the land to foreign countries. The problem 
4West Africa, October 22nd, 1973. 
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facing Nigeria therefore is not simply one of rapid development in 
order to increase the per capita income, but it is also one of 
equitable distribution of the national income associated with rapid 
economic development. 
THE NECESSITY FOR AND THE DETERMINANTS OF RAPID ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
It has been established in the previous paragraphs that the 
Nigerian economy is characterized by the concentration of employment 
in agriculture, heavy unemployment, a skewed distribution of income, 
meagre existence of the export of manufactured goods and low per capita 
income. All these characteristics are some of the main features of 
under-development. These features are compounded by the widespread 
existence of "poverty, ignorance and disease" which Chief Awolcwo said 
"are in evidence everywhere, more particularly in the rural areas"5. 
The enumerated features of the Nigerian society are enough to show why 
it is necessary for Nigeria to achieve rapid economic development, for, 
without making more goods and services available to those in want and 
creating more opportunities for those in search of jobs, Nigeria cannot 
have a stable society with happy and contented people. 
Many factors have frequently been mentioned as necessary for 
rapid economic development and they are often conveniently classified 
into quantitative and qualitative factors. The quantitative factors 
include increases in the factors of production - land, labour, and 
capital. The qualitative factors are simply the institutional 
framework for improving the efficiency of the factors of production 
and they include the traditional and attitudinal traits of the develop- 
ment planners and the people of the country seeking rapid economic 
5West Africa, October 22nd, 1973. 
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development and technological innovations. It should be added, 
however, that the classification of factors into quantitative and 
qualitative is by no means clear-cut, for in the processes of develop- 
ment the changes that do occur may blur the dividing line between the 
various factors. For instance, more capital for investments will 
no doubt require some qualitative improvements in savings habits and 
an increase in and better organization of savings institutions. 
Nigeria requires the various quantitative and qualitative factors 
mentioned for rapid economic development. Land is plentiful in Nigeria 
and in addition, Nigerian land is rich in mineral resources. 
6 
Some 
of these mineral resources have been and are being exploited to provide 
capital for investments. There is no doubt, however, that some of the 
mineral resources are not being fully utilized to the best advantage 
of the country and we are in this case referring to coal and the natural 
gas produced in conjunction with crude petroleum which is being flared 
in Nigerian oilfields. Only a small proportion of the Nigerian rich 
land is cultivated; the rest is allowed to remain fallow. In some 
cases where agricultural lands are intensively cultivated, the inability 
of farmers to apply manure due to ignorance and lack of capital 
necessarily reduces the productivity of such lands. In other cases 
where farmers have extensive margins of cultivation, lack of irrigation, 
and primitive energy-consuming hand tools, poor financial resources and 
bad land tenure systems also reduce the productivity of land. There is 
no doubt that if the constraints on the adequate utilization of Nigerian 
resources are removed, a more rapid economic development will result from 
increased and better utilization of land and mineral resources. 
6More 
will be said about the Nigerian mineral resources towards 
the end of the chapter. 
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An adequate supply of labour, especially skilled and managerial 
manpower, is an important pre-requisite for rapid economic growth. 
Population growth increases the supply of labour but management and 
technical education increases the supply of skilled and managerial 
manpower. The quality, efficiency and the adaptability of the labour 
force depends, among other things, on the level of education of the 
labour force. Education then becomes one of the most crucial factors 
for rapid economic development because not only does it upgrade the 
quality of labour, but it also enables the other factors of production, 
land and capital to be appropriately combined and utilized. Nigeria 
with a population of over 60 million should have very little problem 
in supplying the required labour force for rapid economic development. 
With the large-scale unemployment and the ineffectiveness of the trade 
union movement, labour costs are not a serious problem in Nigeria. 
It should be added, however, that it is neither the absolute population 
nor the total unemployed that matters but the skill and the competence 
of the labour force. Although Nigeria is still deficient in some 
types of technical and managerial manpower, in every sense, Nigeria 
has a well-educated labour force. There are over 1500 primary schools 
with an enrolment of over 3 million children; 350 teacher-training 
colleges with 32,000 students; 1300 secondary modern and secondary 
grammar schools with 280,000 students; six universities with nearly 
20,000 students and several technical and trade centres. In addition, 
there are over 12,000 Nigerian students in overseas institutions. 
Since political independence in 1960, Nigeria's annual educational 
budget as a percentage of total annual expenditure has been one of 
the highest in the world. Out of the public sector's capital 
expenditure of £536.5 million during the 1962-68 period, £45.6 million 
was expended on education.? This amount represented 8.5 per cent of 
7 
Second National Development Plan 1970-74, Ministry of Information, 
Lagos, 1970. 
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the public sector's capital expenditure during the period. The 
Nigerian government has also earmarked a sum of £139 million for 
education during the 1970-74 period. It should therefore not be 
surprising that there are several thousands of school and college 
leavers unemployed in the towns. The number of unemployed graduates 
and professional people has been increasing very rapidly in recent 
years. There is no doubt, therefore, that Nigeria has adequate man- 
power, necessary for rapid economic development. In addition, any 
foreign investor who may come to the country will not only find a 
pool of qualified unemployed to select from, but he will also be 
helping to reduce the present large-scale unemployment of Nigeria. 
Another requirement for rapid economic development in Nigeria is 
the availability of capital to carry out various agricultural and 
industrial projects in the country. The level of investment in an 
economy depends on the domestic resources which can be mobilized and 
the inflow of resources from foreign countries, whether in the form 
of aid or direct investments. Investment resources within an economy 
can be mobilized by voluntary savings, taxation and deficit financing. 
While it is true that there is usually an understatement of savings 
in under-developed countries because a lot of the savings of the 
peasants are not recorded, it must be conceded that the level of personal 
saving in Nigeria is very low. Although no attempt has been made to 
collect data on the various components of the Gross Domestic Savings 
in the past, a projected savings level for the economy during the 
Second National Development Plan period 1970-74 can throw some light 
on savings in Nigeria. 
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TABLE 1.9 
PROJECTED GROSS DOMESTIC SAVINGS (AT CURRENT PRICES) IN PERCENTAGES 
1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 TOTAL 
Personal Saving 14.4 11.0 8.5 7.2 9.3 
Excess of Wage Accruals 
over Disbursements 3.3 2.4 1.9 1.6 2.1 
Corporate Capital 
Reserves 42.9 38.4 34.5 29.4 34.5 
Government Surplus on 
Income and Product Account 25.4 37.3 44.9 52.8 43.8 
Internal Resources of 
Statutory Corporations 14.0 10.9 10.2 9.0 10.3 
TOTAL IN £N'I9ILLION 134.3 210.2 297.2 387.0 1028.7 
SOURCES SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1970-74, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1970. 
Table 1.9 shows the estimated domestic savings for the period 1970-74. 
During the plan period, personal savings will account for only 9.3 per cent 
of the total Gross Domestic Savings. Corporate ploughed-back profits 
will account for over one-third of the savings. The remaining items 
on the table, which represent public sector savings, will account for 
56.1 per cent of the total Gross Domestic Savings during the 1970-74 
plan period. The fact that the figures in Table 1.9 are mere estimates 
very much reduces their reliability. 
The level of voluntary saving is very low in Nigeria for two main 
reasons: (a) a low level of per capita income even if the national 
income is evenly distributed reduces the available resources for saving. 
In addition the inadequacy of savings institutions, especially in the 
rural areas, reduces the gathering of the resources of rural savers. 
The commercial banks are the most important savings institutions in 
Nigeria. They account for over 90 per cent of the total personal savings 
in the country. Their savings activities are limited because 
(a) there 
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are only 300 commercial banking branches serving the whole of Nigeria, 
and (b) because all the 300 branches are located in the towns, there 
is a complete lack of relationship between rural financial resources 
and investment for developmental purposes; and (b) the concentration 
of the national income in the hands of few Nigerians who have a high 
conspicuous consumption preference for foreign goods often reduces the 
amount of domestic savings. These factors explain why the bulk of 
Nigerian savings are accounted for by the public sector and corporate 
firms. In addition, when the resources available for the government's 
investment projects are inadequate, there is always a resort to credit 
creation or deficit financing. However, there is a limit to the use 
of credit creation if the accompanying inflation is not to get out of 
hand. As a consequence, the Nigerian government, while making use of 
the credit creation facilities has nevertheless been very active in 
seeking foreign resources to augment domestic investible resources. 
During the 1970-74 Plan period, out of an estimated gross fixed domestic 
investment of £1596 million, the Nigerian government hopes for a net 
private foreign capital inflow of £495 million which is nearly one-third 
of the estimate. The level of investment in the Nigerian economy 
and also the pace of economic development will not only be determined 
by the mobilized level of domestic investible resources, but also 
by 
the level of the inflow of foreign capital. 
Three important qualitative factors are necessary for rapid 
economic development in Nigeria and they are 
(a) changes in attitude; 
(b) improvements in and extension of knowledge and technology; and 
(c) 
improvements in institutions and in social and economic organization. 
The attitudinal traits of many Nigerians, especially 
in high places, 
are not conducive to rapid economic 
development. A large majority 
of Nigerian businessmen are 
interested in quick profits and so opt 
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for speculative investments such as urban development. A large number 
are also engaged in import and export businesses, distribution, haulage 
and agency businesses. The ploughing-back of profits and the ability 
and willingness to take risks are qualities lacking in Nigerian business- 
men. These character traits should not surprise anyone who knows that 
some Nigerian leaders are wasteful and at times corrupt. If the leaders 
cannot put up with a temporary state of deprivations and austerity, it 
is difficult to see how an ordinary man in the street can be convinced 
to economize. As Peter Clark observed during his involvement with 
the Nigerian First National Development Plan, "Nigerian politicians 
want economic development, but the consolidation of their political 
position receives first priority. ..... Most Nigerian leaders were 
position-oriented, not achievement-oriented, desiring status, authority 
and personal aggrandizement". 
8 
Until such time when there is a change 
of attitude on the part of Nigerians, especially the businessmen and 
the national leaders, the resources of the country cannot be fully 
mobilized for rapid economic development. 
Improvements in and extension of knowledge and technology have 
been emphasized by many writers, especially B. R. Williams9 as an 
important agent of rapid economic development. Improvements in existing 
techniques and the introduction of new technology can lead to an improve- 
ment in the methods of production, in products and in the introduction 
of new products which may gain access to the international market. 
An increase in the demand for goods arising out of technical progress 
and the infusion of new technologies can lead to increased investment 
and the adoption of labour-saving and capital-saving techniques which 
8P. B. Clark, Economic Planning for a Country in Transition: 
Nigeria, in Planning Economic Development, by E. E. Hagen, Richard Irwin, 
Homewood, Illinois, 1963, p. p. 263-264. 
9B. 
R. Williams, Technology, Investment and Growth, Chapman, London, 
1967. 
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in turn can result in rapid economic development. Technical innovations 
and new technologies do not originate from a vacuum; they are the end 
result of systematic research and development carried out by corporations 
and government institutions. Nigeria performs very little research 
and development and as a consequence, it has to rely on the import of 
foreign technologies to upgrade its backward economy. 
10 
Many institutions require improvements if Nigeria is to achieve 
rapid economic development. The savings institutions are too few and 
are badly organized. The post offices are few and are grossly inefficient. 
The telephone system is chaotic. Water supply, electricity and health 
facilities are inadequate. In addition, government departments which 
deal with many aspects of development are badly organized, with the 
result that unnecessary delays have frustrated many investors, both 
foreign and indigenous. 
The attitudes of the trade unions may have a favourable or an 
unfavourable effect on economic development. Trade unionism is in 
its infancy in Nigeria and as a result of the rivalry among the existing 
unions, they are badly organized and lack unity, with the result that 
they cannot provide a united front against employers. In addition, 
government legislation and decrees exist to limit their power. 
As an 
example, strikes by trade unions are forbidden. 
In sum, the need for rapid economic development in Nigeria cannot 
be over-emphasized, since the country is still relatively 
backward and 
the standard of living of the people is very low. 
Many factors are 
necessary for rapid economic development 
in Nigeria and these include 
land and its resources in the form of mineral 
deposits, an increasing 
10More 
will be said about R&D activities 
in Nigeria and the 
transfer of modern technology to the country 
in Chapter VI. 
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supply of skilled and management personnel, a high level of investments 
in appropriate projects, a good educational system tailored to meet the 
needs of the country, a change in attitudes and improvements in the 
social and economic institutions, adequate infrastructure, technical 
innovations and new and adapted technology. Some of the factors listed 
as necessary for rapid economic development cannot be adequately provided 
by Nigeria alone. Such factors include capital for investments, 
technical and managerial personnel, and new and adapted technology. 
This being so, one of the most important methods of making up the 
deficiencies in the domestic developmental resources is through direct 
investments. Direct investments will only take place if investors 
are convinced they can at least earn as much profit abroad as in their 
domestic economies. In order to attract foreign investors, many 
countries have offered incentives to prospective investors. In 
addition, some countries have some natural advantages which can act 
as incentives to foreign investors. Nigeria has been lucky enough 
to have some of these natural incentives. 
THE NATURAL INDUCEMENTS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
There are two types of inducements for private investors in Nigeria. 
The first type, which will be discussed at a later part of the thesis, 
consists of planned incentives calculated to bring private investments 
to Nigeria. Among such incentives are government policies favourable 
to private investment, tax holidays, pioneer industry certificates 
and industrial estates. The second type of inducements with which 
this section is concerned is those natural aspects of the Nigerian 
society which are not designed specifically to attract foreign 
investors but do act as incentives. Important among these are the 
natural resources of Nigeria, the available infrastructure and 
the 
extent of the Nigerian market. 
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NATURAL RESOURCES 
Nigeria is potentially rich in mineral resources. The confidence 
which Western European countries have in Nigeria is based on the exist- 
ence of large-scale untapped mineral resources. Among the known mineral 
resources of Nigeria are petroleum oil, limestone, coal, tin, gold, 
columbite, silver, lead-zinc, gypsum, glass sands, clays, asbestos, 
graphite, iron ore, stone, zircon and gas. While the deposits of 
some of these minerals have been fairly accurately determined, further 
surveys are necessary to locate and assess the reserves of others. 
Table 1.10 shows the recent production of minerals in Nigeria. The 
growing importance of petroleum as the cornerstone of the Nigerian 
economy is demonstrated by the rapid growth in the production of crude 
oil. 
TABLE 1.10 
MINERAL PRODUCTION 1960-1970 (IN TONS UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED) 
DATE CASSITERITE 
COLUMBIT 
LIMESTONE 
CLAY 
TIN 
METAL 
COAL CRUDE OIL 
(BARRELS) 
GOLD 
(OZS) 
MARBLE 
1960 10374 2048 24101 - - 561961 6367187 994 - 
1961 10513 2346 589559 4977 622 597364 16802016 679 - 
1962 11043 2260 710786 3086 7663 617785 24623691 411 - 
1963 11789 2011 804426 866 9050 582984 27913476 315 - 
1964 11788 2339 980685 - 8749 688206 43996898 244 1669 
1965 12885 2548 1291587 - 9339 730092 1DO065294 79 1120 
1966 12566 2221 1097992 - 9155 630126 152427535 50 1400 
1967 12260 1924 833940 321 9104 94563 116461625 39 595 
1968 13025 1135 647445 - 9783 - 51732410 214 145 
1969 12631 1491 679951 - 8741 19527 197204339 298 1150 
1970 10585 1590 677524 - 7940 59986 
1, '95835825 124 1801 
SOURCES: 1. FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, LAGOS; 
2. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF MINES AND POWER, LAGOS. 
Petroleum exports now account for nearly 80 per cent of Nigeria's exports 
and remain the largest single earner of foreign exchange. In 1969 
Nigeria ranked as the 13th largest oil producer in the world and the 
third in Africa but, by the first quarter of 1970 when petroleum production 
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hit the 1 million barrels per day level, Nigeria had become tenth 
among the world petroleum producers and second in Africa. The 
Nigerian workable coal reserve is estimated as 340 million tons 
while lignite has an estimated reserve of 70 million tons. The 
estimated reserve of columbite stands at over 53,000 million tons while 
that of cassiterite is 135,000 million tons, and iron ore 46 million 
tons. Nigeria is the world's largest producer of columbite. The 
existence of these mineral resources has given rise to certain industries 
in which foreign investors, especially British investors, are engaged. 
Limestone deposits have given rise to cement factories at Ewekoro, Nkalagu 
and Calabar. Tin smelting and other associated activities have been 
concentrated in dos plateau - the main area of the deposits. Nigeria 
is a member of the International Tin Council. The large deposits of 
crude oil in the Southern part of Nigeria have led to the construction 
of a ¬10.5 million refinery at Elesa-Eleme opened at Port Harcourt 
in 1965. The construction of an iron and steel complex planned during 
the Second National Development Plan 1970-74 period is based on the 
existence of large deposits of iron ore and coal. Nigerian mineral 
resources have induced foreign investors to come to Nigeria in two 
ways. The first way is that significant raw materials have been 
provided for the establishment and expansion of local industries 
in which foreign investors are interested and examples include cement, 
engineering and petroleum industries. The second way 
is the foreign 
exchange resource associated with the exports of some of 
the mineral 
resources which have enabled the Nigerian government 
to relax some 
of the exchange regulations restricting the repatriation of profits 
to the benefit of foreign investors. 
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INFRASTRUCTURE 
Perhaps more than in any other field since independence, Nigeria 
has made very rapid progress in transport and communications. As 
one writer has put it, "Generally speaking, Nigeria's transportation 
facilities, communications media, and electricity supply may be con- 
sidered to be some of the brightest constituents of her economy". 
11 
Nigeria has over 55,300 miles of roads throughout the Federation, out 
of which 9,500 miles are asphalted. These roads connect not only 
the main towns of the Federation to each other, but they also run 
from the towns to the rural areas. It must be added, however, that 
many of the roads leading to the rural areas are neither tarred nor 
repaired. During the Nigerian civil war, many roads and bridges 
were damaged. The Nigerian government has, however, planned to 
spend a total of £32.8 million on road rehabilitation during the 
1970-74 period and the road programme of the states will cost 
£72.4 million during the same period. One important defect of the 
Nigerian roads is that many of the bridges and culverts on them are 
narrow and badly constructed. The Federation of British Industries 
has drawn the attention of the Nigerian government to the "obvious 
urgency of a programme of revision of sub-standard bridges and culverts 
on the roads. The international standard is a loading of 8 tons per 
axle, but although much progress has been made there are still many 
on main roads which are limited to 4-ton loads". 
12 
"Efficient postal and telecommunications systems, " we are told, 
"are indispensable factors in the promotion of rapid economic growth. 
11 
Alan Sokolski, The Establishment of Manufacturing in Nigeria, 
Frederick Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 272. 
12Federation 
of British Industries, Nigeria: An Industrial 
Reconnaissance, London, Feb. 1961. 
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This is particularly true in developing countries where good transport 
and communications facilities act as incentives to commercial and 
industrial investors". 13 In spite of the above understanding of the 
value of efficient postal and telecommunications systems, Nigerian 
postal and telephone services are grossly inadequate and inefficient. 
However, efforts are being made to improve and expand the services and 
an expenditure of ¬42.6 million has been planned during the 1970-74 
period to build more post offices, improve radio-telephone-telegraph 
links between states capitals and Lagos, and between Nigeria and the 
rest of the world. An earth satellite station of an estimated cost 
of £3.4 million is under construction at Lanlate. When all these 
programmes have been completed, Nigeria will have an efficient communica- 
tion system. 
Nigeria has over 2,280 miles of railway lines running from the 
West to the North, and from the East to the North. Extensions of the 
existing lines to connect other strategic commercial towns are under 
way. The repairing of the lines damaged during the civil war, along 
with other specific development projects, is estimated to be costing 
£21.8 million during the Second National Development Plan period of 
1970-74. 
The Nigerian Airways also provide air transport both on national 
and international routes. All the major cities in the Federation are 
linked by air routes. Work is already in progress for the extension 
of many runways in various airports within the country and an estimated 
expenditure of £25.6 million has been planned for 
the period 1970-74 
to widen the scope of the Nigeria Airways. 
13Transport 
and Communications: Building the New Nigeria, 
Nigerian National Press, Apapa, (No date) p. 19. 
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The Nigerian National Shipping Line and other private companies 
provide shipping services between Nigeria and other parts of the world. 
The possibility of making Nigerian rivers play an increased role in 
the nation's transport system is under study. The scopesof the 
Nigerian major ports in Apapa, Port Harcourt, Warri and Calabar are 
being widened. 
Electricity and water taps, although available in the main towns 
and some rural areas, are not adequate for Nigeria's needs. Large 
sums of money, £45.3 million for electricity, £53.8 million for health 
and £51.7 million for water, have been ear-marked for increasing the 
supply of water and electricity, and for widening health services 
throughout the Federation during the 1970-74 period. Efforts are 
also being made to build more hospitals and to train more doctors in 
Nigerian and overseas institutions. In sum, there is no doubt that 
Nigeria has one of the most modern and best developed transport and 
communications systems in Africa. Road, rail and air routes traversing 
the whole length and breadth of the country link agricultural, industrial 
and commercial centres. "For an under-developed country, Nigeria is 
relatively well advanced in the provision of a comprehensive and 
partially integrated infrastructure". 
14 
I 
THE SIZE OF THE NIGERIAN MARKET 
A country with a population of over 60 million people will, on 
the face of it, at least be expected to provide a steady market for 
the sale of many goods and services. It is, however, not 
the size 
of the population that matters, but the purchasing power of 
the 
population. There are three important limitations 
to the size of 
14 
A. Sokolski, Ibid., p. 273. 
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the Nigerian market: (a) the per capita income in Nigeria, as shown 
earlier, is one of the lowest in the world and in Africa; (b) there 
is the concentration of the national income in few hands, with a prefer- 
ence for goods with high import content and (c) - perhaps the most serious 
limitation - is the preference of a large number of Nigerians for goods 
manufactured abroad. In an interview, an official of the UAC Group 
of Companies drew the attention of the writer to the problem such prefer- 
ences create for their expansion programmes in Nigeria. Added to the 
limitations mentioned above was the unhealthy regional rivalry which 
has contributed to the fragmentation of the Nigerian market by the 
frequent establishment of production units in each region when the 
country as a whole cannot even adequately support one unit. Despite 
these limitations, it must be conceded that the size of the Nigerian 
market along with a steady rise in incomes is one of the brightest 
features of Nigeria. For some commodities, the Nigerian market may 
be small, but for a large number of products, it is not only adequate, 
but many British firms are finding it difficult to meet its ever-growing 
demand. 
INVESTMENT AGENCIES 
One of the brightest features of Nigeria is the existence of a 
large number of institutions ready and willing to give financial 
assistance to investors. The establishment of development institutions 
in Nigeria dated back to 1946, when the Nigerian Local Development 
Board, designed to grant loans to local governments, government 
departments as well as private organisations for building infrastructure 
and stimulating industrial production, came into being. The Local 
Development Board was wound up in 1949 only to be replaced by four 
locally oriented boards called Regional Development Boards, one 
for 
each of the three Regions and the other for Lagos. 
The Regional 
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Development Boards later became the Development Corporations with one 
in each of the Eastern, Mid-Western, Northern and Western Regions of 
Nigeria. After the division of Nigeria into twelve States in 1967, many 
of the newly-created States have established their own Development 
Corporations. The functions of the Development Corporations can be 
summed up as: 
"(a) The undertaking of those projects for which individual 
initiative and private capital are not forthcoming, i. e., 
to be complementary to, and not competitive with, private 
enterprise; 
(b) The undertaking of those types of enterprises for which 
the minimum economic unit and so the capital requirements 
are 1aiige; 
C The attraction, as far as possible, of outside capital to 
these enterprises subject to adequate safeguards". 
15 
Since the inception of the Development Corporations, many of them have 
invested directly either individually or in partnership with foreign 
and/or indigenous investors in agricultural and industrial projects. 
British companies which have entered into partnership with the 
Development Corporations include Vono Ltd., the U. A. C., Crittall Hope, 
Asbestos Cement Products Ltd., Tate & Lyle, Bookers Brothers, 
John Holt Ltd., British Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers, 
and many others. 
In addition to the Development Corporations, the Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank (NIDB) was established on January 22nd, 1964, by a 
consortium of international financial and investment institutions 
and the Nigerian government to provide medium and long-term finance 
to enterprises owned and managed by the private sector. NIDB is also 
15Western Region Production Development Board, Annual Report, 
1955-56, p. p. 7-8. 
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prepared to assist clients to obtain the necessary advice in carrying 
out the feasibility studies and financial planning which have to pre- 
cede actual investment. At the end of 1972, over £16 million have 
been invested in indigenous and foreign companies operating in manu- 
facturing, mining, agro-allied industries, hotel businesses and tourism. 
16 
There is also the Revolving Loans Fund created by the Revolving Loans 
Fund for Industry Act, 1959, for providing loans to assist in the 
establishment, expansion or modernisation of industrial enterprises 
within the Federation of Nigeria. The initial capital of the fund, 
£200,000, was given to Nigeria by the United States as aid. The Fund 
is administered by the Federal Ministry of Commerce and Industry to 
make loans varying from £10,000 to £50,000 to incorporated companies 
preferably with Nigerian participation. At the end of 1962, three 
foreign companies with Nigerian participation have so far been granted 
loans. 
The Commonwealth Development Corporation also operates in Nigeria 
to provide funds to public and private agencies involved in the agri- 
cultural and industrial development of the country. 
17 
In addition to 
holding shares in and granting loans to companies, the C. D. C. also 
invests in a large number of companies through its subsidiaries - the 
Development Finance Co., Ltd., and the Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd., 
which were joint ventures between the former Eastern Nigerian Government 
and the former Northern Nigerian Government respectively. At the end 
of 1972, the C. D. C. has invested over £11 million in Nigeria. 
The last of the investment agencies to be considered is the 
International Finance Corporation (I. F. C. ), a member of the World Bank 
Group established in 1956 "to further economic development 
by encouraging 
16N. I. D. B., Annual Report, 1972, Lagos. 
17More 
will be said about the activities of the Corporation 
in 
Chapters III and IV. 
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the growth of productive private enterprise in member countries, 
particularly in the less developed areas, thus supplementing the 
activities of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development". 
18 
Since its inception in 1956, the I. F. C. has invested in four projects 
in Nigeria in partnership with British and Japanese private investors, 
the C. D. C. and the Nigerian Federal and States Governments. At the end 
of 1973, the I. F. C. had invested over $4 million in Nigeria. 
The existence of the investment agencies has not only attracted 
many foreign investors to Nigeria through the risk capital, technical 
and management services provided, but the activities of the agencies 
and their foreign partners have also helped to accelerate the growth 
of industrial and agricultural development in Nigeria. 
CONCLUSION 
Nigeria provides a classical example of a land of want and plenty. 
Nigeria is an agricultural society and the agricultural sector employs 
70 per cent of the working population, provides over 50 per cent of 
the export earnings and contributes over half of the GDP. In recent 
years, the depressed state of the Nigerian agriculture has highlighted 
the under-developed nature of the Nigerian economy. A large majority 
of Nigerians are poor, underfed and disease-stricken. Heavy employment 
and meagre wage employment are two additional features of the Nigerian 
economy. Yet, the country is rich in human and natural resources which 
are not only under-utilized but are also misutilized. If Nigeria is 
to utilize its human and natural resources appropriately and fully, 
there is an urgent need for rapid economic development. Certain factors 
are necessary for rapid economic development in Nigeria and they include 
18I. F. C., Article One, Articles of Agreement, reproduced in 
I. F. C. Annual Report, 1973. 
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land and its resources, a healthy and skilled labour force, an 
availability of financial investment resources, adequate infrastructure, 
changes in attitudes and traditional institutions, and improvements 
in and extension of knowledge and technology. While the majority 
of the factors listed above can be provided by a rigorous mobilization 
of domestic resources, external resources are required to make up the 
deficiency in the supply of some factors. Not only will modern 
technologies accompany the inflow of external resources to Nigeria, 
such resources may also provide a useful cushion to alleviate the 
foreign exchange bottleneck which has acted as a strait-jacket on 
economic development in many less developed countries. Whether or 
not these advantages have accompanied British direct investments to 
Nigeria will be found out in the remaining part of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE [MAGNITUDE AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT 
IN NIGERIA 
This chapter is concerned with the significance of U. K. direct 
investment in the Nigerian economy. Attention will be focussed on 
the level and proportion of total investment accounted for by Britain, 
the sectoral distribution of such investments and the motivation to 
invest in Nigeria of British companies. In addition, an attempt will 
be made to show that the inflow of British capital to Nigeria was 
closely related to the pattern of trade between Nigeria and Britain 
by investigating the level of British investment in distribution. 
THE MAGNITUDE OF INVESTMENT 
Among the things which can be associated with British rule in 
Nigeria, apart from the inherited political democracy, is the existence 
of British capital in Nigeria. British capital in Nigeria is as old 
as British rule itself. Nigeria is the most important absorber of 
British capital in Black Africa and is only surpassed by South Africa 
in the whole of Africa. The Table 2.1 following shows the book values 
of the cumulative private investment of the U. K. compared with the total 
foreign investment in Nigeria. Cumulative investment is the overall 
total of investment to-date. The first point to note in Table 2.1 
is the rapid growth in U. K. investment in Nigeria since 1960. Between 
1960 and 1968, U. K. investment in Nigeria grew at an annual compound 
rate of 10 per cent. Total foreign investment, on the other hand, 
grew at an annual compound rate of 14 per cent over the same period. 
The breakdown of U. K. total investment into paid-up capital and reserves 
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TABLE 2.1 
BOOK VALUES OF CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT OF THE U. K. AND 
TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA (NL'rILLION) 
THE BREAKDOWN OF U. K. INVESTMENT 
TOTAL 
FOREIGN PAID-UP TOTAL PERCENTAGE 
INVESTMENT CAPITAL OTHER U. K. OF TOTAL 
YEAR IN NIGERIA AND RESERVE LIABILITIES INVESTMENT INVESTMENT 
1960 179.9 - - 120.9 67.2 
1961 203.2 - - 134.7 66.3 
1962 220.9 47.8 87.8 135.6 61.4 
1963 258.8 65.2 87.4 152.6 59.0 
1964 321.8 82.2 98.4 180.6 56.1 
196.5 377.0 112.2 89.4 201.6 53.5 
1966 426.4 141.2 86.0 227.2 53.3 
1967 474.0. 164.4 76.4 240.8 50.8 
1968 510.7 192.9 68.3 261.2 51.1 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, 1965-1971. 
and other liabilities reveals that the other liabilities accounted for 
more than half of the total investment between 1962 and 1964. Other 
liabilities are companies' indebtedness to their head offices and other 
foreign institutional moneylenders. Since 1965 paid-up capital and 
reserves have been growing very fast and by 1968 they represented 
73 per cent of U. K. total investment in Nigeria. The rapid increase 
in the paid-up capital and reserves component of the U. K. investment 
and the fall in other liabilities were due to (a) the run-down of 
companies' indebtedness to their head offices. Between 1965 and 1967, 
nearly £30 million were paid by British companies operating in Nigeria 
to their head offices in the U. K. And (b) as companies ploughed 
back their profits as a result of government economic policies pro- 
hibiting repatriation during the Nigerian crisis, retained earnings 
increased the paid-up capital and reserves. Another point worth 
noting is that, although total U. K. investment 
in Nigeria has been 
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increasing from year to year since 1960, the percentage share of U. K. 
investment in total foreign investment has, however, been declining. 
The main reason for this is the granting of exploration rights to oil 
companies from the United States, France, Holland and Italy which 
were formerly monopolized by the Shell B. P. Group. The exploration 
activities of the oil companies from these countries have swollen the 
inflow of capital to Nigeria from the countries as Table 2.2 below 
will show. 
TABLE 2.2 
CHANGES IN CUMULATIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY ORIGIN 1962-68 (L1ILLION) 
COUNTRY/ 1962 1968 
PER- 
CENTAGE 
REGION PER- PER- INCREASE INCREASE 
OF ORIGIN NEMILLION CENTAGE NLIILLION CENTAGE 1962-68 1962-68 
United Kingdom 135.6 61.4 261.2 51.1 125.6 92.6 
United States 19.4 8.7 103.5 20.3 84.1 433.5 
Western Europe 46.8 21.2 110.5 21.6 63.7 136.1 
Others 19.1 8.7 35.5 6.9 16.4 85.8 
SOURCE: CALCULATED FROM: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
REVIEW, 1965-1971. 
Table 2.2 shows changes in cumulative investment between 1962 and 1968. 
Although the U. K. was the most important investor in Nigeria in 1968, 
her percentage increase in investment was the second lowest over the 
1962-1968 period. The United States, on the other hand, increased 
its total investment four-fold between 1962 and 1968. The annual 
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compound growth rates for the period 1962-1968 are as follows: 
20 
United Kingdom 11.6 per cent 
United States 32.2 per cent 
Western Europe 15.4 per cent 
Others 10.7 per cent 
Total 15.0 per cent 
The growth rate figures show that the U. K. achieved the second lowest 
annual growth in total investment over the 1962 to 1968 period in Nigeria. 
Another important point to note is the difference in the growth rates of 
U. K. investment during the 1960-1968 period and 1962-1968 period. While 
U. K. investment grew at an annual compound rate of 10 per cent during 
the 1960-68 period, a higher annual compound growth rate of 11.6 per cent 
was achieved during the 1962-1968 period. This means that U. K. invest- 
ment grew more rapidly between 1962 and 1968 than between 1960 and 1962. S 
The main explanation =, f or the slow growth of U. K. investment in Nigeria 
between 1960 and 1962 was the uncertainty created by Nigeria's independence 
in October 1960 among U. K. investors. Faced with a new Nigerian govern- 
ment which was likely to remove some of the political advantages enjoyed 
under the British colonial government, there was a run-down of head office 
liabilities by British companies which led to an outflow of over £7 million 
20Annual 
compound growth rates are calculated by using end point 
ratios, 
(1 + ý) _ (It/A) 1 ..... 
(1) 
100 t 
where 1t is the value at the end of period 
t 
A is the initial value 
t is the time period. 
It follows from equation (1) that Log (1 +r)= Log 
(It/A). 1 
100 t 
which equals 1 (Log 4t - Log A). Therefore 
t 
r= antilog (1(Log 
'ft 
- log A) )-1. 
100 (t ) 
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in 1962. The impact of oil investments on the United States' invest- 
ment in Nigeria is clearly reflected in the highest growth rate achieved 
by the country during the 1962-1968 period. The discovery of oil in 
Nigeria encouraged more oil companies to seek exploration licences from 
a post-independence Nigerian government which was prepared to grant 
licences to new oil companies in order to break the monopoly of Shell-BP. 
When Nigeria obtained political independence in 1960, there were only 
two oil companies operating in the country. At the end of 1968 there 
were nine oil companies operating in Nigeria, out of which five were 
American major oil companies. The rapidly increasing investments of 
the American oil companies and the fact that the United States started 
with a low base figure in 1962 resulted in a very high growth rate of 
the United States' investment in Nigeria between 1962 and 1968. The 
growth in the investments of Western Europe in Nigeria during the 
1962-1968 period was due to the investment activities of the Italian, 
French and Dutch oil companies. The rapid increase in oil investments 
undertaken by American and Western European oil companies provides the 
explanation for the rapid growth in the total volume of investment in 
Nigeria and the changes in the sources of foreign investment. 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT 
The sectoral distribution of U. K. investment in Nigeria is not 
available in the Central Bank of Nigeria's publications. However, the 
Board of Trade provides information on the extent of U. K. investment 
in agriculture, commerce and industry, and others. The reconciliation 
of the Board of Trade figures and the Central Bank of Nigeria's figures 
gives a broad sectoral breakdown of U. K. investment in Nigeria, as 
Table 2.3 shows. The first point to note is the slow growth of U. K. 
investment in the Nigerian economy excluding the petroleum industry, 
banking and insurance investments. There was a year-to-year fall 
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TABLE 2.3 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF CUMULATIVE INVEST11ENT (LrILLION) 
COMMERCE, INDUSTRY 
AND AGRICULTURE AND 
OTHERS 
PETROLEUM INVESTMENT, 
BANKING AND INSURANCE 
TOTAL 
PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE 
Year £MILLION OF TOTAL LMILLION OF TOTAL NL MILLION 
1962 92.8 68.4 42.8 31.6 135.6 
1963 97.8 64.1 54.8 35.9 152.6 
1964 90.4 50.1 90.2 49.9 180.6 
1965 94.7 47.0 106.9 53.0 201.6 
1966 91.2 40.1 136.0 59.9 227.2 
1967 95.0 39.5 145.8 60.5 240.8 
1968 80.7 a 30.1 180.5 69.1 261.2 
SOURCES: 1. BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL, September 23,1970. 
2. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
REVIEW 1968-1971. 
NOTE: a: The Board of Trade figure of £93.6 million (sterling) 
was converted into Nigerian pounds to take into account 
the devaluation of the pound in 1967. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria's exchange rate in 1968 was NL1 = £1.16 (sterling). 
in the percentage proportion of the total U. K. investment in other 
sectors of the Nigerian economy excluding petroleum, banking and 
insurance investments due to a rapid increase in the total U. K. invest- 
ment brought about by increased petroleum investments. Of the total 
U. K. investment in the petroleum industry, banking and insurance, 
petroleum investments accounted for over 95 per cent. Between 1962 
and 1968, petroleum investments increased more than four-fold and at 
the end of 1968, petroleum investments accounted for over 65 per cent 
of the total U. K. direct investment in Nigeria. 
21 
21More 
will be said about U. K. investment in the petroleum 
industry in Chapter V. 
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While it is true that a large proportion of U. K. investment is con- 
centrated in the petroleum industry, it must be emphasized that British 
investment in Nigeria is more diversified throughout the Nigerian 
economy than investments from other foreign sources. 
NET U. K. DIRECT INVESTMENTS 
We have seen in the previous sections that the U. K. is the major 
investor in Nigeria and that since 1962 her proportion of the total 
investment has been falling steadily. What is being attempted here 
is to find out whether the U. K. increased her net investment at the 
same rate as the total net. foreign investment was increasing. 
Table 2.4 shows the net capital inflow from the U. K. to Nigeria 
compared with the total net foreign capital inflow 
TABLE 2.4 
0 
NET FLOW OF U. K. AND TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT 1961-68 (. MILLION) 
DATE TOTAL NET INFLOW U. K. NET INFLOW 
U. K. NET INFLOW AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL 
1961 27.3 13.8 50.4 
1962 17.7 2.9 16.4 
1963 37.9 17.0 44.9 
1964 63.0 28.0 44.4 
1965 55.2 21.0 38.0 
1966 49.4 25.6 51.0 
1967 47.6 13.6 28.0 
1968 36.7 20.4 55.0 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, 
1968-1971. 
Net capital inflow is the total capital inflow minus repatriated profits, 
dividends, interest and other capital transfer. The first point to 
note is that net capital inflow from the U. K. accounted 
for over half 
of the total net capital inflow to Nigeria in only three years of 
the 
eight years under consideration. U. K. net capital 
inflow reached its 
lowest level ever in 1962 when about L3 million was invested and the 
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reasons for this were (a) the repatriation of profits by companies 
operating in commerce and industry and (b) the settlement of inter- 
company liabilities. The fact that there was a net capital inflow 
from the U. K. in 1962 was due to the retained earnings of Shell-BP 
which were meant for the expansion of the company's activities in 
the petroleum industry. Total net capital inflow from all sources 
and from the U. K. increased to reach its highest level in 1964. Several 
reasons explain the high level of total net capital inflow from all 
sources and from the U. K. in 1964 and these are (a) the inclusion of 
banking and insurance inflows in the 1964 Survey which were never 
included in the previous surveys added £10.4 million to the total capital 
inflow to Nigeria during the year; (b) the establishment of the Nigerian 
Industrial Development Bank Ltd. in 1964 attracted substantial capital 
from foreign financial institutions and companies who contributed part 
of its initial capital, (c) about 25 per cent of registered companies 
in 1963 which were in their pre-production planning stage started full 
production in 1964 and so brought in substantial capital for their 
operations and (d) the successful oil exploration efforts in 1964, 
apart from leading to an expansion in the operations of existing 
oil companies, also attracted additional new companies to Nigeria. 
The total net capital inflow continued to fall after 1964 in response 
to the uncertainties associated with the political disturbances in the 
country. In 1967, the net capital inflow from the U. K. reached its 
lpwest level since 1963 due to the fact that British companies in the 
war-affected areas had, to a large extent, ceased operations. The 
recovery of net capital inflow from the U. K. in 1968 was due to the 
increase in liabilities to head office and trade and suppliers' credit. 
Of the total net capital inflow to Nigeria during the 1961-68 period, 
which amounted to nearly £335 million, the U. K. was responsible 
for 
42 per cent. The fact that the U. K. still accounted 
for over half 
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of the total foreign investment in Nigeria in 1968 despite the slow 
growth of her net capital inflow was due to the U. K. 's substantial 
investment in Nigeria before 1961. 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF U. K. NET INVESTMENT 
The Board of Trade frequently publishes the net flow of U. K. 
investment to different parts of the world. Table 2.5 shows the net 
flow of U. K. investment to Nigeria excluding that of the oil companies. 
The first point to note is that in three out of the eight years under 
TABLE 2.5 
U. K. NET INVESTMENT FLOWS TO NIGERIA 1963-1970 (LMILLION) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
7 -5 7 -1 -3 3 24 23 
SOURCE: BOARD OF TRADE JOURNALS, April 8,1970 and March 23,1972. 
consideration, there was a disinvestment by the U. K. in sectors other 
than oil exploration. The disinvestmentsof 1964,1966 and 1967 were 
due to (a) the run-down of inter-company indebtedness and (b) the desire 
of subsidiary companies to build up their credit positions with their 
head offices. The enormous capital required to repair the war damages 
and the ensuing boom which began at the end of the war in January 
1970 
led to a record inflow of capital to Nigeria from the U. K. in 
1969 and 
1970. Excluding 1969 and 1970, the annual average U. K. net invest- 
ment flow to Nigeria was X1.3 million which cannot 
be said to be very 
substantial. 
We have seen from the previous section that the U. K. net 
invest- 
ment, excluding that of the oil companies, was very small 
indeed, 
especially during the 1963-68 period. 
What remains to be investigated 
is the sectoral distribution of the meagre net 
investment. Table 2.6 
shows the sectoral distribution of 
U. K. net investment in Nigeria 
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excluding the oil companies. 0 
TABLE 2.6 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF U. K. NET INVESTr1ENT IN NIGERIA (¬1ILLION) 
SECTOR 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Agriculture it +ý ) ) of 
Mining -0.2 -0.1) -0.6) -0.6 -0.2 Electrical & Mechanical Engineerin " - - -0.2 -0.2 
Vehicles & Shipbuilding - - - - - 
Other Manufacturing Industries 3.4 0.3 1.9 2.4 0.7 
Construction 0.6 -0.2 0.6 0.5 -0.8 
Distribution 0.1 -4.9 3.2 -3.4 -3.9 
Transport & Communications 0.8 -1.0) ) -0.3 
Shipping " 0.1 -1.1 
Other Activities (incl. Banking and 
Insurance 2.4 2.1 2.2 -0.1 2.5 
TOTAL 6.6 -4.8 7.4 -1.2 -2.5 
SOURCES: 1. BOARD OF TRADE JOURNALS, 19.7.68 and 9.5.69. 
2. SUPPLIED BY THE BOARD OF TRADE, STATISTICS SECTION, LONDON. 
NOTE: " means 'not available'. 
The first point to note is that the differences between the figures in 
Table 2.5 'and the total in Table 2.6 are due to the rounding-off of 
figures in Table 2.5. The second point to note is that net capital 
inflow from the U. K. during the 1963-67 period was absorbed by three 
sectors only and these were: other activities, of which banking and 
insurance are the most important, other manufacturing activities, and 
construction. The highest level of disinvestment occurred 
in distribution 
where the run-down of merchant stock resulted in an outflow of over 
£12 million during the period. In addition, the restriction on 
imports 
of non-essential consumer goods after 1961 and the 
import substitution 
policy of the Nigerian government resulted in the withdrawal of capital 
from distribution. 
22 
22More 
will be said about why British companies withdrew 
from 
distribution in Chapter IV. 
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As more opportunities for making profits in the manufacturing sector 
were discovered, British merchant companies continued to redeploy a 
substantial part of the capital withdrawn from distribution into 
manufacturing. It is also worth noting that no additional investment 
took place in the agricultural sector during the period. The fact 
that in three of the five years under consideration, figures of invest- 
ment in agriculture were not available could only serve to indicate 
the interest which U. K. companies took in Nigerian agriculture. It is 
difficult to imagine how the effects of British investment could be felt 
by a large majority of the population if agriculture is neglected since 
the latter sector is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy. 
23 
Since the investments of the oil companies are not included in the 
Board of Trade Figures, we can estimate the extent of the companies' 
investment by comparing the Central Bank of Nigeria's figures with those 
of the Board of Trade. Table 2.7 shows the net investments of U. K. 
oil companies in Nigeria. 
TABLE 2.7 
NET' INVESTMENT FLOW OF THE U. K. OIL COMPANIES 1963-1968 (NLMILLION) 
A C. 
YEAR 
TOTAL NET INVESTMENT 
(INCLUDING OIL 
COMPANIES 
TOTAL NET INVESTMENT 
(EXCLUDING OIL 
COMPANIES) 
INVESTMENT 
BY OIL 
COMPANIES 
C AS A 
PERCENTAGE 
OF 'A' 
1963 17.0 7 10 58.8 
1964 28.0 -5 33 117.9 
1965 21.0 7 14 66.7 
1966 25.6 -1 26.6 103.9 
1967 13.6 -3 16.6 122.1 
1968 20.4 
* 2.6 17.8 87.3 
SOURCES: 1. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, 1968-71. 
2. BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL, APRIL 8,1970. 
NOTE: *: The figure of £3 m. (sterling) recorded by the Board of Trade 
was converted into the Nigerian pound (N11 = ¬1.16 sterling in 
1968) to take account of the devaluation of 1967. 
23More 
will be said about why British companies do not invest in 
Nigerian agriculture in Chapter III. 
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A large proportion of U. K. net investment between 1963 and 1968 went 
to oil exploration in Nigeria. In three of the six years under considera- 
tion, net investments by the oil companies exceeded the total U. K. net 
investment by 18 per cent, 4 per cent and 22 per cent respectively in 
1964,1966 and 1967. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that 
oil exploration has been the major absorber of U. K. net capital inflow 
since 1963. 
COMPONENTS OF U. K. NET INVESTMENT 
Capital inflow consists of unremitted profits, increase in equity 
holdings and debentures, commercial credits and other short-term loans 
from overseas parent and affiliate companies. The Board of Trade has 
been kind enough to supply the break-down of U. K. net investment 
(excluding the oil companies) in Nigeria between 1958 and 1964. Table 2.8 
shows the component of U. K. net investments in Nigeria. 
TABLE 2.8 
COMPONENT OF U. K. NET INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA 1958-64 (LFIILLION) 
COMPONENT 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
Unremitted Profits 1.8 2.1 2.1 -5.5 -1.8 2.7 2.8 
Nett Acquisitions 0.4 2.9 1.2 1.6 3.6 9.4 0.5. 
Head Office Indebtedness 1.8 0.7 0.1 1.3 -3.6 0.4 1.5 
Inter-company Account 0.1 -1.5 3.7 13.1 -2.8 -6.0 -9.4 
TOTAL 4.0 4.2 7.2 10.5 -4.6 6.6 -4.8 
SOURCE: SUPPLIED BY THE BOARD OF TRADE, STATISTICS SECTION, LONDON. 
The two most important sources of U. K. net investments during the 
1958-64 period were net acquisitions and unremitted profits. The 
desire of the U. K. merchant companies to redeploy their capital more 
widely into the manufacturing sector resulted in the acquisition of 
ownership interest in many industrial projects undertaken by private 
and public agencies. 
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Retained earnings which were contributing some part of total net 
U. K. investment during the 1958-60 period recorded negative contributions 
in 1961 and 1962. The repatriation of profits during the 1961 and 
1962 period was due to the fear that the newly independent Nigerian 
government might take some drastic measures which were not favourable 
to British investors. After repeated assurances from the Ministers 
of Trade and Finance, some companies began to plough back some part 
of their profits. Table 2.8 is, however, limited in scope because it 
did not include net investments by the oil companies. More appropriate 
data embracing all the sectors of the Nigerian economy is shown below in 
Table 2.9 
TABLE 2.9 
COMPONENTS OF U. K. NET. CAPITAL INFLOW TO NIGERIA 1961-68 (ZMILLION) 
CHANGES IN TRADE 
FOREIGN SHARE AND OTHER LIABILITIES 
UNREMITTED AND LOAN SUPPLIER'S FOREIGN TO HEAD 
YEAR PROFITS CAPITAL CREDIT LIABILITIES OFFICE TOTAL 
1961 1.8 5.9 1.1 - 5.0 13.8 
1962 7.1 2.4 0.4 0.4 -7.4 2.9 
1963 10.0 6.9 0.1 1.1 -1.1 17.0 
1964 11.6 14.4 0.5 -0.7 2.2 28.0 
1965 25.2 1.1 0.4 -1.0 -4.7 21.0 
1966 38.9 0.1 0.6 0.4 -14.4 25.6 
1967 18.4 1.4 1.7 2.4 -10.3 13.6 
1968 12.6 3.1 3.6 0.3 0.8 20.4 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW 1968-1971. 
The first observation on Table 2.9 is that unremitted profits or retained 
earnings remained the single most important source of U. K. net capital 
in Nigeria. During the 1961-1964 period, unremitted profits accounted 
for 51 per cent of the U. K. net capital inflow 
to Nigeria. During the 
1965-68 period, however, unremitted profits were substantially 
higher 
than the total net capital inflow for the period. 
There are several 
reasons for these observations. Between 
1961 and 1964, there was no 
restriction on the repatriation of profits 
from Nigeria and as a 
so 
consequence British companies saw no reason for retaining a substantial 
part of their profits before 1965. In addition, the social instability 
which prevailed in Western Nigeria, during 1964-64, threatening peace 
all over the country, created a situation which inspired caution in 
further commitment of new capital resources in the country by U. K. 
companies. The increased resort to internal financing after 1961 was, 
no doubt, by firms already firmly established in the country, who found 
it profitable to maintain and even expand their operations where it was 
advisable to do so. It should therefore not be surprising that the 
British oil company, Shell-BP, accounted for all the unremitted profits 
component of U. K. net capital inflow to Nigeria during the 1961-64 
period. As the political disturbances of Western Nigeria spread to 
other parts of the country, the Nigerian government introduced a very 
strict scrutinization procedure for applications for profits repatriation 
and other capital transfers in 1965 and 1966. Many British companies 
were forced to plough back their profits when there was no means of 
repatriating them out. With the outbreak of war in 1967, there was a 
total ban on the repatriation of profits. The ban was not lifted until 
1972. Despite the ban on profit repatriation after 1966, the magnitude 
of U. K. unremitted profits declined as a result of the curtailment, and 
in some cases, cessation of investment activity coupled with losses 
sustained from war damages. Many British companies, especially the 
Shell-BP Company and the United Africa Company, suffered severe losses 
during the Nigerian civil war. Foreign share and loan capital were 
an important source of new U. K. capital investment in Nigeria 
during 
the review period, especially during the first four years of 
the period. 
It is observed that, taking consecutive years 
from 1961 to 1968, there 
existed an inverse jElationship between the magnitude of unremitted 
profits and the inflow of foreign share and 
loan capital. During the 
period 1961-196<4 when British companies could repatriate 
their profits, 
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foreign capital as a component of net capital inflow was substantial. 
During the 1965-1968 period when unremitted profits were substantial, 
foreign share and loan capital fell drastically. It would therefore 
appear that the level of unremitted profits resulting from exchange 
control restrictions, coupled with investment opportunity created by 
the ban on importation of manufactured goods in Nigeria did influence 
the magnitude of foreign share and loan capital during the review period. 
In addition, there was the likelihood that as companies resorted to more 
internal financing, there might have been no need for foreign loan capital. 
Trade and suppliers' credit is a short-term trade credit granted 
by a seller who agrees to be reimbursed by the purchaser over a period 
of time. Trade and suppliers' credit has the main advantage of bailing 
out a purchaser from a difficult time when instant payments cannot be 
made. The supplier may also gain because trade and suppliers' credit 
may enable him to sell more goods than otherwise. The year to year 
contribution of trade and suppliers' credit to British net capital 
inflow before the imposition of exchange restrictions in 1967 was due 
to the Nigerian government's regulation which imposed 180 days' delay 
before the import bill of certain goods could be settled. In 1967 and 
1968, the strict exchange control measures and the total ban on the 
repatriation of profits and capital delayed the liquidation of external 
liabilities due and this explains why trade and suppliers' credit was 
the second most important source of U. K. net capital inflow to Nigeria 
in 1968. 
Other liabilities, which are receipts from and payments to foreign 
affiliate companies represented the second least important source of 
U. K. net capital during the review period. During the 1961-68 period 
receipts from the head office were not a source of net capital 
inflow 
to Nigeria. More capital was transferred to the head office than was 
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received from it. During the 1961-64 period when British companies 
operating in Nigeria were free to repatriate their profits, the negative 
figures of liabilities to head offices recorded in 1962 and 1963 were 
due to the willingness of British companies to build up their credit 
positions with their head offices. Between 1965 and 1967, there was 
a restriction on the repatriation of profits but there was no ban on 
the transfer of capital to the parent company. As a consequence, 
British companies took advantage of the loophole provided by a distinction 
between repatriated profits and capital transfer to head offices to 
repatriate a large proportion of their profits to the U. K. under the 
disguise of capital transfer to their head offices. When in 1968 the 
loophole was plugged by a ban on profits repatriation and capital transfer 
to head offices, liabilities to head offices made a moderate contribution 
to U. K. net capital inflow to Nigeria. 
Apart from the opportunities which gaps in governments' policies 
can offer to companies, there are three other methods by which financial 
capital can be transferred from the subsidiary company to the parent 
company and these are (a) the accounting practices of firms which enable 
the subsidiary company to be in substantial debt to the parent company; 
(b) the transfer of goods at very low prices from the subsidiary company 
to the parent company and (c) the transfer of goods at higher prices 
from the parent company to its subsidiary. British companies operating 
in Nigeria do not transfer goods to their parent companies because 
(a) they concentrate on consumer goods which are meant for the Nigerian 
market and (b) the Nigerian Marketing Board is a monopsony as far as 
Nigerian primary products are concerned. If U. K. companies need 
Nigerian primary products, they can only buy them from the Marketing 
Board. The other method by which U. K. companies operating 
in Nigeria 
can transfer their financial capital to the U. K. is 
through the high 
prices the parent company can charge on purchases made on 
behalf of its 
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subsidiary. The opportunity for transfer pricing occurs because 
subsidiary companies purchase their raw materials, intermediate and 
capital goods requirements through their parent companies rather than 
in the free market. The predictability of the demand of the subsidiary 
companies, reinforced by the restriction imposed on dealings with other 
suppliers confers upon the parent companies the unique advantage of 
marking-up the prices of goods supplied to their subsidiaries without 
a reduction. 
There are three major reasons why companies may adopt transfer pricing 
as a method of transferring financial capital. The first reason is to 
avoid tax payment both at home and abroad. Since only profits are 
taxed by most governments, hidden payments in the form of high mark-up 
prices for imported raw materials, intermediate and capital goods offer 
a good method of tax evasion. What firms are interested in is their 
post-tax profit and as long as this can be increased, they cannot be 
bothered about what happens to their tax payment to the government. 
Transfer pricing is a device which enables firms to increase their 
post-tax profits without any change in pre-tax profits. The second 
reason for transfer pricing is that when restrictions are imposed on 
the repatriation of profits, high mark-up prices for imported goods 
may be the most important way of repatriating substantial profits. 
The third reason is that the profits earned by a company may be so 
high as to provoke a public outcry if shown in the profit and loss 
account and the only way to get round this problem is through 
transfer 
pricing which may substantially disguise the level of actual profit. 
How does this practice fit into the Nigerian situation? 
There 
is no doubt that some British companies operating 
in Nigeria do mark-up 
the prices of their imports substantially above 
the international 
price levels. As an example, a British drug 
firm in Nigeria was 
found to be selling some drugs at higher prices 
than Nigerian retailers 
54 
who obtained their supplies from Nigerian businessmen who ordered 
directly from the U. K. When the Nigerian branch manager of the firm 
was asked why this was so, he explained that the prices of supplies 
from the U. K. as quoted by their parent company were so high they were 
only selling at costs plus freight charges. The above example may 
not be enough to conclude that the British drug firm concerned was 
marking-up the prices of drugs substantially above what they cost in 
England since it was possible for Nigerian importers to deal with firms 
offering cheaper prices than those firms from which the British drug 
parent company was ordering drugs. It must be added, however, that 
it was most unlikely that Nigerians could get more favourable treatment 
from British companies than could other British companies. 
Scanty though the supporting evidence may be, there are certain 
indications that some U. K. companies operating in Nigeria use transfer 
prices to transfer financial capital out of the country. In addition 
to the use of transfer prices in transactions between subsidiary companies 
and parent companies, a vertically integrated company whose various 
activities in the same line of production and marketing are scattered 
about in many countries has a unique opportunity of using transfer 
prices to switch financial resources from one country to another. 
Shell-BP is an example of a British company, vertically integrated 
and with the power to switch financial resources to and from Nigeria 
through the use of transfer prices. While it is possible 
for Shell-BP 
to use transfer prices to switch financial capital 
to Nigeria, there 
are several reasons why the opposite is likely 
to be the case. Firstly, 
there is very limited opportunity for the use of 
large financial resources 
in Nigeria by Shell-BP. The company has not diversified 
into petro- 
chemicals where huge resources would be required. 
Secondly, the return 
on resources kept in Nigeria is likely to 
be very low since the rate of 
interest on savings is very low. Thirdly, political 
instability may 
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make the repatriation of such capital difficult and unsafe. Lastly, 
Nigerian currency is not an international currency and any attempt by 
Shell-Bp to transfer capital from Nigeria must be accompanied by the 
permission of the Central Bank of Nigeria. While it can be argued that 
transfer prices could be used to transfer financial resources out of 
the country in the future, the fact remains that the Nigerian Government 
has in recent years been very active in the fixing of posted prices 
for crude oil and this is likely to be the case in future. In addition, 
more and more countries are entering into bilateral agreements with 
producing countries on the level and prices of crude oil for their 
refineries, thus removing the opportunity for the oil companies to buy 
at cheaper prices in producing countries and sell at higher prices in 
importing countries. It can therefore be reasonably-postulated that 
if Shell-BP adopts transfer pricing in its operations in Nigeria, the 
practice will not result in an inflow of financial resources to the 
country. It is therefore likely that transfer pricing will be used 
to switch capital to countries where high returns are likely to be 
earned and where the capital is safe. 
Like other international oil companies operating in Nigeria, Shell-BP 
not only produces crude oil in the country, but it also refineq distributes 
and markets the final products. The vertically integrated nature of 
Shell-BP enables the company to pay a low price for Nigerian crude oil 
and to sell the crude oil at a higher price to its refinery overseas, 
thus making a large untaxed income in its operations. One of the main 
reasons why exporting and importing countries complain about the oil 
companies is because they charge different prices for crude oil in 
exporting and importing countries. 
24 
24 E. T. Penrose, "The Large International Firm in Developing 
Countries", Allen & Unwin, London, 1968. 
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The ability of the oil companies to charge different prices for crude 
oil in exporting and importing countries provides them with an instrument 
for switching financial resources from one country to another in order 
to avoid taxation. It should therefore not be surprising that some 
people have referred to the oil companies as "masters in tax evasion". 
While there is no concrete evidence to substantiate the fact that 
Shell-BP has been using transfer prices to switch financial resources 
from Nigeria overseas, there is a general belief that Shell-BP has been 
adopting the method. This belief is reinforced by the ability of the 
Nigerian government to sell the crude oil accruing to it from its 35 per cent 
ownership stake in Shell-BP's operations in Nigeria at '16.80 a barrel 
in the free market when Shell-BP only pays fß. 31 a barrel for the crude 
oil the company produced in Nigeria. 
25 
In addition, the interviews conducted in Nigeria and in England 
seem to suggest that U. K. companies do mark-up the prices of purchases 
undertaken on behalf of their Nigerian subsidiaries overseas. British 
companies interviewed in England repeatedly stated that it was to get 
favourable prices for their subsidiaries that they undertook overseas 
purchases on their behalf. In 1971, however, the views expressed by 
some Nigerian managers, when asked about the head offices in London 
undertaking their overseas purchases on their behalf, were different 
from the views expressed by the head offices in 1972. The majority 
of the Nigerian managers interviewed held the view that better prices 
would be obtained for their imports if they were free to 
import from 
where they liked. 
Perhaps it is appropriate to pause at this stage to consider 
the 
implication of transfer prices for the theory of 
the firm. In economic 
25 
More will be said about Shell-BP's operations 
in Nigeria in 
Chapter V of the thesis. 
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theory, the firm is usually regarded as an "unibrain", a decision-making 
entity whose action is oriented towards making profits. Without going 
into the controversy about the motive or motives of the firm, it can 
be safely asserted that all firms want to survive and grow, and in 
order to do this, they must earn profits. The level of post-tax 
profits earned by a firm is affected, among other things, by the 
government's economic and monetary policy. In the economic theory 
of the firm, there is the omission of the government's effect on the 
decision of the firm. Transfer pricing is essentially an attempt to 
reconcile the government with the decision-making process of the firm. 
In their drive to earn high profits in order to survive and grow, firms 
will not only search for profitable opportunities for investment, but 
they will also be preoccupied with the removal of obstacles to the 
achievement of maximum benefits from successful investments. While it 
is possible for a subsidiary company to transfer financial resources to 
its parent company overseas through head office transfers, the fact remains 
that this method can be easily noticed and stopped, as the Nigerian case 
showed in 1968. Transfer pricing provides the firm with the unique 
opportunity of transferring substantial resources from one company to 
another unnoticed and without provoking public outcry. 
There is no doubt that multi-national companies do mark-up the 
prices of their intermediate and capital goods in some developing countries 
where they operate. C. Cooper, for example, found that the mark-up 
prices for intermediate goods were substantially higher than inter- 
national prices in Turkey. 
26 In his investigation of costs in Colombian 
firms, Vaitsos found that mark-up prices for intermediate products and 
capital goods in the Colombian pharmaceutical, electronics, rubber and 
26 
C. Cooper, "The International Transfer of Technologies", Seminar, 
Sussex University, Brighton, 5.6.70. 
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chemical industries were between 25 and 200 per cent above the international 
price. 
27 
Vaitsos came to the conclusion that If Colombia could reduce 
the prices of its intermediate products and capital goods by only 
15 per cent it could have saved in 1968 foreign exchange equivalent to 
more than 50 per cent of its total earnings from all its exports outside 
of coffee and petroleum, close to U. S. # 100 million". 
28 The findings 
of Vaitsos indicate that the use of transfer prices to transfer financial 
capital can have an unfavourable effect on economic development through 
the balance of payments crisis associated with the drain on foreign 
exchange resources to pay for imported intermediate products and capital 
goods. There can be, in the final analysis, only one answer to the 
problem of transfer prices and that is for the countries where they are 
used to develop their intermediate and capital goods industries so that 
most of their requirements are met from internal production. The con- 
clusion to be drawn from the discussion on the use of transfer prices to 
transfer financial capital is that if companies actually do it, as seems 
likely, then the profits shown in their profit and loss accounts become 
a defective indicator of actual profitability. There is every possibility 
that as the level of implicit or hidden payments in the form of mark-up 
prices for imports goes up so also is it likely that the level of explicit 
payments on profits will go down. 
THE MOTIVATION TO INVEST 
We have seen in the previous sections that U. K. investment in Nigeria 
has been increasing since 1961 and the pace has not slowed down. The 
question which this section is seeking to answer is why U. K. businessmen 
invest in Nigeria. The first pioneer work on motivation to invest was 
27 C. V. Vaitsos, Transfer of Industrial Technology to Developing 
Countries through Private Enterprise, Sussex University, 1970. 
28C. V. Vaitsos, Ibid., p. 10. 
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carried out in 1964 by A. N. Ho kam. 29 The four most frequently cited 
motives in his survey were: 
1. The firm had long held a good market relation with Nigeria. 
Aiming to preserve the market for the parent company in the 
face of rising duties or local competition (58 per cent). 
2. Aim to expand sales into a new market otherwise difficult by 
just exporting (30 per cent). 
3. As a result of the parent company's strategy of investing 
in key global areas. Convinced that Nigeria is a very 
important area and that it might be too late to gain entry 
profitably into the market if the decision were postponed 
too long (28 per cent). 
4. Aim at forestalling a major competitor's move or possible 
move into Nigeria (26 per cent). 
Another survey carried out by R. S. May30 in England came out with many 
frequently mentioned motives. The factors influencing the investment 
of 26 manufacturing companies interviewed by R. S. May were the following: 
FREQUENCY 
FACTOR OF MENTION 
1. To avoid being shut out by tariffs and other restrictions 15 
2. Specific invitation of/encouragement from the Nigerian Govt. 11 
3. Long-term prospects of Nigerian Economy 9 
4. To take advantage of increased demand 7 
5. Activities of competitors 7 
6. Request by/encouragement from company already in Nigeria 5 
7. Profits on supply of machinery 3 
8. Presence of raw materials 2 
9. Others 8 
From the questionnaires sent out and the interviews conducted by the 
writer, the motivation to invest of 37 British Companies operating in 
Nigeria is summarized as follows: 
1. The Nigerian economy is inherently strong and we are confident 
about the long-term prospects for industrial development in the 
country (38 per cent). 
29A. 
N. Ho, kam, The Motivation to Invest and the Locational Pattern 
of Foreign Private Industrial Investments in Nigeria, Nigerian Journal 
of Economics and Social Studies, March, 1966. 
30 
R. S. May, Direct Overseas Investment in Nigeria 1953-1963: Some 
aspects of its constitution and contribution to Nigeria's Economic 
Development, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, November, 1965. 
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2. The tariff barriers erected against imports made domestic 
production a necessity if we do not wish to lose our market 
in Nigeria (30 per cent). 
3. To be able to compete on equal footing with our competitors 
(18 per cent). 
4. Our existing investment in Nigeria and the resources and 
knowledge accumulated through time provided us with an 
incentive to venture into new but closely related areas 
(13 per cent). 
The three investigations provide us with a useful guide as to why British 
businessmen invest in Nigeria. There is a variation in the emphasis 
each investigation puts on different motives. Such a variation is to 
be expected due to the place and the timing of the interviews. While 
Ho. kam carried out his investigations in Nigeria, R. S. May and the 
writer carried out their studies in England. Also, Horkam and May 
carried out their studies in 1964, whereas this writer conducted his 
interviews in 1972. However, it must be accepted that, even with the 
differences in the emphasis laid on different factors, the results of 
the three investigations emphasize the same factors. The confidence 
which British investors have in the long-term prospects of the Nigerian 
economy has been frequently mentioned. Even with the tribal politics 
of the early post-independence period and the ensuing civil war which 
came to an end in 1970, British investors regard the future prospects 
of their investments in Nigeria with great optimism. The rapidly 
growing population and the associated increase in the demand 
for goods 
and services brought about by a rising standard of 
living must have 
been and will be acting as a great incentive for industrial expansion. 
On the modernisation programmes which represented a 
further investment 
of millions of pounds undertaken by the U. A. C. 
Group in Nigeria in 1972, 
the Group's magazine, "Link", notes that the "growing sophistication 
of 
the Nigerian consumer was expanding the market 
for manufactured goods. 
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To satisfy these demands some companies within the group had installed 
new machinery for increased production and others had introduced new 
products into the Nigerian market. 
31 
The increase in the production of petroleum oil which is continuously 
accelerating the country's foreign exchange earnings will no doubt 
continue to result in a healthy balance of payments position which 
will in turn enable profits to be repatriated abroad without much strain 
on the economy. Many firms feared the erection of tariff barriers and 
other restrictions against imports into Nigeria as being reasons for 
domestic production. With the Nigerian government bent on reducing 
the importation of some goods, high tariffs have been erected to shelter 
domestic firms from foreign competitors. Businessmen who found exporting 
to Nigeria too difficult saw no other alternative way of retaining the 
Nigerian market than by initiating domestic production. behind the tariff 
wall. The activities of competitors have also stimulated investment 
in Nigeria. The desire of businessmen to hold on to what market they 
have under their control while diversifying into other new lines to 
increase their overall market share not only necessitates capital 
deepening but it also requires capital widening. 
Putting all the motives given by businessmen for investing in 
Nigeria into real perspective, one major aim stands out quite clearly 
and that aim is to get the highest level of profit possible from every 
unit of investment. One important British company interviewed, which 
has substantial investments in many African countries, puts its motive 
thus: "by investing in these countries, one gets a greater volume of 
sale and as long as that is profitable it is worthwhile continuing to 
do so". Implicit in the confidence which businessmen have in the 
long-term prospects of the Nigerian economy is the belief that high 
31West Africa, January 29,1973. 
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profits can be earned. The defensive investments of some business- 
men to combat the aggressive competithn of their rivals were induced 
by the desire to maintain and expand sales in order to earn more profits. 
The initiation of domestic production behind tariff walls when export 
prospects had been made bleak was merely to recoup what would be lost 
on a reduction in exports through the gains from domestic production. 
The specific invitations and encouragement given by the Nigerian 
authorities to some foreign investors would only be considered and 
accepted if enough profits would be earned. The core of the argument 
here is that profit is the keystone of the investment arch in Nigeria; 
it is the central factor upon which investment decisions hinge. 
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN DISTRIBUTION 
The early contact of the British with Nigeria was made by merchant 
firms who traded in slaves and later shifted to the purchase of 
commodities like ivory, palm oil and cocoa for sale in the U. K. after 
the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. British traders were not 
the only traders interested in the Nigerian trade; they faced stiff 
opposition from French firms who often challenged them. In order 
to counteract the challenge of French trading firms, usually backed 
by the French government, British traders amalgamated to form the 
United Africa Company in 1879. When the United Africa Company received 
a royal charter in 1886, Britain gave the company the right to administer 
and rule Nigeria until 1900 when the company was relieved of this 
function. The United Africa Company then concentrated all its attention 
on trading between Nigeria and Britain. It is therefore not surprising 
that from the period of the first contact of the British with Nigeria 
up to the early 1960's, the direction of British investment in Nigeria 
was closely related to the pattern of trade between Britain and Nigeria, 
in 
as Table 2.10. The table shows the sectoral distribution of U. K. 
A 
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investment in Nigeria in 1968. The first point to note is that the 
figures in the table added together amount to £89.5 million, which 
means that the remaining £6.1 million represents investments in agri- 
culture, electrical and mechanical engineering, transport and communica- 
tions and shipping, for which the breakdown was not available. The 
same reason explains why the percentages added up would give a total 
of 95.6, which means the remaining 4.4 per cent was accounted for by 
the four sectors for which there was no breakdown. 
TABLE 2.10 
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL VALUE OF U. K. INVESTMENT 
IN NIGERIA AT THE END OF 19681 
SECTOR VALUE IN £MILLION PERCENTAGE 
Agriculture to " 
Mining 6.2 6.6 
Electrical & Mechanical Engineering 
Vehicles, Shipbuilding & Marine 
Engineering - - 
Other Manufacturing 32.8 35.0 
Construction 4.1 4.4 
Distribution 35.1 37.5 
Transport & Communications of to 
Shipping of if 
Other Activities 11.3 12.1 
TOTAL 93.6 
SOURCE: BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 23,1970. 
NOTES: 1: CDC, banking, insurance and oil industries were excluded. 
": means 'not available'. 
-: means 'nil' or 'negligible'. 
Apart from petroleum investments, which were not included in Table 2.12, 
distribution was the most important absorber of British capital at the 
end of 1968. The U. K. investments in distribution were undertaken 
by three merchant firms, the United Africa Company, John 
Holt Ltd., 
and Paterson Zochonis of Manchester. The main initial 
functions of 
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the British merchant firms were the importation and distribution of 
British manufactured goods throughout Nigeria and the purchase of 
Nigerian primary products for sale in the U. K. These functions were 
succinctly put as "On the one hand the importation, distribution, and 
sale of manufactured goods of all kinds throughout the countries of 
West Africa and on the other the buying and marketing overseas of the 
natural products of the countries prevailed. 
32 
During the post-war period, two important changes began in the 
distribution activities of British merchant firms. The first change 
was the gradual withdrawal from the purchase of Nigerian primary products. 
By the end of 1960, the Nigerian Marketing Boards had become the sole 
buyer and seller of Nigerian primary products. The second change was 
the gradual withdrawal from retail trade, and the capital thus with- 
drawn was redeployed in the manufacturing sector. 
33 
British investments 
in distribution are at present largely concentrated on wholesale activities. 
In addition, some retail trading is still carried out by the three 
merchant firms but only in the cities and in commodities requiring 
technical knowledge and after-sales services, such as electrical 
appliances, drugs, motor vehicles and some household consumer durable 
goods. 
CONCLUSION 
Britain has been the major foreign investor in Nigeria up to the 
end of 1968 and this situation is explained by the fact that Nigeria 
was a colony of Britain until the country became independent in 1960. 
British investment has been increasing from year to year since 1960 
as British investors discover new avenues for making profits. Despite 
the increase in the level of investment emanating from Britain, the 
proportion of total foreign investment in Nigeria accounted 
for by 
32 
UAC, A Profile, UAC Ltd., London, 1972, p. 5. 
33More 
will be said about the reasons for and the timing of the 
changes in Chapter IV of the thesis. 
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Britain has been falling as more oil companies, especially from America 
and Europe, entered the Nigerian petroleum industry. The exploration 
activities of these companies have resulted in more rapid increases in 
the level of investment emanating from their countries of origin. A 
large proportion of British investment in Nigeria is concentrated on 
the exploration and production of crude oil and this means in effect 
that British investment is largely devoted to the provision of a 
commodity for the international market. Distribution was the second 
largest absorber of British capital investment at the end of 1968, with 
the manufacturing sector absorbing a little less than the distribution 
sector. The Nigerian agricultural sector did not absorb a significant 
proportion of British direct investments and why this was so will be 
the subject matter of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
This chapter is concerned with the contribution of British direct 
investment to agricultural development in Nigeria. 
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
In many respects agriculture is the most important sector of the 
Nigerian economy. As we pointed out earlier in Chapter One, a large 
proportion of the Nigerian labour force is engaged in agriculture; 
the rural sector generates three-fifths of the national income and 
supplies a large proportion of Nigeria's exports, and is, therefore, 
an important earner of foreign exchange. 
TABLE 3.1 
EXPORTS OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 1962-1970 (LN'OOOs) 
1962, 1963 1964 196 1966 1967 1968 196 1970 
Cocoa 33347 32359 40100 42693 28250 54511 51200 52596 66537 
Groundnuts 32426 36646 34056 38033 40816 35594 37973 35404 21771 
Groundnut Oil 6177 6528 8144 9533 9667 5920 9362 10462 11606 
Groundnut 
Cake 2452 2735 4634 5251 4695 4211 4884 5058 5520 
Palm Kernels 16887 20818 20962 26540 22432 7797 10125 9903 10871 
Palm Oil 8937 9364 10755 13842 10962 1338 69 404 566 
Raw Cotton 5857 9500 6104 3296 3349 4139 3283 3339 6565 
Natural 
Rubber 11356 11794 12007 10977 11437 6344 6407 9640 8706 
Hides & 
Skins 3820 4196 4620 4567 5736 4347 3980 4163 2845 
Timber 5674 6647 7782 6278 5726 3403 3663 4230 3100 
Agricultural 
Exports 126933 140587 149164 161010 143070 127604 130946 35199 138087 
TOTAL 
EXPORTS 68536 189330 214651 268390 284084 241819 211085 18152 42834 
Agricultural 
Exports as a 
Percentage 
of Total 
Exports 75.3 74.2 69.5 60.0 50.4 52.8 62.0 42.5 31.2 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, DECEVBER, 197C 
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Table 3.1 shows the composition of Nigerian agricultural exports. 
Exports of cocoa and groundnuts accounted for about 50 per cent of 
total agricultural exports. Over the period, there is a variation in 
the contribution of each product to total agricultural exports, as 
Table 3.2 will show. In Table 3.2, only four out of the ten major 
agricultural products contributed more to total agricultural exports 
in 1970 than in 1962. 
TABLE 3.2 
CHANGES IN THE VALUE OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS 1962 & 1970 
IN PERCENTAGE 
Agri 
cult 
Grd. Grd. Palm Raw Natu- Hides ural 
Grd. Nut Nut Kern- Palm Cott- ral & Tim- Ex- TOTAL 
Cocoa Nut Oil Cake els Oil on Rubber Skins ber ports EXPORT 
Changes 
1962/70 +99.5 -33.0 +87.9 +125 -35.6 -93.7 +12.1 -23.3 -25.5 -45. +8.8 +162. 
SOURCE: CALCULATED FROM TABLE 3.1 
The highest percentage increase was recorded in groundnut cake, the export 
value of which was 125 per cent in 1970 above the 1962 level. The value 
of the exports of cocoa and groundnut oil nearly doubled the 1962 level 
in 1970. Among the six major products whose export values were below 
the 1962 level in 1970, palm oil export value reached the lowest recorded 
level. There are two main reasons why the export value of any Nigerian 
agricultural product may be higher or lower than that of the previous 
period. The first reason is that there may be an increase or a fall 
in the quantity exported; second, that the international price of a 
particular product might have increased or decreased. The fall in 
the contribution of some major agricultural exports to the total 
agricultural exports value in 1970 was due to a fall in the quantity 
of such products exported. 
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TABLE 3.3 
EXPORTS OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (IN '000 TONS) QUANTITIES 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Cocoa 195 175 197 225 190 242 206 171 193 
Groundnut 530 614 544 512 573 520 638 517 287 
Groundnut Oil 63 67 80 91 104 71 109 100 89 
Groundnut Cake 88 85, 139 113 133 131 171 168 160 
Palm Kernels 367 398 394 416 394 163 159 176 182 
palm Oil 118 126 134 150 143 16 3 8 8 
Raw Cotton 23 40 25 14 23 33 14 14 28 
Natural Rubber 60 63 75 68 70 48 52 56 58 
SOURCE: ECONOMIC & STATISTICAL REVIEW, 1970, FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, 
LAGOS, 1971. 
As Table 3.3 shows, all the products which recorded a negative change in 
Table 3.2 were in 1970 below the 1962 quantity level. The highest fall 
in the quantity of export occurred in palm oil and palm kernels which 
were only 6.7 and 49.5 per cent respectively of the 1962 level in 1970. 
The fall in the export of palm oil and palm kernels after 1966 was 
brought about by the Nigerian civil war which seriously disrupted 
production in the three Eastern States and the Mid-West. The fall 
in 
the quantities of other major agricultural export commodities was 
due 
to two main reasons. Firstly, the increased use of some of 
the agri- 
cultural products in domestic industries necessarily reduced 
the quantity 
available for exports. This was the case with rubber and 
hides and 
skins. Secondly, there was a general fall in the production of some 
agricultural products brought about by a shift 
from the production 
of cash crops to food crops as the prices of 
the latter substantially 
increased because of a rapid rise in demand. 
The importance of the agricultural sector as a major earner of 
foreign exchange is also shown in Table 
3.1. In 1961, agricultural 
exports totalling £134 million accounted 
for 89 per cent of all exports, 
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and 66 per cent of total foreign exchange earnings 
4 
Despite the fact 
that the figures for agricultural re-exports are not included in Table 3.1, 
the export of major agricultural products alone contributed over 60 per cent 
of Nigeria's total foreign exchange earnings from 1960 to 1968. The 
fall in the percentage contribution of agricultural products to total 
exports in 1966 and 1967 was due to the Nigerian political disturbances. 
As can be noted in Table 3.2, the growth in the value of agricultural 
export has not kept pace with the growth of total export value. Whereas 
the value of total exports was 162.8 per cent above the 1962 level in 
1970, the value of agricultural exports was only 8.8 per cent above the 
1962 level in 1970. It is therefore not surprising that in 1969 and 
1970 exports of major agricultural products only contributed 42.5 per cent 
and 31.2 per cent respectively of the total export value. Two factors 
are responsible for the falling percentage share of the value of agri- 
cultural exports in total exports value. The first factor is the 
sluggish growth in the output of agricultural products. The second 
factor is the growing importance of the petroleum export. The latter, 
which stood at £17.2 million in 1962, has substantially increased to 
£254.8 million in 1970.35 
Another indication of agriculture's importance in the Nigerian 
economy is its contribution to the GDP. Table 1.6 in Chapter 
I shows 
the various components of the GDP of Nigeria. In 1960 when 
Nigeria 
became independent the agricultural sector contributed about 70 per cent 
to the GDP. This percentage contribution fell to 64 per cent 
in 1961, 
but it was not until after 1964 that agriculture contributed 
less than 
60 per cent to the GDP. Since 1965 the contribution of 
agriculture 
34Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second National Development 
Plan 
1970-74, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1970, p. 
103. 
35More 
will be said about the petroleum industry 
in Chapter V. 
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to the GDP has been falling in percentage terms but even then, up to 
1969, agriculture still contributed more than half of the GDP. In 
1970, only 47.7 per cent of the GDP emanated from agriculture, which 
shows quite clearly that other sectors are growing more rapidly than 
the agricultural sector. It has been shown in the previous discussion 
that agriculture is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy, employing 
about 70 per cent of the labour force, contributing about 50 per cent 
to the GDP, and is also the most important single earner of foreign 
exchange. The next discussion will centre on the specific role 
agriculture could play in the future economic development of Nigeria. 
THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF NIGERIA 
In the contemporary world developing countries face difficult 
decisions in the allocation of their meagre investment resources, and 
the major choice they face is between the decision to invest in agri- 
culture or that to invest in industry. At first sight the decision 
whether to invest in agriculture or in industry should not be difficult 
in the less-developed economies, where about three-quarters of the 
population depends on agriculture for a livelihood. In Nigeria, 
40 to 70 per cent of the national income is generated in the agri- 
cultural sector which also provides 50 to 80 per cent of foreign ex- 
change earnings. Yet this important decision has been clouded by the 
inability of many developing countries, especially Nigeria, to get 
their investment priorities right. "Often in ignorance, but sometimes 
in flagrant disregard of the historical conditions precedent to, and 
contemporaneous with, industrial development in the more advanced 
societies, the leaders of most of the under-developed countries 
feed 
the popular fancy about the efficacy of industrialism 
by directing 
their scarce capital resources to channels which 
bear very little relation 
to their present economic advantages and growth capacities. 
" 
36 
36professor H. A. Oluwasanmi, Agriculture and Economic Development 
in Tropical Africa, Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 
May, 1959. 
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As a consequence, many developing countries in the fifties and sixties 
took a pessimistic view about agricultural development and tended to 
associate poverty with agriculture and wealth with industrialization. 
This view was reinforced by the economic development of U. S. S. R. which 
was based on industrialization and the expansion of the public sector 
at the expense of agriculture. This view led to a tragic neglect of 
agriculture. 
In recent years, it is becoming more clear to developing countries 
that agriculture and economic backwardness are not synonymous, and that 
sustained industrial development depends to a large extent on the level 
of development in the agricultural sector. The role of agriculture in 
the process of development depends on the stage of development which 
has been reached at the time when industrialization and growth become a 
social aspiration, and also upon the ratio of agricultural land to 
population. Diversity among nations in their factor endowment, traditional 
values, political and historical background precludes any universally 
applicable stated role for agriculture in the process of economic 
development. The emphasis on agriculture in public policy and the 
forms of agricultural policy will, therefore, vary from one country to 
another. 
In its drive towards modernization, there are several ways by 
which agriculture can assist the transformation of the Nigerian economy 
from its present backward state. Firstly, agriculture can help in 
the process of economic development by providing increased food supplies. 
Nigeria has a population of about 60 million and it is increasingly 
becoming difficult to feed the rapidly growing population adequately. 
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TABLE 3.4 
FOOD CONSUMPTION IN NIGERIA AND ADVANCED COUNTRIES 
YEAR COUNTRY 
CALORIES 
PER DAY 
FATS CONSUMPTION 
PER CAPUT 
PROTEIN CONSUMPTION 
PER CAPUT 
1970 Nigeria 2290 48.7 59.9 
1969/70 Germany 3180 163.7 83 
969/70 France 3270 156.3 102.6 
970/71 U. K. 3170 142.3 86.8 
1970 U. S. A. 3300 159.2 98.6 
1970 Japan 2470 51.9 79.6 
SOURCE: PRODUCTION YEAR BOOK, 1971, FAO, UNITED NATIONS, ROME, 1972. 
Table 3.4 shows the calories per day and fats and protein consumption 
per caput in Nigeria compared with those of five selected advanced 
countries. Apart from Japan, the gap in food consumption between 
Nigeria and the developed countries is so wide that the deficiency 
in the diets of Nigerians, and the inadequacy of their food supplies, 
becomes a recognizable problem. What is likely to throw more light 
on the nature of the problem is the fact that the calorie consumption 
of Nigerians has been falling since 1963. During the 1961-63 period 
calories per day in Nigeria stood at 2440. By 1970, calories per 
day had fallen to 2290. The problem of feeding the Nigerian population 
is likely to grow worse in future as Table 3.5 will show, unless 
the 
country embarks on a radical transformation of the agricultural sector. 
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TABLE 3.5 
FOOD CONSUMPTION IN NIGERIA (LMILLION) 1963-1980 
1963 
/64 
RATE 
OF 
GROWTH 
PER 
CENT 
a 
1967 
/68 
RATE 
OF 
GROWTH 
PER 
CENT 
a 
1973 
/74 
RATE 
OF 
GROWTH 
PER 
CENT 
a 
1979 
/80 
G. D. P. 1394 4.5 1663 5.5 2293 6.1 3275 
Savings 139 8.5 193 8.6 317 8.7 524 
Total Consumption 1255 4.0 1470 5.1 1976 5.7 2751 
Riblic Consumption 95 12.1 150 5.8 210 7.8 330 
Private Consumption 1160 3.7 1343 4.7 1771 5.4 2421 
Private Consumption per Caput 20.9 1.2 21.9 1.9 24.5 2.3 28.1 
Food Expenditure at Factor Cost 716 3.4 819 4.0 1039 4.4 1344 
Food Expenditure at Factor Cost 
Per Caput (L) 12.9 0.9 13.3 1.3 14.4 1.3 15.6 
Food Imports 25 30 27 25 
Domestically Produced Food 691 3.4 789 4.2 1012 4.5 1319 
Food Expenditure as Percentage 
of Private Consumption 62% 61% 59% 56% 
Food Imports as Percentage of 
Food Expenditure 3.5% 3.7% 2.6% 1.9% 
SOURCE: AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 1965-1980, FAO, UNITED NATIONS, 
RO1E, 1966. 
NOTE: a: Estimates 
The annual rate of increase in the demand for food is given in the equation 
D=p+ ng, where p and g are the rate of growth of population and per 
capita income and n is the income elasticity of demand for agricultural 
products. The demand on the Nigerian agriculture as shown in Table 2.5 is 
thrown into real perspective when it is realized that population growth 
in Nigeria is of the order of 2.5 per cent per annum and the income 
elasticity of demand for food is about 0.7 compared with a value of 
0.2 - 0.3 in contemporary West Europe, U. S. 
A. and Canada. The magnitude 
of these problems is clearly thrown into relief when Japan's achievements 
in the period from the 1880s to 1920 (when she achieved a rate of growth 
of agricultural output which was able to keep pace with an annual 
in- 
crease in demand of 2 per cent) are compared with 
the task which Nigeria 
must tackle. She must keep pace with a4-5 per cent per annum 
increase 
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in demand for food, and in addition solve the problems of unemployment, 
of improving transport and communications, health and marketing to 
sustain the rapidly growing urban population while at the same time 
keeping a steady relationship between the cities and the rural areas 
so that the former do not become Europeanized. Failure to increase 
food supplies adequately during industrialization to keep pace with 
growth in demand would definitely, as the present situation in Nigeria 
shows, lead to rising food prices and pressure on wage rates which 
adversely affect profits, investment and growth. Under these circum- 
stances, agricultural development then becomes the limiting factor on 
economic development. 
There is little evidence on the price elasticity of demand for 
food in Nigeria but it is probably much lower than that for advanced 
nations since there is little possibility of substitution for the 
Nigerian staple diet, and there is also the obvious natural resistance 
to a reduction of intake. The inflationary effect of a rise in food 
prices is very strong. Foodstuffs account for between 60-62 per cent 
of total private consumption compared with only 20 - 30 per cent in developed 
economies. The real problem then becomes one of how to keep food cheap 
and plentiful. If domestically produced food fails to satisfy the 
need of a country, that country must resort to food imports if a pro- 
portion of its population is not to die of hunger. Necessarily, food 
imports depend on the availability of foreign exchange or suppliers' 
credits. Nigerian food imports add up to an average of ¬30 million 
annually. If the output of Nigerian agriculture could be increased 
to cater for the need of the economy, not only would the scarce foreign 
exchange expended on food imports be saved, internal food prices would 
be, 
stabilized with a consequent favourable effect on investment and 
economic growth. 
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Agriculture can contribute to economic development by providing 
raw materials for Nigeria's developing industries. Nigeria has a 
rich variety of raw materials to serve as a basis for agro-based 
industries. They include palm oil and palm kernels, cotton, sugar 
cane, rubber, cocoa, rice, tobacco, hides and skins, grounds and 
timber. The available raw materials have given rise to some industries. 
As examples, sugar cane is used for crushing and manufacturing of sugar 
by-products at Bacita, cotton ginneries are scattered all over the north, 
rice mills, soap manufacturing, palm oil mills and rubber processing 
plants are located in the palm oil and rubber areas of the East and 
the mid-West. There is a soap and margarine factory at Apapa in Lagos, 
and in the Western State there are a cannery, rubber processing plants, 
cocoa-processing plants and sawmills. In addition, groundnuts and other 
oil-bearing products can provide the foundation for a crushing industry 
together with the manufacture of by-products like fertilizers and 
animal feeds; livestock slaughtering can provide, as well as hides and 
skins for shoe factories, blood, bones and "waste" products as a rich 
source of materials for both animal feeds and fertilizers. Tobacco 
has provided the base for cigarette manufacturing in Ibadan, Ilorin, 
Port Harcourt and Zaria. While it is reasonable to base some industries 
on the available raw materials, the problem which is posed by the inability 
of the supply of raw materials to meet the requirements of industries 
can be very costly indeed. The citrus fruit canning factory of the 
Western Nigeria Development Corporation has been functioning substantially 
below capacity due to an inadequate supply of citrus fruits. Other 
industrial establishments with substantial excess capacity due to an 
inadequate supply of raw materials include the bags and sacks factory 
in Badagry, the oil extracting plant at Apoje near Ijebn-Igbo and the shoe 
factory at Ogbomosho. In March 1972 the £1 million soap factory at 
Aba owned by Lever Brothers was temporarily closed due to an "acute 
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palm oil shortage". 
37 A meat canning plant in Kaduna established in 
1955 was disrupted at its initial stage due to inadequate supply of 
cattle. While there is scope for agriculture to supply industry 
with raw materials, the success of this function depends on the extent 
to which agricultural materials are produced in sufficient quantities 
to meet the industrial needs. If excess capacity is allowed to develop 
due to an inadequate supply of raw material, as has been the case in the 
past, then diseconomies of scale will set in, high production costs per 
unit of output will result with ultimate high prices for final products. 
The high price of final products may reduce demand to a level where to 
produce anything at all will result in heavy losses. 
Agricultural progress is, normally, a pre-requisite of economic 
development in a functional sense. In a closed economy, the growth 
of an industrial sector of high productivity requires both an available 
supply of labour and food. In the Lewis38 two-sector model with the 
assumption of unlimited supplies of labour in the subsistence sector 
the supply of labour to the capitalist sector must come from the agri- 
cultural sector. Whether or not, however, the conditions of the Lewis 
model are met, the industrial labour force must originally be drawn 
from the rural labour force, and, even if there is not a perfectly 
elastic supply of labour, Japanese experience has shown that 
investment 
is the limiting factor and that, provided farm productivity is enhanced 
there will be no shortage of unskilled labour and little 
difficulty 
in achieving the required transfer of manpower from agriculture 
to 
manufacturing and other rapidly expanding sectors 
in the economy. 
37West Africa 17/3/72. 
38W. A. Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies 
of Labour, Manchester School, lay, 1954. 
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Agriculture can make a useful contribution to foreign exchange 
earnings through enlarged agricultural exports. One of the constraints 
which have acted as a bottleneck to development process in many develop- 
ing countries is the shortage of foreign exchange. As shown in Table 3.1, 
agricultural exports accounted for a yearly average of about 60 per cent 
of Nigeria's total exports from 1962 to 1970. The Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations has emphasized that earnings from 
agricultural exports in Nigeria could be substantially increased to 
£163.2 million in 1974 and to £205 million in 1980 if efforts are made. 
39 
The projected agricultural export earnings envisaged by the United 
Nations' FAO may not be difficult to achieve, for two reasons. First, 
Nigerian agricultural export has reached a £161 million level in 1965 
without any serious improvement in the rural sector. If a marginal 
improvement takes place in the future, the result is likely to be 
beneficial to agricultural exports. Second, with the recent boom 
in primary products unprecedented in modern times, Nigeria is likely 
to benefit from high prices for commodities if the quantities available 
for export can be appreciably increased. Although the world export 
prices of primary products have been rising since 1970, during the 
last two years they rose more rapidly than ever before. Melvyn Westlake 
notes that "since last autumn, commodity prices have risen broadly by 
70-80 per cent". 
40 Among the primary products affected by the world 
boom are three of the Nigerian major agricultural exports, cocoa, 
groundnuts and cotton. Nigeria has already started to cash in on 
the boom, for in 1970, when the quantity of cocoa export fell below 
the 1962 level, the value of cocoa export nevertheless was nearly 
39FA0, UNITED NATIONS, Agricultural Development in Nigeria 
1965-1980, Rome, 1966. 
40 M. Westlake, Commodity Boom Redresses Balance, The Times, 
November 14,1973. 
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100 per cent above the 1962 level. The problem of Nigeria is there- 
fore one of how to increase substantially agricultural exports to take 
advantage of the world situation. There is no doubt whatsoever that 
the introduction of new crops or the increased production of existing 
agricultural export crops will continue to play a strategic role in 
providing enlarged supplies of foreign exchange. 
Agriculture may also make a great contribution to capital formation. 
In the Lewis model of the dual economy it is the rate of capital forma- 
tion which determines the rate of expansion of employment in the capitalist, 
high-wage sector, and it is the rate of expansion of such employment, 
relative to the growth of the labour force, which determines how soon 
the surplus rural labour will be so reduced that wage levels are no 
longer depressed by the low level of productivity and earnings in the 
subsistence agricultural sector. As agriculture usually bears the 
brunt of development, Nigeria's future economic progress requires a 
substantial amount of capital to finance investment in manufacturing, 
social overhead capital and recurrent government expenditure on health, 
education and other services. Although substantial earnings are at 
present derived from petroleum exports, the fact remains that the scope 
for raising agricultural productivity by means requiring only very 
little capital investments make it possible for agriculture to provide 
a net contribution to capital requirements without reducing consumption 
standards. Productivity can be increased in agriculture by the 
consolidation of holdings, by improvements in the land tenure system, 
by the expansion of land under cultivation, by planting improved high- 
yielding seeds, by improved marketing and storage facilities, by the 
application of fertilizers and hand tractors, which are not expensive. 
To raise productivity in the agricultural sector is one thing, 
to with- 
draw the surplus in the sector is another. The latter, 
however, is 
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not an easy task in a country like Nigeria where farmers often go 
on riots for small levies. Japanese economic development has shown 
that agriculture can make a substantial contribution to the financing 
of industrial expansion. There is no doubt that the agricultural 
sector bore the brunt of Japanese economic development. The instrument 
for siphoning off agricultural surplus in Japan at the initial stage of 
development was the land tax. The savings of the farmers were also 
gathered by the agricultural banks located in each prefecture. In 
England during the industrial revolution "With the agricultural sector 
providing the largest single contribution, directly or indirectly, to 
the savings produced by the economy before the industrial revolution, 
capital flows from the land were crucial. Landlords' rents and farmers' 
profits contributed capital for investment outside agriculture (particularly 
in transport) as well as for investment in agriculture itself. The 
greater willingness of the English landed classes to invest in these 
economically productive ways, the greater ability of English farmers 
to invest, and the greater opportunities for such profitable investment 
in England than in many continental countries proved very important 
indeed. Direct investment by groups in the landed sector became 
supplemented by a much more widespread connection once the country 
banking system began to tap the savings of agricultural districts 
more widely, and when farmers and landowners began to bank their 
balances rather than keeping them hoarded at home. "41 When agricultural 
productivity becomes increased in Nigeria, it will be easy to siphon 
off the farmers' surplus only if the rich businessmen and landowners, 
who are mostly tax-evaders, are made to contribute their fair share to 
development funds through progressive taxation. The absence of any 
41P. 
Mathias, The First Industrial Nation, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 
London, 1969, p. 65. 
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form of banking facilities in the rural areas and in some towns is 
an important obstacle to gathering farmers' savings for developmental 
purposes. 
Finally, rising agricultural productivity may raise the level of 
rural effective demand for industrial goods. Lewis's model assumes 
that the only obstacle to the expansion of the capitalist sector is 
the shortage of capital, thus an increase in rural nett cash income 
is not a stimulus to industrialization but an obstacle. However, both 
Lewis and Nurske stress the importance of rising rural purchasing 
power in providing profitable investment opportunities. 
42 
There is 
here a clear conflict between the emphasis on agriculture's essential 
contribution to capital requirements for overall growth and the emphasis 
on rising rural purchasing power. There is no simple way to reconcile 
this conflict, for the size of the available market is especially 
pertinent to investment decisions concerning industries characterized 
by economies of large-scale production. It is worth remembering, 
however, that first, the substitution of domestic for imported output 
often provides a significant rise in demand independent of a rise in 
purchasing power. Second, if capital requirements are large relative 
to available resources, it is the availability of capital and not the 
small size of the market that could limit the rate of investment. 
Third, there are also the political considerations which may affect 
policy measures. The Nigerian authorities, however, ought to realise 
that the marginal propensity to save and to invest in the agricultural 
sector is lower than in the industrial sector, and this therefore means 
that to decrease taxation in the agricultural sector may reduce the 
level of investment. 
42 
W. A. Lewis, Report on Industrialization and the Gold Coast, 
Accra, 1953; R. Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in Under- 
Developed Countries. 
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The past discussions have shown quite clearly that agriculture 
can make a substantial contribution to economic development. By pro- 
viding food, capital, raw materials and labour, the agricultural sector 
can help feed the growing industrial labour force, provide investment 
resources in the manufacturing sector, reduce costs through the provision 
of cheap raw materials for industrial establishments, and release labour 
for the manufacturing sector without a reduction in productivity. 
Increased productivity in the agricultural sector can stimulate the 
demand for industrial products while agricultural exports earnings can 
reduce the foreign exchange constraint on development. 
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN AGRICULTURE 
The fact that agriculture is the most important sector of the Nigerian 
economy has been firmly established in the previous sections. What 
needs to be seen is how U. K. investment has contributed to the develop- 
ment of Nigerian agriculture. The United Kingdom, as shown in Chapter II, 
is still the most important investor in Nigeria, accounting for over 
50 per cent of total foreign direct investment in 1968 when her cumulative 
total investment stood at £N261.2 million. If one goes by the history 
of the British-Nigerian relationship and the fact that the U. K. is the 
most important foreign investor in Nigeria, one would expect to find 
a reasonable proportion of U. K. investment in the agricultural sector. 
However, in recent years there has been very little additional U. K. 
direct investment in Nigerian agriculture, as Table 2.10 in Chapter II 
shows. Out of the five years which the Board of Trade statistics 
covered, only in two years were figures of net investment 
in agri- 
culture available, and for those two years the additional 
investment 
was nil (-0.6 in 1965; +0.6 in 1966). It will therefore 
be reasonable 
to assume that U. K. net, private direct investment 
has not been going 
to the agricultural sector. We are therefore 
left with the only 
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alternative of looking at previous U. K. cumulative investment in 
agriculture in order to know the contribution of U. K. direct investors 
to Nigeria's agricultural development. Table 2.12 in Chapter II, 
showing the sectoral distribution of U. K. cumulative investment in 
Nigeria in 1968, reveals the absence of U. K. investment in Nigerian 
agriculture. Although we were told that the figures of U. K. invest- 
ment in Nigerian agriculture were not available, since 174 companies 
were responsible for the £93.6 million value of U. K. direct investment 
in Nigeria at the end of 1968, it can be reasonably assumed that U. K. 
direct investment in Nigerian agriculture was either marginal or non- 
existent. 
Information about the extent of U. K. investment in Nigerian agri- 
culture has been collected from various sources. 
TABLE 3.6 
U. K. PLANTATIONS IN NIGERIA 1905-1960 
YEAR PLANTATION MANAGEMENT 
TOTAL 
ACREAGE 
AVAILABLE 
TOTAL 
ACREAGE 
PLANTED, 
1963 
19.07 Not iI80 (Rubber) Palmol Ltd. 4000 3875 
1905 Sapele Rubber Planta- Miller Brothers 2000 1950 
tion 
- Jamaison River Rubber United Africa Coy. 2000 1930 
Estate 
1936 Cowan Oil Palm Estate United Africa Coy. 6900 6500 
1937 Calabar Oil Palm Palmol Ltd. 12000 7000 
Estate 
1959 Not Okpora Road Dunlop 20000 12171 
(Rubber) 
IJ 
- 
SOURCE: R. K. UDO, BRITISH POLICY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPORT CROPS 
IN NIGERIA, Nigeria Journal of Economics and Social Studies, November, 1967. 
Table 3.6 shows the extent of U. K. plantations in Nigeria before 1961. 
Out of a total of 40 plantations varying from 500 to 20,000 acres in 
Nigeria at the end of 1960, only six were British-owned; the remaining 
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shirty-four are owned by private Nigerian citizens, partnerships and 
Jigerian Development Corporations. 
There are several reasons why British direct investment was and 
is still very small in Nigerian agriculture. The British colonial 
government's agricultural policy in Nigeria was based on the notion 
that the agricultural resources of the country can best be developed 
and exploited through Nigerian farmers. As the Governor of Nigeria 
said in 1940, the British government had no intention of turning 
Nigerians from a race of farmers "into a race of labourers. "43 As 
consequence, foreign entrepreneurs were refused permission to own--lands 
and the plantation system which proved successful in East and Central 
Africa and Congo was rejected as unsuitable for Nigeria. However, the 
effect of the Government's ban was partial and limited only to reducing 
the number of plantations in particular crops, and as will be shown 
later, there are more important reasons why British companies are likely 
to invest in only a few crops. 
Three factors were the main determinant of the agricultural policy 
of the British government in Nigeria. The first consideration was 
economic. The British government at that time did not see the economic 
viability of the plantation system in Nigeria. Although the government 
was aware of the technical advantage of the plantation system and the 
inefficiency associated with peasant producers, the fact that enormous 
losses could be incurred in the plantation when the weather was bad 
and that the heavy fixed costs of management, labour, housing, etc. 
still had to be met even when there was no harvest, prompted the British 
government to prefer the small scale peasant producers who could shift 
from cash crops to food crops without much disruption to the social 
set-up when the weather was bad. The second reason is closely associated 
with the first. In plantations during periods of depression retrenchment 
of labour usually occurred. The British government was aware of the 
social and economic consequences of retrenched labour in plantations 
during depressions and so ruled against the system. The plantation 
system could also lead to the displacement of families especially in the 
densely populated parts of the country which invariablywere the areas 
43This 
statement is part of the Governor's speech to the 
Legislative Council on March 4,1940. 
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most suitable for plantations. The creation of a large pool of a 
landless proletariat resulting from the plantation system could not 
only result in riots and agitations, but such a pool of deprived people 
could provide a class for breeding criminals and law-breakers. Also 
considered important is the fact that the plantation system would 
lead to migration of labour between different parts of the country 
which might upset local tribal life and consequently lead to unhealthy 
tribal rivalry. The last factor determining the agricultural policy 
of the British government in Nigeria was the desire to prevent the 
unnecessary exploitation of the land resources of Nigeria by foreigners. 
As the High Commissioner of the then Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, 
Sir Ralph Ioor, claimed, Great Britain was, in accordance with the 
principle of Dual Mandate which formed the basis of British political 
policy in tropical Africa, morally committed to protect the natives 
and their land from exploitation by foreign capitalists. It is, however, 
difficult to discover the reason why the protection from foreigners 
offered to Nigerian farmers was not extended to East and Central Africa 
where white settlers engaged in the plantation system on a large scale. 
In sum, as far as the British government's anti-plantation policy in 
Nigeria was concerned, "it is fair to recognize that it was well- 
intentioned, although it was by no means the best policy to follow. 
The economic arguments put forward in support of the policy were largely 
based on sentiments and so was the idea of the desire to preserve local 
tribal life - an idea which was both unrealistic and 
inconsistent with 
the growing desire for economic betterment by the people". 
44 
Once foreign capitalists had been excluded from Nigerian agriculture, 
it was left for the Nigerians to develop both their cash crops and food 
44R. K. Udo, British Policy and the Development of Export Crops 
in Nigeria, NJESS, November, 1967. 
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crops to the maximum level possible. The British government did not, 
however, fail to help the peasants in the cultivation of cash crops. 
It was in the interest of the British government that export crops 
were increased in order to swell her foreign exchange resources. As 
a result, the British government embarked on giving various incentives 
to the farmers. In 1910 the Department of Agriculture was established 
to persuade farmers to introduce new farming methods and crops, to carry 
out research and to co-ordinate agricultural policies. Cash subsidies, 
improved seedlings, fertilizers and free supervision and instructions 
on planting, harvesting, -pest control and mechanization were made 
available to farmers as an incentive for increased production of export 
crops. 
Despite all the cash and incentives in kind offered to the Nigerian 
peasants by the government, the results of the policies on agricultural 
production were far from being satisfactory. The yields of some crops 
did not reach the expected level and in other cases where large yields 
were recorded, the inferiority of the crops reduced their prices and 
marketability in the international market. It is quite plain therefore 
that the agricultural policy of the British government in Nigeria did 
not achieve its major aim of increasing agricultural production through 
the peasants. At the same time, the anti-plantation policy did not 
allow foreign investors to engage in Nigerian agriculture. The first 
oil palm plantations in the world were located in the Congo and llalaya, 
after the British government had refused Mr. William Lever 
(later 
Lord Leverhulme) in 1907,1920 and 1925 permission to establish oil 
plantations in Nigeria. The establishment of two oil palm estates 
near Benin and Calabar in 1936 and 1937 respectively took place when 
the British Government relaxed its anti-plantation policy. No sooner 
were these estates established, however, than the government clamped 
down once again on the plantation system. 
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Towards the end of British rule in Nigeria there was a radical 
change in agricultural policy. The plantation systems received a boost 
after 1950 owing. to the belief among Nigerian leaders that the success 
which accompanied the plantation system in the Congo and the Cameroons 
would be achieved in Nigeria. In addition, because the plantation 
system interested foreign investors, foreign investment strategy might 
have persuaded the Nigerian government to go into plantations. As 
Nigeria progressed towards political independence and the achievement 
of self-government in the East and West in 1957, the majority of 
Nigerian leaders were in favour of the plantation system, and this 
resulted in the establishment of a large number of plantations by 
various Nigerian Development Corporations. Out of about 40 plantations 
established in Nigeria between 1905 and 1960, only six were established 
before 1950; the remaining 34 were established between 1951 and 1960. 
After Nigeria had achieved independence in 1960, it was not an 
easy task for the Nigerian government to,. persuade British investors to 
engage in agriculture. Having been restricted from investing in Nigerian 
agriculture for over half a century, it is not difficult to see why it was 
not easy for British investors to engage in agriculture. The reaction of 
some British investors who are engaged in agro-allied industries to Nigerian 
agriculture was distorted by the policy of British colonial government for 
Nigerian agriculture. One British company whose agricultural investment 
in Nigeria is in every respect reminiscent of British government's 
agricultural policy in pre-independent Nigeria is the Nigerian Tobacco 
Company (NTC). The NTC is a subsidiary of the British-American Tobacco 
Company of London, whose agricultural policy in Nigeria is simply one of 
encouraging the peasants to grow tobacco rather than owning tobacco 
plantations themselves. The short gestration period of tobacco and the 
ability of Nigerian farmers to grow superior tobacco make peasant 
agriculture preferable to the plantation system in tobacco growing. 
Tobacco growing in Nigeria dated back to the nineteenth century 
when it was grown for hand-rolled cigarettes and pipes and for chewing 
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purposes. It was not until 1915, however, that the Department of 
Agriculture started to experiment with imported varieties with the 
hope of developing an export trade in tobacco. The experiments were 
unsuccessful, and the idea of commercial production has to wait until 
1933 when the NTC opened a pilot cigarette factory at Oshogbo. In 
order to ensure the domestic supply of tobacco for the new factory, the 
NTC encouraged the peasant farmers to grow tobacco by distributing 
free seeds. As a result, 83 acres of tobacco were grown in Southern 
Nigeria in 1934. The peasant, however, faced the enormous problem 
of getting finance to create barns for flue-cured tobacco, and as a 
result, in the 1920s, the Agricultural Department had thought that the 
flue-cured tobacco was out of the question for peasant farmers. To 
eradicate this problem, the NTC originally undertook the curing of 
the flue-cured tobacco in its barns, and after 1954 the company trans- 
ferred to producers the barns which it had built and operated itself, 
so that the groups now undertake all curing. 
The NTC became after 1954 the buyer and the manufacturer of tobacco 
grown by Nigerian peasant farmers. There are several ways by which 
the NTC has helped the Nigerian tobacco growers. 
Firstly, the company provided the farmer with plants grown in the 
company's nurseries and supervised his cultivation through the Company's 
extension workers, referred to as the "Leaf Staff". Secondly, the 
company encouraged the formation of co-operatives and business companies 
which are registered with the Ministry of Co-operatives and Industry. 
Thirdly, the company lends money to co-operatives on generous terms 
for the construction of barns, for the purchase of other crops, 
fertilizers, sprays and farm implements. Fourthly, the consolidation 
of fragmented plots into large holdings and the use of tractors on 
tobacco farms were due to the encouragement of the company. And 
lastly, 
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the results of the research carried out by the Leaf Department of the 
Company were readily made available to farmers. 
As a result of the activities of the company, the three-year 
mean of the acreage of tobacco grown rose from 935 acres in 1944-6 
to 11,235 acres in 1960-62; the average yield from 349 lbs. /acre to 
519 lbs. /acre; and the production of cured leaf from 326,500 pounds 
to 5,829,000 pounds. Commercial tobacco, which occupied about 
40,000 acres in 1965, is likely to have increased to nearly 60,000 acres 
by now. With the formation of Philip Morris Ltd. at Ilorin in 1963, 
in which the U. A. C. group owns a minority share, tobacco growing in 
Nigeria further received a boost. At the moment about 100,000 Nigerian 
farmers depend on tobacco growing for their livelihood. Without doubt, 
even though the NTC has not invested directly in tobacco growing in 
Nigeria, its activities in the form of advice, supervision, free seeds, 
generous credits and the organised purchase of tobacco have helped 
Nigerian agriculture. 
45 
There are four main reasons why the NTC's strategy was successful 
in Nigeria. The first reason is the genuine interest the company took 
and still takes in tobacco growing. The NTC wanted cheap raw tobacco 
for its cigarette factories and the only way to get this was through the 
encouragement of peasant production. Second, the Nigerian tobacco 
growers were concentrated in a particular division of the Western State 
and as a consequence they were not difficult to organize. Presumably 
if the farmers were mattered all over a wide area, the story would 
have 
been different. Third, the direct purchase of the tobacco harvests of 
farmers and the prompt payments made by the NTC provided an 
impetus 
for confidence and hard work among farmers. And 
last, the short gestation 
45More 
will be said about the industrial activities of 
the company 
in Chapter IV. 
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period between planting and harvesting ensures two harvests in one 
year, The latter provides an incentive to farmers to work hard 
when one harvest is bad. In the final analysis, the success of the 
scheme was due mainly to the initiative and the hard work of the NTC. 
The U. K. manufacturers of cocoa products, especially Cadbury Brothers, 
Ltd., have contributed indirectly to agricultural development in Nigeria 
with special emphasis on cocoa. Although they have not invested 
directly in cocoa production, their buying agencies have undertaken 
extension work on methods of fermentation and drying, and they also 
helped to formulate the inspection and grading regulations, all of 
which improved the quality of cocoa production. The Cadbury plantation 
in the Cameroons may also have some demonstration effects on farmers 
through the information provided on cultivation and costs contained in 
"Cocoa Growers' Bulletin", a bi-annual publication issued by Cadbury 
Brothers to farmers and co-operative societies in Nigeria. U. K. cocoa 
products manufacturers have also contributed to research activities on 
cocoa through the provision of insect-proof quarantine houses for the 
Cocoa Research Institute in Nigeria, and financed the introduction 
of a collection of breeding material from Trinidad to Nigeria. 
Apart from the investment activities of the oil companies, the 
most important U. K. investor in Nigeria is the United Africa Company 
(UAC) and its subsidiaries. The UAC Group accounts for about half of 
the total U. K. investment in Nigeria, excluding oil investments. The 
contribution of the UAC to Nigeria's agricultural development 
has been 
both indirect through buying and marketing export produce and providing 
inducements, and direct through the provision of tools and other 
inputs 
for farming, operating plantations, and processing 
the produce. The UAC 
initial agricultural function in Nigeria was that of 
buying the Nigerian 
( 
primary produce for use in industry in the U. K. 
As a consequence, the 
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company's contribution to agricultural development in Nigeria was 
indirect through the provision of credits, the building of roads to 
extract timber, which often stimulated the opening of new lands along 
the roads, and the confidence it gave to farmers that a steady market 
existed for their products. Another indirect contribution of the UAC 
to Nigerian agriculture has been the supply of agricultural implements 
to Nigerian farmers. Bullock-operated sugar crushers and corn-mills 
were supplied to many parts of the country, and in addition in the three 
Eastern States of Nigeria the company developed and sold several thousands 
of hand presses for palm oil and the Pioneer Oil Mill, a medium-scale 
machine press. Experiments in the use of tractors in the Sokoto Rice 
Scheme were a failure but still the UAC, as Massey-Harris dealers, has 
provided simple but efficient implements, such as groundnut planters and 
groundnut lifters, to farmers in the Northern part of Nigeria. A further 
achievement of the UAC to help Nigerian agriculture was the establishment 
of a crocodile matchet factory at Port Harcourt in 1965 to supply hand 
implements to Nigerian farmers. 
The major direct contribution of UAC to agriculture in Nigeria are 
the plantations owned by the company. Mr. William Lever, the first 
Lord Leverhulme's interest in Nigeria grew from the need for vegetable 
oil for his soap industry in England. As a consequence, the UAC began 
to develop plantations in Nigeria and the Congo, and by 1950 the company 
operated 110,000 acres in both countries. At this time it employed 
nearly 40,000 plantation workers, and had built over 20,000 cottage- 
type workers' houses, providing accommodation for a total community 
of over 50,000. The plantations have produced palm oil and kernels, 
rubber and cocoa, and the company's research department has done 
invaluable work in collaboration with government departments, particularly 
on oil palm. In order to meet the increasing demand for raw materials 
in its soap factories at Lagos and Aba, the UAC further expanded its 
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oil palm estates near Benin and Calabar in the 1950s. The Minna farm 
in Northern Nigeria, which was established in 1959 by the UAC, supplies 
large numbers of pigs both for consumption and for the company's West 
African Cold Storage in Apapa for the processing of meat products. 
The UAC has also established other industries apart from those 
mentioned above to process agricultural products. The bulk oil plants 
which processed all the palm oil exported from Nigeria was formerly 
owned by the UAC before being bought by the government. The UAC has 
also formed a partnership with the Northern Nigeria government to 
develop a Kenaf estate at Jema'a with the ultimate aim of establishing 
a factory for bag production. Farmers have been encouraged to grow 
the fibre themselves in order to supply raw materials for the bag 
factory in Jos. Another area of contribution is the 7 per cent shares 
held in the Nigerian Sugar Company at Bacita, established in 1963 to 
manufacture sugar cube and by-products. Without doubt the UAC has 
contributed substantially to Nigerian agriculture through the granting 
of credits, the purchase of raw materials, the supply of agricultural 
implements and directly through its plantations and pig farm. The 
establishment of agro-allied industries has also provided a ready 
market for Nigerian agricultural produce and indirectly stimulates 
production. 
Other British companies which have contributed to the development 
of agriculture in Nigeria include Dunlop, I. C. T. and Bookers 
Ltd. 
As shown in Table 3.4, the Dunlop Company has the 
largest rubber 
estate among foreign companies in Nigeria. The plantation which 
was 
established in 1959 near Calabar was designed 
to supply rubber for 
the company's tyre factory at Ikeja in Lagos. 
About 500 Nigerians 
are directly or indirectly employed in the plantation. 
I. C. I. 's 
contribution to Nigerian agriculture has been 
indirect through the 
blackpod chemicals produced in the U. K. by 
its subsidiary - 
92 
Plant Protection Limited. Blackpod disease had been a major threat 
to Nigerian cocoa until Plant Protection Limited produced a product 
called "Perenox" which was sold to farmers along with the spraying 
equipment by UAC, the appointed agent of PPL. I. C. Y. further intro- 
duced another product called "Perepod" and UAC, through its produce- 
buying organization helped to test and later to promote it successfully. 
The material and spraying equipment reached farmers through the government- 
financed co-operative movement. At present Gammalin 20, produced in 
the U. K. and distributed by John Holts and UAC, has replaced previous 
chemicals and it is widely used by cocoa farmers in Nigeria. 
An aspect of agriculture in which a British firm has invested and 
performed other important functions has been the £6 million Bacita Sugar 
project of the Nigerian Sugar Company Ltd. The project, studies for 
which began in 1957, comprises some 6000 acres planted with cane, a 
factory capable of producing 60,000 tons of white sugar a year, and a 
division to sell and distribute sugar to retail outlets throughout 
Nigeria. Total capital of the Nigerian Sugar Company Ltd., a public 
company incorporated in Lagos in 1962, is £3.8 million. All the 
Nigerian governments are represented on the Board. A British 
subsidiary company in Nigeria called Bookers 
(Nig. ) Ltd. is one of 
the largest shareholders. The company is also the managing agent of 
Nigerian Sugar Company Ltd. For its initial annual production of 
some 25,000 tons of sugar, the company employed an all-the-year-round 
force of about 11,000, plus another 1,200 for cane cutting, 
transport 
and replanting during the harvesting period from November 
to April. 
The labour force grew from 300 in 1962 to 1,800 in 1964, and at 
the 
moment over 3,000 people are employed in the venture. 
We have noted from the previous sections that U. K. private 
direct 
investment in Nigerian agriculture has been very marginal indeed. 
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What we are concerned with at the present moment is the reasons why 
Nigerian agriculture has not absorbed substantial U. K. private capital 
as was the case in East and Central Africa. The first important reason 
why U. K. private investors have not invested in Nigerian agriculture 
is the agricultural policy of the British colonial government which 
prohibited the ownership of land by foreigners. The plantation system 
was regarded as unsuitable for Nigeria, and British investors interested 
in such ventures had to turn elsewhere. Although in 1951 a new 
constitution permitted regional governments in Nigeria to alienate 
land but at that time only a few British investors were interested in 
the agricultural sector, having been used to new lines of investment 
activities, it was not easy to persuade private investors to shift 
their resources to agriculture. The second reason for marginal invest- 
ment in agriculture is the lack of experience or any knowledge about 
agricultural investment. A large majority of firms interviewed 
emphasized the fact that they have no knowledge of any kind about 
agriculture as being the major reason ruling out agricultural investment 
from their investment projects in Nigeria. As far as many U. K. private 
firms in Nigeria are concerned, investment in Nigerian agriculture 
would represent "a round peg in a square hole" which would neither fit 
nor be comfortable. Another factor of importance is the low rate of 
return on agricultural investments. The level of return on agricultural 
investments depends on a number of factors such as the weather, pests 
and diseases, and the price obtained on the harvested products. Some 
of these factors are outside the control of an investor, and the latter, 
the price of crops, is very important, since the Nigerian Marketing 
Board has the sole monopoly of buying the majority of Nigerian export 
crops. In addition, it takes a longer period to get any yield from 
agricultural crops. Cash crops like cocoa, palm produce, coconut and 
rubber take from 5 to 7 years before any harvest can be reaped from them 
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after planting. To many British investors, who are in most cases 
myapic, such an investment represents an unnecessary tying-down of 
capital which ought to be profitably used elsewhere. In the final 
analysis, agricultural investments are not likely to be attractive 
to British investors since they want to recoup their initial capital 
investment within 3 to 5 years of their operations in Nigeria. The 
last factor of importance which has acted as a disincentive to foreign 
private investment in the agricultural sector is the buying activities 
of the Nigerian Marketing Boards. The Nigerian Marketing Boards, who 
are charged with the buying of the majority of Nigerian cash crops, 
have tended to price these products below the minimum accepted level, 
with the result that such prices have acted as a disincentive to in- 
creased production. The CBI in 1961 laid emphasis on the problem a 
foreign investor would face if he had to buy his raw materials from 
a monopoly coller, such as the Nigerian Marketing Boards, and that 
guarantees and assurances of protection against such monopolists are 
required to encourage investment. 
46 
Nine years later, in 1970, the 
CBI echoed the same feeling: "Marketing Boards exist for palm oil, 
groundnuts, bonni seed, cotton and soye bean. There is reason to 
believe that their operation has so affected the return on these crops 
that further investment has been discouraged. "47 The result of the 
pricing policies of the Marketing Boards has been to encourage foreign 
private investors who are particularly interested in agricultural 
investments to concentrate on products which are not bought by the 
Boards, like rubber, pige and other food crops. As a result of the above 
reasons, only three British companies, the UAC, Dunlop and Bookers Ltd. 
46CBI, 
Nigeria: An Industrial Reconnonssance, London, February 1961. 
More will be said later about other factors limiting British investment in 
Nigerian agriculture. 
47 
CBI, Nigeria, 1970, London (no date). 
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have direct investments in Nigerian agriculture. If, however, British 
companies are not interested in direct investment in agriculture, a 
British public corporation has done a lot to improve agricultural 
development, and its activities will be the subject of the following 
discussion. 
COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (CDC) 
The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) was established by 
an Act of Parliament in 1948 as the Colonial Development Corporation 
to assist the economic development of British dependent territories. 
As many of the dependent territories became independent and more were 
in the process of becoming independent, an Act of Parliament in 1963 
changed its name to Commonwealth Development Corporation, to enable the 
Corporation to operate in newly independent territories within the 
Commonwealth. In 1969 the Overseas Resources Development Act empowered 
the CDC, with the approval of the Minister for Overseas Development, 
to operate outside the Commonwealth. So far, the CDC has been permitted 
to operate in the Cameroons, Ethiopia, Indonesia and Thailand. In other 
words, the CDC has become a world corporation operating on commercial 
lines, with the obligation that it must pay its way. The CDC has 
regional offices in different parts of the world, and its function has 
been to undertake projects for the promotion and expansion of economic 
activities in areas where it operates. The economic activities in 
which the CDC has invested include agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
mining, commerce and industry, electricity and water undertakings, 
transport, housing, hotels, building and engineering. The investment 
activities of CDC have grown astronomically since its inception 
in 1948. 
At the end of 1949 there were 28 projects with a capital outlay of 
£1,418,700 and of these, approximately one-third were agricultural. 
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? e_n years later at the end of 1959 there were 88 projects with an 
invested capital of E5999219000. By December 1969, there were over 
180 projects, with an outlay of £129,890,000. As the investment 
activities of CDC grow, so does the functional distribution of its 
investment become more sophisticated and radically changes. 
TABLE 3.7 
FUNCTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF COC'S INVESTMENT 1959-1971 IN PERCENTAGES 
SECTORS 1959 1960 1965 1970 1971 
Basic Development (Public Utilities 45.2 52.5 53.1 50.3 52.0 
Primary Production 43.1 38.3 21.0 19.2 17.8 
Commerce and Industry 11.7 9.2 25.9 30.5 30.2 
SOURCE: CDC ANNUAL REPORTS 1959-1971 
In Table 3.7, the primary sector accounted for 43.1 per cent of CDC's 
total investment in 1959, but after this date the proportion absorbed 
by the sector has been falling until it reached its lowest level in 
1971. Investments in public utilities remained steady over the period, 
but what was not invested in the primary sector was invested in commerce 
and industry. In 1959 only 11.7 per cent of the total investment went 
to commerce and industry. By 1971, commerce and industry absorbed 
nearly one-third of CDC total investments. Investments in public 
utilities were concentrated on power and water supply, housing and 
transport. In 1971 the 52 per cent of the total investment absorbed 
by public utilities was distributed as follows: power and water supply 
25 per cent; housing 24 per cent and transport 3 per cent. The shift 
in emphasis from primary production since 1959 was due to the stipulation 
by the government that the CDC must pay its way. As an official of 
CDC who was interviewed told the writer, "at any point in 
time there 
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is always a large amount of CDC investment in projects at the develop- 
ment stage, and so there is no return from them at all. If we are to 
pay our way, as we should, we ought to invest in commerce and industry 
in order to get some return". 
The CDC operation in Nigeria is of particular importance to the 
economy of the country. Apart from Shell-BP and UAC, the CDC is the 
third largest British investor in Nigeria. At the end of 1971, the 
CDC's investment in Nigeria was nearly ten million pounds. Table 3.8 
shows the operations of the CDC in Nigeria at the end of 1971. 
TABLE 3.8 
CDC'S OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA AS AT 31ST DECEMBER, 1971 
1. BASIC DEVELOPMENT (PUBLIC UTILITIES) £3,253,671 
Lagos Executive Development Board 
Nigerian Housing Development Society Ltd. 
2. PRIMARY PRODUCTION 
Ilushin Estates Ltd. (Rubber) 
Oke-Afa Farms Ltd. (Poultry) 
Savanah Sugar Co., Ltd. (Sugar Estate) 
South Chad Irrigation Pilot Project (Wheat & 
Rice 
South-Eastern State Rubber Plantations Ltd. ) 
Cross River Rubber Estate ) 
3. COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
Afprint (Nig. ). Ltd. 
Development Finance Co., Ltd. 
Dunlop Nigerian Industries Ltd. 
Five Star Industries Ltd. 
Hill Station Hotel Ltd. 
Nigeria Hotels Ltd. 
Nigerian Cement Company Ltd. 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank 
Northern Hotels Ltd. 
Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd. 
Zamfara Textiles Industries Ltd. 
TOTAL INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA 
L1,028,671 
L2,225,000 
L77,778 
L100,000 
L64,000 
L50,000 
E401,652 
L554,000 
f1,000,000 
E150,000 
L258,334 
L25,000 
L636,852 
L472,500 
E75,000 
L83,350 
L2,297,800 
L100,000 
£693,430 
L5,652,836 
L9,599,937 
SOURCE: CDC ANNUAL REPORT, 1971. 
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CDC investments were in nineteen areas, of which six were agricultural 
projects. What is important, however, is the amount invested in each 
area of operation. The distribution of the CDC's investment in Nigeria 
at the end of 1971 is as follows: basic development 33.9 per cent; 
primary production 7.2 per cent; and commerce and industry 58.9 per cent. 
If the functional distribution of the CDC's investment in the world is 
compared with that of Nigeria at the end of 1971, a great divergence 
would be observed between the two. 
AREAS THE WORLD NIGERIA DIFFERENCE 
(Per cent) (per cent) (Per cent) 
Basic Development 52.0 33.9 -18.1 
Primary Production 17.8 7.2 -10.6 
Commerce and Industry 30.2 58.9 +28.7 
These figures show that the CDC's investments in Nigeria's basic develop- 
ment and primary production were 18.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent 
respectively below the world average investments in these areas in 1971. 
Investments in Nigeria's commerce and industry were 28.7 per cent above 
CDC's investments in these sectors at the end of 1971, which will tend 
to suggest that more profitable opportunities existed in Nigeria's commerce 
and industry than in many areas where the CDC operates. Our main concern 
here is with agricultural investments which accounted for only 7.2 per cent 
of the CDC's total investments in Nigeria in 19.71. Ilushin Estates Ltd. 
is a rubber plantation venture of over 5,000 acres owned by the Western 
State government and the CDC. No profits were made at the end of 
1971 
due to delays in the delivery of factory plant, depressed market conditions 
and rising costs. The Oke-Afa Farms Ltd. is a poultry venture owned 
by a Nigerian - Chief Ashamu. The CDC's 
involvement here was simply 
the advancing of £1.1 million to the businessman. The Savanah 
Sugar 
Co., Ltd., is still at its pilot stage. The Federal government of 
Nigeria requested the CDC to investigate the site near 
the confluence 
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of the Gongola and Benue rivers for a sugar estate. As a consequence, 
the CDC, with technical assistance from Bookers and Tate & Lyle, is at 
present undertaking a feasibility study of the project. Management 
and consultancy services for the project are being provided by the CDC. 
The South Chad irrigation pilot project is a joint venture between the 
CDC and the North-Eastern State government to investigate the mechanised 
production of wheat and rice, and the settlement of smallholders on an 
area of over 500 acres. The CDC has seconded a manager with two 
supporting staff, who are being paid under British technical aid for the 
project. The Southern Eastern State Rubber Plantations Ltd. and the 
Cross River Rubber Estate were rubber plantations formerly owned by 
Dunlop but bought over by the Southern Eastern State government. The 
CDC has not only provided finance for these projects, but technical 
services and management have also been provided. 
The above discussion has shown that the CDC's agricultural invest- 
ments, in Nigeria have been concentrated on rubber (the only cash crop) 
and food crops like wheat, rice, poultry and sugar. The CDC has not 
invested in any of the crops purchased by the Nigerian Marketing Boards. 
There is no doubt that the CDC has contributed directly to agricultural 
development in Nigeria. By investing in cash and food crops, the CDC 
is not only helping to increase the export of rubber, but also helping 
to provide food for thousands of Nigerians when the wheat and rice 
project in 1aiduguri reaches maturity. By providing consultancy and 
technical services as well as management for some of its agricultural 
projects, the CDC is indirectly contributing to the efficiency of Nigerian 
agriculture. It must be added, however, that the CDC's investments in 
Nigerian agriculture are very small compared with the enormous capital 
flowing to commerce and industry, but as one official of the CDC stated 
when interviewed, investments in the agricultural sector are in "projects 
which cannot attract investment because of the low return and the 
long 
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yielding period. It is the small investment in industry which enables 
us to make some profit. " 
THE STATE OF NIGERIAN AGRICULTURE 
It has been established at the beginning of the chapter that Nigeria 
is an agricultural country and will remain so for the foreseeable future, 
no matter how great the growth of industry and oil production may be. 
A country that is willing to grow ought to, and should, make use of its 
abundant resources as the springboard of its development process. The 
immediate problem facing Nigerian leaders in the 1950s was "to discover 
the actual and potential prime movers in the economy, and to seek to 
facilitate their growth. For if the prime movers are pushing ahead 
rapidly, everything else will fäll into place". 
48 
Nigerian leaders 
took no time to realize that agriculture was the prime mover of the 
economy, for as W. A. Lewis said, "the growth of agricultural exports 
has been the main element carrying the economy". 
49 
It was therefore 
not a misplaced emphasis when the IBRD declared in its report on Nigeria 
that "Nigeria's economic development and the improvement of its living 
standards thus depend largely upon the growth and progress of the agri- 
cultural sector of the economy". 
50 
Since the IBRD wrote its report, 
petroleum has been discovered and exploited in Nigeria, but still the 
emphasis on agriculture has not waned. In 1961 Lord Netherthorpe 
observed that "No investment by Nigeria herself could yield greater 
dividends nor contribute more effectively to her economic and industrial 
development than agriculture". 
51 
48W. 
A. Lewis, Reflections on Nigeria's Economic Growth, OECD, 
Paris 1967, p. 15. 
49 
W. A. Lewis, Ibid., p. 16. 
50IBRD, 
The Economic Development of Nigeria, John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1955, p. 192. 
51 
CBI, Nigeria: An Industrial Reconnaissance, London, February, 
1961. 
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Having made up their minds to develop agriculture, Nigerian leaders 
after 1950 concentrated their attention on the development of export 
crops through the plantation system, which the British government had 
regarded as unsuitable to Nigeria. As a consequence, out of the 40 
plantations in Nigeria at the end of 1960,28 were wholly owned by the 
Nigerian governments. Twenty-one of the thirty-two plantations 
established in Nigeria since 1951 are completely controlled and owned 
by the governments. Two were wholly owned by expatriates, three were 
wholly owned by Nigerians and joint government-private firms amount to 
six. The financing and the management of the government plantations 
were left with the Regional Development Corporations. However, despite 
the efforts of the Regional governments to increase production through 
plantations, the results were far from being satisfactory. In 1961, 
only 5 per cent of the 60,000 tons of rubber produced and 32 per cent 
of the total palm oil export of 165,000 tons came from the plantations. 
In 1970, an estimated 95 per cent of Nigerian cocoa was produced in the 
Western State by about 350,000 cocoa farmers and about 20 per cent of the 
total production of rubber came from the plantations. Although the 
plantations supplied high quality commodities, their failure to provide 
a sizeable part of total agricultural production convinced the Nigerian 
governments that encouragement and incentives should be given to the 
farmers. As a consequence, various regional governments embarked upon 
a number of programmes. In 1962, the then Eastern Region launched 
the 
Oil Palm Rehabilitation Scheme. Under the scheme farmers were paid a 
subsidy of about £18 per acre in the form of cash, 
fertilizers and seedlings 
over a five-year period, provided new oil lands were opened and planted 
with improved palms developed by the Nigerian Institute 
for Oil Palm 
Research. As a result of the scheme, over 50,000 acres of oil-palm 
were planted in the Eastern Region between 1962 and 
1967. In addition, 
farmers were encouraged to form co-operatives, and efforts were made 
for 
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the replacement of the traditional hand-squeezing method of processing 
palm oil by the widespread use of the hand hydraulic oil mills, which 
the UAC did so well to supply, often on credit. 
In the then Western Region, the effort of the government was con- 
centrated on improving cocoa supply. The Nigerian Cocoa Research 
Institute, which was an outgrowth of the West African Cocoa Research 
Institute established by the British government, devoted its energy to 
the elimination of the blackpod disease. The control of cocoa pests, 
and the -widespread use of gammalin 20 and spraying equipment among cocoa 
farmers were due to the intensive campaign and the generous loans offered 
by the Western Regional government. Further assistance to farmers in- 
cluded subsidies on fertilizers and insecticides, distribution of high- 
yielding seedlings and intensive extension assistance. Farm settlements 
were also undertaken to provide employment for school leavers. Out of 
the three Regional governments, the Northern Region government was the 
only one that did not invest in plantations. Instead, the government 
embarked upon helping farmers to increase the production of cotton and 
groundnuts by providing new varieties of seeds, and subsidizing fertilizers. 
Fertilizers used in Northern Nigeria increased from 4,000 tons in 1962 
to 35,000 tons in 1967. In the Mid-West, there was an intensification 
of the extension programme, and of developing high-yielding clonal rubber 
seedlings for distribution to farmers at subsidized rates. Hiring units 
for tractors and equipment and service workshops were set up in all the 
regions. The governments' programmes when put in money terms were not 
as extensive as the description above would tend to suggest. Out of a 
total capital expenditure programme of £676.5 million in the 1962-68 
Development Plan, only £91.9 million was allocated to the primary sector, 
and this represented 13.5 per cent of the Plan's total expenditure. 
During the Plan period, 1962-68, however, only £52.7 million out of 
the 
103 
planned expenditure of £91.9 million was spent and this represents an 
underspending of 42.8 per cent. During the Second National Development 
Plan period of 1970-74, £107,663,000 has been ear-marked for agriculture out 
of a total capital expenditure of £1,025,369,000. Planned expenditure 
on agriculture during the 1970-74 period represents 10.5 per cent of total 
capital expenditure. Some light is shown on the credibility gap between 
what the governments say they would do and what they actually did by 
Table 3.9. 
TABLE 3.9 
SECTORAL PERFORMANCE: AGRICULTURE 1970-71 (*MILLION) 
PLANNED ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE EXPENDITURE PERFORMANCE 
STATE 1970-71 1970-71 RATIO PER CENT 
Federal 4.545 2.407 53.0 
Benue-Plateau 0.645 0.502 77.8 
East Central 2.239 0.341 15.2 
Kano 3.917 1.661 42.4 
Kwara 0.364 0.069 19.0 
Lagos 0.455 0.010 2.2 
Mid-Western 0.934 0.509 54.5 
North-Central 0.681 0.399 58.6 
North-Eastern 0.826 0.295 35.7 
North-Western 0.759 0.211 27.8 
Rivers 0.707 0.309 43.7 
South Eastern 1.962 0.070 3.6 
Western 2.466 1.073 43.5 
TOTAL 20.5 7.856 38.3 
PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURE IN 
ALL SECTORS 10.8 6.6 
per cent per cent 
SOURCE: SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1970-74, FIRST PROGRESS REPORT, 
THE CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE, LAGOS, 1972. 
In all the States, actual expenditure on agriculture was substantially 
below the targets set. Overall expenditure in all the states was 
61.7 per cent below the planned target. Also, while 
the planned 
expenditure on agriculture was to be 10.8 per cent of 
the total expenditure, 
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during the 1970-71 period, it was only 6.6 per cent and this shows that 
other sectors received more priority than the agricultural sector. 
Moreover, when the planned expenditure on agriculture during the 1962-68 
period is compared with the planned expenditure on the sector during 
the 1970-74 period and it is realized that during the latter period 
planned expenditure was to be 3 per cent below the proportion devoted 
to agriculture during the 1962-68 period, it would be reasonable to conclude 
that Nigerian authorities are giving less priority to agriculture than 
before. 
The reduced priority given to agriculture in recent years seems 
to contradict the belief of the authorities about the role of agriculture 
in the development of the country. "The economic growth which took 
place in Nigeria over the last two decades had agricultural production 
for export as its main driving force. Not only did the exportation 
of agricultural products generate income within the domestic economy, 
it also provided the foreign exchange which made possible the importation 
of machinery and other capital goods required for industrialization and 
general development. " 
52 
It is in the Plan where the above statement 
was quoted that gave lower priority than ever before to agriculture. 
The low rating of agriculture in the development strategy of Nigeria, 
and the defects associated with executed agricultural programmes, have 
resulted in a marked reduction in agricultural exports and an increase 
in food imports. As Figure3"1 shows, the aggregate index of recorded 
output of agricultural export c'ommodities, which stood at 100 in-1960, 
fell to 80.9 in 1971, and this represented a decline of about 20 per cent 
below the 1970 level, and, except for 1969, was the lowest index since 
52SECOND 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1970-74, p. 103. 
iC i _, ý mAE 
3'. 1 
S, }; EGAiE ! r/nE-X cý_ 
1 oy- cu 
0 14 L'1 q% 43 l- Al, ' j(-L, ýX!, vf27 Co /14 lYr C c-i; i-/ (= C. 
= 
ý 13výs c. : 19 60 oo) 
ý.. It 30 1`0/ 
ýýiGo itib! f9 6; t- Ki63 i`fEsý- 146s- lyt6 ýQ6: 
ý 196g 1467 
R l9ý0 ¢ lýIý/ " op N/4ERi9. ' r'rNNUßL REPoR iS '{-O ouRcE Ai- 8A/yx 
105 
1960. Food imports on the other hand rose from £23.5 million in 1962, 
to £28.8 million in 1970, and to £44.1 million in 1971. 
There are three major defects associated with agricultural policies 
in Nigeria. The first type of defects are those associated with the 
plantations of the Regional Development Corporations. Many of the 
plantations were located on poor soils and areas of insufficient rainfall. 
Feasibility studies and soil surveys to discover suitable locations were 
rarely undertaken. Economic factors were relegated to the background while 
political considerations became the overriding determinants of locations. 
In some cases, exorbitant compensations have been paid to owners of lands 
on which government plantations are located. In other cases, inadequate 
compensations have led to agitation and lack of co-operation between 
plantation management and the surrounding localities. Mismanagement, lack 
of discipline, laziness, favouritism, primitive techniques, costly develop- 
ment errors, excessive expenditure on housing and amenities, have added up 
to the high costs and gross inefficiency which characterize many of the 
plantations. These defects of the plantation system in Nigeria ensure that 
as long as there is a choice between peasant agriculture and the plantation 
system, peasant agriculture is to be preferred as the plantation system is 
not a substitute for peasant agriculture. 
The second defect is the inadequate information services provided by 
governments about available incentives and new techniques. Government 
agricultural experts are rarely seen in the rural areas. Because govern- 
ment agricultural institutions are located near the towns and along main 
roads, they cannot be contacted easily by farmers in rural areas. The 
majority of the farmers in rural areas are simply not aware of government 
incentives, high-yielding seedlings, new techniques and the existence of 
fertilizers. It is therefore not surprising that agriculture in Nigeria is 
still largely carried out with primitive traditional and extended-family 
methods of production. 
Perhaps the major defect of agricultural policies in Nigeria is 
the lack of co-ordination at the departmental level, at the regional 
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level and at the Federal level. The interflow of ideas between the 
different sections of agricultural departments and institutions suffers 
from the bureaucratic defects of red-tape, communication defects and 
inefficiency on the part of officials. At the regional level there 
is little or no exchange of ideas about agricultural policies and 
development. This has resulted in agricultural policies being 
haphazardly formulated, and applied with wide variations all over the 
country. At the Federal level, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture 
is extremely weak and lacks the dynamic force of leadership which could 
have minimized the defects at the States level. The defects in 
governments' agricultural policies are not insurmountable, - but the 
speed and the extent to which they are remedied will depend on the role 
Nigerian leaders envisage for agriculture in the development of the 
country. 
OBSTACLES TO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
Agricultural development in Nigeria is hindered by many obstacles. 
The first obstacle is the repressive pricing policies of the marketing 
Boards. Nigerian marketing boards are an outgrowth of the old West 
African Produce Control Board, created by the British government to 
market West African export products. The Nigerian Marketing Boards 
were created between 1947 and 1949, the first to be established being 
the Cocoa Marketing Board in 1947. The government statement establishing 
the boards stated that "average price paid in West Africa will be sub- 
stantially near the average net price realized on the world markets and 
the boards' buying and selling transactions will, therefore, approximately 
The initial function of the marketing boards was therefore balance. " 
53 
53Statement 
on the Future Marketing of West African Cocoa, Cmd 6950, 
London, H. M. S. O. 1946. 
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the stabilization of producers' prices. Later, however, they became 
the instrument for the mobilization of farmers' savings for economic 
development, and they also encouraged and financed research. As a 
result of the monopsomy position of the marketing boards as the sole 
buyer of Nigerian export crops, they accumulated huge surpluses by paying 
farmers prices substantially below the f. o. b. prices of their products. 
In the period 1964-65, the ratio of the producer price to the f. o. b. 
price, according to W. A. Lewis54 was as follows: cocoa 69 per cent, 
groundnuts 64 per cent, seed cotton 54 per cent, palm kernels 51 per cent 
and palm oil 50 per cent. The huge surpluses accumulated were not used 
to subsidize prices paid to farmers in years of low overseas prices, but 
were appropriated by the governments to finance agricultural and industrial 
development. Sometimes, however, the surpluses were used to finance 
political parties. The withholding from farmers of a high proportion 
of their earnings through low prices was regarded by many people as an 
important fiscal role to damp down or prevent inflation. However, the 
IBRO in 1955 recommended that "henceforth the boards' functions are 
limited to setting quality standards, fixing producer prices and purchasing 
and marketing crops. The financing of economic development and agri- 
cultural research is a responsibility of government and the 
boards should 
not attempt to undertake it. ...... We also recommend 
that in fixing 
producer prices, the boards should have no object other 
than mitigating 
price fluctuations and giving an incentive to improvement of quality. 
The deliberate use of the price-fixing function for other purposes, such 
as the promotion of development or to counteract inflationary or 
deflationary trends cuts across the responsibility of government . 
55 
54W. A. Lewis, Ibid., p. 20. 
55IBRD, Ibid., p. 88. 
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The marketing boards did not take the IBRD's recommendations seriously, 
instead they stuck to their fiscal role of pricing the farmers' products 
down, and thus discouraging production, and in turn reducing fiscal 
revenues. The repressive pricing policies of the marketing boards 
have had some unfavourable consequences on agricultural production. 
First, the prices of some products have been so low as to discourage 
farmers from investing in crops purchased by the marketing boards. 
This has resulted in farmers shifting from export crops to food crops 
on which they could earn high returns. In the East, W. A. Lewis noted 
that "the chief reason for the decline of production, and the still 
greater decline of the export of palm produce, is that the government 
has driven the price so low that farmers have preferred to grow food, 
and have encouraged their relatives to emigrate to other regions". 
56 
In the North, many farmers have abandoned groundnut growing for cattle 
rearing and the growing of millet and guinea corn, because of the low 
prices paid on groundnuts. 
Second, foreign investors have been discouraged from investing in 
Nigerian agriculture because of the pricing policies of the marketing 
boards. Foreign entrepreneurs who are interested in agriculture have 
concentrated on crops outside the control of the boards, and those 
that 
have invested in crops controlled by the boards did so to feed their 
industries with the raw materials emanating from such crops. 
Third, in the West low prices have acted as an incentive to smuggle 
cocoa out of Nigeria to Dahomey. As the governor of 
the Western State 
has recently said, "Some licensed buying agents appointed 
by the State 
marketing board have been using their licences as 
'veritable instruments 
for promoting smuggling"' . 
57 
56Ibib., 
p. 21. 
57West Africa, 19th February, 1973. 
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It is estimated that the tonnages of cocoa smuggled range from 10,000 
to 30,000 tons annually which-represents a loss of about £3 million or 
more a year to Nigeria in foreign exchange. In the Northern part of 
Nigeria, the smuggling of groundnuts to the Niger Republic is on a 
large scale and this is estimated to be costing an additional £3 million 
in lost foreign exchange. 
Lastly, Nigerian farmers have on a number of occasions demonstrated 
their viols-, t resentment at the pricing policies of the marketing boards. 
The death of a policeman in 1971 at the Nigeria-Niger border, when 
smugglers fired on him, is an example of the resentment. In 1968, the 
under-payment of cocoa farmers in the Western State was one of the major 
causes of riots which took many lives. 
It is now widely recognized that the pricing policy of the marketing 
boards needs a thorough review. The problem posed by the marketing 
boards was clearly put in a recent government publication: "Another 
important policy area which requires action in the agricultural sector 
is the marketing board system. The indications show that the system 
as presently operated discourages increased efforts and production by 
the farmers. The stagnation in the output and export of some cash 
crops is attributed to the marketing board system. The time has come 
for a serious review of the situation. Such an exercise will consider 
the need for the continued existence of the marketing boards, their 
powers and functions, producer price fixing, alternative marketing 
systems, and effects of any changes on the fiscal position of the State 
governments". 
57 
During the Independence anniversary on October 1,1972, 
the Nigerian Military government pledged to reform the marketing boards. 
57Second 
National Development Plan 1970-74, First Progress Report, 
Central Planning Office, Lagos, 1972, p. 66. 
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In future prices paid by the boards to the farmers would be fixed by 
the Federal Military government and not by individual boards. Two 
further problems of the marketing boards which, according to the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, require urgent attention, are "the failure of local 
mills to pay promptly for produce purchased from the boards, who 
thereby bear an unnecessary financial burden, including interest charges 
on loans over long periods, and the need for the boards to keep adequate 
and up-to-date accounts, in order to know their position at any point 
in time and to exercise financial control. In some cases, the boards' 
accounts are several years out-of-date". 
58 
In addition, an attempt 
should be made to merge the nine marketing boards. The six Southern 
States and Benue- Plateau have one marketing board each for crops produced 
in their States; there is another one for the remaining five Northern 
States and another central one in Lagos. These independent boards 
could be merged into a Central marketing board with branches in the 
States. This would ensure uniformity of treatment for farmers through- 
out the country. 
The second major obstacle to agricultural development in Nigeria 
is the land tenure system, and communal ownership. Land tenure in many 
parts of the country is still largely under the control of families, 
communities, clans and villages. The inheritance system in many 
parts of the country, which often results in the division of lands 
into smaller holdings among the children and relatives of the deceased, 
hinders agricultural improvement in many ways. The fragmentation of 
lands often leads to misunderstandings and disputes, which result in 
valuable time being spent on settling disputes. Many farmers have 
58Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report for the Year ended 
31st December, 1971. 
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their lands scattered over a wide area, and they have to walk long 
distances from one plot to another. Under these circumstances time 
and energy are wasted, distant plots cannot be adequately supervised; 
capital equipment may be duplicated and if plots are very small it may 
be difficult to work them with ploughs. In order to increase the size 
of farms, consolidation should be encouraged and the inheritance system 
which divides lands into small plots should be abolished. On communal 
lands, which anybody with a right to the lands can farm, there is 
usually no incentive for improvement. Investment apart, communal 
tenure is a handicap to innovation. Livestock cannot be bred selectively 
unless they are segregated and their mating controlled; neither is it 
convenient to experiment with new agricultural methods in circumstances 
where communal activity imposes its own routines. Individual ownership 
should be encouraged. 
The third major obstacle to agricultural development is finance. 
One major problem facing Nigeria is the shortage of institutions to pro- 
vide credit to farmers. The importance of agricultural credit for agri- 
cultural development cannot be overrated. We have been told that 
"Efficient systems of agricultural credit are necessary if agriculture 
is to make its contribution to national development". 
59 There are 
three sources of agricultural credits for farmers in Nigeria: they 
are the banks, the government and private money lenders. The banks 
are better placed to grant credits to farmers because they have large 
financial resources. However, many of the banks, especially foreign- 
owned banks, have not been of much help to farmers. 
59H. 
Belshaw, Agricultural Credit in Economically Underdeveloped 
Countries, FAO, United Nations, Rome, 1959, p. 228) 
112 
TABLE 3.10 
COMMERCIAL BANK LOANS AND ADVANCES TO AGRICULTURE L'000) 
END OF MONTH 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1971 
3UNE: Agriculture2 4687 7565 11213 2342 1658 2644 5360 
TOTAL 37713 61090 91869 123056 103063 121645 218936 
Agriculture as a 
Percentage of Total 12.4 12.4 12.2 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.4 
DECEMBER: Agriculture2 11281 18039 30223 2423 1924 3496 
TOTAL 57000 77035 122407 14904,5 12859 175675 
Agriculture as a 
Percentage of Total 19.8 23.4 24.7 1.6 1.7 2.0 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, 
1961-1971. 
NOTES: 1: Prior to January 1966, agriculture included loans to finance 
exports. 
2: Figures for imports and domestic trade were not separated until 
April, 1969. 
Table 3.10 shows bank loans and advances to agriculture. Between 
1960 and 1965, when finance for export crops was included in the figures, 
credits to agriculture were never above a fifth of total credits, except 
in December 1962 and 1964. Since January 1966, when the finance for 
export crops has been excluded from the sector, commercial bank credits 
to agriculture have been very small indeed, representing only about an 
average of 2 per cent over the 1966-71 period. Commercial bank credits 
to agriculture become less important when it is realized that small farmers 
have generally had little direct help from banks. The banks usually 
demand securities which most farmers cannot provide. Farmers are not 
prepared to use their lands as security, even if they own the lands. 
Since the majority of farmers are scattered over the rural areas, they 
have been excluded from the credit facilities of the banks, because 
the 
latter are located in big towns. Also important is the fact that 
there 
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are only 300 commercial bank branches serving over 60 million Nigerians, 
out of which Barclay's Bank, which had been the only and the oldest bank 
in Nigeria for a long time, has 87 offices. The commercial banks are 
not important credit providers to farmers in Nigeria. 
Government finance to farmers is limited. Apart from export crops 
being the prime receiver of loans, only favoured and influential people 
get government loans. In some cases, political supporters and co-operatives 
get some advances. The small farmer is unknown and gets no financial 
help from the government's meagre financial credit. The majority of 
farmers in Nigeria rely on money lenders for their credits and, as such, 
they are usually at the mercy of the unscrupulous money lenders who 
charge very high interest rates. Apart from the high interest rates, 
the money lenders exploit the farmers in two other ways. One is the 
system of lending money by buying farmers' crops in advance, which 
prevents farmers from reaping any gain when prices are high. The second 
system is that of lending money in return for a certain fixed part of the 
farmers' total harvest. The enumerated features of money lending have 
impoverished many farmers who could have been better off if alternative 
credit facilities were available. The income of the farmer is at the 
mercy of factors, some of which are beyond his control, such as locusts, 
drought and other climatic factors. If any of these factors occurs, the 
farmer needs funds. He also needs funds for farm operations, fixed 
capital and working expenses for marketing and processing, and for other 
incidental expenditure between sowing and harvesting. There is, therefore, 
an urgent need for institutions to provide credits to farmers. The 
Nigerian government can learn a lot from Japan in this respect by 
establishing agricultural banks in rural areas to provide credits, and 
also by helping to gather the savings of the farmers which can then be 
harnessed for developmental purposes. Alternatively, mobile banks 
could be provided to serve the rural areas. 
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THE FUTURE OF NIGERIAN AGRICULTURE 
Nigerian agriculture faces enormous tasks in the future, and if 
the sector is adequately to meet the challenge, there should be a serious 
transformation from the present backward and traditional system to a more 
ambitious modern system of farming and cattle rearing. As it is widely 
believed in official circles, "the performance in the past has not been 
quite satisfactory and this situation has called for a radical departure 
from the traditional approach to agricultural development in Nigeria". 
6D 
There are six major tasks facing Nigerian agriculture. First, to provide 
employment for the rapidly growing population. The FAO agricultural 
report referred to earlier estimates that Nigeria's population would be 
86.2 million by 1980. Although the manufacturing sector is growing 
fast, only a few people can be absorbed into this sector because it 
employs capital-intensive methods of production. As a result, the 
agricultural sector will be expected to meet the employment challenge 
of the future. Second, to provide an adequate, well-balanced diet for 
the growing population. The population of Nigeria is about 60 million 
at the moment and food imports have been increasing greatly, yet the 
masses of Nigerians are pathetically underfed and malnourished. 
When 
the population reaches 86.2 million in 1980, the problem of 
feeding 
Nigerians becomes a mammoth task. There is no doubt that 
the past 
performance of the agricultural sector of a compound growth rate of 
1.5 per cent between 1966 and 1972 cannot be enough 
to feed an estimated 
annual population growth rate of 3 per cent after 1974. 
It is essential 
that food production should grow at an annual rate of 
4-5 per cent if 
the rapidly increasing population is to be fed, and such a growth rate 
60First Progress Report on the Second National Development 
Plan, 
Lagos, 1972, p. 66. 
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requires mammoth efforts on the part of the Nigerian government and the 
farmers. If food production does not meet the requirements of the 
population, the only alternative to starvation is the importation of 
food. Imports would drain Nigeria of its scarce foreign exchange 
resources, and the country may be plunged into a balance of payments 
crisis. The latter would in turn have an adverse effect on investment 
and industrialization. In addition to increasing the production of 
cereals and legume grains, adequate attention should be paid to animal 
products. Nigeria imports 300,000 cows, 250,000 sheep and 150,000 
goats from the Cameroons, _, 
Chad and Niger every year. 
61 
Nigeria's 
import bill on milk in 1964 amounted to £2.25 million and this had 
increased to over £7 million by 1971. It was recently reported that 
Nigeria expressed an interest in purchasing 100,000 tons of meat from 
Uruguay annually and the latter was only able to supply 30,000 tons 
to Nigeria every year. 
62 
Nigeria, however, has ample land and resources 
to provide enough products to meet its requirements if efforts can be 
directed in the right directions. During the 1970-74 period, in addition 
to the £107.7 million estimated for the agricultural sector, a sum of 
£25 million was earmarked for livestock, forestry and fishing, to be 
shared as follows: livestock £12.24 million, forestry £5.76 million 
and fishing £6.96 million respectively. Estimated figures cannot 
solve Nigeria's food problem. Until the authorities turn estimates into 
reality, Nigeria's food problem is frighteningly enormous. 
The third task ahead of Nigerian agriculture is to provide raw 
materials in large quantities to satisfy the needs of the industrial 
sector. There are three types of linkages possible in the agricultural 
sector: (a) horizontal, (b) backward and (c) forward linkages. There 
61West 
Africa, August 18,1972. 
62 
West Africa, September 15,1972. 
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is some degree of interdependence between the different sections of the 
agricultural sector which provide important horizontal linkage effects. 
Cow dungs and groundnut shells are used on a large scale as manure on 
many farms in Northern Nigeria. To a large number of farmers who cannot 
afford fertilizers, this is the cheapest way of conserving soil fertility. 
Agriculture is regarded as short on backward linkage effects because 
very little investment opportunities occur in the earlier stages of 
production, but as for forward linkages, the sector can be rated high. 
Agricultural raw materials can generate large-scale manufacturing activities, 
especially in agro-based industries. In the case of Nigeria, this is 
especially so since many industries depend on the agricultural sector 
for their raw materials. It was shown earlier in the chapter that 
some factories have been forced to close down temporarily owing to 
shortages in the supply of agricultural raw materials. Other factories 
exist with substantial excess capacity due to inadequate raw materials. 
In the absence of adequate raw materials to satisfy the needs of agro- 
based industries, if factories are not to close down, there can be only 
one answer to the problem and that is to import. This would drain 
Nigeria of its meagre foreign exchange resources and in the event of 
a balance of payments crisis arising, there is bound to be a curtailment 
of industrial production. 
Four, agriculture should provide more foreign exchange through 
export earnings than the sector has ever done in the past. The FAO 
report on Nigerian agriculture estimates that the agricultural export 
earnings should be about £300 million by 1980 if there is to be enough 
finance for the economic and social objectives which the country has 
set itself. It has been estimated by the U. S. Department of Agriculture 
that Nigeria would be a net importer of palm oil by 1980.63 
63U. 
S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Production and Export Prospects 
for Palm Oil in West Africa, West Africa, February 5,1973. 
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This forecast can only be disheartening to the Nigerian authorities 
since Nigeria, until after 1960, was the leading producer and exporter 
in the world. 
Five, the agricultural sector should contribute a substantial part 
of the capital needed to finance economic development. If the farming 
population becomes well-off through increased agricultural production, 
they can be easily taxed and their savings gathered to finance develop- 
mental projects. 
Last, and closely associated with the fifth task, is the problem 
of providing a steady and growing market for the manufacturing sector. 
The manufacturing sector, in the absence of export possibilities, will 
depend to a large extent in the foreseeable future on Nigeria's domestic 
market. With about 70 per cent of the population involved in agri- 
culture, an increase in the demand for manufactured goods would depend 
mostly on what happens to the agricultural sector. 
One of the ways by which agricultural production can be increased 
is by bringing more land under cultivation. At the moment, only 
16 per cent of Nigeria's soil is under cultivation, 62 per cent is 
uncultivated and left fallow; 21 per cent is occupied by forests, 
mountains and rocks, while buildings occupy the remaining 1 per cent. 
This means that out of Nigeria's economically active population of 
30 million, 70 per cent are in agriculture, cultivating 37 million 
acres of land, and this represents an average of 1.8 acres per head 
of the active labour force in agriculture. This situation is even 
made worse by the fact that the 16 per cent of Nigeria's soil cultivated 
represents areas with low productivity potential. The FAO classifies 
Nigeria's soil into five classes according to potentiality. 
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TABLE 3.11 
SOIL POTENTIALITY CLASSES IN NIGERIA 
SOIL CLASSES 
1 (Very high productivity - 65 to 
100 per cent) 
2 (High productivity - 35 to 64 per 
cent) 
3 (Medium productivity - 20 to 34 per 
cent) 
4 (Low Productivity -8 to 19 per cent) 
5. (Very low productivity -0 to 7 per 
cent) 
AREA IN SQ. KM. 
31200 
415200 
276600 
88800 
100800 
912000 
PERCENTAGE 
3.42 
45.53 
30.27 
9.37 
10.05 
100.0 
SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, FAO, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
1965-1980, ROME 1966. 
Table 3.11 shows that nearly half of Nigeria's soil has high productivity 
and that only about a fifth has low productivity. Let us compare the 
table above with the land actually in use in Nigeria. 
TABLE 3.12 
PRESENT SOIL PRODUCTIVITY CLASSES IN NIGERIA 
SOIL CLASSES AREA IN SQ. KM. PERCENTAGE 
1 - - 
2 50400 5.52 
3 289200 31.72 
4 423600 46.45 
5 148800 16.31 
912000 100.0 
SOURCE: AS IN TABLE 3.11. 
Table 3.12 shows that Nigerian farmers do not utilize high productivity 
soils of the country despite the fact that only 16 per cent of the 
country's soil is under cultivation. Over 62 per cent of the 16 per cent 
of Nigeria's soil under cultivation is classified as being areas of low 
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and very low productivity. If agricultural productivity is therefore 
to be substantially increased, not only should more lands be brought 
under cultivation, but also Nigeria's high productivity soils should 
be fully utilized. 
Bringing under cultivation more of Nigeria's soil requires sub- 
stantial investment in the agricultural sector. Table 3.13 shows the 
investment requirements of the agricultural sector up to 1980. 
TABLE 3.13 
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE 1963-1980 (L'1ILLION) 
1963/64 1967/68a 1973/74a 1979/80a 
Total Investment 172 288 417 642 
Investment in Agriculture 30 52 83 135 
Public Investment in Agriculture 10 18 33 61 
Private Investment in Agriculture 20 34 50 74 
Investment in Agriculture as a 
percentage of total 17% 18% 20% 21% 
Total Public Investment 69 119 185 292 
Public Investment in Agriculture as 
a percentage of Total Public Invest- 
ment 14% 15% 18% 21% 
Public Investment in Agriculture 
as a percentage of Total Agricultural 
Investment 33% 35% 40% 45% 
SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, FAO, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
1965-1980, ROME 1966. 
NOTE: a; Estimates. 
Figures of the private sector's investment in agriculture are not avail- 
able, but if public expenditure planned for 1970-74 period is compared 
with Table 3.13, and if public authorities stick to the plan, the target 
set by the United Nations would be met. The experience of the 1962-68 
and 1970-71 periods has shown that planned investment in the agricultural 
sector will not be met as priorities are often easily given to other 
projects. The Nigerian authorities may pay particular attention to 
agricultural projects requiring low capital investment but high yielding, 
that is, agricultural projects with low capital-output ratio. 
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HE FUTURE ROLE OF BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN NIGERIAN AGRICULTURE 
The past discussions have highlighted some of the gaps in Nigerian 
, griculture which can 
be readily filled by British investments. Of the 
, wo 
forms, modern farming and the plantation system, which British 
. nvestment can 
take in Nigerian agriculture, for political, social and 
. conomic reasons, the type which appeals to British investors is the 
: stablishment of plantations for crops. Modern farming, as it exists 
Ln advanced societies, is essentially the management of large units of 
land with all the main attributes of an industrial firm. It requires 
a great deal of both fixed and working capital and a small amount of 
labour per unit of output as a capital-intensive form of technology, 
which aims at cutting down labour and increasing its productivity is 
adopted. "In every type of operation, cultivating and harvesting 
included, human energy is replaced as far as possible by the work of 
animals and the power of machines". 
1 
In modern farming, "More and 
more farm workers have to be skilled technicians, and their employers 
skilled personnel and business managers. Farm technology is ever more 
sophisticated and science-based, and innovations are readily adopted by 
an increasing proportion of the farmers". 
2 
In addition, land is inten- 
sively cultivated and several crops are planted in rotation. 
The plantation system has many dimensions. It is a system of 
agricultural production as well as a social institution. A plantation 
is defined as "an economic unit producing agricultural commodities 
(field 
crops or horticultural products, but not livestock) for sale and employing 
a relatively large number of unskilled labourers whose activities are 
1R. 
Dumont, Types of Rural Economy, Studies in World Agriculture, 
Methuen & Co., London 1970', P. 3., 
2A. 
H. Bunting, ed.: Change in Agriculture, Duckworth & Co., 
London 1970, P. 726. 
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; losely supervised. Plantations usually employ a year-round labour 
. rew of some size, and they usually specialise in the production of only 
Dne or two marketable products. They differ from other kinds of firms in 
the way in which the factors of production, primarily management and 
labour are combined". 
3 
With the above definition, the major similarities and differences bet- 
ween the plantation system and modern farming can be identified. 
Firstly, both the plantation system and modern farming employ wage labour. 
Whereas the peasant agriculture is essentially a family undertaking, 
employing no wage labour. Secondly, like plantations, modern farming 
produces commodities for sale in domestic and foreign markets while 
peasant household produces goods for his own consumpsion and for sale 
in the market. Unlike peasant agriculture and modern farming, the 
plantation system is restricted to one or two field crops. Several 
crops are cultivated in peasant agriculture and modern farming, and 
both embrace all aspects of agriculture: field crops, poultry keeping 
and livestock. This diversification of production in modern farming and 
peasant agriculture ensures their flexibility and responsiveness to 
changes in the relative prices of agricultural products. In Nigeria, 
all the crops produced by plantations are also produced by peasants. 
Therefore, agricultural production in Nigerian plantations is designed 
to supplement the produce of peasants. 
Another major distinguishing feature of the plantation system 
from modern farming is the technology adopted. The plantation system 
employs a labour-intensive form of technology and as a consequence, the 
method of production in plantations is not much different from the method 
used in peasant agriculture. The technology adopted in plantations 
ensures the employment of a large number of unskilled labour, normally 
3 
G. L. Beckford, Persistent Poverty, Underdevelopment in plantation 
economies of the third world, Oxford University Press, New York 1972, P. 
6 
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. yawn 
from the peasantry. Normally, the wage labour employed in 
>lantations maintains some form of link with peasant agriculture. 
lodern farming, on the other hand, is not restricted to labour intensive 
technology. In addition, because of the method of production adopted 
Ln modern farming, a large number of inputs comes from the manufacturing 
sector. The existence of modern farming, therefore, is highly dependent 
on the industrial sector for the provision of inputs. "Farming is 
buttressed by an array of input industries, which supply machinery, 
fertilizers, chemicals, seeds, containers and other needs, and of output 
industries which purchase, transport, store, preserve, process and pack the 
produce, and organize the supply of food to urban consumers. "1 
There are several reasons why British companies have not invested in 
modern farming in Nigeria in the past and are not likely to invest in the 
future. Firstly, there is the absence of white settlers in Nigeria. 
The development of modern farming in Africa is closely associated with 
the existence of white settlers. The colonization of Nigeria by the 
British was not accompanied by British settlement. Since there are no 
white settlers in Nigeria, it should therefore not be surprising that 
there has been no British investment in modern farming, in Nigeria in the 
past, and this is likely to be the situation in the, -present. Secondly, 
there is the total lack of knowledge and experience about the complexities 
of modern farming among British companies operating in Nigeria. None of 
them specialise in the production of agricultural commodities and as explained 
earlier, they emphasized the lack of background knowledge as ruling 
agricultural investment from their investment programmes. Lastly, new 
agricultural investors are likely to be discouraged by the great deal of 
both fixed and working capital required in modern farming. Given the 
constraints on foreign investment in Nigeria, it is most unlikely that 
British investors will be willing to invest enormous capital in Nigerian 
agriculture without a proof of adequate returns. 
1A. 
H. Bunting, ed., op. cit., p. 726 
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The plantation system, which will be the form which British 
. gricultural 
investment takes in the future has certain fundamental 
. 
imitations. Firstly, the plantation system is usually restricted to 
. ew crops. Some plantations cultivate crops with long gestation periods 
chile others cultivate crops with short periods. What the plantation 
system produces depends on who establishes the plantation. In Nigeria, 
Eor example, only cocoa, palm produce, sugar-cane, and rubber are 
cultivated in plantations. State plantations except in terms of ownership 
are identical to companies' plantations. As for Nigerian food crops, the 
variation in dietsbetween the different parts of Nigeria and-the limited 
nature of the demand for many Nigerian food crops make large-scale prod- 
uction, for which the plantation system is best suited unnecessary and 
unsuitable. The second limitation of the plantation system is the 
problem of efficiency. Efficiency in plantations crucially depends on 
many factors such as the size of the plantation, its organisation, the 
level of supervision, climatic factors, political considerations which 
may restrict land area cultivated and the amenities provided, and the 
employment of expatriate staff. While the effects of some of these 
factors on efficiency can be readily assessed, the effects of others cannot 
be readily predicted. What is certain, however, is that when a plantation 
is efficient, it may not only be advantageous to its foreign owner, but 
it may well benefit Nigeria directly or indirectly. However, when 
plantations are inefficient, they not only result in a wasteful use of 
good soils, but they may also represent a misallocation of human and 
financial resources. 
The third limitation concerns the inflexibility of the system. The 
inflexibility in Nigerian plantations is brought about by the long 
gestation periods of crops most suited for the system in Nigeria. Cocoa, 
palm produce and rubber take from 5 to 10 years after planting before any 
crop can be harvested. When there is a change in the world commodity 
prices requiring either expansion or contraction in production, the 
Plantation system is usally insensitive or sluggish to respond. Added 
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to the tenacity of a company's plantation is the strategy of the owner 
which may prevent its adaptation to changing conditions. This means 
that even if the crop on a company's plantation has a short gestation 
period, the plantation may still be insensitive to changes. As an 
example, a company which owns a plantation, the crop from which is used 
as a raw material in its domestic industries will be reluctant to shift 
from the production of the crop to another one whose price has increased 
in the international market. This is because the company will not only 
consider seriously the problem of serving its industries with raw 
materials but there is also the likelihood that the shift from the 
established crop to another may not fit into the parent company's global 
strategy. This means that decision-making processes in companies' 
plantations are not isolated from the industrial and global strategies 
of these companies. The last limitation to the plantation system in 
Nigeria, as far as foreign investors are concerned, is the fact that, 
apart from food crops, most of the cash crops which are suitable for the 
plantation system cannot be sold directly in the international market 
by the individual producing company. As we have argued earlier in this 
chapter, the Nigerian Marketing Board is the sole seller of the Nigerian 
cash crops in the international market. Because the prices paid for the 
crops the Board purchases from domestic producers are generally lower than 
can be obtained by direct selling to the world market, many foreign 
investors have not been willing to invest in Nigerian cash crops and are 
not likely to do so in the future. 
Despite the enumerated limitations, some British companies like 
Unilever, African Timber & Plywood Ltd., Tate & Lyle, Dunlop, Bookers Ltd. 
and the United Africa Company Ltd., have undertaken plantation invest- 
ments in the past and the experience this gained is likely to be of 
particular importance in the establishment of future plantations in the 
production of particular commodities. In addition, as long as British 
companies find it cheaper and more convenient to supply their industries 
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with the produce of their plantations, they are likely to continue to 
invest in plantations. The majority of British investors in plantations 
are vertically integrated companies diversifying into the sources of 
raw materials to ensure steady and adequate supplies. There are many 
crops not controlled by the Marketing Board, the demand for and the 
prices of which are rising very fast. Some of these crops can be and 
have been cultivated in plantations. As an example, the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation has recently entered into an agreement with the 
Nigerian Government for a giant sugar-cane plantation near Numan in the 
North-Eastern state at a cost of £40 million, a third of which will be 
provided by the Corporation1. In addition, two other British companies 
involved in the project are Tate & Lyle as a technical partner and Ward, 
Ashcroft and Parkman Ltd. to handle the irrigation and water resources 
aspects. 
Another area of profitable investment in Nigerian agriculture is cattle 
ranching. Apart from the United Africa Company's investment in a pig 
farm in Northern Nigeria, British investors have not considered invest- 
ment in cattle ranching seriously. Yet, as we have pointed out earlier 
in this chapter, Nigeria spends several million pounds every year to 
import goats, pigs, sheep and beef from African and Latin American 
countries. Despite the imports, the inability of supplies to meet 
demand has resulted in very steep prices for meat and meat products in 
Nigeria. In addition, the world-wide shortage of beef has resulted in 
high prices for beef and meat products in the U. K. Under these circum- 
stances, some persuasion on the part of the Nigerian authorities for British 
companies (especially those engaged in the production of dairy products) 
to enter into partnership agreements with the Nigerian government for the 
establishment of cattle ranching is likely to receive a more serious 
consideration in the future. 
1West 
Africa, March 18,1974 
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But even if British companies are not particularly keen to invest 
3irectly in Nigerian agriculture, their indirect investments in the 
production of inputs to the agricultural sector can be very beneficial 
to Nigeria indeed. The inputs we are particularly referring to in 
this instance are fertilizers, chemicals, insecticides and other bio- 
chemical inputs required to improve the output of the agricultural 
sector. Such an undertaking will also help to integrate the petroleum 
environment with that of agriculture. It ought to be emphasized that 
even when improved seedlings are available to the farmers, unless they 
are planted in conjunction with fertilizers and other chemicals to 
check pests and to conserve soil fertility, excellent results cannot 
be obtained. 
CONCLUS ION 
British private direct investment in Nigerian agriculture has not 
matched the level of British total investment in the country. As a 
result of the meagre investment in the agricultural sector, the contri- 
bution of British direct investment to the Nigerian agriculture has been 
basically indirect through the purchase of raw materials, the granting 
of credits and loans, the supplying of agricultural implements, the 
research into crop diseases and making available to farmers the results 
of such research. The restrictions imposed by the British Colonial 
Government and later the repressive buying activities of the Marketing 
Boards made and still make agricultural investment unattractive to 
British investors. In a recent report, the Central Bank of Nigeria 
observed that "the low level of performance of the agricultural sector 
export in recent years points to the need for re-examination of the 
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entire fabric of that sector. Apart from inhibiting factors such 
as inadequate mechanisation, out-dated farming techniques, deficiencies 
in the system of land tenure, and the vagaries of weather, inefficiencies 
in the marketing process have contributed greatly to the poor performance 
of the sector. Specifically, it appears that the operations of the 
Marketing Boards, particularly, the determination of producer-prices 
and the practices of licensed buying-agents, have not provided the 
much-needed incentives for expansion for output". 
66 
The above quotation suggests that despite the activities of the 
Nigerian authorities to increase agricultural production, not much has 
been achieved so far and this situation tends to suggest that there is 
a need for a new approach to agricultural development. In addition 
to reforming the pricing activities of the marketing boards, urgent 
attention should be paid to the land tenure system, the co-ordination 
of agricultural policies and the provision of credit to farmers. 
Nigerian authorities could create an agricultural bank with offices 
in rural areas to provide credit and at the same time gather the savings 
of farmers for economic development. An intensive feasibility study 
and soil survey of the whole country would enable the choice of good 
soils for cultivation to be made. Water resources and irrigation should 
receive adequate attention, especially in Northern Nigeria, where 
drought has frequently been a major problem. The adoption of new 
techniques with special reference to mechanization should receive 
attention. Although there are many teething problems of finance and 
education to be overcome before Nigerian farmers readily accept 
the 
use of ploughs, tractors, combine harvesters and other agricultural 
machinery, the present hand implements require too much energy so 
that 
farmers often achieve very little with them. As a first step, 
better, 
66Central 
Bank of Nigeria, Annual Report, 1971, p. 
16. 
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sharper and more productive hand tools, such as the simple, easy to 
operate Japanese hand tractors, could be introduced. British investors 
can help in setting up factories for the manufacture of simple hand 
tools tailored to meet the needs of the Nigerian agricultural popula- 
tion. Animal-drawn implements, already in use in Northern Nigeria, 
though on a small scale, should be encouraged to be widely used 
throughout the country. In the course of time, however, farmers should 
be educated to use tractors, cotton pickers, combine harvesters, better 
hoes and other sophisticated agricultural implements and machinery. 
Agricultural education should receive more attention. There is a 
frightful shortage of agricultural personnel in Nigeria at the moment. 
Apart from the agricultural departments of the six Nigerian universities, 
there are only a few institutions in towns like Akure, Ibadan, Kabba, 
Umudike and Zaria to train Nigerian future agriculturists. Farmers 
receive little or no education, and it is therefore difficult for them 
to understand and apply new techniques. The States' authorities would 
do well to expand agricultural education. In the Northern States, 
the authorities should try to delegate some agricultural functions 
formerly performed by the local authorities taken from them. It appears 
that since the government has taken over agricultural functions from 
the local authorities, agricultural performance in some Northern States 
has slumped noticeably. Health facilities, storage and marketing 
techniques should be provided and improved. As Chief Awolowo has said, 
"If our farming, storage, and marketing techniques were modern and 
if the education, health, and general living conditions of our 
farmers 
were much better than they are, much more acreage of land would be brought 
under cultivation; far fewer people would be needed on the farm 
to 
produce more food and export crops than at present, and the productivity 
and standard of living of the farming population would rise considerably". 
67 
67Chief 
0. Awolowo, The People's Republic, Oxford University Press, 
Ibadan 1968, p. 303 
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To sum up, Nigerian authorities should embark on a serious 
transformation of agriculture through a dynamic agrarian reform pro- 
gramme directed at the abolition of intermediaries, replacement of 
the multiplicity of land tenures by a simpler system, restriction on 
subletting, diminution in the number of uneconomic holdings by pro- 
hibiting partition of holdings below a certain level, legal restrictions 
on ejection, fixation of fair rents, legal security of tenure, the 
consolidation of holdings, legislative measures towards redistribution 
of land, promotion of co-operative farming and the provision of credit 
facilities and education. This means that efforts should be directed 
at removing the structural obstacles to agriculture. Once these 
structural obstacles are removed and farmers are educated to use high- 
yielding seeds and fertilizers, and better, sharper and energy-saving 
hand tools, agricultural productivity will increase and the important 
role of agriculture in industrialization will be played effectively. 
If agriculture succeeds, the hard road to industrialization will be 
very easy. For a developmental strategy that seeks to mobilize and 
harness the resources and efforts of a large majority of a country's 
population is likely to be successful, provided that the right pro- 
grammes are pursued. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria's leaders in the past two decades have been pre-occupied 
with accelerating the growth of the manufacturing sector. The demand 
for industrialization is not unique to Nigeria; it is a common feature 
of many developing countries. As a result of a misconception of the 
immediate role of industrialization in economic development, many of 
these countries concentrated a large proportion of their resources in 
manufacturing, and regarded that sector as a panacea for economic 
backwardness. After several years of intensive manufacturing activities 
which were not matched by a tangible reduction in the problems of economic 
backwardness, many developing countries have started to rethink, and 
to adopt appropriate development strategies designed to reduce poverty, 
unemployment and the concentration of incomes in a few hands. 
Manufacturing on a significant scale in Nigeria is a post- 
independence phenomenon. Although Nigeria emerged from World War II 
with some light industry, and the ensuing post-war boom brought about 
further industrial expansion, it was not until after 1955 that specific 
attention was focussed on industrial expansion as a major goal. In 
1960, when Nigeria obtained political independence, there were only 
150 establishments employing twenty-five or more people. Of 
these 
150 establishments, 55 per cent were established between 1956 and 1960. 
This means that the five-year period prior to Nigeria's independence, 
when two of the three Regions, the East and the West, were self-governing, 
saw a marked intensity in manufacturing activities. Between 
1961 and 
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1965, however, manufacturing activities expanded enormously. Of all 
the medium and large-scale plants in existence in Nigeria at the end 
of 1965,55 per cent were established between 1961 and 1965, according 
to Professor Aboyade68 The remaining 45 per cent were established as 
follows: 5 per cent before World War II; 15 per cent between 1946 and 
1955, and 25 per cent between 1956 and 1960. Since 1966 only a few 
industrial establishments have come into operation. Of the 1035 
mining and manufacturing establishments employing ten or more people 
in Nigeria at the and of 1971, only 164 were established between 1966 
and 1971.69 This figure must be interpreted with caution since many 
of the establishments listed in the Industrial Directory are undated. 
Having said that, the political disturbances in Nigeria between 1966 
and 1970 damped down industrial activities and the ensuing civil war 
did not provide a congenial atmosphere for the establishment of new 
industries. 
WHY MANUFACTURING? 
The upsurge of industrial activities in Nigeria after 1955 was 
due to a number of factors. The primary motive for the intensification 
of manufacturing activities by Nigerian leaders since 1956 was the desire 
to diversify the economy. As shown in Chapter III, Nigeria is an agri- 
cultural country, and until recently agricultural goods accounted for 
over 60 per cent of total exports. With the downward movement in the 
world export prices of products, from the Korean war peak, since 1956 
and until recently, Nigeria would face two important dangers if resources 
were concentrated in the agricultural sector alone. The first danger 
680. 
Aboyade, "Industrial Location and Development Policy: The 
Nigeria Case", Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies, 
November 1968. 
69Federal 
Ministry of Industries, Industrial Directory 1971, 
Lagos 1972. 
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is associated with planning. The fluctuations in output and foreign 
exchange earnings resulting from movements in world demand and prices 
for primary products make development planning very difficult. The 
second danger is that the reliance of Nigeria's economy on the export 
of a few primary products exposes the country to very serious dis- 
rupting problems should there be a fall in the demand for any of these 
products. Three products, cocoa, groundnuts and palm kernels, accounted 
for a yearly average of 70 per cent of Nigeria's total agricultural 
export earnings during the 1962 to 1970 period. The development of 
the manufacturing sector would provide a cushion for the economy, and 
damp down any disrupting effect from world fluctuations in the demand 
for, and the prices of, primary products. 
The second attraction of manufacturing to Nigeria is the belief 
that an intensive and sustained growth of manufacturing would help to 
absorb both the unemployed and the under-employed labour in agriculture. 
However, the limits to the number of people which the manufacturing 
sector can absorb are more real than are sometimes supposed. These 
limits are imposed by the type of technology adopted, and the need to 
rely on foreign skilled labour at the initial stage of industrialization. 
It has also become very clear nowadays that manufacturing activities 
involving capital-intensive technology usually employ a very limited 
number of people. 
Another reason for the great enthusiasm for manufacturing is the 
thought that a growing manufacturing sector would not only cause a fall 
in foreign exchange expenditure, but might also provide a net addition 
to existing foreign exchange through the export of manufactured goods. 
Although an intensive and sustained effort in the manufacturing sector 
may help to reduce foreign exchange pressures, in the short run and 
in most cases, however, this is not the case. The ability of the 
manufacturing sector to provide foreign exchange and to reduce foreign 
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exchange expenditure depends on (a) whether a large proportion of the 
manufactured goods are exported, (b) whether manufacturing activities 
are concentrated on import substitution and (c) whether a large pro- 
portion of the raw materials and intermediate goods used in the manu- 
facturing sector are supplied domestically. If, as in the case of 
Nigeria, manufacturing goods are for the domestic market and a large 
proportion of the raw materials and intermediate goods needed in the 
sector are imported, an intensive manufacturing expansion is likely 
to aggravate foreign exchange problems if there is no alternative 
foreign exchange earner in the economy. 
The desire to industrialize has frequently been based on the 
claim that the high standard of living in advanced societies is a function 
of their industrialization. Agriculture tended to be associated with 
poverty and industrialization with wealth. It is not only erroneous 
to associate agriculture with economic backwardness, but agriculture 
may also provide the necessary impetus for industrialization. Historical 
facts do not lend any support to this belief either. Australia, 
New Zealand, Sweden and Denmark have shown quite clearly that the 
modernization of the agricultural sector can provide a country with a 
high standard of living. Iloreover, it was not until 1941 that manu- 
facturing employment exceeded agricultural employment in the United States 
and by that time, the U. S. had been the richest country in the world for 
many decades. Perhaps Nigerian future planners would realize that it 
is not the sector itself that resources are concentrated upon that deter- 
mines the improvement in the standard of living of the population, but 
the organization, efficiency and the productivity of that sector. If 
manufacturing activities were to be organized with little or no efficiency, 
as it is the case with agriculture in Nigeria, it would not be long before 
it became clear that the advantages which inspire enthusiasm for industrial- 
ization could not be realized. 
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One of the main attractions of accelerated development of the 
manufacturing sector is that it can raise the pace of economic develop- 
ment much faster than can a corresponding attempt in the agricultural 
sector. The sluggish growth of the Nigerian agricultural sector in 
recent years has encouraged the rapid acceleration of manufacturing 
in order to provide a sufficiently strong impulse to make the economy 
grow at a fast rate. This belief has been succinctly put by Nigeria's 
permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Industries, By its very nature, 
however, the agricultural sector can only register a modest growth rate. 
During the present plan period it has grown around 4 to 4.5 per cent 
per annum. Because of this, in Nigeria as in every developing country, 
the role of 'industrialization is crucial if satisfactory growth rates 
are to be achieved for the economy as a whole". 
70 In the 1950s the 
agricultural sector grew at an annual rate of 3 per cent; in the 1960s 
the growth rate fell to about 2 per cent per annum, and since 1970, 
the sector has been growing at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent. It 
has been shown in Chapter III that the slow growth of the agricultural 
sector was due, among other reasons, to the inadequate attention paid 
to the sector. It is difficult therefore to understand how a sector given 
such a low priority in the development programmes could provide the 
much-needed expansionary stimulus to the economy as a whole. 
The acquisition of political power associated with political 
independence must be emphasized as one of the major incentives for in- 
tensified manufacturing activities between 1961 and 1965. The British 
colonial government was not interested in the industrialization of Nigeria 
for the same reason that led it to prevent foreign capitalists from 
investing in the Nigerian agriculture. The British government was 
70P. 
C. Asiodu, Industrial Policy and Incentives in Nigeria, 
Nigerian Journal of Economics and Social Studies, July 1967. 
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interested in the preservation of the Nigerian social life and anything 
that could disorganize it, like industrialization or foreign ownership 
of land, did not receive official approval. In addition, industrialization 
would have raised many administrative problems which might have put an 
unnecessary strain on officials. After political independence, Nigerian 
leaders were free to undertake various projects of which the industrial 
ones received the greatest priority. In addition, Nigeria was, and 
still is, free to fix tariffs according to the requirements of the country, 
as long as GATT provisions are met. As a result of the political power 
which accompanied political independence, various laws and incentives 
were designed to stimulate industrialization. Also worthy of note 
is the existence of a group of Nigerian businessmen who are in favour of 
rapid industrialization. Having realized the importance of industrialization 
as a quick way of making money, Nigerian businessmen became an active 
pressure group urging the government to accelerate the pace of this 
industrialization. 
THE LEVEL OF MANUFACTURING IN NIGERIA 
Having committed itself to rapid industrialization, the Nigerian 
government embarked on an industrial policy aimed at making industrial 
investments very lucrative to both domestic and foreign investors, and 
this has resulted in a very rapid expansion of manufacturing. Foreign 
investors are, however, largely responsible for the rapid expansion of 
the manufacturing sector. In 1965, it is estimated that 63 per cent 
of total industrial investments in Nigeria was undertaken by foreign 
investors. The picture has not changed much since then, and at the 
moment foreign investors still undertake about 60 per cent of manu- 
facturing investments. Table 4.1 shows the rapid expansion of invest- 
ments in the manufacturing sector. Between 1962 and 1968 foreign 
investments in the manufacturing sector grew by 17.7 per cent per annum. 
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TABLE 4.1 
CUMULATIVE FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
ANALYSED BY TYPE OF INDUSTRY (N'-000) 1962-68 
TYPE OF INDUSTRY; 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 15är 108 
1. Food 4305 8441 10039 9037 7137 13801 11636 2. Beverages 5768 2739 2705 6977 7590 7184 8974 3. Tobacco 6839 5724 5904 6992 9192 7890 11706 4. Textiles 3669 3960 4016 6196 5138 8784 13023 5. Footwear & Apparel of 338 340 159 235 282 796 910 
Textiles 
6. Wood and Cork - 282 356 234 269 796 910 
7. Furniture & Fixtures 265 614 665 350 889 1033 1183 
8. Paper &. Paper Products 293 290 792 1001 1394 2367 1992 
9. Printing & Publishing 666 829 700 1019 900 792 1815. 
10. Leather & Leather Products - 51 52 155 152 270 201 
11. Rubber Products 2033 4127 2914 4206 5032 9302 3533 
12. Chemicals 3884 5991 6010 5745 9056 9522 12935 
13. Products of Petroleum and 864 2711 7314 6762 8084 9500 9131 
Coal 
14. Non-Metallic Mineral 3393 4995 3683 7227 6986. 7287 11289 
Products 
15. Basic Metal (Iron & Steel) 100 160 334 1618 1053 3640 1785 
16, Metal Products 3404 4807 8566 7580 8015 11071 6881 
17. Machinery (Except 146 180 377 129 457 91 172 
Electrical) 
18. Electrical Machinery 234. 542 608 686 704 517 902 
19. Transport Equipment 1683 1880 2898 2076 1837 3212 3045 
20. Miscellaneous 453 671 508 1287 333 2035 637 
TOTAL 38335 49334 58600 69512 74.500 99322 102045 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, 1968-71. 
In 1968, cumulative investments in the sector were 166.2 per cent above 
the 1962 level. The most rapidly growing industries are basic metals, 
products of petroleum, paper and paper products, textiles, chemicals and 
food. The industries where a large proportion of foreign investments 
were concentrated in 1968 are textiles, chemicals, tobacco, food, non- 
metallic mineral products and beverages. The six industries accounted 
for over 68 per cent of total foreign investment in the manufacturing 
sector in 1968. The rapid increase in investments in the manufacturing 
sector has resulted in the accelerating pace of industrial production as 
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shown by Figure 4.1. From 1963 to 1966 there was a rapid growth in 
manufacturing production. During the 1967 to 1968 period, the civil 
war which engulfed Nigeria adversely affected manufacturing production, 
hence the sluggish growth during the period. As soon as the war was 
nearing an end, manufacturing activities revived and from 1969 until the 
present, manufacturing production has been growing more rapidly than 
ever before. 
The rapid increase in the level of investment and production in 
the manufacturing sector has been accompanied by a growing increase in 
the value added by the sector. 
TABLE 4.2 
VALUE ADDED BY THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1958-68 (LMILLION) 
INDUSTRY GROUP 1958 1963 1967 1968 
Food (including tobacco, meat, 
dairy, sugar & confectionery) 4.76 10.77 16.02 10.94 
Beverages (including soft drinks) 4.50 10.17 11.79 15.80 
Vegetable Oil milling 1.51 3.42 7.22 6.28 
Textiles 1.76 3.99 13.68 13.78 
Garments 0.04 0.09 1.02 1.18 
Footwear 0.24 0.54 1.35 0.86 
Furniture and Fixtures 0.32 0.73 1.62 1.89 
Glass Products and Pottery 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 
Paints 0.16 0.36 0.59 0.69 
Bricks and Tiles 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.11 
Cement and Concrete Products 1.51 3.42 3.14 4.15 
Basic Industrial Chemicals, Petroleum 
Products & Miscellaneous Products 1.27 2.87 7.04 15.52 
Electrical Equipment 0.05 0.12 0.44 0.63 
Basic Metal & Metal Products 1.27 2.88 6.07 6.35 
Motor Vehicle & Bicycle Assembly 0.29 0.65 0.80 1.64 
Other Manufactures 6.57 14.8 16.68 18.05 
Crafts 16.20 20.4 22.4 23.0 
TOTAL 40.5 75.3 110.03 120.94 
SOURCE: FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, LAGOS. 
Table 4.2 shows the value added71 by manufacturing from 1958 to 1968. 
71 
Value added is calculated by subtracting industrial costs 
from 
gross output. See Table 4.9. 
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The consumer goods, on which a large proportion of foreign investment 
was concentrated, contributed the largest part of the value added by 
the manufacturing sector during the 1958-68 period. In 1968 value 
added by the manufacturing sector was 198.6 per cent above the 1958 
level. Over the 1958-68 period value added by manufacturing grew at 
an annual rate of 11.5 per cent. The most rapid growth rate was recorded 
during the first five years between 1958 and 1963 when the annual 
growth rate was 13.2 per cent. The value of the output of the manu- 
factoring industries was estimated as over £250 million in 1971.72 
THE [1AGNITUDE OF BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The U. K., as shown in Chapter II, is Nigeria's most important 
foreign investor, accounting for over 60 per cent of total foreign 
investment in Nigeria in 1962. As more countries have increased the 
level of their investments in Nigeria, the relative importance of the 
U. K. as the major investor has been diminishing. At the moment, with 
the U. S. investments in Nigeria amounting to more than NL250 million 
in 1972, according to the U. S. Ambassador in Nigeria, Mr. John Reinhardt, 
U. K. total investment has currently been estimated to be about one-third 
of total foreign investment in Nigeria. 
73 
The downward trend in the 
percentage share of U. K. investment in the total foreign investment 
has also been reflected in her share in total foreign manufacturing 
investments. In 1965, according to Professor S. Aluko, when foreign 
investors accounted for 63 per cent of the total industrial investments 
in Nigeria, the U. K. alone accounted for 45 per cent. 
74 In 1968, as 
Table 2.12 in Chapter II shows, if the unknown but meagre level of 
72Federal 
Ministry of Industries, Industrial Directory 1971, 
Lagos, 1971. 
73West 
Africa, September 29,1972. 
74Chief 
Awolowo, The People's Republic, Oxford University Press, 
Ibadan 1968, p. 310. 
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investment in the electrical and mechanical engineering industry is 
excluded, U. K. investment in the Nigerian manufacturing sector amounted 
to £32.8 million, which was 35 per cent of the total value of British 
investment in Nigeria excluding oil, banking and insurance investments. 
In the same year, if manufacturing investment is compared with the 
overall total of U. K. investment in all the sectors of the Nigerian 
economy, the percentage share of manufacturing investment becomes 
infinitesimal. In 1968 when total U. K. investment in Nigeria amounted 
to NL261.2 million, investment in the manufacturing sector totalling 
X32.8 million or NL25.65 million was only 9.8 per cent of U. K. total 
investment. The U. K. share in total foreign manufacturing investment 
was also very low in 1968. As Table 4.1 shows, total foreign invest- 
ment in Nigerian manufacturing amounted to NL102 million; U. K. invest- 
ment in the sector was NL25.65 million and this represents only 25 per cent 
of the total foreign manufacturing investment. The deteriorating 
position of the U. K. as Nigeria's major investor in the manufacturing 
sector becomes clear when it is realized that whereas in 1965 the U. K. 
accounted for 69 per cent of the total foreign manufacturing investment, 
by 1968 this proportion had fallen to 25.1 per cent. 
The diminishing importance of the U. K. as Nigeria's most important 
foreign investor in the manufacturing sector can be explained by the 
inability of the U. K. 's net investment in the sector to keep pace with 
the growth of net foreign investment in manufacturing. 
TABLE 4.3 
NET FLOW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR (L1) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
U. K. 
Total Flow 
3.4 
11.0 
0,3 
9.3 
1.9 
10.9 
2.2 
5.0 
0.5 
24.8 
U. K. as a Percentage of Total Flow 30.9 3.2 
17.4 
- 
44.0 2.0 11 
SOURCE: 1: BOARD OF TRADE JOURNALS OF 19.7.68 AND 9.5.69. 
2: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW 1968-71. 
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Table 4.3 shows the net inflow of investment to the Nigerian 
manufacturing sector from all foreign sources and from the U. K. The 
low level of net capital inflow from the U. K. during the period was 
due to a number of reasons. The political disturbances which began 
in the Western Region in 1964 threatened peace throughout the country, 
and made the business outlook very gloomy. In addition, the Nigerian 
coups which took place in January 1966 and July 1966 culminated in a 
civil war which affected British companies more severely than companies 
from other parts of the world. 
THE O. K. MAJOR INVESTORS 
THE UNITED AFRICA COMPANY LTD. (UAC) 
The United Africa Company Ltd. (UAC), a member of the Unilever Group 
of companies, is the second largest U. K. investor in Nigeria, next in 
importance only to the Shell-BP group. In its own right, the UAC is 
the largest merchant firm in Nigeria and also the most important investor 
in distribution and manufacturing. Excluding oil investments, the UAC 
accounts for about two-thirds of British investment in Nigeria. The UAC 
and the affiliated companies in the Unilever Group's investment in 
Nigeria amounted to £48.5 million in 1961.75 The United Africa Company 
Limited was formed on 29th April, 1929, by a merger between the Niger 
Company (a subsidiary of Unilever Ltd. ) and the African and Eastern Trade 
Corporation. As an off-shoot of the Chartered Royal Niger Company 
(which has been referred to in Chapter II), the UAC's contact with 
Nigeria dated back over 300 years. The initial functions of the UAC 
prior to the post-war period (as explained in Chapter II) were the dis- 
tribution of U. K. manufactured goods in Nigeria and the purchase of Nigerian 
75Statement 
to the Shareholders in 1961 by the Chairman of Unilever. 
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primary products for export. After World War II, UAC's operations in 
Nigeria entered a period of fundamental change. 
TABLE 4.4 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BY THE UAC GROUP AND OTHER 
UNILEVER ASSOCIATED COMPANIES (£'000s) 
DATE.. COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL TRANSPORT AGRICULTURAL TOTAL 
1951/52 549 728 403 529 - 1806 
1952/53 587 701 38.9 516 - 1804 
1953/54 823 492 33.2 166 - 1481 
1954/55 787 238 15.4 310 206 1541 
1955/56 1186 519 24.7 296 100 2101 
1956/57 1624 552 21.6 209 172 2557 
1957/58 1351 508 18.6 635 232 2726 
1958/59 935 563 26.9 263 334 2095 
1959/60 1074. 1224 43.3 40 479 2817 
1960/61 1403 736 31.4 82 124 2345 
1961/62 1368 1267 47.2 48 2 2685 
1962/63 1293 3018 68.6 37 51 4399 
1963/64 742 1558 58.2 303 74 2677 
SOURCE: UNITED AFRICA COMPANY LTD., STATISTICAL & ECONOMIC REVIEW, 
1955-1964. 
Table 4.4 shows the capital expenditure of the UAC in Nigeria from 1951 
to 1964. The figures for later years were not included in the table 
because the UAC has discontinued the publication of the Statistical and 
Economic Review from which the figures could be extracted. When contacted, 
the UAC has not been able to supply the break-down figures after 1964 
because, according to an official of the company, no attempt has been 
made to calculate the figures since the discontinuation of the Review. 
As Table 4.4 shows, more capital was invested in commerce than in any 
other sector between 1951 and 1959. Industrial investments did not 
account for more than 30 per cent of total capital expenditure except 
in 1951,1952 and 1953 during the 1951 to 1959 period. After 1959, 
however, industrial investments began to receive pride of place. Between 
1960 and 1964, capital expenditure in the industrial sector was 
77.7 per 
cent above the expenditure in the sector for the 1951 to 1959 period. 
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During the last five years of the period under consideration, 1960-1964, 
capital expenditure in the industrial sector accounted for 64 per cent of 
the total capital expenditure by the UAC during the 1951 to 1964 period. 
There was therefore a shift in the investment priorities of the UAC 
from commerce to industry after 1960, and this shift from one sector to 
another has been termed "redeployment". 
REDEPLOYMENT IN MERCHANT FIRMS 
Redeployment involves two things. Firstly, it involves the with- 
drawal of capital and manpower by the merchant firm from established lines 
of business which circumstances have rendered unprofitable or politically 
unacceptable to national aspirations. Secondly, it involves the re- 
investment of withdrawn resources in those activities which offer a 
satisfactory return and are politically acceptable. There are two 
main reasons why the UAC and other merchant firms have embarked on a 
serious process of redeployment since the post-war years. The first 
reason is economic. The boom which followed the Second World War 
brought with it expansion and a rise in incomes for many Nigerians. 
The increase in wealth and the associated desire for a higher standard 
of living brought about a sophistication in consumer demand which con- 
stitutes a salient change in the structure of market opportunities in 
Nigeria. As more local industries were developed and many Nigerian 
customers of the merchant firms engaged in export and import businesses, 
competition became fiercer in distribution and the profit margins of 
merchant firms were adversely affected. In addition, after Nigeria's 
political independence in 1960, the monopoly in distribution enjoyed 
by British merchant firms, under the tariff and political protection 
offered by the British colonial government, disappeared. To maintain 
their profit levels, British merchant firms had to bow to the inroads 
of Nigerian and foreign manufacturers into their jealously guarded 
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distributive trades by moving into new areas of activities where their 
experience, financial resources and marketing experience could shield 
them from these competitors. The case has been clearly put by the UAC, 
"Once the development of a country is under way, incomes begin to rise 
and the demand of consumers for goods and services tends to increase. 
When this happens, the local market comes to assume a growing importance 
and new and competitive suppliers of the goods and services in demand 
are attracted. This is what has been happening in the countries of 
tropical Africa during the post-war years. Some of the. new and com- 
petitive suppliers are local traders and wholesalers; others are overseas 
manufacturers no longer content to leave the local marketing of their 
wares, as hitherto, to established general merchants, unless on a favoured 
basis; still others are the new industries that are being developed 
locally to produce goods that previously had to be imported. As many 
of these new local suppliers are merely taking advantage of the expanding 
market and are operating on very low overheads, their entry into the field 
has had the effect of reducing the overall profit margins of the established 
merchants, whose overheads, arising from their world-wide buying machinery 
and their networks of trading posts, are necessarily on a sizeably larger 
scale; while the direct incursion of overseas and local manufacturers 
into the market has detracted from the range of merchandise being handled 
by the general merchants". 
76 
The second reason is political. Once Nigeria obtained political 
independence, there was also the desire to obtain economic independence. 
As a consequence, attention was focussed on industrialization as this was 
regarded as a panacea for economic backwardness and the means to raise 
the standard of living of the people. Industrial policies therefore 
76UAC, 
Redeployment: An Aspect of Development in Tropical Africa, 
Statistical and Economic Review, No. 28, April, 1963, p. 3. 
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involved the handing-over of primary products export and the buying 
businesses to the Nigerian Marketing Boards from the merchant firms, 
increased participation in industrial and distributive trades by the 
government and rich Nigerians. "The upshot of this multi-pronged 
government penetration, " said the UAC, "has been to bring the 'commanding 
heights' of the economy securely into its hands, thus making it quite 
impracticable - as well as quite impolitic - for a private firm to 
pursue its own development along lines at variance with overall national 
policy and need". 
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It is in the light of the economic and political 
changes taking place in Nigeria that merchant companies, especially 
the UAC, have undergone a fundamental change to recast their patterns of 
operations and embark on a programme of redeployment that would enable 
them to earn high profits while at the same time associating themselves 
with the national aspirations. 
REDEPLOYMENT IN THE UAC GROUP 
The UAC provides a unique example of a merchant company which has 
successfully diverted a higher proportion of its resources in Nigeria 
to manufacturing. The company's first step was to withdraw from cocoa and 
palm produce buying at the end of 1958-59 season. The company then 
concentrated on purchasing non-controlled items like hides and skins, 
rubber and sheanuts. The company also withdrew from provisions and 
petroleum and many of its smaller trading stations were either closed 
or transferred to independent Nigerian operators. The company then 
deployed resources into department and multiple stores and shops where 
enormous amounts of capital, marketing expertise and the provision of 
technical after-sales services are required. As a consequence, units 
77UAC, Statistical and Economic Review, April 1963, p. 6. 
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were formed dealing with motors, machinery and electrical equipment, 
chemists, textiles and haberdashery, hardware and cold storage in many 
parts of Nigeria. 
It was in the manufacturing sector that UAC's redeployment was 
well-marked. As a company spokesman has said, "To withdraw, however, 
is only in order to reinvest to better purpose. To firms with their 
sights adjusted to the future, new horizons of opportunity are con- 
stantly opening up to replace those which are closing down. To release 
men and money from commitments in which their usefulness is declining 
and to reinvest them where better prospects beckon is an inescapable 
course for any firm whose orientation is to the future rather than to 
the past". 
78 
In a country like Nigeria, the rapidly growing population 
and the sophistication of consumer demand associated with rising incomes 
provide an avenue for a high level of investment in the manufacturing 
sector and the UAC took advantage of the situation. 
Table 4.5 shows the industrial investments of the UAC in Nigeria. 
The African Timber and Plywood (Nig. ) Ltd. is one of UAC's earliest 
agricultural and industrial investments in Nigeria. Established and 
located at Sapele in the Mid-West, the company began with the felling 
and the extraction of Nigerian timber for export. Later, a sawmill 
was added and this was followed by a plywood and a blackboard factory. 
By 1960, the African Timber and Plywood Ltd. not only formed one of 
the largest tropical timber extraction and processing units in the 
world, it also represented the largest industrial unit in the country. 
The company now serves export markets with Nigerian timber while at 
the 
same time providing increasing quantities of timber for home use 
in 
building houses, shops, and schools, and materials for heavy construction 
such as railway sleepers, bridge beams and dock piles. 
78 
UAC, Ibid., p. 15. 
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TABLE 4.5 
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS OF THE UAC GROUP OF CQfWPANIES 
COMPANY I , 
{ 
African Timber & Plywood 
Ltd. 
Nigerian Breweries Ltd. 
Nipol (Nig. ) Ltd. 
Vehicle Assembly Plant 
Lipton (Nig. ) Ltd. 
W. A. Portland Cement Co. 
W. A. Cold Storage Co. 
Walls (Nig. ) Ltd. 
Vono Products Ltd. 
Guinness (Nig. ) Ltd. 
The Nigerian Sugar Co. 
Norspin 
Vitafoam (Nig. ) Ltd. 
A. J. Seward (Nig. ) Ltd. 
Bordpak (Nig. ) Ltd. 
Philip Morris (Nig. ) Ltd. 
Associated Cement Mfrs. 
Crocodile Machets 
General Cotton [Mill Ltd. 
Premier Packaging Ltd. 
LOCATION 
Sapele 
Apapa, 
Kaduna 
Ibadan 
Apapa 
Apapa 
Ewekoro 
Apapa 
Apapa 
Mushin- 
Lagos 
Ikeja, 
Benin 
Bacita 
Kaduna 
Ike ja, 
Aba 
Apapa, 
Zaria 
Apapa 
YEAR OF 
PRODUCT START--UP 
Timber & Plywood 1948 
Aba, Beer & (Minerals 
i 
Products 
Bedford Lorries 
and Parts 
Tea & Coffee blend- 
ing & packaging 
Cement 
Pleat Products 
Ice cream 
Beds, Mattresses, 
etc. 
Stout, Beer 
1949,1956-7 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1962,1972 
Sugar & By-products 1963 
Cotton Yarn 1963 
Foam Rubber Productsf 1963,1972 
Perfumes and 1964,1963 
Ilorin 
Apapa 
Port 
Harcourt 
Onitsha 
Apapa 
cosmetics 
Cardboard Boxes 
& Cartons 
1964 
Cigarettes { 1964 
Vehicle Batteries 1965 
achets 1965 
ýrinted Textiles 
gaper Wrappings 
SOURCE: UAC, STATISTICAL & ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1955-1964, UAC LINK 
MAGAZINES AND UAC HEAD OFFICE IN LONDON. 
1965 
1966 
The Nigerian Breweries Ltd. (NBL) represents one of UAC's import 
substitution investments. NBL began the production of beer and minerals 
at Apapa in 1949. By 1956 another brewery went into production at Aba, 
and to complete the regional distribution, a brewery was opened in Kaduna 
in 1957. 
i 
The NBL is a joint venture between the UAC, Heinekens of Holland, 
a number of European companies and the Nigerian public. In 1962, the 
UAC in partnership with Guinness Overseas Ltd. opened a stout factory 
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at Ikeja. The unique feature of UAC's investment in the beer and 
stout industry is that the company went into partnerships with. companies 
possessing technical competence; Heinekens of Holland in beer brewing 
and the Irish brewer, Guinness, in stout. The assembly plant for 
Bedford commercial vehicles erected by the UAC came into operation in 
June 1959. In addition to vehicle assembly, bus and body building 
is also carried out in the plant at Apapa. The UAC holds a 10 per cent 
share in the West African Cement Company at Ewekoro. The Nigerian 
Sugar Company Ltd. at Bacita is a public company whose shares are held 
by Federal and State governments, Booker (Nig. ) Ltd., and Tate & Lyle 
are technical partners. UAC holds a7 per cent share interest in the 
company. In the textiles industry the UAC is well represented by its 
investments in Norspin, whose textile factory is at Kano and General 
Cotton Mill Ltd. at Onitsha. Norspin is a joint venture between the 
UAC, the English Sewing Cotton and Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd., 
the body in which the CDC is associated with the old Northern Nigeria 
Development Corporation. It was established in 1963 to produce cotton 
yarn and cotton cord for Dunlop's tyre factory at Ikeja. In 1965 both 
the UAC and its technical partner, English Sewing Cotton, established 
the General Cotton Mill Ltd. at Onitsha to print imported Japanese 
cloth. The West African Cold Storage Company manufactures and markets 
a range of food products, including meat, ice cream, canned soups, 
condiments and sugar confectionery. Vono Products Ltd., a joint 
venture among the UAC, Vono Ltd., a leading U. K. bedding manufacturer, 
the Western Nigeria Development Corporation and CFAO, was established 
in 1961 to manufacture mattresses and spring beds. Vitafoam (Nig. ) Ltd. 
was incorporated as a company in association with G. B. Ollivant Ltd., 
a member of the UAC Group, and Vitafoam Ltd., of iliddleton, Manchester, 
in 1963 and commenced manufacturing operations in November of the same 
year. Located at Ikeja, Vitafoam manufactures latex foam moulded 
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products such as mattresses, pillows, cushions and fillings for the 
furniture trade. UAC is also associated with Lipton Ltd. which owns 
a factory at Apapa for roasting, blending and packaging tea and coffee. 
The UAC owns Bordpak (Nig. ) Ltd., established at Apapa in 1964 to 
manufacture cardboard boxes and cartons. Premier Packaging Ltd. was 
established in 1966 to manufacture paper wrappers. In the perfumes, 
cosmetics and other toilet preparations industry, the UAC is well 
represented by A. J. Seward (Nig. ) Ltd. The company has two factories, 
at Apapa and Zaria, to manufacture pomades, balms, brilliantines, perfumes, 
talcum powders and other toilet preparations. The Kwara Tobacco Company 
was a joint venture between the UAC, Philip Morris of America and the 
Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd. Its cigarette factory was opened 
at Ilorin in 1964 with the aim of providing cigarettes which will cater 
for all classes of demand in Nigeria. The name of Kwara Tobacco Company 
has been changed to Philip Morris (Nig. ) Ltd. with effect from 
9th January, 1969. Other companies which the UAC has joined with others 
to establish but with which it is no longer concerned include 
Taylor Woodrow (Nig. ) Ltd., Nigerian Pre-Stressed Concrete Company Ltd., 
Nigerian Joinery, Northern Construction Company, Farm Milk and Pye (Nig. ) 
Ltd. 
One important industrial investment of the UAC Group to which no 
reference has yet been made is Lever Brothers (Nig. ) Ltd. As a subsidiary 
of Unilever Ltd. of the U. K., Lever Brothers is one of the oldest manu- 
facturing companies in Nigeria. The first factory was established at 
Apapa in 1925. The other factory, a £2 million soap factory, was established 
at Aba in 1958. In its two factories, Lever Brothers (Nig. ) Ltd. manu- 
factures products identical with those of its U. K. parent company such 
as detergents, margarine and other edible fats, soap and other toilet 
preparations, perfumes and talcum powder. 
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Just as the UAC Group has been redeploying its capital and structure 
to meet changing conditions, so also has the company been redeploying 
its labour and upgrading African employees. 
TABLE 4.6 
UAC GROUP: AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN MANAGERIAL STAFF 
TOTAL AFRICAN MANAGERS EUROPEAN MANAGERS 
DATE NO. % No. % No. % 
1953 697 100 80 11.5 617 88.5 
1955 775 100 99 12.8 676 87.2 
1957 874 100 149 17.0 725 83.0 
1959 917 100 166 18.1 751 81.9 
196.0 929 100 200 21.5 729 78.5 
1961 1006 100 264 26.3 742 73.7 
1970 1134 100 771 68.0 363 32.0 
SOURCE: 1: UAC, STATISTICAL & ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1955-1963. 
NEW COMMONWEALTH, TRADE & COMMERCE, NO. 8,1970. 
Table 4.6 shows the rapid Africanisatrion of its managerial staff. While 
in 1953 only 11.5 per cent of its managerial staff were Africans, by 
1959 the percentage had increased to 18.1. After 1960., there has been 
a rapid Africanisation of the managerial staff, partly because the company 
is genuinely interested in providing employment for the rapidly increasing 
number ofNigerian graduates, and partly because of the pressure put 
on the company by the Nigerian government to reduce its European 
managerial staff. 
The post-war activities of the UAC in Nigeria have shown quite 
clearly that when there is the desire, there is always the possibility 
of adapting to changing conditions. The UAC has responded honourably 
to the economic pressures mounted by competitors and the desire of the 
Nigerian government to industrialize. Not only have resources been 
withdrawn from less profitable and politEally acceptable lines, such 
resources have also been redeployed into new lines. The UAC has been 
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able to do this by building on its accumulated marketing experience. 
In some cases the company has collaborated with overseas technical 
partners, mostly manufacturers with whom the company have already done 
business, whose special technical skills could be married with the 
commercial experience of the UAC, to provide a complementary element 
of expertise and capital. There is therefore an element of truth in 
the attitude of the UAC group regarding industrialization in Africa 
put forward in 1959, "... Thus, quite apart from a genuine desire in 
sympathy with public demand to help West African countries to broaden 
the scope of African enterprise, there is a thoroughly practical basis 
for the encouragement of local industries by the company. This has also 
found practical expression in the way the United Africa Company and 
other trading companies have gone into partnership with local govern- 
ments and with experienced manufacturers in the establishment of 
industries in West Africa". 
79 
The success which has accompanied the adaptation of the UAC to 
the changing Nigerian conditions is due largely to the interest and 
the confidence the company has in Nigeria. Although all the industrial 
investments of the UAC are concentrated in light industries and consumer 
goods, the fact remains that the Company redeployed its capital to 
manufacturing. In addition, as an official of the company said in an 
interview, "UAC are not industrialists. We are a merchant firm adapting 
to the aspirations of your people". For the UAC to redeploy a large 
proportion of its capital from its established lines of activities to 
manufacturing within a period of about ten years is in itself commendable. 
The UAC represents all that is good in a British investor in Nigeria. 
The company has formed partnerships with Nigerian governments in a 
number of projects, recruited foreign technical partners to Nigeria, and 
79 
UAC, Industrialization in Commonwealth Africa, Statistical and 
Economic Review, No. 23, September 1959, p. 39. 
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provided genuine training opportunities for Nigerians to acquire much- 
needed managerial skills. The company has also associated itself with 
Nigeria at all times whether in times of adversity or prosperity. It 
is therefore not an exaggeration to say that what is good for the UAC 
is, in most cases, good for Nigeria. 
COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
After Shell-BP, UAC and the NTC, the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (CDC) is next in importance among the British direct investors 
in Nigeria. As explained in Chapter III, the CDC is a public body whose 
main interest is to help backward countries to develop and for this 
reason, the CDC only have to break even from one year to another to 
remain in business. Table 4.7 shows the CDC's investment in Nigeria's 
commerce and industry in 1971. Commerce and industry accounted for 
58.9 per cent of the CDC's total investment in Nigeria in 1971, the 
corresponding figure for CDC's operations in the world, as a whole, 
TABLE 4.7 
COC'S OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA'S COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY IN 1971 
1. Afprint (Nig. ) Ltd. £554,000 
2. Development Finance Co. Ltd. £1,000,000 
3. Dunlop Nigerian Industries 
Ltd. £150,000 
4. Five Star Industries Ltd. £258,000 
5. Hill Station Hotel Ltd. £25,000 
6. Nigeria Hotels Ltd. £636,852 
7. Nigerian Cement Co., Ltd. £472,500 
8. Nigerian Industrial 
Dev. Bank £75,000 
9. Northern Hotels Ltd. £83,350 
10. Northern Nigeria Investments 
Ltd. £2,297,800 
11. Zamfara Textiles Industries 
Ltd. £100,000 
TOTAL £5,652,836 
TOTAL CDC'S INVESTMENT IN ALL SECTORS IN 1971 = £9,599,937 
COMMERCE & INDUSTRY AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INVESTMENT = 58.9 
SOURCE: CDC ANNUAL REPORT, 1971. 
150 
was 30.2 per cent. These figures would tend to suggest that the CDC 
paid more attention to commerce and industry in Nigeria than it did in 
many parts of the world. Three of the companies in Table 4.7, Afprint 
Ltd., Five Star Industries Ltd. and Zamfara Textiles Industries Ltd., are 
in the textile industry. Afprint (Nig. ) Ltd. is a textile company to 
which the CDC has agreed to lend £800,000 for expansion. The company 
operates a factory at Iganmu, Lagos, to provide finished printed fabrics 
from grey cloth. A £6 million expansion programme into spinning and 
weaving to utilize local raw materials began in 1971. By the end of 
1971, the CDC had advanced £554,000 to the company. Five Star Industries 
Ltd. operates a factory completed in 1971 at Ikeja industrial estate in 
Lagos to produce woven and knitted fabrics from synthetic filament yarns. 
The CDC holds £25,000 shares in the company and has also lent £233,334 
to it. The Zamfara Textiles Industries Ltd. was established in 1965 
as a joint venture between the CDC, a Sudanese businessman called Seroussi 
and the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation. The company has two 
spinning and weaving mills in GusaU and Kaduna. The CDC holds £40,000 
shares in the company and has lent another £60,000 for expansion purposes. 
Development Finance Co. Ltd. and Northern Nigeria Investments Ltd. are 
development companies established in partnership with the former Regional 
governments of the East and North to finance industrial projects. When 
the war broke out in 1967, Development Finance Co. Ltd. had invested 
1.7 million in 15 businesses in the Eastern part of Nigeria. The war, 
however, paralyzed the activities of the company and its operation was 
suspended during the war. After the war, the CDC has helped to resuscitate 
the company and some of the businesses in which the company had invested 
have already been brought back into operation. The Northern Nigeria 
Investments Ltd. has invested some £5 million in 30 projects including 
textiles, engineering, food processing, hotels and tanning. One can 
see that through the two development companies alone, the CDC has investments 
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in over 40 industrial projects in Nigeria. The Nigerian Industrial 
Development Bank, in which the CDC has a £75,000 investment, was 
established in January 1964 to finance industrial investments. It is a 
Federal Government institution whose shares are held by the Federal and 
State governments and foreign and domestic companies. Dunlop Nigerian 
Industries Ltd. is a British company established in 1963 which owns a 
rubber tyre and tube factory in Lagos. The CDC holds £50,000 shares 
in the company and has lent another £300,000 for expansion programmes. 
The Nigerian Cement Company Ltd. is a joint venture between the Nigerian 
government, the CDC, the Nigerian public, along with the Danish firm of 
F. L. Smidth and its British Associated Tunnel Portland Cement Company 
as technical partners. The company was established in 1957 and has a 
cement factory at Nkalagu in East Central State. The CDC holds 
£375,500 (8.9 per cent) of issued stock of the company. The Nkalagu 
factory was severely damaged during the war and the CDC has agreed to 
lend £585,000 to restore the company to its pre-war level of operation. 
The CDC also has substantial investments in the three Nigerian Hotel 
companies which build and operate hotels throughout the country. 
Although most of the CDC's investment undertakings in Nigerian commerce 
and industry have been through advances and shareholding rather than 
by owning industrial establishments of its own, the CDC's contribution 
to industrial expansion is invaluable to the Nigerian economy. By 
providing capital at critical stages when firms needed further expansion 
in order to stay in business, the CDC has not only helped to avert the 
economic collapse of these firms, but it has contributed to employment, 
rising incomes and the general economic prosperity of Nigeria. Through 
the three investment agencies - Development Finance Company Ltd., 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank and the Northern Nigeria Investment 
Ltd., in which the CDC has over half of its total investment in commerce 
and industry, the CDC has its capital widely diffused in over 50 industrial 
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projects in Nigeria. This means that the effects of the CDC's industrial 
investments are not limited to the projects listed in Table 4.7 alone, 
but are widely felt throughout the country. 
THE NIGERIAN TOBACCO COMPANY (NTC) 
Another important British company in Nigeria is the Nigerian Tobacco 
Company (NTC). The NTC is associated with the British-American Tobacco 
Company Group in London, the largest manufacturer of tobacco products in 
the world with over 140 factories manufacturing tobacco products in 55 
countries. The NTC is reckoned to be Nigeria's third largest British 
investor, outplaced only by Shell-BP and the UAC. The NTC provides a 
unique example of a company whose contribution to the Nigerian economic 
development is likely to be substantial not only in terms of the enormous 
capital invested in its four factories, but also in terms of its import 
substitution effect and the much-valued steady market it provides for 
Nigerian tobacco growers. 
60 The first attempt at tobacco manufacturing 
in Nigeria dates back to 1935, when the British-American Tobacco Company 
established a pilot plant in a disused cotton factory in Oshogbo. Here 
cigarettes were manufactured from imported tobacco leaf. With supplies 
of domestically produced tobacco leaf increasing and the possibility of 
further expansion, BAT opened its own factory at Ibadan in 1937. In 
1951 Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) acquired the business previously 
carried on by British-American Tobacco Company, and five years later, 
in 
1956, another factory was established in Port Harcourt. In order to 
meet rising demand and to spread the benefits of tobacco manufacture 
more equitably among the three Regions of Nigeria, another factory was 
established in Zaria in 1959. In 1970, work started on the construction 
of another factory in Zaria to add to the already existing one in the city. 
80Much 
has been said about the activities of the NTC in 
the agri- 
cultural sector in Chapter III. 
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It was estimated that the new factory, including equipment, will cost 
about £2.5 million. The new Zaria factory when completed will form 
an integrated complex with the existing factory and the Zaria complex 
was estimated to have a manufacturing capacity of 400 million cigarettes 
per month. In 1970, according to an official of BAT, NTC produced 
700 million cigarettes per month. 
In 1960, the NTC became a public company and share ownership was 
extended to Nigerians. Again in 1964, ordinary stock of the NTC was 
offered to the Nigerian public for sale and according to Mr. Jamieson, 
an NTC manager, there were 1900 Nigerian shareholders1 In 1966, the 
8 
authorised capital of the company was £7.5 million and its shareholders 
in Nigeria numbered 3700, while its fadtories gave direct employment to 
over 2700 Nigerians. 
TABLE 4.8 
NTC_AT A GLANCE FROM 1959 TO 1966 (IN NL) 
YEAR 1959/60 1960/61 1961/62 962/63 1963/64 1964/6 1965/66 
Trading Profit 1039060 1142838 1116040 1216071 1406686 1570749 1994256 
Taxation 427483 453796 436422 456891 531587 557140 873000 
Nett Profit 611577 689042 679618 759180 875099 1013609 1121256 
Dividend: 
a) Amount 410000 500000 562500 625000 750000 750000 900000 
b) Rate in L1 1/7d. 2/-d 2/3d 2/6d 3/-d 3/-d. 3/-d. 
Fixed Assets 3271710 3555793 3731399 4096910 4436729 5090851 5909037 
SOURCE: NTC, YOU AND NTC (NO DATE) 
Table 4.8 shows the performance of the NTC from 1959 to 1966. As can be 
noted in the table, taxation paid to the government doubled over the 
period. The nett profit earned by the company was also outstanding, 
amounting to 83.3 per cent above the 1959 level in 1966. Dividend to 
stockholders increased by more than 119 per cent above the 1959 level in 
1966. In 1970, capital and reserves of the company was estimated to be 
81West 
Africa, 13.6.64. 
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over £10 million and the total number of people directly employed was 
3550. When the fourth factory in Zaria comes into full production, it 
is estimated that the NTC will be employing over 4000 people. In addition, 
since about 97 per cent of NTC's tobacco requirement is presently pro- 
duced in Nigeria, the company has thus offered a livelihood to about 
100,000 farmers who grow tobacco and sell it to NTC. Since 1962, the 
distribution of NTC's products has been entirely in the hands of independent 
Nigerian businessmen and women, who supply the retail traders in their 
various areas of responsibility. There are 61 NTC distributors who 
jointly employ about 2,000 people, serving some 750,000 retailers. The 
NTC controls about 90 per cent of the Nigerian cigarette market; the 
remaining 10 per cent is controlled by Philip Morris. 
The NTC's investment in the tobacco manufacturing industry has given 
rise to a secondary investment activity. In 1964, the Nigerpak Ltd. 
was established as a joint venture between the NTC and Times Press Ltd. 
to provide labels, shoe boxes, and other types of light cartons and 
packaging materials, including cigarette packets. By the end of 
March, 1964, a sum of £150,000 had been invested in modern rotogravure 
machinery, the first of its kind in West Africa. Nigerpak Ltd. employs 
about 100 Nigerians and supplies NTC's cigarette cartons. 
There is no doubt that the NTC has made a substantial contribution 
to the economy of Nigeria. By paying substantial taxes to the Nigerian 
government, the company is helping to swell public revenue, often used, 
among other things, for development purposes. In addition, several 
thousands of Nigerians are employed directly and indirectly by the company 
and such large-scale employment helps to stimulate demand in other industries. 
OTHER BRITISH INVESTORS 
Other important British companies operating in Nigeria include 
John Holt (Liverpool) Ltd. John Holt is the second largest merchant firm 
in Nigeria. It was founded in 1867 as a family concern. Unlike 
UAC, 
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John'Holt has not redeployed its capital into industrial undertakings 
on a large scale. Instead the company has concentrated on distributing 
drugs and cosmetics through its West African Drug Company, motor vehicles 
and parts through J. Allen & Company Ltd., engineering, electrical equip- 
ment, hardware, provisions, textiles and building materials through its 
various ventures scattered all over Nigeria; travel services through 
Holts Travels, and insurance through John Holt Insurance Company. As 
for industrial investments, John Holt has controlling interests in Haco, 
a company manufacturing perfume and plastics located at Kano and Ikeja; 
Nigerian Enamelware Company in Ikeja, Holt Rubber Company in Sapele and 
Holt Tanneries in Northern Nigeria. The company also has minority 
interests in Crittall-Hope, a British company manufacturing building 
materials; Nigerian Breweries, Nigerian Canning Company and Asbestos 
Cement Products. The main reason why John Holt has paid very little 
attention to manufacturing in Nigeria is that the company has other 
profitable opportunities in wine and spirits in France and these are the 
areas of investment to which resources are being diverted. However, 
John Holt is likely to be faced with a serious problem in the future 
when the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree comes into effect, for a 
large proportion of its distributive activities will be affected by the 
decree. The choice that would face the company then would be either to 
expand manufacturing activities in Nigeria or to contract its investments 
altogether. 
Williams and Williams Ltd. opened their first factory in Port Harcourt 
in 1960 to manufacture window and curtain walling materials. In 1963 
Williams and Williams Ltd. formed a, partnershi; p with Northern Development 
Limited to operate a joint venture called Reliance Metal Products 
(Nig. ) 
Limited, located in Kaduna. The new company has been manufacturing a 
wide range of standard windows, doors and sheet metal products. 
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In March, 1964, in order to meet the increasing demand for paint 
created by the developing economy of Nigeria, Pinchin Johnson and 
Associates Ltd., the Courtaulds paint subsidiary, formed a new company 
Pinchin Johnson and Associates (W. A. ) Ltd. with registered offices in 
Port Harcourt. In the same year, four other British companies, 
International Paints, British Paints, Permacem, Imperial Chemical 
Industries, also established four more paint factories in Lagos. In 
the cement industry British firms were also important investors. In 
1957, the West African Portland Cement Company, with its factory located 
at Ewekoro in Abeokuta, was formed by a joint venture between Western 
Nigeria Development Corporation and two British firms, Associated 
Portland Cement Ilanufacturers, the world's largest cement producer, 
and the UAC. The two British firms held 51 per cent and 10 per cent 
shares respectively. Despite the fact that the West African Cement 
Company has to compete with other cement companies in Nigeria, the 
venture has so far been a success. In addition to the investment 
activities of the UAC in the textiles industry, Whitebread and Sons of 
Lancashire went into partnership with the Northern Nigeria Development 
Corporation and the Northern Nigeria Marketing Board to establish Kaduna 
Textiles Limited. Other important British investors in Nigerian manu- 
facturing include Pilkington Glass of St. Helens in Lancashire, Cadbury 
Brothers Ltd., Dunlop, W. J. Bush, Metal Box Company, Turner and Newall, 
Tate & Lyle, Paterson Zochonis of Manchester and its associate 
Nicholas (Nig. ); Ltd. and Crittall Hope Ltd. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING INVESTMENT TO TWE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
The previous sections considered the area of British investments in 
the manufacturing sector of the Nigerian economy, and also the major 
British firms responsible for these investments. The present section 
is concerned with the contribution of these investments to the Nigerian 
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economy. One of the main attractions of industrialization in Nigeria 
is the belief that intensive manufacturing activity would help to remove 
the stubborn, intractable and unyielding obstacles to mass employment. 
Almost all the literature on foreign investment in developing countries 
has laid emphasis on the employment creation effect, yet no attempt has 
been made to quantify the level of employment actually generated by foreign 
investment in these countries. Developing countries have been made to 
believe that once the manufacturing sector is intensively activated, 
unemployment will be reduced and one of their social problems would be 
solved very quickly. Professor A. Lewis took the same view in his 
celebrated article in which he emphasized that it is the rate of expansion 
in the capitalist sector which determines the rate of expansion of employ- 
ment in the high wage capitalist sector. 
82 For Professor Lewis, "the key 
to the process is -the use which is made of the capitalist surplus. Insofar 
as this is reinvested in creating new capital, the capitalist sector 
expands, taking more people into capitalist employment out of the sub- 
sistence sector. The surplus is then larger still, capital formation 
is still greater, and so the process continues until the labour surplus 
disappears: 83 The above quotation seems to suggest that there is a 
positive correlation between investments in the capitalist sector and 
-employment creation. It is doubtful whether such a correlation exists 
for the rate and level of employment generated by a unit of investment 
in the capitalist sector depend on (a) the area of investment in the 
capitalist sector and (b) the technology adopted. The greatest limitation 
of Lewis's two-sector model of employment creation by the capitalist 
sector to Nigeria is the fact that the surplus labour in the agricultural 
sector is not brought about by the pressure on land or by agricultural 
82A. 
Lewis, Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, 
Manchester School, 1954. 
83 
A. Lewis, op. cit. 
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efficiency resulting in many people doing what few people could do. 
There is surplus labour in the Nigerian agricultural sector because 
many people are cultivating a small proportion of the country's avail- 
able soil. As shown in Chapter III, only 16 per cent of Nigeria's 
soil is cultivated due to (a) insufficient capital to bring in more 
land under cultivation (b) primitive agricultural systems accompanied 
by a laborious system of cultivation and complete lack of agricultural 
education and professional agricultural system. If capital is avail- 
able to extend the proportion of land under cultivation, say to 50 per cent 
of Nigeria's arable soil, will there not be more employment opportunities 
for a greater number of people? 
TABLE 4.9 
THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AT A GLANCE 1965-1971 
1965 1967a 1969a 1971 
No. of Establishments 776 555 704. 870 
No. Employed 94,277 76,395 128,519 145,445 
Wages & Salaries in Nis 21,300,000 20,169,000 34,461,000 44,667,000 
a) Gross Output in NLs. 218,325,000 219,246,000 423,921,000 477,082,000 
b) Industrial Costs in ' 
Nis. 132,390,000 131,615,000 226,804,000 255,859,000 
Value Added (a-b)' in 
Nis. 85,935,000 87,631,000 197,116,000 221,223,000 
SOURCE: FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR APRIL 1973, 
JULY 1972, APRIL 1970, AND DIGEST OF STATISTICS, VOL. 17, NO. I, 
JANUARY 1968. 
NOTE: a: Excluding the three Eastern States. 
British investment in the Nigerian manufacturing industry as shown 
in Chapter II amounted to £32.8 million (sterling) in 1968. Table 4.9 
shows, among other things, the number of people employed in Nigerian 
manufacturing industries in the 1965-1971 period. The total number 
of people employed in 1971 was 145,445, which was 0.4 per cent of the 
Nigerian working population for the year. This figure represents a drop 
in the ocean of the employment pool in Nigeria. If one assumes that 
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British investment alone was responsible for the employment of 145,445 
people in 1971, the conclusion would still be that British investment 
in the manufacturing sector creates negligible employment. If one 
now drops the assumption, then the level of employment created by British 
investment in the manufacturing sector becomes extremely small. The 
employment figures in Table 4.9 covered both foreign and domestic 
establishments operating in the manufacturing sector. Britain accounted 
for only 25.1 per cent of total foreign investment in Nigeria's manu- 
facturing sector in 1968. British investment as a proportion of total 
foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has been falling since 1965 
when it stood at 69 per cent. When it is realized that the U. K. only 
accounted for less than one-third of total foreign investment in the 
manufacturing sector in 1971, and that the total employment created in 
the sector by both foreign and domestic investors was only 145,445, 
the U. K. then becomes less important as a creator of employment in the 
manufacturing sector. Another factor worth noting is that unlike 
some other foreign investors in Nigeria, U. K. establishments adopt 
the most modern and capital intensive form of technology. Industrial 
establishments adopting modern and capitalist forms of technology do 
not individually create much employment. It is estimated that in 1967, 
such establishments which contributed 85 per cent of total industrial 
output were responsible for employing less than 10 per cent of the labour 
force in manufacturing. 
84 Putting all the facts together, the obvious 
conclusion is that U. K. investment in the manufacturing sector of the 
Nigerian economy has not created significant employment. This, however, 
is not surprising, for as Professor Dudley Seers has rightly asserted, 
"there is by now plenty of evidence to show that a growing manufacturing 
Daily4Times, The Role of Industries in Nigeria's Economy, June 30,1972, 
Lagos. 
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sector does not provide much employment, even if care is taken to use 
labour-intensive techniques where possible. The correct proposition 
is that if industry develops, the consequent rise in incomes will permit 
a substantial expansion of employment to take place in the economy as a 
whole". 
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Another major attraction of intensive manufacturing to the Nigerian 
authorities is the belief that foreign exchange problems would be reduced 
by producing import substitution products and by exporting some of the 
manufactured goods to other countries. As a consequence, particular 
attention was paid to import substitution and British companies are pro- 
minent in the production of commodities like beer, cement, cotton textiles, 
paints and detergents. 
TABLE 4.10 
INDICES OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS OF SELECTED MANUFACTURES 
SEER AND 
STOUT CEMENT 
COTTON 
TEXTILES PAINTS 
SOAP AND 
DETERGENTS 
PRODUC IM- IN- PRODUC IN- PRODUC- IM- PRODUC- IN- PRODUC- 
DATE TION PORTS PORTS TION PORTS TION PORTS TION PORTS TION 
1963 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1964 118.0 87.0 26.3 159.6 100.5 113.3 224.6 146.4 50.8 96.1 
1965 121.3 22.9 7.0 188.9 101.4 198.2 693.7 202.0 67.6 125.8 
1966 133.7 19.1 53.0 192.6 70.5 338.9 182.5 243.2 28.7 141.7 
1967 128.3 13.0 47.0 141.0 88.4 447.0 188.1 230.4 77.0 130.4 
1968 150.1 13.4 31.6 110.4 61.8 419.6 172.2 207.2 41.7 93.3 
1969 185.9 11.0 36.1 108.8 86.5 541.2 494.4 331.3 30.4 94.5 
1970 233.5 11.9 168.8 112.3 72.5 621.6 340.4 535.8 31.5 102.6 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORT, 1970. 
Table 4.10 shows the indices o. f domestic production and imports of the five 
products mentioned above. As the domestic production of the selected 
manufactured products increases, so does the import of such products 
decrease. In other words, increasing manufacturing production of the 
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D. Seers, The Role of Industry in Development: Some Fallacies, 
Journal of Modern African Studies, Decem_b er 1963. 
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selected products has resulted in a fall in imports and some savings in 
foreign exchange. The sudden increase in the imports of paints in 1966 
marked the first full year of domestic production by the five leading 
British paint manufacturers. Also, the sudden increase in the import- 
ation of cement and detergents in 1970 was due to the fact that the two 
major cement and detergent factories at Nkalagu and Aba respectively 
were paralyzed and went out of action during the Nigerian civil war. 
To meet the increasing demand for these products, suppliers resorted to 
imports. Can we conclude that import substitution policy, because it 
has resulted in a reduction in imports of consumer goods, has saved 
Nigeria some foreign exchange? 
A reduction in imports of manufactured goods is brought about by 
an increase in domestic production to satisfy expanding demand. An 
intensive activity in the manufacturing sector is usually associated 
with a marked increase in the imports of capital goods and raw materials. 
TABLE 4.11 
IMPORTS BY MAJOR GROUPS (NLMILLION) 
IMPORT GROUP 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Consumer 111.1'' 117.3 118.7 90.4 90.6 71.2 81.9 109.1 168.5 
Goods 
Durable 18.0 19.3 20.8 17.4 16.2 8.6 12.3 22.2 34.7 
Non-Durable 93.1 97.8 97.9 73.0 74,4 62.6 69.6 86.9 133.8 
Capital Good 93.0 133.7 153.8 163.3 129.6 113.3 150.4 259.8 362.3 
& Raw Matis. 
Capital Good 47.3 71.4 86.5 92.3 69.2 61.0 75.6 142.6 201.1 
Raw Materials 45.7 62.3 67.3 71.0 60.4 52.3 74.8 117.2 161.2 
Miscellan- 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.6 3.4 8.1 16.4 9.3 7.4 
eous 
TOTAL 207.6 254.3 275.3 256.3 223.6 192.6 248.7 378.2 538.2 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORTS, 1965-1971. 
Table 4.11 shows Nigeria's imports of major groups of commodities. The 
table shows the rapidly increasing rate of imports of capital goods and 
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raw materials for industry since 1963. The imports of capital goods 
and raw materials amounted to over L150 million annually from 1963-1971. 
TABLE 4.12 
IMPORTS BY MAJOR GROUPS IN PERCENTAGES 1963-1971 
IMPORT GROUP 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Consumer Goods 53.5 46.1 43. 35.3 40.5 37.0 
_ 
32.9 28.8 31.3 
Capital Goods and Raw 44.8 52.6 55. 63.7 58.0 58.8 60.5 68.7 67.3 
Materials 
SOURCE: TABLE 4.11 
As Table 4.12 shows, imports of capital goods and raw materials rose from 
44.8 per cent of total imports to 67.3 per cent in 1971. On the other 
hand, imports of consumer goods fell from 53.5 per cent in 1963 to 
31.3 per cent in 1971. The first conclusion on a policy of import 
substitution in Nigeria is that it is a device for substituting imports 
by imports. Figure 4.2 shows the correlationship between manufacturing 
production and the imports of capital goods and raw materials. The 
diagram shows that both indices move in the same direction. As manu- 
facturing production increased rapidly from 1963 to 1966, so there was a 
rapid increase in the imports of capital goods and raw materials. Between 
1967 and 1968, manufacturing production slowed down as a result of the 
Nigerian civil war, which began in 1967. The war emergencies called for 
a stiffer control on imports to conserve foreign exchange for arms purchase, 
and the imports of capital goods and raw materials were adversely affected, 
hence the sudden dip after 1966. After 1968, when a large proportion 
of the break-away region had been captured, confidence began to return; 
manufacturing activities picked up and there was a relaxation of war con- 
trols to allow into the country the capital goods and raw materials 
necessary for industry. As a consequence, manufacturing production and 
the imports of capital goods and raw materials began to increase at an 
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unprecedented rate. An increase in the manufacturing activities of 
British firms brought about foreign exchange lesgkages through the 
imports of capital goods and raw materials. 
It has been shown in the previous section that a policy of import 
substitution in Nigeria is a device for substituting the imports of 
capital goods and raw materials for the imports of consumer goods. If 
the value of the capital goods and raw materials imports is more than 
the savings from a reduction in the imports of consumer goods, then a 
policy of import substitution is likely to have an unfavourable effect on 
the country's balance of payments. In Nigeria the savings from the 
domestic production of many of the import substitution goods have not 
been sufficient to compensate the value of the imports of capital goods 
and raw materials. Available data are so defective as to make it 
impossible for the writer to detail the unfavourable balance of payments 
effects of import substitution on Nigeria. There are three reasons 
why a policy of import substitution has been unfavourable to the 
Nigerian balance of payments. The first is that the increase in the 
domestic production of some goods is not a sufficient indication of what 
will happen to the imports of such products when there is no domestic 
production. This is because domestic production can itself lead to an 
increase in demand brought about by large-scale advertisement and know- 
ledge of the existence of the products. This has been the case with 
beverages and tobacco products in Nigeria. Without the domestic 
production of beer and cigarettes, their imports could not have been 
appreciably different from when there is domestic production. The 
increase in the domestic production of beer and cigarettes is due to a 
rapid increase in demand brought about by large-scale advertisements, 
and the practice of allowing employees to have free beer and cigarettes; 
this in turn encourages them to continue to buy beer and tobacco when 
they leave these industries, as smoking and drinking have become a 
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permanent habit. However, there is no doubt that the value of imported 
capital goods and raw materials would not have been as high as it is 
to-day in the absence of increased local production of import substitutes. 
The second reason is that the total outlay on imported capital goods 
and raw materials is substantially higher than the cost of importing 
consumer goods. As a consequence, a rapid increase in the imports of 
capital goods and raw materials is likely to have a more serious effect 
on the balance of payments than a reduction in the imports of consumer 
goods. The third and the last reason is the practice by international 
companies of pricing their imported capital goods and raw materials 
substantially above the international price level through a system of 
86 
invoicing. 
Without doubt, a policy of import substitution has had an un- 
favourable effect on the Nigerian balance of payments, and, were it not 
for the petroleum industry which continues to provide the necessary 
foreign exchange requirements for capital goods and raw materials imports, 
the policy would have collapsed in the face of the development of a foreign 
exchange bottleneck. 
Import substitution in Nigeria has led to the production of inferior 
goods at very high costs, which in turn reduces the level of demand. 
This is the case with cement and textiles in Nigeria at the present time. 
In addition, a policy of import substitution in Nigeria has led to the 
concentration of enormous resources in consumer goods industries and 
"a diversion of scarce capital resources from the establishment of 
industries making intermediate and capital goods capable of changing 
the structure of the economy"* 
87 
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Much has been said about this practice in Chapter II. 
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A. F. Ewing, Industry in Africa: Oxford University Press, 
London, 1968, p. 9. 
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The results of a policy of import substitution in Nigeria are 
not different from what has been observed in many developing countries. 
In his conclusion on the policies of import substitution, G. Meier declared 
that in many instances the policies "have resulted in higher prices, 
a domestic product of inferior quality, excess capacity in the import- 
competing industries, and a restraint on the expansion of exports - all 
without a nett saving of imports since the replacement of finished import 
commodities has required heavy imports of fuels, raw materials, and 
capital goods, as well as foodstuffs in cases where agricultural develop- 
ment has lagged". 
88 
Jack Baromson echoed the views of Meier two years 
later in 1966 when he declared, "Import substitution policies now in 
effect in many new industrializing areas, while providing protection 
for domestically produced products, have at the same time intensified 
supply difficulties and restricted demand to domestic markets. This 
tendency has been to foster small-scale, high-cost plants producing for 
domestic markets of limited size and insulated from competitive forces. 
A proliferation of these small, inefficient factories has had the self- 
defeating effect of spreading scarce resources, especially technical and 
managerial personnel, too thinly and of intensifying balance of payments 
difficulties (by generating new demands for imports of materials and 
parts to maintain established plants or their suppliers". 
89) 
A policy of import substitution which has been vigorously pursued 
since the past decade seems to be waning. The Nigerian government 
is currently emphasizing development of industries making intermediate 
and capital goods. In addition, some of the import substitution 
industries, especially textiles, are being exposed to international 
competition through a reduction in tariffs to increase their efficiency. 
8SG. 
Pl. Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1964, p. 303. 
89 
Jack Baromson, "Transfer of Technical Knowledge by International 
Corporations to Developing Economies", American Economic Review, 
Supplements, 1966, p. p. 269-267. 
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It has been said earlier that British investments in the manufacturing 
sector have been a source of foreign exchange leakage through the imports 
of capital goods and raw materials associated with these investments. 
However, foreign exchange leakages can be compensated for by the exports 
of manufactured goods which can earn foreign exchange. Table 4.13 
shows the exports of manufactures compared with total exports from 
Nigeria between 1964 and 1971. 
TABLE 4.13 
NIGERIA'S TOTAL EXPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES (N£IIILLION) 
1964 1965. 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Exports of 
manufactures 2.2 2.7 3.1 2.6 2.4 3.0 32.9 22.6 
TOTAL EXPORTS 214.7 268.4 283.1 241.8 211.1 318.2 442.7 648.7 
Exports of Manu- 
factures as a 
percentage of 
total exports 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 7.4 3.5 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORTS 1966-1971. 
Over the 1964-69 period, exports of manufactures accounted for a yearly 
average of £2.7 million. In 1970 and 1971, however, there was a sudden 
apparent increase in the exports of manufactures. The reason for the 
increase was the change in the statistical computation of figures of 
manufactures. Whereas in the past, processed agricultural exports were 
not included in manufactures, after 1969, such agricultural exports have 
been classed as manufactures. Out of the exports of manufactures of 
£32.9 million and ¬22.6 million in 1970 and 1971 respectively, agri- 
cultural exports accounted for 40.4 per cent and 34.1 per cent respectively 
in 1970 and 1971. This means that without a change in the computation of 
figures in 1970 and 1971, exports of manufactures could have been £19.6 
million and £14.9 million in 1970 and 1971 respectively. 
ever the 
1964-1971 period, exports of manufactures accounted for a yearly average 
of 2.1 per cent of Nigeria's total exports. The exportation of 
Nigerian 
manufactured goods is not to countries outside Africa. Although some 
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British companies, like Vitafoam Ltd., West African Cold Storage Company, 
Lipton and the Nigerian Tobacco Company, have been exporting some of 
their manufactured goods to Sierra Leone, Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Ivory 
Coast and West Cameroons, nevertheless, British investors in the manu- 
facturing sector have not been responsible for a large proportion of 
the meagre manufactured goods Nigeria exports beyond its national boundary. 
We find the savings on import substitution in the Nigerian manufacturing 
are less than £5 million annually, and that exports of manufactures are 
less than £9 million annually on the 1964-71 average, while the imports 
of capital goods and raw materials represent a yearly average of over 
£150 million. The obvious conclusion from these figures is that, far 
from contributing anything to Nigeria's foreign exchange resources, 
British manufacturing investments have aggravated Nigeria's foreign 
exchange problems through import leakages. This conclusion is not 
surprising, since there is now enough evidence to show that industrial- 
ization in many of the less-developed countries has not reduced their 
foreign exchange problems. 
90 
On the effect of industrialization on 
foreign exchange, Professor Seers declared, "There is the fallacy that 
industrialization will cause the expenditure of foreign exchange to fall. 
This may happen, but generally it does not, because industrialization 
involves importing machines and spare parts, materials and semi- 
manufactures, and usually fuel; it also means a rising outflow of profits 
to foreign investors. The correct statement here is not that the expend- 
iture of foreign exchange will fall, but that industrialization will 
make it possible for incomes to rise faster than imports. Moreover, 
in the end, after a decade or so, dependence on the proceeds of a few 
primary products will be lessened". 
91 
90For 
a detailed experience of Latin-American countries, see "The 
Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-war Period", United 
Nations, New York, 1964. 
91D. 
Seers, "The Role of Industry in Development: Some Fallacies", 
Journal of Modern African Studies, December, 1963. 
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If British firms have not contributed anything to Nigeria's foreign 
exchange resources, they have, however, contributed substantially to 
the rising level of incomes. As shown in Table 4.9, substantial wages 
and salaries were paid by the manufacturing sector during the 1965 to 
1971 period. The annual average wages and salaries paid by the manu- 
facturing sector amounted to over £30 million. Out of the total wages 
and salaries paid to employees in the manufacturing sector over the 
1965-1971 period, British firms accounted for more than one-third. 
This amount represented a substantial purchasing power in the economy 
as a whole. The fact that British firms paid a large proportion of the 
wages and salaries generated in the manufacturing sector should not 
obscure the fact that a large proportion of British firms still pay 
many of their employees less than subsistence level wages. On the 
whole, however, ' British firms pay higher wages and salaries to their 
employees than Nigerian-owned firms and most other foreign firms. 
British manufacturing companies have made available to the majority 
of Nigerians a large variety of commodities; without their investments 
this would not have been possible. Many brands of products have been 
made available to customers and for the first time, a large number of 
people can make a choice in the selection of the products they buy 
according to their financial capability. Not only are British manu- 
facturing firms catering for the higher income groups; many of them, 
especially Lever Brothers and other UAC groups of companies, Cadbury 
Brothers, Nigerian Tobacco Companyy, I. C. I. and the British paint menu- 
facturing companies, have also been very successful in manufacturing 
products tailored specifically to meet the needs of the lower income 
groups. 
British companies have also acted as a pull to other foreign manu- 
facturers to invest'in Nigeria. Through their day-to-day dealings with 
other companies in England and throughout the world, they have been able 
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to provide useful information and guidance to interested companies 
about investment opportunities in Nigeria. The most important contributor 
in this respect is the UAC group of companies. Apart from holding 
exhibitions about Nigeria in its Africa House in London, UAC has helped to 
recruit many British and foreign companies to Nigeria. Through partner- 
ship, UAC recruited investment in Nigeria from Heineken of Amsterdam, 
Arthur Guinness, Son & Company of Dublin, Lipton Limited of London, 
Vono Limited of Tipton, Staffordshire, British Vita Company Ltd. of 
rliddleton, in Manchester, the English Sewing Cotton Company Ltd., the 
Calico Printers' Association Ltd. and Philip Morris International of 
America. Presumably, without the search for technical partners and the 
success of UAC to obtain the support of these companies, they would not 
have invested in Nigeria. Philip Morris International's investment in 
Nigeria was the company's first investment in Africa. By holding art and 
cultural exhibitions, and by their daily transactions with other companies, 
British manufacturing firms have provided information and publicity 
about Nigeria which can induce other companies to invest in the country. 
It should be added that bad publicity and information given by un- 
successful British companies in Nigeria to other companies abroad can 
have the adverse effect of frightening off potential investors. 
Apart from the contribution made by British manufacturing companies 
to the upgrading of industrial technology (which will be dealt with in 
Chapter VI), one major contribution of British manufacturing companies 
to the Nigerian economy is the substantial revenue the government 
derives from them. The Nigerian government derives revenue from 
British companies through import duties, export duties, motor licences, 
excise duties, company tax and the personal income tax paid by their 
employees. The tax revenue derived by the Nigerian government is very 
substantial. As an illustration; in 1966 the Nigerian Tobacco Company 
paid £873,000 in tax to the government. In the same year, the Nigerian 
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Breweries Ltd. paid £3.5 million to the government in taxes. 
TABLE 4.14 
NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT REVENUE (NL1000) 
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1970 
Import Duties 60174 , 61278 84821 54895 75804 107754 
Export Duties 13495 13536 15765 14034 18739 20618 
Excise Duties 6407 9299 16538 30142 35971 56275 
Company Tax 4738 6173 6510 11250 ) 
personal Income and ) 44748 87120 
Other Taxes 18439 22397 19991 15410 ) 
TAX REVENUE 103253 112683 143629 125731 175262 271767 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, 
DECEMBER 1968 AND JUNE 1971. 
Table 4.14 shows the tax revenue of the Nigerian governments from 1961 
to 1970. Tax revenue has been growing quite rapidly since 1961. The 
revenues for 1967 were low because the three Eastern States were not in- 
cluded as a result of the civil war. Although the tax revenues emanated 
from both domestic and foreign firms' activities, British firms contri- 
buted a substantial part of the tax revenue. In 1970, for example, 
Dunlop paid £677,697 in taxes to the government, and in 1971 the tax 
payment increased to £930,000. In 1970, also, W. J. Bush paid a total 
tax of £140,006 to the Nigerian government. Guinness Ltd. paid a 
total 
of £7 million in'taxes to the Nigerian government in 1971/72. 
There 
is no doubt, therefore, that the tax payments made by British manufacturing 
companies to the Nigerian government are a useful and important source 
of public finance. 
THE LINKAGE EFFECTS 
The last discussion has focussed attention on the fiscal linkages 
of British manufacturing companies' investment. By providing revenue 
to the government, British manufacturing investment would 
be indirectly 
linked with those things such as public health, road building, electricity 
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and water supply, social services, etc., on which government revenues 
are expended. 
Technological linkages of British manufacturing investments, that 
is, the extent to which manufacturing companies help to build up Nigeria's 
skilled and technical manpower and supply other industries with such 
manpower, will be dealt with in Chapter VI. The international invest- 
ment linkage effects of British manufacturing companies resulting from 
the dissemination of knowledge and information about Nigeria has already 
been dealt with earlier in this chapter. The present section is concerned 
with the sectoral and inter-sectoral linkage effects of British manu- 
facturing investments. Sectoral or inter-firm linkage effects are 
those benefits and costs associated with the transactions between firms 
in the same industry and sector. If, for example, the spinning of yarn 
in an establishment gives rise to weaving in the same or another establish- 
ment, that would represent a sectoral linkage effect. The relationship 
and dealings among firms in this case would be horizontal. Inter-sectoral 
linkage effects are those benefits and costs resulting from transactions 
between firms in different sectors. If, for example, the cotton grown 
by the farmer is sold to an integrated textiles manufacturing establish- 
ment, that would represent an inter-sectoral linkage between the agri- 
cultural sector and the manufacturing sector. The relationship among 
firms in this instance would tend to be vertical. Both sectoral and 
inter-sectoral linkages can give rise to forward and backward linkages. 
There is little or no sectoral linkage effect that can be associated with 
British manufacturing investments in Nigeria. Nigerian manufacturing 
industry is dominated by foreign entrepreneurs and as a consequence 
almost every industry in the manufacturing sector is dominated by giant 
foreign monopolists. Inter-sectoral linkage effects occur mostly as a 
result of backward transactions with the agricultural sector; the NTC 
provides the most successful example of such transactions. 
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One of the main features of British manufacturing investments 
in Nigeria is that they are mainly concentrated in final products. As a 
consequence, the only forward linkage that could take place is with the 
distribution sector. Distribution was formerly controlled by the 
merchant companies, the most important of which are the UAC and John Holt. 
The distributive trades of the companies and their rapid withdrawal from 
the sector as a result of intensive competition from Nigerians and the 
government's pressure to reserve distribution for Nigerians have already 
been dealt with in Chapter II. By March, 1974, as a result of Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree, distributive trades would largely be in the 
hands of Nigerians. 
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Another feature of British manufacturing investments in Nigeria is 
that almost all the manufacturing establishments depend on imported 
intermediate and capital products and raw materials. This is why the 
correlation between increased manufacturing production and the imports 
of capital goods and raw materials, as shown in Figure 4.2, is very 
high. This will continue to be so until Nigerian authorities design 
industrial policies that encourage the production of intermediate products. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that the manufacturing sector, 
which is usually regarded as having very high linkage effects, has been 
characterized in Nigeria with a low linkage effect because of the high 
import content of manufacturing production and the concentration of 
manufacturing activities on final products. The above discussion raises 
the question as to which industries British manufacturing investment 
will go into in the future. Until now, the end products of British 
manufacturing investment go to consumers as final products, with very 
little investment in the intermediate goods sector, and none at all in 
92 
More will be said about the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree 
in the later part of this thesis. 
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the capital goods sector. One of the main reasons why a large pro- 
portion of British manufacturing investment is concentrated on consumer 
goods is the policy of the Nigerian government to develop import sub- 
stitution goods. Now that the policy has so far succeeded, emphasis has 
been shifting to the development of industries for intermediate and 
capital goods. One of the main aims of the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree is to force foreign investors to withdraw from consumer 
goods industries into more sophisticated intermediate and capital goods 
industries. It is very likely, therefore, that more British manufacturing 
investments will go to intermediate and capital goods industries in the 
future, as a result of the constraints on investment in the consumer 
goods industries. 
There are some linkages effects which can be associated with British 
manufacturing investments. UAC's investment in the Nigerian Brewery 
Limited has given rise to secondary industries. The bottles used by 
the brewery. are now mostly bought from Glass Industries Ltd. in Port 
Harcourt; crown cork requirements are purchased from a factory in Ikeja, 
and cartons for beer are manufactured at UAC's Bordpak Ltd. at Apapa. 
The manufacturing investments of the Nigerian Tobacco Company have given 
rise to Nigerpak Ltd. -a company established by the NTC and Nigerian 
Times Press Ltd. to manufacture cigarette labels and cartons. The most 
important linkage effect of British manufacturing investments in Nigeria 
has been felt in the agricultural sector. Nigerian Tobacco Company 
factories provide a steady market for the tobacco leaf grown by about 
100,000 farmers; Lever Brothers' factories at Apapa and Aba provide a 
heavy demand for Nigerian palm oil, Tate & Lyle's factory at Ilorin makes 
use of cane sugar grown in Nigeria and the textiles factories and vegetable 
oil factories rely on raw cotton and groundnuts grown by Nigerian farmers. 
These examples are essentially backward linkages to the sources of raw 
materials. The initial export of logs and timber business of the 
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African Timber and Plywood Ltd., a member of the UAC Group, has grown to 
an industrial complex comprising a sawmill, a plywood factory and a 
blackboard factory at Sapele. This is essentially a forward linkage 
from raw materials to final production in the industrial sector. The 
above examples have shown quite clearly that the linkage effects of 
British manufacturing investments have not been substantial and are 
limited to the agricultural sector due to the high import content of 
manufacturing consumer goods, and the absence of British manufacturing 
investments in intermediate and capital goods production. 
THE GOVERNMENT'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INCENTIVES 
The industrial policy of the British colonial government in Nigeria 
was essentially based on capitalism; that is, the development of industries 
by private entrepreneurs. The colonial government believed that once 
industrialists were given some incentives, they would no doubt seek 
profitable opportunities and invest their capital in industry to make 
large profits. As a result of this belief, during the 1955-1960 period, 
out of a public capital programme of £91.3 million, only £7 million or 
7.6 per cent of the total was allocated for industrial development and 
only a small proportion of the estimate was actually spent. However, 
the colonial government then went on to pass benevolent legislation which 
conferred salutary investment advantages on private entrepreneurs to spur 
them to a high level of industrial activity. After political independence 
in 1960, the post-independence Nigerian civilian government continued 
with the industrial policies of the colonial government and passed 
further legislation to induce entrepreneurs to invest in Nigerian industry. 
The industrial incentives which are available to industrialists in Nigeria 
are embodied in four Acts - the Industrial Development 
(Income Tax Relief) 
Act, 1958; the Industrial Development (Import Duties Relief) Act, 1957; 
the Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidized Goods) Act, 1958; the Customs 
(Drawback) Regulations, 1959, and the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1959. 
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The Income Tax Relief Act of 1958, which grew from an earlier Act 
called Aid to Pioneer Industries Act (No. 10) of 1952, was designed to 
enable companies to enjoy tax holidays during the early stages of their 
operations. Under the Act, an industry can be declared a pioneer and 
firms operating in such an industry can obtain pioneer certificates 
which would entitle them to a tax holiday for a period up to five years. 
A tax holiday is granted in the first place for a period of three years 
provided that a minimum qualifying capital expenditure of £5,000 has 
been incurred before production started. The initial capital expenditure 
requirement has been increased to £75,000 for foreign firms and £25,000 
for indigenous controlled firms. The government will grant another 
year of tax holiday if after three years the rate of expansion, standard 
of efficiency, and the level of development of the company are considered 
satisfactory. An additional year of tax relief can be granted if the 
authorities are satisfied that local raw materials are substantially 
utilized by the company; there is adequate training and development of 
Nigerian personnel in the relevant industry; that the industry is important 
for the Nigerian economy; and the need for expansion, having regard to 
the location of industry. If the firm incurs losses during one or more 
years during the tax holiday, the time of exemption is extended from tax 
on profits earned by the company in its tax relief period. Shareholders 
are exempted from tax on dividends up to the amount of such profits. 
The first batch of industries to be declared pioneers were five in number, 
on 15th September, 1955. From 1955 to the end of 1967, there were 64 
industries declared pioneer, 42 of which were declared during the 
1955-1960 period. 
93 It must be added that the declaration of an industry 
as a pioneer was never met with the same speed in the granting of 
93Establishing 
Business in Nigeria, 2nd Edition, 1968, Federal 
Ministry of Information, Lagos. 
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certificates. For example, out of the five industries declared pioneer 
in 1955, only one firm was able to receive a pioneer certificate in that 
year. Between 1955 and 1967,143 pioneer certificates were awarded, the 
majority going to foreign firms, especially British firms. British 
companies who have benefited from the scheme include all the textiles 
firms in which the U. K. companies invest, Bordpak Ltd., Nigerpak, Dunlop, 
British paints, Pinchin Johnson, Glaxo Laboratories, Turners Asbestos 
Cement Ltd., International Paints, Crittall-Hope, Nigerian Enamelware 
Company Ltd., Metal Box Company, Dorman Long and Amalgamated Engineering 
Ltd., Williams and Williams Ltd., Crocodile Matchets Ltd., Crown Cork 
Company Ltd., Raleigh Industries Ltd., West African Cement Company, 
Vitafoam Ltd. and many other companies with British capital. The major 
criticism of the scheme is the delay in the award of pioneer certificates. 
It could take from 6 to 18 months from application to a certificate being 
issued, and it is very likely that such a long delay can frustrate a 
potential investor and can, in fact, discourage investments. Another 
criticism of the scheme is that pioneer certificates have been awarded 
indiscriminately. Some companies who were granted pioneer certificates 
made huge profits during the tax relief period which were exempted from 
any form of taxation. Again, once an industry is declared pioneer, 
there has been no consideration to limit the number of pioneer certificates 
granted to firms willing to go to the particular industry which might have 
been saturated or may have offered huge returns on investments. The 
scheme needs an urgent revision. Selectivity should replace indiscriminate 
awards of certificates. Industries which offer attractive profits in 
the initial stage of operation should be excluded from the scheme. Constant 
revision of the list of industries declared pioneer would enable emphasis 
to be shifted from saturated fields into areas needing attention. 
The Import Duties Relief Act, 1957, and the Approved User Scheme 
were designed to allow complete exemption from duty or the granting of a 
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concessionary low rate of duty on materials imported into Nigeria for 
use in the manufacturing or processing of goods, or in the provision of 
services, provided the applicant can satisfy the government that (a) it 
is impossible to provide the goods and services in question at prices 
low enough to compete with the imported equivalent , or that the imported 
finished article bears a lower proportion of import duty than the materials 
imported to manufacture the same article in Nigeria; (b) that any repayment 
of import duties to be made are to the overall economic advantage of 
Nigeria, having regard to the importance of the industry for which the 
materials are meant in the Nigerian economy and the need of relief to 
prevent adverse financial results, and (c) that the materials are not 
used other than for the approved purpose on which relief was granted 
without prior permission of the Board of Customs and Excise. The main 
purpose of the Act and Scheme is to enable industries to grow unimpeded 
by any lack of raw materials. Many British companies have benefited 
from the scheme. It is, however, fair to ask why the Nigerian authorities 
still pursue a policy which leaks out a substantial part of the foreign 
exchange resources of the country when they could make it compulsory 
for firms to find alternatives to imported materials. As shown earlier 
in this chapter, an accelerated manufacturing production is closely 
associated with a high level of imports of capital goods and raw materials. 
Over the past decade, nearly 60 per cent of the average annual value 
of the gross output of the manufacturing sector was accounted for by the 
cost of imported raw materials and capital goods. This, of course, 
represents a dangerous industrial development strategy since it involves 
a high dependence on imports. Through its Import Duties Relief Act of 
1957 and the Approved User Scheme, the Nigerian government has deliberately 
encouraged industrialists to rely on imported raw materials rather than 
vigorously searching for domestic alternatives. The present scheme 
therefore requires an urgent modification that could encourage industrialists 
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to search and make use of domestic raw material inputs, to serve as 
good substitutes for imports. 
The administration of the scheme has also been erected with certain 
defects. There is the fact that differences exist in the amount of 
relief and the period for which the relief is granted among firms in 
the same industry and in different industries. Two important drawbacks 
can be associated with such a practice. Firstly, assuming the amount 
and the period of relief are determined by economic criteria, which give 
more favourable treatment to weaker firms, there is the danger of perpetuating 
inefficiency in industry, while at the same time discouraging the drive 
to increase efficiency among firms which are willing to do so. In many 
cases, however, it is likely that the amount and the period of relief 
would be influenced and determined by the nature of the lobby a firm 
could muster and mount. Under this circumstance, since the big firms 
are more powerful in their lobbies, finance and influence, they are likely 
to get more favourable treatment than the weaker ones. The second danger 
of importance, therefore, is that the more relief these powerful large 
firms obtain, the greater becomes their monopoly power and profits. 
This, of course, may be detrimental to the Nigerian economy due to the 
barriers to entry for new competitors these firms are likely to erect. 
Another important loophole in the Imports Duties Relief Act 1957 and the 
Approved User Scheme is the opportunity the schemes offer to cheat the 
Nigerian Board of Customs and Excise by false declarations 
to obtain 
100 per cent import duty relief. A very recent example was a British 
firm which gave a false declaration of alarm bells which are exempted 
from duty under the Import Duties Relief Act 1957 and the Approved 
User 
Scheme, instead of declaring the costly materials it actually 
imported, 
which carried heavy duty. 
94 Having defaulted the Board of Customs and 
94Daily 
Times, Lagos, 16th December, 1972. 
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Excise through false declarations, the sacking of Nigerian managers in 
the firm concerned led to the revelation. There is no doubt that many 
foreign and domestic firms have been cheating the Nigerian Board of 
Customs and Excise for a long time in the past under the scheme. Since 
it is possible for foreign firms operating in Nigeria to tell their 
suppliers of raw materials, who are usually situated in their countries 
of origin, what the contents of their invoices should be, having known 
what materials are exempted from import duty under the schemes, and 
since the Board of Customs and Excise do not open all boxes, successful 
attempts to cheat the Nigerian government under the schemes cannot be 
doubted. 
The Customs Duties (Dumped and Subsidized Goods) Act, 1958, is 
designed to protect local manufacturing establishments against any goods 
which are being dumped in Nigeria or are subsidized by any government or 
authority outside Nigeria through the imposition of high tariffs and 
special duties on such goods. The operation of the Act by the Nigerian 
government is usually considered in such a way that there will be no 
conflict with Nigeria's obligations under the General Agreement on Trade 
and Tariffs. The government has in recent years exercised the power 
under the Act in August 1965 when the tariff on bicycle tyres was increased 
from 20 per cent ad%alorem to 50 per cent ad valorem to protect domestic 
producers against dumping by foreign manufacturers. 
The Customs (Drawback) Regulations, 1959, is designed to enable the 
government to grant duty drawbacks or refunds of duty paid on imported 
materials provided the goods are exported in the same state as that in 
which they were imported and the materials imported are for use in the 
manufacture of goods for export. These regulations if well organized 
can boost Nigerian exports of manufactured goods, but the fact remains 
that the regulations will be frustrated by administrative laxity and 
red-tape which would result in prolonged delays and make it impossible 
for industrialists to use the capital involved. 
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The Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1959, which was reframed and now 
incorporated in the Companies Income Tax Act, 1961, is a kind of accelerated 
depreciation scheme which provides companies with a high level of initial 
allowance under the company tax law. The Act has the objective of 
granting to companies a very much quicker write-down of their capital 
assets in the early years of trading, so as to enable them to amortize 
their capital assets during their formative years, and to build up liquid 
reserves at an early date. The high initial allowances permitted under 
the 1961 Act completely reduce the risks and uncertainties associated 
with business investments since it is possible for a company to write-off 
all its initial capital outlay within the period of 2-5 years of its 
operation in Nigeria. According to P. C. Asiodu, under the 1961 Act, 
it was possible for a company to write off 73 per cent of the total cost 
of a commercial vehicle in the first year. 
95 
Under the 1961 Act, a 
company is allowed an initial deduction of 40 per cent for machinery 
and 20 per cent for industrial buildings in the first year. In addition, 
a company may take the annual write-down allowance allowed on assets, 
which is generally 5 per cent to 15 per cent for machinery and 10 per cent 
for industrial buildings. It should also be noted that a firm may 
write-off against profits as much as 50 per cent of the cost of machinery 
during the first year of operation. When taxable income fails to absorb 
an annual write-off, the balance may be carried forward to be written off 
against future profits for up to ten years. The accelerated depreciation 
scheme as formulated in the Companies Income Tax Act of 1961 is generous 
and has been criticized by visiting economists to Nigeria in the past. 
As a result of the various experts' criticisms, in a decree published 
in 1966, the Federal Military government has reduced the rates of initial 
95 
P. C. Asiodu, Industrial Policy and Incentives in Nigeria, 
NJE55, July, 1967. 
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allowance for machinery from 40 per cent to 15 per cent and for industrial 
buildings from 20 per cent to 10 per cent for the first year while the 
ordinary annual write-down varies from 5 per cent to 15 per cent. 
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Even with the reduction brought about as a result of the 1966 Decree, 
it is still possible for companies to write-off from profits as much as 
25 per cent of the cost of machinery in the first year. 
In addition to tariff protection, accelerated depreciation and tax 
holidays, the Nigerian authorities also established industrial estates 
where industrial establishments can be located at very low rental. The 
industrial estates are found in different parts of the country and are 
served with all the modern amenities of electricity, pipe water, good 
roads and buildings in some cases. The Nigerian governments have also 
been willing to provide financial resources to foreign companies investing 
in Nigeria who wish to have some local financial participation to increase 
the Nigerian commitment to the undertaking and to provide the benefits 
of local knowledge and experience. Federal and States governments' 
financial participation in industrial projects are done through the various 
investment agencies like the Development Corporations, the Northern 
Nigeria Investments Ltd., the Development Finance Company Ltd. and the 
Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. 
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The enthusiasm of the Nigerian government for rapid industrialization 
since the 1950s has reflected itself in the generous incentives offered 
to foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. Some of these incentives have 
been effective and some have not. For example, out of all the incentives 
offered by the Nigerian government, only two were considered important 
by all the British firms interviewed and these are tariff protection and 
the accelerated depreciation scheme provided under the Companies Income 
96Income 
Tax Amendment Decree 1966, official Gazette No. 110, 
Vol. 53, December 6,1966. 
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More will be said about these investment agencies in Chapter VII. 
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Tax Act of 1961. Nigeria has been losing several million pounds 
every year due to excessive generosity of the industrial incentives. 
For instance, during the 1968/69 financial year, when the war emergency 
made it necessary for the government to tax companies on the understanding 
that the pioneer periods of the affected companies will be extended 
for another year, £2.5 million was collected by the Nigerian government. 
By allowing companies making huge profits to go untaxed, Nigeria has 
been creating an unnecessary balance of payments problem for itself. 5 
Perhaps the most serious defect of the incentive policy therefore is the 
adverse effect the generous financial incentives may have on the Nigerian 
balance of payments. By granting the incentives, the profitability of 
affected companies is increased, and the level of profits to be transferred 
abroad is also increased, with the ultimate burden on the balance of pay- 
ments. Perhaps one of the main reasons for the generous concession is 
that the Nigerian balance of payments position has been healthy due to 
the huge foreign exchange earnings of the petroleum industry. Once the 
balance of payments position of Nigeria begins to worsen, there is likely 
to be a drastic reduction in the incentives. 
In addition, some of the incentives have been abused, especially 
the Import Duties Relief Act and the Approved User Scheme. These have 
enabled crooked entrepreneurs, both domestic and foreign, to default the 
Nigeria Board of Customs and Excise through false declarations. Better 
controls should be introduced to plug all the existing loopholes used 
by customs defaulters. Another aspect of the incentives worth mentioning 
is that many of the firms interviewed honestly believe that tariff pro- 
tection offered by the Nigerian authorities to get industries off the 
ground would continue for ever. This, of course, is a false assumption 
and belief, for if Nigeria does not want to perpetuate inefficiency in 
its industries, tariff protection must gradually be removed to enable 
these industries to compete with their counterparts in other parts of 
the 
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world. Some companies complained about the reduction of tariff on 
imported textiles during the last budget. One company in particular 
estimated that it is losing an average of £1 million every week due to 
the excessive imports of textiles and the preference of Nigerians for 
imported textiles. One British firm in the Northern part of Nigeria 
has substantially retrenched its Nigerian labour force because the company 
alleged that the reduction of tariffs on imported textiles has made it 
difficult for it to continue at the former level of production. 
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There 
is the danger that some companies may use tariff reduction arguments to 
intimidate the Nigerian government indirectly; by sacking Nigerian workers 
in textile firms, some of the firms might have felt the Nigerian government 
would be forced to change its policy. The Nigerian government should 
make it abundantly clear to foreign firms that they cannot be protected 
for ever. Nigeria wants industrial development but Nigeria also wants 
industrial establishments which will be able to compete in the international 
market. 
In addition to various incentives to stimulate private investments 
in industry, the government's direct investment in industry has been 
growing very rapidly since 1960. Before 1960, less than £5 million 
annually was invested in the manufacturing sector and foreign investors 
were largely responsible with public investment accounting for a negligible 
proportion. For example, during the 1955-1960 period, only £7 million 
or 7.6 per cent of the £91.3 million public capital expenditure was allocated 
for industrial development and less than half of the estimate was actually 
spent. Since 1960, public expenditure in industry has been increasing. 
In the 1962-68 First National Development Plan, provision was made for a 
capital expenditure of £90 million which represents roughly 13 per cent 
98 
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of the public investment programme during the six-year period. The 
political disturbances in the country from January 1966 until early 
1970 made it impossible for most of the industrial projects in the Plan 
to be executed. As a consequence, by March, 1968, when the life of the 
plan expired, less than one-third of the amount stipulated had in fact 
been committed. During the 1970-74 Plan period, the total cost of 
Federal government's industrial programme is about £235 million. Since 
the Federal and States governments would enter into partnership with 
foreign investors in the execution of most of the industrial projects, 
and as all investment funds will not be actually disbursed during the 
Plan period, only £40.8 million is provided as probable disbursement for 
the 1970-74 period by the Federal government. 
TABLE 4.15 
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON INDUSTRIES 1970-74 (LOOOs) 
(000s) 
POPULATION 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 1973-7,, TOTAL 
Federal Government 54,671 5402 14555 13170 7690 40817 
Benue-Plateau 4,230 330 520 580 520 1950 
East Central 7,469 2595 1575 825 655 5650 
Kano 5,775 665 945 945 945 3500 
Kwara 2,399 312 498 637 709 2156 
Lagos 1,443 100 710 770 880 2460 
Mid-Western 2,536 2305 1385 936 737 5363 
North-Central 3,878 730 431 431 976 2568 
North-Eastern 7,793 516 1400 1460 655 4031 
North-Western 5,734 548 1019 405 555 2527 
Rivers 1,545 990 1248 938 857 4033 
South-Eastern 3,381 1085 1007 462 455 3009 
Western 9,488 2450 2389 1783 1383 8005 
TOTAL STATES 54,671 12626 13127 10172 9327 45252 
TOTAL - ALL GOVERNfENTS 18028 27682 23342 17017 86069 
SOURCE: SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPM'IENT PLAN 1970-74, FEDERAL MINISTRY OF 
INFORMATION, LAGOS, 1970. 
Table 4.15 shows how the total public sector capital expenditure in industry 
for the period 1970-74 is shared by Federal and States governments. In 
addition to the Federal government's industrial programme of £235 million, 
1a5 
out of which we have been told only £40.8 million will actually be 
provided by the government, the States governments would also be spending 
£45 million on industries. This means that during the 1970-74 period, 
public sector investment in the industrial sector would be £280 million. 
Investment in manufacturing from the private sector is estimated and 
expected to grow from £74.8 million in 1970-71 to £117.4 million in 
1973-74. For the four years 1970-74, capital investment in private 
sector manufacturing would add up to £378.5 million. The total capital 
investment in manufacturing both by the public and private sectors would 
be around £658 million during the 1970-74 period. 
CONCLUSION 
British manufacturing investment in Nigeria has grown from a very 
low level to become the second most important after the petroleum invest- 
ment. In 1960, about 20 per cent of total British investment in Nigeria, 
excluding oil investments, was in the manufacturing sector and by 1968, 
the sector had increased its proportion to 35 per cent. At the moment, 
over 60 per cent of U. K. total investment in Nigeria, excluding oil 
investment, is in this sector. The rapid rate of growth of British 
manufacturing investment was due to the emphasis on industrialization 
in the development strategy of Nigeria and the industrial policy pursued 
by the government which favours the manufacturing sector more than any 
other sector. Although U. K. investment in Nigerian manufacturing has 
been growing very rapidly since 1955 until now, nevertheless, as a 
proportion of total foreign investment in the manufacturing sector, it 
has been falling. In 1955, the U. K. accounted for 95 per cent of total 
foreign investment in the manufacturing sector. By 1960, when Nigeria 
became independent, the proportion had fallen slightly, to roughly 
90 per cent. In 1965, the U. K. still accounted for 69 per cent of 
total 
foreign investment in Nigerian manufacturing sector, and by the end of 
1968 the proportion had fallen to 25 per cent. The reason for this 
phenomenon is that U. K. net capital inflow to the manufacturing sector 
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has not kept pace with the rate of increase in the net total foreign 
capital inflow to the sector. Between 1963 and 1967, for example, 
r 
the U. K. only accounted for 13.6 per cent of total net foreign capital 
inflow to Nigerian manufacturing sector. Two features can be associated 
with British manufacturing investment in Nigeria. The first is the 
concentration of British manufacturing investment in a few companies. 
Although most of the large British companies have manufacturing interests 
in Nigeria, the United Africa Company, the Commonwealth Development 
Corporation and the Nigerian Tobacco Company accounted for about 65 per 
cent of the total U. K. manufacturing investment. The UAC is the most 
important manufacturing investor in Nigeria and the second most important 
U. K. investor after the Shell-BP Group. The second feature of U. K. 
investment in the Nigerian manufacturing sector is the high concentration 
of investment on final production. Over 80 per cent of U. K. manufacturing 
investment is concentrated on final products. 
The enthusiasm of the Nigerian authorities for rapid growth of the 
manufacturing sector has not been justified by the findings of the effects 
of U. K. manufacturing investment on the Nigerian economy. Nigerian 
employees in British manufacturing establishments have been a minor 
proportion of the total working population. About 50,000 people are 
employed in British establishments out of Nigeria's working population 
of 30 million. The main reason for the meagre employment creation 
effect of British manufacturing investment is that British companies 
adopt capital-intensive and most modern techniques of production which 
make use of limited labour. British manufacturing investment also 
adds very little to incomes in Nigeria. The main reason for this is 
that a large proportion of the value added by the manufacturing sector 
goes abroad, since resources are concentrated on final production. 
W. A. Lewis has succinctly put the case thus, "It follows that the 
chief reason why large-scale manufacturing adds so little to Nigerian 
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income is not that wages are a small part of value added, but that the 
major part of value added goes abroad". 
99 
British manufacturing invest- 
ment has not contributed anything towards Nigeria's foreign exchange 
resources; it has, in fact, depleted the country of its scarce and meagre 
foreign exchange through the importation of capital goods and raw materials 
for industry which has not been matched by the exports of manufactures. 
To quote Professor Lewis again, ".... And since many products survive only 
because they are protected by tariffs exceeding 30 per cent of value 
added, it is clear that Nigeria spends more foreign exchange (on machines, 
raw materials, expatriate salaries and profits) on making some products 
at home than she would spend if she were to import the manufactured 
product itself". 
100 The linkage effects of British manufacturing 
investment have also been limited since investments are concentrated 
on final products. The only area where the linkage effects of British 
manufacturing investment are substantial is the agricultural sector. 
As a result of backward linkages to the sources of raw materials, some 
British manufacturing establishments have provided a stable and steady 
market for some agricultural products. British manufacturing investments 
in Nigeria have, however, increased the variety of goods available to 
the mass of the population and have thereby increased the possibility 
of choice through the introduction of new products on a large scale. 
The most important contribution of British manufacturing investments to 
the Nigerian economy is the substantial tax revenue which the investments 
provide for the government. About one-quarter of the Nigerian govern- 
ment's tax revenue comes from British manufacturing companies. This, 
of course, represents a substantial contribution to public finance 
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which will no doubt have an indirect effect on a large majority of the 
population who benefit from public expenditure programmes. 
The Nigerian authorities have pursued for the past decade an 
industrial policy that gives very generous tax holidays, import duty 
relief and tariff protection to industries. Despite the vigorous 
attempt at industrializing, the results of the accelerated growth in 
the manufacturing sector are far from being satisfactory. This is not 
surprising; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's 
mission to Nigeria in 1955 hinted at the modest contribution of industries 
to the Nigerian economy. "Interest in industrialization is intense and 
articulate. Many Nigerian leaders are hopeful that industrial expansion 
can be brought about quickly and that through it there can be an early 
and marked improvement in living standards. The mission believes that 
these hopes over-emphasize the contribution which industry can make in 
the foreseeable future and that it would be unwise to count on more than 
a modest expansion in the next few years"". 
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Nigeria is an agricultural 
country. Over 70 per cent of the working population is engaged in agri- 
culture and the corresponding figure for manufacturing is 10 per cent. 
Over the last decade, agriculture contributed a yearly average of 50 per 
cent of total Nigerian export earnings, the corresponding proportion for 
manufacturing is 1.2 per cent. With these vital statistic$ in mind, it 
is estimated that private investment in the agricultural sector would 
amount to £60 million during the 1970-74 period. Public expenditure 
would be £107.7 million. In the manufacturing sector it is estimated 
that the private sector would invest £378.5 million during the 1970-74 
period. As for the public sector's industrial investments, apart from 
the £235 million industrial projects of the Federal government, of which 
101IBBD, 
The Economic Development of Nigeria, John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1955, p. 50. 
189 
we are told only £40.8 million would come from the government and the 
rest from foreign partners, the States also allocated £45 million for 
industrial development. 
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If we add all the capital expenditures of 
both the public and private sectors together, an interesting picture 
would emerge. While £167.7 million would be invested in the agricultural 
sector, £464.5 million would be going to the industrial sector. Invest- 
ment in agriculture during the 1970-74 period would just be 36 per cent 
of the total investment in the industrial sector. Apart from the fact 
that the estimate of private investment in agriculture has been too-high, 
it is fair to ask whether there is a balanced distribution of investable 
resources between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The con- 
centration of resources in the industrial sector is made worse by the 
fact that Nigerian governments have no preconceived plan as to what new 
industries to develop and what commodities should be produced. In some 
few cases, when the new industries to be developed are known, political 
rivalry and uneconomic social factors have made progress too slow. There 
is no doubt therefore that the Nigerian authorities should develop an 
industrial policy that would maximise the overall advantage from every 
unit of investment in the industrial sector, if much progress is to be 
made. The present low priority given to agriculture should be rectified 
if the sector is to continue to play its vital role in the economic 
development of Nigeria. The basic truth is that no country wants to 
be wholly industrial or wholly agricultural. The most sensible develop- 
ment strategy therefore is one that strikes an appropriate balance 
between agriculture and industry, so that they complement each other 
in the process of rapid economic development. 
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CHAPTER. U 
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
This chapter is concerned with the role of British direct invest- 
ment in the development of the Nigerian petroleum industry and the 
effects of the development on the growth of the Nigerian economy. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the brightest features of post-independent Nigeria is the 
discovery, the exploitation and the export of crude petroleum oil on a 
large scale. The search for crude oil in Nigeria began in 1937. 
However, the intensive search activities did not show any sign of being 
fruitful until 1956 when the first oil discovery was made in the Niger 
Delta. Further discoveries were made in later years and by 1958, crude 
oil production had begun and in that year about 2.3 million barrels were 
produced. Since then petroleum production has increased very rapidly 
to nearly 400 million barrels in 1970. Figure 5.1 shows the rapid in- 
crease in petroleum production from 1958 to 1970. From 1958 to 1966 
there was a year-to-year increase in production. The Nigerian civil 
war of 1967-1970 severely affected petroleum production resulting in a 
fall in the figures recorded for 1967-1968. From 1969 onwards production 
picked up as fighting moved from the oil fields. By the end of the war, 
production had returned to normality and, in 1970, petroleum production 
was 17,109 per cent above the 1958 level. When petroleum production 
began in 1958, the average daily production for that year was 6301 barrels, 
In 1970, the average daily production was over 1 million barrels and in 
1973 the average daily production had increased to over 2 million barrels. 
Between 1958 and 1970, total crude oil production in Nigeria grew at an 
annual compound rate of nearly 54 per cent. 
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The discovery and the production of crude oil in Nigeria has 
focussed world attention on the country, not only as a potential area of 
investment, but also as a source of energy for advanced nations, especially 
since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the precarious 
nature of the Diddle East oil supply. Table 5.1 below shows the 
world production of oil in 1970. 
TABLE 5.1 
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION IN 1970 
CUUNTRIES THOUSAND BARRELS PER DAY 
PERCENTAGE OF 
WOriLD TOTAL 
U. S. A. 11,311 24.0 
U. S. S. R. 7,052 14.9 
Iran 3,845 8.1 
Venezuela 3,714 7.8 
Saudi Arabia 3,549 7.5 
Libya 3,314 7.0 
Kuwait 2,735 5.8 
Iraq 1,565 3.3 
Canada 1,425 3.0 
Nigeria 1,085 2.3 
Algeria 981 2.1 
Indonesia 853 1.8 
Abu Dhabi 694 1.5 
Neutral Zone 504 1.1 
Mexico 490 1.0 
Egypt 394 0.8 
Argentina 393 0.8 
Qatar 362 0.8 
Oman 332 0.7 
Roumanfa 270 0.6 
Others 2,185 4.6 
WORLD TOTAL 47,053 100.0 
SOURCE: IC/153; DATA SUPPLIED BY SHELL INTERNATIONAL, LONDON. 
NOTE: 1: Less than 250,000 barrels per day. 
Although Nigeria's average daily production of crude oil was only 2.3 per 
cent of the world daily production in 1970, nevertheless, Nigeria was 
the tenth leading producer of petroleum. By 1972, Nigeria has become 
the eighth leading oil producer in the world. In the continent of 
Africa, 
Nigeria occupies a unique position, second in importance only to Libya. 
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Out of the 450.34 million metric tons of coal equivalent of energy pro- 
duced in Africa in 1970, Libya and Nigeria accounted for 210.2 and 
70.8 million tons respectively. 
103 
The use of petroleum fuels as an important source of world energy has 
been growing very rapidly since 1950 when such fields accounted for roughly 
24 per cent of total world commercial energy, excluding the Communist 
Areas and North America. 
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By 1960, the proportion had grown to 
41.6 per cent and it is estimated that, by 1976, petrol will account for 
nearly 70 per cent of world commercial energy. There is a limit to 
the importance to be attached to the figures quoted since the U. S. S. R., 
the United States and Canada are not included; but, the trend of the 
energy picture for the world as a whole does not differ from that depicted. 
In 1960, petroleum accounted for 40 per cent of energy demand in the 
OECD; the corresponding figure for the world as a whole was 34.4 per centl05 
By 1980, it is estimated that petroleum would account for 50 per cent 
of the OECD energy demand and 42.1 per cent of the world's. What this 
means, in effect, is that by 1980, OECD petroleum demand would be 
191.3 per cent above the 1960 level and the world petroleum demand would 
be 223 per cent above the 1960 level. What all the available data clearly 
show is that the demand for petroleum products should continue to increase 
for the next ten years at least. 
THE BRITISH OIL INVESTORS 
British investments in the Nigerian petroleum industry are under- 
taken by Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Limited, 
which is jointly owned by Shell Petroleum Company and British Petroleum 
103 
United Nations, Statistical Year Book, 1971, New York, 1972. 
104 
The figures quoted in this section are supplied by Shell 
International London. 
105 
S. R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford, 1970, p. 6. 
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Company, each with 50 per cent ownership interest. The first attempt 
by the Sheil-BP Petroleum Development Company (henceforth referred to 
as Shell-BP) to search for oil in Nigeria began in 1937. This was 
the second attempt by any company to search for oil in Nigeria, the first 
attempt having been made in 1908 by the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a 
German company which was forced to leave at the outbreak of the first 
World War. During the second year of its search for oil in Nigeria, 
Shell-BP obtained from the British Colonial Government an oil exploration 
licence covering the entire land area of Nigeria, which is 357,000 square 
miles. With the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, all the 
search activities were suspended and the Shell-BP company was inactive 
until the end of the war, when the search for oil was resumed and in- 
tensified. The disappointments and the frustration arising from the 
lack of success were not abated until 1956, when oil was discovered in 
promising quantities at Oloibiri in Yenogoa province in the Niger Delta. 
By 1956, the Shell-BP company had already invested £15 million in Nigeria 
and, with the discovery of oil at Oliobiri, there was high hope of further 
discoveries resulting in increased activities between 1956 and 1958. 
Further discoveries were made in 1957 and 1958 and, by the time the first 
export of oil took place in 1958, Shell-BP had already invested L25 million 
in Nigeria. Since 1958 many oil wells have been discovered from which 
large quantities of oil had been produced and sold to the international 
market. Nigeria has become an important oil producer within a decade 
after the achievement of political independence. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS AMONG THE OIL COMPANIES 
The oil concession negotiated and obtained from the British Colonial 
Government by Shell-BP in 1938 covered the entire mainland of Nigeria, 
an area of 350,000 square miles. There were many reasons why Shell-BP 
could not hold on to the concession for such a vast area for very long. 
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Firstly, the prospect of finding oil in every part of the country was, and 
still is, remote and it would serve the company no useful purpose to 
hold on to areas with little or no prospect for oil. Secondly, the 
longer the Shell-BP company held to its concession covering the entire 
land-area of Nigeria, the higher would be the payments to the Government 
since licensing fees were to be paid on a yearly basis. As soon as other 
companies sought exploration licences, offering more favourable terms 
to the Government, the more resolute the government would be in asking 
for higher licensing fees. Lastly, there was the prospect that, after 
Nigeria had achieved political independence, the civilian government 
might revoke the initial licence covering all of Nigeria and replace it 
with another covering areas with little prospect of oil. 
In order to avoid these unpleasant and unfavourable results, Shell-BP 
embarked on a comprehensive geological survey of Nigerian soils. The 
company then selected for itself those areas of the country showing the 
brightest prospects of oil and handed back to the government the remaining 
area. It was therefore the privilege and the monopoly conferred upon 
Shell-BP by the oil exploration licence of November 1938 that enabled 
the company to occupy a dominant position among the oil companies operating 
in Nigeria. Faced with no opposition for over two decades, Shell-BP 
was able to select the best soils with oil prospects before handing over 
the rest to the government for leasing to other companies. 
Other international oil companies were not slow to seek exploration 
licences in Nigeria. As soon as the major oil companies were aware 
of the geological survey of Nigerian soils and the prospect of finding 
oil, they came one after another to begin their search for oil in the 
country. At the moment, out of the seven major 
106 international oil 
companies, ranked by their crude oil production in 1966, only the 
106 
See E. T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing 
Countries, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1968, Chapter IV. 
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Standard Oil Company of New Jersey does not have an exploration licence 
and operate in Nigeria. The remaining six "majors", along with other 
smaller companies, operate in Nigeria. At the end of 1972, there were 
fifteen oil companies at work in the country, of which eleven are wholly 
foreign-owned, one is a private Nigerian company and the remaining three 
are partnerships between private Nigerian companies and foreign companies. 
Table 5.5 shows the oil concessions held by the fifteen companies at the 
end of 1972. In the table only one company -a private Nigerian company, 
Henry Stephens & Sons - had a concession covering a larger area of land 
than Shell-BP. What is important, however, is not the area covered by 
a concession but the geological quality of the area and the prospect 
of finding oil. The 18,898 square miles covered by the Shell-BP company's 
concession represent the area with the brightest prospects for the dis- 
covery of oil. It is worth noting at this juncture that only two 
companies - Shell-BP and Mobil - out of the fifteen oil companies 
presently operating in Nigeria obtained oil exploration licences before 
Nigeria became politically independent; the remaining thirteen companies 
got their licences from the post-independent Nigerian government. The 
government has always preferred to deal with many companies rather than 
with one big company in order to increase the government's bargaining 
power and competition. The granting of oil-prospecting licences to 
thirteen other oil companies since 1961 was designed specifically to 
break the monopolistic advantages conferred upon Shell-BP during the 
period of the British colonial administration of Nigeria. As a result 
of the government's willingness to grant oil concessions, Nigeria's oil 
industry has become internationalized and the competition among oil com- 
panies has not only reduced the dangers of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
behaviour, but it has also enabled the government to make the granting 
of new concessions, dependent upon the payment of high initial bonuses 
and premiums. 
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TABLE 5.5 
OIL CONCESSIONS HELD BY PETROLEUM COMPANIES IN NIGERIA IN 1972 
CONCESSIONS IN Sq. 
NAME OF S ON STATES 
COMPANY OWNERSHIP SHORE SHORE TOTAL LOCATIuN 
Shell-BP Petroleum Royal Dutch Shell East Central 
Development Company Petroleum Co. (50%) 14992 3906 18898 Kwara 
of Nigeria Ltd. British Petroleum Mid-Western 
Company (50jä) Rivers 
Sth-Eastern 
Western 
Mobil Ni eria Ltd. Mobil Oil Co. (100%) 2025 2025 Sth-Eastern 
Tennessee Oil Co. Cumberland Corp. (50%) Mid-Western 
of Nigeria Ltd. Sinclair International 1380 - 1380 Rivers 
Oil Co. (25%) 
Sunray Dx. Oil Co. 25aß 
Gulf Oil Co. East-Central 
(Nigeria) Ltd. Gulf Oil Corp. (10O%) 3965 2890 6855 Lagos 
Mid-Western 
Rivers 
Sth. -Eastern 
Western 
Texas Overseas California Asiatic Oil 
(Nig. ) Petroleum Co. (50%) 
Ltd. Texas Overseas - 1931 1931 Rivers 
Petroleum Co. (50%) 
Nigerian AGIP Oil E. N. I. (50/) East Central 
Company Ltd. Phillips Petroleum 2031 - 2031 Mid-Western 
Co. 50°6 Rivers 
Safrap (Nigeria) Safrex (50%) Benue-Plate au 
Ltd. Erap (40%) 9336 - 9336 East-Central 
Sogerap (1.0%) Kwara 
Mid-Western 
Rivers 
Phillips Oil Co. Phillips Petroleum Mid-Western 
Ni eria Ltd. Company (100%) 1401 - 1401 Western 
Union Oil Nigeria Union Oi1 Co. of 
California 1000 - 1000 1000 La os 
Delta Oil (Nig. ) Pan Ocean Oil of New Rivers 
Ltd. York (50%) 
Chief Godfrey Amachree Mid-Western 
Ni Brian 50°, 
Occidental Occidental of America - 73600 73600 Rivers 
(100"ä acres acres Sth. -Eastern 
Deminex (Nig. ) Ltd. Deminex of W. Germany 2999 2999 Rivers, Lagos 
Ni er Petroleum Co. Ltd. - s . km s . km. Sth. -Eastern 
Henry Stephens & Chief H. Fajemirokun - 34329 34329 Rivers 
Sons Private Nigerian) Sth. -Eastern 
Japanese Nigeria Petroleum Co. of Tokyo 2000 2000 Western 
Oil Development Co. Tei'in Teikoku Mitsui - s . km s . km. 
Monsato Oil Co. of Monsato of America 616 616 Mid-Western 
Nigeria Ltd. Niger Oil Resources - sq. km sq. km. Rivers 
(Private Nigerian Co. ) 
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TABLE 5.5 (Cont. ) 
SOURCE: 1: S. R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1970, p. 16. 
2: L. H. Schatzl, Petroleum in%Nigeria, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1969, p. 8. 
3: West Africa, January 1971 - December 1972. 
4: Daily Times, July 8,1972, Lagos. 
5: Petroleum Press Service, December 1971. 
The Nigerian government's policy of granting oil prospecting licences 
to oil companies was based on the initial determination of the government 
to develop Nigeria's petroleum through the foreign oil companies long 
established in the petroleum industry. There are three main methods 
by which a country can exploit its natural resources: (a) the country 
can utilize its financial, technical and managerial resources, if it has 
them, to set up ventures that would exploit its natural resources; (b) the 
country can invite foreign companies with expert knowledge in the field 
of operation relevant to its resources and (c) the country can undertake 
a joint venture with a foreign investor for the exploitation of these 
natural resources. The Nigerian government initially decided to adopt 
the second method by inviting foreign petroleum companies to search for, 
and produce, oil in Nigeria. The main reason for the choice was the 
dearth of finance and of technical and managerial manpower needed for 
a wholly home-operated oil company or for the formation of a joint venture 
with foreign oil companies. After over ten years of accumulated know- 
ledge in the petroleum industry, Nigeria's attitude towards the exploit- 
ation of its petroleum deposits has started to change significantly. 
Whereas the first ten companies listed in Table 5.5 did not have the 
Nigerian government's participation clause written into their concession 
agreements, the last five have it specifically written in that the Nigerian 
government would secure a majority 51 per cent share in any oil discovered 
in'their areas of operations. The last five companies listed in Table 5.5 
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obtained their concessions between October 1971 and April 1972. It 
is worth noting that the change in the attitude of the Nigerian govern- 
ment towards new concessions after 1970 began with Nigeria becoming a 
member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971 
and the formation of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC), also 
in 1971, for oil exploration, production, and the processing of gas and 
petro-chemicals in . the large areas of the country specifically reserved 
for the company. 
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With the formation of NNOC early in 1971, the 
government declared its intention to participate in the offshore licences 
which the last five companies in Table 5.5 started to negotiate as from 
December 1970. It is therefore not surprising that in all the agreements 
signed in 1971 the government's majority share of 51 per cent was specifi- 
cally written in. The Nigerian government has also made it clear that 
it is not likely to grant an exploration licence to any oil company in 
the future. The desire of the Nigerian government to search for oil 
by itself in those areas not covered by previous agreements can be 
verified -by the deliberate reservation "for the use of the nation" 
of the most attractive half of the 5000 square miles originally offered 
for bids in 1971. 
OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT BY SHELL-BP 
The rush by international oil companies to obtain an oil exploration 
licence from the Nigerian government was due to two main causes, firstly, 
the inexperience of the Nigerian authorities in the oil industry and 
secondly, the important advantages of the Nigerian crude oil. When 
Nigeria obtained political independence in October 1960, the country was 
very backward, lacking in financial and technical manpower resources. 
When Shell-BP discovered crude oil in Nigeria in 1956 and other oil 
companies were optimistic about future discoveries, the possibility 
of exploiting the inexperience of the Nigerian authorities could be 
107More 
will be said about OPEC and NNOC in later parts of this 
chapter. 
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regarded as one of the main factors encouraging some companies to 
seek oil exploration licences. This strategy on the part of the 
oil companies paid off because, until 1st September, 1970, Nigerian 
crude oil was the cheapest in the world, substantially priced below 
crude oil from the Middle East, Libya and other OPEC countries. The 
Nigerian officials, unaware of the intricacies and complexities associated 
with the international petroleum industry, initially made it possible 
for the first few oil companies who started producing crude oil in 
Nigeria to obtain favourable treatment with regard to concessions and 
prices that would have been impossible in a country with a sound know- 
ledge of the background of the international petroleum industry. The 
second major attraction of Nigeria for international oil companies is the 
quality associated with Nigerian crude oil, due largely to its relatively 
low sulphur content. The low kerosene content of the Nigerian crude 
oil ensures its relatively high fuel yield and excellent blending 
properties and, since industrialized countries want crude oil for fuel 
rather than for kerosene, the quality of the Nigerian crude oil confers 
upon it an important advantage. Scott Pearson has emphasized that the 
low content of the Nigerian crude oil "will become increasingly important 
as legislation concerning air pollution is passed in consuming countries. 
There is technology available to remove sulphur from high sulphur crudes. 
But the world price of sulphur must rise even higher than recent levels 
to make the eventual joint production of petroleum products and sulphur 
more profitable than the production of petroleum products alone from a 
crude with low sulphur content. And even then, the removal of sulphur 
from crude oil on a large scale would have a depressing influence on 
the world sulphur price, tending to shift the advantage back 
to the 
producers of low sulphur crude .... unless 
high sulphur prices induce a 
major cost-reducing technological change in sulphur extraction from 
crude oil, the 'sweet' quality of Nigerian crude should remain an 
important 
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advantage for the production of oil in Nigeria. 
108 
In recent years the strategic position of Nigeria in the West 
African coast has conferred additional advantages on the Nigerian crude 
0 
oil. Nigeria is located in the relatively peaceful part of Africa and 
this ensures a steady supply of oil to the international market. 
Although Nigeria has recently fought a civil war, this disturbance was 
an internal conflict which is not likely to be repeated. The large 
army of Nigeria, strategically placed in barracks located near the oil 
installations and Nigerian boundaries, and the relatively weak military 
strength of Nigeria's immediate neighbours, make it very certain that 
the production and the export of Nigerian crude oil to the international 
market will continue undisturbed. With the beginning of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in 1967 and the associated precarious nature of the Middle East 
oil supply, and the constant threat to supply through occasional stoppages, 
the blowing up of pipe lines and the setting on fire of oil storage tanks, 
Western Europe and North America have increasingly attached more importance 
to Nigerian crude oil as a more reliable alternative. Additionally, the 
cost of shipping Nigerian crude oil to Western Europe, North and South 
America is cheaper than the shipping costs of some of the crude oil 
producers in the Middle East. The closure of the Suez Canal has also 
aggravated the transport problems of Middle East oil producers and it 
is estimated that Nigeria's transport advantage over Persian Gulf crude 
oil destined for Western Europe amounted to about '0.27 per barrel 
before the closure of the Suez Canal, and after the closure, it has 
increased to/%0.47 per barrel. 
The search for oil in Nigeria by Shell-BP which began in 1937, and 
the subsequent discovery of oil in 1956, meant that the company had a 
108 
S. R. Pearson, Petroleum and the Nigerian Economy, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1970, p. p. 19-20. 
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complete monopoly of the entire land area of Nigeria for nearly two 
decades. The only company which was able to obtain an oil exploration 
licence in Nigeria before 1960 was IYlobil, which, in 1955, signed an agree- 
ment covering the land area handed over to the government by Shell-BP 
(after an intensive geological survey had indicated the areas with oil 
discovery prospects). The dominant position of Shell-BP in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry should not be surprising, therefore, since the company 
was the first to be in Nigeria and also had the opportunity to select 
the most prosperous areas with oil prospects for itself. The enclosed 
map shows the on-shore and off-shore concession areas in which Shell-BP 
operates to-day in Nigeria. Shell-BP concession areas in orange colour 
on the map are located in five of the six southern States, and in the 
territorial waters of Nigeria, along with a small portion of the Kwara 
State. Five of the six states (the Western, Mid-Western, East-Central, 
Rivers and South-Eastern) in which Shell-BP concession areas are situated 
have accounted for all Nigeria's crude oil production and export up to 
the end of 1972. This state of affairs will tend to underline the state- 
ment made earlier that Shell-BP concession covers areas with the brightest 
prospects for oil discovery in Nigeria. 
The search for oil, and the subsequent production of it when discovered, 
no doubt require substantial capital investment. Shell-BP 
(who did the 
initial pioneer geological and map surveys of Nigeria from which other 
oil companies have benefited) has invested enormous resources in its 
operations in Nigeria. By the end of 1958, when the first shipment of 
crude oil from Nigeria took place, Shell-BP had invested £25 million. 
The 
intensification of search activities and the production of existing oil 
discoveries pushed Shell-BP's investment in Nigeria to 
£90 million by 
the end of 1962. By 1967 when the Nigerian civil war broke out, 
Shell-BP 
had invested over £150 million in its operations in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian 
Following Shell-BP's pioneering work 
some fourteen other oil companies are nok, 
engaged in oil exploration and production 
in Nigeria. The on-shore and off-shore 
concession areas in which Shell-BP 
operates today are shown in orange on 
the map 
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SOUTH-EASTERN 
Shell-BP 
organisation 
The Company is headquartered in Lagos in a number of 
temporary offices pending the completion of a new office 
block scheduled for about the end of 1971. There are two 
Operating Divisions-Eastern States Division and Mid-West 
and Western States Division-named thus because of their 
physical location east and west of the Niger River. The 
Mid-West and Western States Division has its headquarters 
in Ward, also in temporary accommodation pending the 
construction of a new Division office. The Eastern States 
Division is headquartered in Port Harcourt, which pre-crisis 
was the main headquarters of the Company. This was 
because the Company's main production came from that 
area in those days. The general reorganisation of the 
Company and relocation of headquarters is the result of the 
major expansion of activities that has taken place over a 
wide area including the big build up of production from 
fields west of the Niger. 
The chief executive is the Managing Director and he is 
supported in Lagos by a management team consisting of : 
a Deputy Managing Director responsible for the technical 
functions of Exploration, Engineering, Petroleum 
Engineering and Computer Development; a General 
Operations Manager responsible for the Divisional activities; 
a Finance Manager and an Administration Manager who 
covers such functions as Personnel, Office Administration, 
Legal, Public Relations and Medical. Each Division operates 
under the control of a Division Manager and both are 
similar in structure including a full range of the technicians 
and administrators required for oil field operations. 
The relationship between the Lagos Head Office and the 
Divisions is that Lagos Management is responsible for the 
development and establishment of policies, standards and 
norms. The Divisions are responsible for fulfilling 
programmes and achieving the objectives and targets set 
and operating within the authorities delegated to them. 
yý 
A seismic survey party in the 
Mid- West, whose instruments 
record evidence of possible oil 
bearing rock formations 
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civil war, which did not come to an end until January 1970, adversely 
affected Shell-BP's operations because all its production activities were 
largely taking place in the areas where the soldiers were fighting. 
As a consequence, for nearly two years, Shell-BP was inactive. By 
early 1969 Federal soldiers had captured most of the company's oil 
installations and areas of concession, and the security provided by 
the Federal soldiers encouraged the Shell-BP company to embark on a 
capital investment of ¬45 million which at that time was the largest 
expenditure programme in the company's history. In January 1970, the 
rebel soldiers surrendered and as the Federal soldiers occupied the 
fighting ground, life began to return to normal. On April 6th, 1970, 
Shell-BP announced in a Press Release the largest investment programme 
ever undertaken by the company in Nigeria. The Press Release stated 
that "Shell-BP will expand its activities in Nigeria this year and a 
record ¬56 million capital expenditure programme has been planned by the 
company. This programme will involve extensive exploration, drilling, 
construction and oil field development throughout the concession areas in 
the Nid-Jest, Eastern States and off-shore". 
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Shell-BP's capital 
investment in 1971 was estimated to be £65 million and according to the 
Petroleum Press Service of December 1971, the company's investment pro- 
gramme for 1972 was 25 per cent above the 1971 level. At the end of 
1972, the total investment of Shell-BP since it started operating in 
Nigeria in 1937 has grossed up to nearly £400 million. 
The enormous resources invested in Nigeria by Shell-BP have been 
accompanied-by large-scale exploration, drilling and construction activities. 
At the end of 1970 Shell-BP has drilled 866 wells and shot 60,000 miles 
of seismic lines since it started operating in Nigeria. The huge 
109She11-BP 
Development Company, Shell-BP in Nigeria, Lagos (no date). 
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capital investment along with the intensified exploration activities 
have resulted in Shell-BP being the leading oil producer in Nigeria. 
TABLE 5.6 
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN NIGERIA BY COMPANIES 1958-71 
IN THOUSAND BARRELS PER DAY 
YEAR TEXACO 
AGIP/ 
SAFRAP PHILLIPS MOBIL 
SHELL- 
GULFBP 
TOTAL PRO- 
DUCTION 
-SHELL-OP AS A 
OF TOTAL 
1958 - -- - - 6.3 6.3 100 
1959 - -- - - 11.2 11.2 100 
1960 - -- - - 17.4 17.4 100 
1961 - -- - - 46.0 46.0 100 
1962 - -- - - 67.5 67.5 100 
1963 - -- - - 76.5 76.5 100 
1964 - -- - - 120.2 120.2 100 
1965 - -- - 25.0 249.2 274.2 90.8 
1966 - -- - 51.0 366.6 417.6 87.7 
1967 - -- - 54.8264.3 319.1 82.8 
1968 - -- - 98.3 43.0 141.3 30.4 
1969 - -- 0.3 185.9354.1 540.3 65.5 
1970 2.4 - 4.4 54.2 231.8 790.3 1083.1 72.9 
1971 10.4 25.1 38.5 72.4 277.1 07.7 1531.2 72.3 
v 
SOURCES: 1: THE INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM, LONDON. 
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, 
1963-1971 
The first point to note is the rapid growth in the production of crude 
oil from 6.3 thousand barrels per day in 1958 to 1.5 million in 1971. 
According to the December 1972 issue of the Petroleum Press Service, 
Nigeria was producing almost 1.9 million barrels daily throughout 1972. 
In December 1973, Nigeria was producing nearly 3 million barrels of 
crude oil per day. The number of oil producing companies increased 
from one in 1958 to six at the end of 1971. By January 1973 there were 
nine companies producing oil in Nigeria. The dominant position of 
Shell-BP as the major oil producer in Nigeria is shown in Table 5.6. 
Apart from being the only oil producer in Nigeria between 1958 and 1964, 
Shell-BP still accounted for over 70 per cent of the total Nigerian crude 
oil production between 1965 and 1971 despite the production activities 
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of other oil companies which began with American Gulf oil in 1965. 
The rapid growth in the production of oil by Shell-BP which began in 
1958 was checked by the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967. 
Between 1967 and 1969 oil production by Shell-BP fell, reaching the 
lowest level for that company since 1961 in 1968. In 1969, oil pro- 
duction by Shell-BP rose higher than the 1968 level, but was still 
lower than the pre-1967 level. It was not until 1970, when full pro- 
duction resumed, that Shell-BP was able substantially to increase its 
production above the 1966 level. Since 1971 oil production by Shell-BP 
has been incre@sing more rapidly than ever before. 
There are several reasons why the Nigerian civil war severely 
affected Shell-BP. Firstly, as shown in the map of Shell-BP's concession 
areas in Nigeria, a large proportion of its oilfields were concentrated 
in the three States - East-Central, Rivers and Southern-Eastern - which 
declared a unilateral independence. Secondly, the other oil fields in 
the adjacent Mid-West state were brought to a halt when the soldiers from 
the break-away state infiltrated into the Mid-West and some parts of the 
Western States. Fighting on a large scale not only took place in the 
rebel states but also in the Mid-West and Western States as well. Thirdly, 
as soon as the war broke out, one of the military strategies of the 
Federal government was the complete blockage of the sea surrounding the 
break-away states. This means there could be no oil exports through 
the oil terminal at Bonny in the Rivers State. One might be tempted to 
suggest that the second oil terminal at Forcados in the Mid-West should 
have been used for the export of oil from Nigeria, but because fighting 
also took place in the Mid-West, the use of the Forcados oil terminal 
was limited. There are two further reasons why the use of the Forcados 
oil terminal, assuming no fighting prevented its use, could have had a 
marginal effect on the oil export and production from and in Nigeria. 
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Firstly, a large proportion of Nigerian oil production before the out- 
break of the civil war in duly 1967 took place in the areas within the 
break-away state. 
TABLE 5.7 
DISTRIBUTION OF CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION WITHIN THE STATES ('000 BARRELS/DAY) 
JUNE 1967 AUGUST 1967 JANUARY 1969 
STATES BARRELS/DAY % BARRELS /DAY" % BARRELS/DAY ö 
East Central 27.8 4.8 - - - - 
Rivers 254.1 44.0 - - 138.2 28.9 1 
East-Central/ 95.6 16.5 - - 29.1 6.1 
Rivers 
TOTAL2 377.5 65.3 - - 167.3 35. 
Mid-Western 200.8 34.7 51.9 100.0 310.7 65.0 
NIGERIA TOTAL 578.3 100.0 51.9 100.0 478.0 100.0 
SOURCE: COMPILED AND CALCULATED FROM: THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF MINES 
AND POWER: MONTHLY PETROLEUM INFORMATION, June 1967, 
August, 1967 and January, 1969. 
NOTES: 1: Oil fields in boundary lines. 
2: Total for the areas within the break-away state of Biafra. 
As Table 5.7 shows, 65.3 per cent of the total oil production in Nigeria 
in June 1967, a month before the civil war began, took place in the two 
of the three Eastern States. Two months later in August 1967, when the 
Federal government had blockaded the break-away states, there was no oil 
production in the three Eastern States. In January 1969, when the 
Federal soldiers had captured all the oil fields in the break-away 
region and in other parts of Nigeria, and Shell-BP had begun production, 
the Mid-Western State had become the most important oil producing area 
in Nigeria, supplying 65 per cent of the total oil production in Nigeria, 
in January 1969. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, is the fact 
that a large proportion of the oil produced in the Mid-West was, and still 
is, exported through the Bonny terminal located in the break-away state 
of Biafra. What this means in effect is that even if Shell-BP could 
206 
continue with oil production in the Mid-West between July 1967 and 
late 1968, the company could not export the oil produced because the 
blockade of the Bonny oil terminal had cut off the company's Mid-Western 
state oil fields linked with the Bonny terminal by the Trans-Niger 
pipeline. As a consequence, and in the absence of any storage facilities 
near the oil fields in the Mid-Western state and elsewhere, when on 
6th July, 1967, the Federal government blockaded the sea surrounding 
the break-away state in order to break the secession, oil export from 
the Bonny terminal was brought to a halt and Shell-BP had to suspend 
its entire production in the Mid-Western state and in the break-away 
state of Biafra for a period of 14 months between 6th July 1967 and 
6th September, 1968. Once the Federal government had succeeded in 
capturing the oil fields, Shell-BP once more started to export oil 
from Bonny terminal on 7th September 1968, and during the following 
month the Trans-Niger pipeline linking the Mid-West oil fields of 
Ughelli with the Bonny terminal was reopened. 
The effects of the Nigerian civil war on the two other oil companies 
producing oil in Nigeria before the war were different from that of 
Shell-BP in certain vital respects. SAFRAP, the French oil company, 
was completely barred from operating in Nigeria as soon as the Federal 
government was aware of the support which the French government was 
giving to the secessionist regime. It was not until 1971, after SAFRAP 
had agreed to the most stringent conditions ever put-to an oil company 
by the Nigerian government, that is, a 35 per cent ownership interest 
by the Nigerian government in the oil produced by SAFRAP, did the company 
start the production of crude oil in Nigeria. The American Gulf Oil 
company was the least affected by the civil war. The company's oil 
production activities were carried on during the war at its offshore 
field in the Mid-Western State and as such the fighting which took 
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place in the Mid-West did not affect the company's activities. During 
the civil war, Gulf Oil continued to expand its investment activities 
and production commenced in its newly-developed offshore fields located 
south of Benin (see the map enclosed). It is therefore not surprising 
that, when oil production by Shell-BP fell in 1968 to its lowest level 
since 1961, Gulf Oil for the first time exceeded the level of oil pro- 
duction by Shell-BP, contributing nearly 70 per cent of the total oil 
production in Nigeria in 1968. By the end of 1968, the three oil companies 
producing oil in Nigeria before the war broke out had, except SAFRAP, 
started oil production again. During 1969 all the damaged installations, 
pipelines and buildings were repaired and, early in the year, oil pro- 
duction by Shell-BP had reached the pre-war level. On account of 
Shell-BP's heavy investment in 1969 and 1970, and also the completion 
of a second oil terminal at Forcados in the Mid-West in July 1969, its 
oil production increased sharply to 8000,000 barrels per day towards the 
end of 1970. In 1971 Shell-BP's daily crude oil production reached the 
1 million barrels mark and in December 1972 the company was producing 
1.3 million barrels per day. Out of the 1136 million barrels of crude 
oil produced in Nigeria during the 1958-70 period, Shell-BP accounted 
for nearly 77 per cent or 873 million barrels. At the end of 1970, 
Shell-BP was producing crude oil in 32 oil fields and the total output 
for the year alone amounted to 289 million barrels. Despite the dominant 
position of Shell-BP as the major oil producer in Nigeria, the company's 
percentage contribution to total oil production in Nigeria in future 
is likely to continue to fall as more oil companies start to discover 
and produce oil in Nigeria, that is, unless the company starts to produce 
from its offshore fields, which have not yet been touched, and/or can 
discover big oil fields like those in the Middle East. 
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The advantages conferred upon Shell-BP by the concession obtained 
from the British colonial government in Nigeria explains the dominant 
position of the company in Nigeria to-day. As Dr. L. H. Schatzl has 
said, "Unaffected by competitors the Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company of Nigeria was able to select at their leisure until 1962, 
15,000 sq. miles of the 357,000 sq. miles concession area obtained in 
1938. In the areas it chose were located the best geological indications 
for the formation of crude oil deposit sites. The opportunity of 
exercising an autonomous strategy throughout two decades in the realm 
of concession politics brought about the result that this company to-day 
possesses the optimal concession sites in the country. Its monopolistic 
position in the past with respect to licence selection affords Shell-BP 
both now and in the future a position of dominance in the development of 
the Nigerian mineral oil industry. This strong position has resulted 
from the intensive activities in the investigation of a geologically 
unexplored territory with unfavourable physical conditions and a rather 
poorly developed infrastructure. By mastering Nigeria as a new territory 
for mineral oil supply as well as by the opening of mineral oil deposits 
with modern equipment and advanced methods not employed heretofore, the 
company performed the function of a pioneer entrepreneur according to 
Schumpeter's meaning". 
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NIGERIAN CRUDE OIL EXPORTS AND THEIR DESTINATION 
Up to the end of October 1965, all crude oil produced in Nigeria was 
exported. By November 1965, when an oil refinery, jointly owned by the 
Nigerian government and Shell-BP Development Company of Nigeria, was com- 
pleted at Alesa-Eleme in Port Harcourt, Nigeria started to refine some 
110 
L. H. Schatzl, Petroleum in Nigeria, Oxford University Press, 
Ibadan 1969, p. 3. 
209 
crude oil for domestic use and for export in times of surplus. During 
the first year of operation in 1966, about 12.3 million barrels of crude 
petroleum, or 8.1 per cent of the total crude petroleum output for the 
year, were processed at the refinery. About 1.2 million tons of 
petroleum products consisting mainly of motor spirit, kerosene, automotive 
gas oil, marine diesel oil and fuel oil were produced for marketing in 
Nigeria. However, the capacity of the Nigerian refinery is limited 
to 38,000 barrels per day and as a consequence, Nigeria has been ex- 
porting an annual average of 97 per cent of its total oil production 
since 1958. When allowance is made for the surpluses to Nigeria's 
requirements in the oil refined at port Harcourt which are exported to 
countries like Niger, Dahomey, Toga, Chad, the United States and some 
Latin-American countries, about 98 per cent of total crude oil production 
in Nigeria is exported annually. Table 5.8 shows the quantity and value 
of crude oil exported from Nigeria during the 1960-1971 period. The 
quantity and the value of'crude oil exports increased annually from 
1958 onwards until 1965, when there was a sudden rise in the quantity and 
value of, exports. While the quantity of crude oil exported in 1965 
nearly trebled the 1964 quantity, the value of such exports more than 
doubled the 1964 value. For the first time, in 1965, crude oil exports 
accounted for roughly one-quarter of the total value of Nigerian exports. 
The upward trend in the quantity and value of crude oil exports con- 
tinued in 1966. However, between 1967 and 1969, petroleum exports 
did not increase at the previous rate. In fact, the lowest level of 
crude oil export since 1965 took place in 1968 when its value of about 
£37 million only accounted for 17.4 per cent of the total Nigerian 
export for the year. Although the quantity and value of petroleum 
export reached a new record level in 1969, it was not until 
1970, when 
full production in all the oil fields was resumed, that the astronomical 
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increase in quantity and value enabled crude oil exports to account 
for nearly 58 per cent of the Nigerian total export. In 1971, when 
crude oil export reached an all-time record level of about E476 million, 
such export not only accounted for over 70 per cent of Nigeria's total 
export for the year, but it also represented more than half of the total 
value of crude oil exports from Nigeria between 1958 and 1971. 
TABLE 5.8 
CRUDE OIL EXPORTS OF NIGERIA 1960-1971 
CRUDE OIL EXPORTS 
NIGERIA'S TOTAL OIL EXPORT AS 
QUANTITY IN VALUE EXPORT A PERCENTAGE 
YEAR '000 TONS (NEMILLION (NL MILL. ) OF TOTAL EXPORT 
1960 828 4.4 169.7 2.6 
1961 2224 11.5 173.6 6.6 
1962 3368 17.2 168.5 10.2 
1963 3695 20.2 189.3 10.7 
1964 5783 32.1 214.7 15.0 
1965 13039 68.1 268.4 25.4 
1966 18947 91.9 283.1 32.5 
1967 14776 72.4 241.8 30.0 
1968 6969.6 36.8 211.1 17.4 
1969 26549.6 131.0 318.2 41.2 
1970 50916.5 255.0 442.7 57.6 
1971 a 70879.5 475.9 648.7 73.4 
SOURCES: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORTS 1965-1971; 
ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, 1968-1971. 
NOTE: a: Provisional 
The United Kingdom, until the present moment, has been the major 
importer of Nigerian primary exports. In the case of Nigerian crude 
oil, its direction has always been the decision of the international 
oil companies whose vertically integrated set-up not only allows them 
to control crude oil production but also its distribution and hence 
its destination as well. 
lll 
Despite the difference in the locus of 
decision making processes in the primary and in the petroleum sectors 
as to the direction of trade, the United Kingdom has been the major 
importer of Nigerian crude oil. 
lllMore 
will be said about the problem of vertical integration in the 
oil companies at a later part of the chapter. 
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TABLE 5.9 
EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL TO THE U. K., GERMANY AND BENELUX (PERCENTAGES) 
1955 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
United Kingdom 42.3 65.2 94.2 100 68.2 61.3 57.7 53.8 
Western Germany - - - - 13.8 26.0 25.4 15.7 
Benelux 57.7 34.8 5.8 - 17.3 7.1 1.4 7.3 
SOURCE: NIGERIA TRADE SUMMARY, 1958-1966. 
Table 5.9 shows that, except in 1958, the U. K. imported over half of the 
yearly crude oil export from Nigeria between 1958 and 1965. Over the 
whole of this period, the U. K. imported nearly 70 per cent of the total 
crude oil export of Nigeria. The Benelux countries which took over 
half of the first shipment of crude oil from Nigeria in 1958, lost the 
second position to Western Germany (who had imported no crude oil from 
Nigeria between 1958 and 1961) after 1962. Between 1958 and 1964, all 
the Nigerian crude oil export went to Western Europe and Africa, the 
latter accounting for about 1 per cent of the total. As from 1966 
onwards, other parts of the world began to import Nigerian crude oil as 
the table below will show. 
TABLE 5.10 
NIGERIAN CRUDE OIL EXPORTS 1966-1971 (IN PERCENTAGES) 
AREA 1966 1970 1971 
Western Europe 74.2 69.0 68.0 
Western Hemisphere 25.1 29.0 29.0 
Africa 0.3 2.0 2.0 
Australia 0.4 - - 
Japan - - 1.0 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCES: 1: NIGERIAN TRADE SUMMARY, DECEMBER, 1966. 
2: PETROLEUM PRESS SERVICE, DECEMBER 1971 & 1972. 
As shown, the proportion of crude oil import from Nigeria by Western 
Europe fell from 74.2 per cent of the total in 1966 to 68 per cent in 1971. 
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The main explanation of this is the fall in the total crude oil import 
from Nigeria by the U. K. from 38.9 per cent in 1966 to 23 per cent and 
18 per cent in 1970 and 1971 respectively. For the first time, the 
United States and Canada began to import crude oil from Nigeria in 1965, 
each taking 6.8 per cent and 0.9 per cent respectively of the total 
crude oil export from Nigeria in that year. By 1966, both countries 
imported 6.0 per cent and 6.9 per cent respectively of the total Nigerian 
crude oil export. However, in 1970, the United States became an important 
importer of Nigerian crude oil, accounting for 12 per cent of the total 
crude oil export for the year. By 1971, when the United States accounted 
for 20 per cent of the Nigerian crude oil export for the year, the U. K. 
lost its position as the most important importer of Nigerian crude oil 
to the U. S. The overall increase in the export of Nigerian crude oil 
to the Western Hemisphere after 1965 was due to the rapid increase in 
crude oil imports by the United States and Canada. Japan also entered 
the Nigerian crude oil market in 1971 by importing 1 per cent of the 
total oil export from Nigeria in the year. As shown earlier, economic 
factors and the global strategies of the oil companies had been the main 
determinant of the direction of Nigerian crude oil exports in the past. 
However, Nigerian authorities are likely to have more influence in the 
future with the acquisition of ownership-interest by the Nigerian 
government in existing oil companies and the establishment of a National 
Oil Corporation to produce and market crude oil. 
BRITISH INVEST(YIENT IN THE PETROLEUMS INDUSTRY AND ITS CONTRIBUTION TO 
THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
This section is concerned with the contribution of Shell-BP to the 
economic development of Nigeria. The Shell-BP Petroleum Development 
Company is the only British oil company operating in Nigeria. 
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EMPLOYMENT, WAGES AND SALARIES 
The role of the petroleum industry as a provider of employment 
, 
has not been stressed by many of the writers 
112 
on the contribution of 
the petroleum industry to economic development. The reason for this is 
that the petroleum industry is characterized by capital-intensive 
technology and, as a consequence, only a very limited number of people 
are required for employment. Shell-BP offers direct employment to 
only a small number of Nigerians. In 1963, according to R. L. Hamilton, 
Shell-BP Finance Ilanager, the total number of -people employed by Shell-BP 
in Nigeria was 2731.113 By March 31,1965, the number of people employed 
by Shell-BP had increased to 2800. These totals are comprised of 
Nigerian employees as well as expatriate employees. The Nigerian 
petroleum industry is not an important absorber of labour, as Table 5.11 
will show. Less than four thousand people were employed in the petroleum 
industry by the beginning of the Nigerian civil war in 1967, and out of 
this total, 83.3 per cent were Nigerians. Table 5.11 also shows that 
the majority of Nigerians were employed, and are still employed, as 
unskilled labour and labourers. In'managerial, professional and 
supervisory positions, few Nigerians were employed, the highest number 
being employed in 1967, when 622 out of the 3,252 Nigerians employed 
in the petroleum industry were in high-level positions. Although the 
expatriate staff formed a small proportion of the number of employees 
in the Nigerian petroleum industry, they nevertheless occupied high- 
level positions carrying high salaries and wages. In 1970, when 
economic activities returned to normal, about 4,300 people were employed 
in the petroleum industry. In this year, when the Nigerian labour force 
112 
See, for example, R. F. Iikesell, et all "Foreign Investment 
in the Petroleum and Mineral Industries', John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1971. 
113 
West Africa, 3.8.63. 
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TABLE 5.11 
LEVELS OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE NIGERIAN PETROLEUM EXPLORING AND PRODUCING 
INDUSTRY, 1964-1967 (NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES) 
EMPLOYEES 1964 1965 1966 1967 
Total Employees 3075 3135 3438 3901 
NIGERIAN EMPLOYEES: TOTAL 2627 2668 2900 3252 
Management) 6 16 16 
Professional ) 74 85 141 
Supervisory ) 39 534 
Skilled Labour ) 558 )I 882 1043 
Unskilled Labour 1393) 898 969 
Other 602 788 570 618 
EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES: TOTAL 448 467 538 649 
Management ) 31 39 47 
Professional ) 301 280) 379 
Supervisory ) a a 
495 ) 
Skilled Technicians ) 147 156 4 38 
SOURCE: S. R. PEARSON, PETROLEUM AND THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford 1970, p. 84 
NOTE: a: Residual Category. 
stood at 26 million and 24 million Nigerians were gainfully employed, 
employment in the petroleum industry represented a negligible proportion 
of all gainful employment. Since 1970, more companies have entered the 
Nigerian petroleum industry and the intensive activities in the petroleum 
industry have resulted in more employment opportunities. By the end of 
1972, about 5000 Nigerians were employed in the industry and Shell-BP 
accounted for 3500 of the total employees. 
If the petroleum industry provides little employment for people, 
it can, however, increase the level of demand in the economy by the high 
wages and salaries paid to its employees. The salaries and wages paid by 
the petroleum industry can have a salutary effect on secondary industries, 
especially when a large part of the salaries and wages are spent on 
domestically-produced goods. As shown in Table 5.11, the majority of 
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the employees in the petroleum industry who were (and still are) in 
high-level positions carrying substantial rewards were expatriates. 
Between 1958 and 1964, the total amount paid out in wages and salaries 
by Shell-BP amounted to NL9.7 million, representing 28.3 per cent of 
the total local expenditure of Shell-BP during the period. 
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Out of 
the ¬9.7 million paid out in wages and salaries, nearly 45 per cent was 
paid to expatriate employees who have a very high consumption preference 
for goods manufactured abroad. The Nigerians in high-level positions 
who also received high salaries spent a large proportion of them on 
foreign goods. We are therefore left with a situation in which only 
a small proportion of the wages and salaries paid by Shell-BP was spent 
on domestically produced goods. It should therefore not be surprising 
that the employment offered by Shell-BP and the salaries and wages paid 
to its employees have had only a marginal effect on the Nigerian economy. 
THE LINKAGE EFFECTS 
When an initial or a primary investment gives rise to secondary 
investments, we have what is referred to as a linkage effect. Invest- 
ments in the petroleum industry can and often do give rise to investments 
in other sectors. The extent to which the activities of Shell-BP have 
given rise to secondary investments can best be assessed by a break-down 
of the company's local expenditures as shown in Table 5.12. Payments 
to contractors represent a large proportion of Shell-BP's domestic 
expenditure. As the table shows, Shell-BP paid a total of £19.8 million 
to contractors over the 1958-64 period, and this amount represented a 
yearly average of 41 per cent of the total domestic expenditure. Since 
the end of the civil war in 1970, as a result of increased exploration, 
drilling and construction payments to contractors by Shell-BP have 
been an average of 48 per cent of the company's total local expenditure. 
114 
L. H. Schatzl, op. cit., p. 245. 
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TABLE 5.12 
LOCAL EXPENDITURES OF SHELL-BP: 1958-1964 (LN'rILLION) 
.... 
TOTAL 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1958-1964 
m % £m % £m % £m % £m % Lm % £m % £m % 
Pay- .4 2. 
mts. 
to 
Contrs 41 4. 1 43. 2.3 35.4 2.8 41.8 1.8 31.6 2. 38.7 5 49. 19.8 41.4 
Sals. 
& 
Wages 0.8 15. 0. 15 1.4 21.5 1.5 22.4 1.2 21 1.9 25.3 2 19. 9.7 20.3 
Local 
Purch- 
ases 0.4 7. 0.4 6.7 0.5 7.7 0.4 6 0.4 7 1.1 14.7 1.2 11. 4.4 9.2 
Duesý 
Local 
Taxes 
Rates 0.2 9 3.8 0.3!; 5 0.2 3.1 0.2 3 0.3 5.3 0.2 2.7 0.5' 5.0 1.9 4 
Other 
Expen- 
diture 1.5 12B. 3 1.8 30 2.1 32.3 1.8 26.9 2 35.1 1.4 18.7 1.4 13.9 12 25.1 
Total 
Local 
Expen- 
diture 5.31100 6 00 6.5 100 6.7 100 5.7 100 7.5 100 10.1 100 47.8 100 
Total 
Expend- 
itures 
in 
Nigeria 
and 
Abroad 15 8.5 - 16.9 - 18.3 - 13.4 - 19.7 - 33.7 - 35.4 - 
Local 
Expend 
tures 
sa% 
of 
Total 
Expend- 
itures 3 1 1 32.4 38.7 36.6 42.5 38: 1 30 
SOURCE: L. H. SCHATZL, PETROLEUM IN NIGERIA, oxford University Press, 
London 1969, p. 245 
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Shell-BP contracts out all drilling and construction, and handles only 
the work-over rigs. This pattern, which can be observed in the other 
oil companies operating in Nigeria, has stimulated the growth of con- 
tracting firms and industries which are directly or indirectly dependent 
on the oil industry. 
Perhaps it is worth noting at this juncture that a large proportion 
of the payments made to contractors go to foreign contractors. 
TABLE 5.13 
SELECTED ANCILLARY FIRMS' RECEIPTS FROM THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
PAID ABROAD AND PAID LOCALLY BY OWNERSHIP OF FIRMS IN 1965 (N¬MILLION) 
PAID LOCALLY 
CATEGORIES OF FIRMS TOTAL PAID EXPATRIATE NIGERIAN TOTAL 
ABROAD OWNED OWNED 
Suppliers 
Local Purchases of Good sa 2.735 - 2.713 0.022 2.735 
Contractors - - 
Well-Site Preparation & Roads 2.781 - 2.361 0.420 2.781 
Dredging 0.470 - 0.471 - 0.470 
Drilling 8.603 5.956 2.647 - 2.647 
Surveys 2.044 0.956 1,088 - 1.088 
Construction 3.483 2.417 0.902 0.164 1.066 
Catering 0.209 - 0.150 0.059 0.209 
Transportation 2.950 0.750 1.970 0.230 2.200 
TOTAL CONTRACTORS 20.540 10.079 9.588 0.873 10.461 
TOTAL SUPPLIERS AND 
CONTRACTORS 23.275 10.079. 12.301 0.895 13.196 
SOURCE: S. R. PEARSON, op. cit., p. 88. 
NOTE: a: including fuel and lubricants. 
Table 5.13 shows the total expenditure by the petroleum industry on con- 
tracting and local purchases of goods in 1965. Of the £20.5 million 
paid to contractors, £10.1 million or 49 per cent was paid abroad and 
the remaining £10.5 million was paid to'contractors operating in Nigeria. 
` 
What is also worth noting is the large proportion of the local payments 
made by the oil companies to foreign firms. Out of the ¬10.5 million 
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paid locally to contractors, only 8.3 per cent went to Nigerian-owned 
firms. The above table therefore shows that foreign firms were res- 
ponsible for a large proportion of the locally purchased goods and the 
contracting businesses of oil companies in 1965. At the end of 1972, 
foreign contractors still accounted for about two-thirds of the con- 
tracting services of the oil companies paid for locally and the remainder 
went to 'Nigerian-owned firms. 
Most of the foreign contractors employed by Shell-8P and other oil 
companies are highly specialized firms who service and supply the 
petroleum industry in its operations in different parts of the world. 
Notable among the foreign contractors are Richard Costain, Taylor Woodrow, 
Transworld Drilling, Mothercat, Halliburton Ltd., and Dresser Magcobair. 
Foreign contractors predominate in fields of activity requiring specialized 
knowledge, capital and management know-how, including seismic surveys, 
dredging, drilling, the laying of pipelines and the construction of 
helicopter landing sites, harbours and bridges. Until such time when 
Nigerian-owned firms can build up a reservoir of competent and experienced 
engineers and have enough capital to perform the specialized contracting 
functions now undertaken by foreign contractors, the latter will continue 
to account for a large proportion of the contracting businesses of the 
oil companies. It must be added that many of the foreign-owned con- 
tracting firms do give employment to Nigerians, and in that sense, they 
are contributing to the Nigerian economy. The activities of Nigerian 
contractors are largely concentrated on clearing bushes, building roads, 
catering, transportation and intermediate constructions. Most of the 
Nigerian-owned companies operating in the areas listed above employ 
an army of smaller local contractors operating in a variety of fields, 
including the supply of raw materials and the contracting of labour. 
Most of these large and smaller contracting firms are located near the 
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oil areas, especially in Warri and Port Harcourt, and their immediate 
environs. An additional 5,000 Nigerians are employed in contracting 
firms as a result of Shell-BP's oil exploration activities in Nigeria. 
The wages paid by Shell-BP to its Nigerian employees, many of whom are 
unskilled, along with the incomes generated by the local contractors 
have acted to stimulate commercial and industrial activities in the 
oil-producing areas. There is a consumer boom at the moment in Port 
Harcourt, Aba and Warri which is brought about by the concentration of 
economic and administrative functions of Shell-BP in these areas. In 
addition, the increasing employment opportunities in the oil-producing 
areas and the associated higher wages have stimulated the activities 
of petty traders. With their turnover increasing daily, they are re- 
stocking at a faster rate as a result of the big drift to these areas 
of unskilled labour whose demand for food and domestically produced 
goods is rapidly increasing. The initial investment of Shell-'BP in 
the exploration and the production of crude oil has led to the growth 
of a large number of small-scale industries in trading, construction and 
engineering, banking and insurance, transport and catering sectors in 
the oil producing areas. 
The discovery and the production of crude oil in Nigeria has, however, 
aggravated the economic disparity between the regions. Because the oil 
activities are concentrated on the Southern part of Nigeria, the six 
northern states are completely cut off from the direct benefits of the 
Not only are Northern rs not employed in the oil f'e ds boom in the oil fields, 
Abut 
they are also unable_ to 
to 
e advantage of 
the increasing demand in the oil-producing areas as a result of regional 
rivalry. The effect of the petroleum industry on the Southern parts 
of Nigeria is localized to the oil producing areas. Lagos and Western 
States are only marginally affected, while the four states in the South- 
Eastern part of-Nigeria are affected quite considerably. The Mid-Western 
and the Rivers states are the most prosperous and richest states 
in Nigeria. 
f 
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The ridiculous revenue allocation system of the Federal government 
which enables the states where the oil is being produced to derive a 
certain fixed proportion of the revenue from the oil companies puts at 
the disposal of the oil producing states financial resources far in 
excess of their requirements. In addition, tribal rivalry and the 
insistence by authorities in the oil producing areas that the jobs 
created directly and indirectly by the petroleum industry be reserved 
to the nationals of the states ensure that people from other states 
cannot and do not take up jobs in the oil states. The regional rivalry 
associated with the petroleum industry was brought to a head when the 
Western State insisted that the oil discovered in its offshore must be 
developed in its state. Presumably, the State government was willing 
to make sure that the benefits associated with the oil discovered in its 
state were not passed on to other parts of the country. The point worth 
emphasizing is that not only has crude oil production increased the 
prosperity of the inhabitants of the oil producing areas, but it has 
also widened the regional economic disparities. 
The production of crude oil in Nigeria has also led to the construction 
of an oil refinery at Alesa-Eleme in Port Harcourt. The refinery, which 
started operating in October 1965, was constructed and managed by a 
joint venture between the Nigerian government (60 per cent) and Shell-BP 
(40 per cent) in the Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company 
(NPRC). The 
refinery was constructed at a cost of £10.6 million and about 250 Nigerians 
are employed to operate it. The refinery has not only ensured a steady, 
cheap and reliable supply of refined petroleum to the Nigerian market, 
it has also saved Nigeria a large amount of foreign exchange as 
the 
import of oil falls steadily. 
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TABLE 5.14 
EFFECTS OF OIL REFINERY ON OIL IMPORTS 
YEAR 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
(NZMILLION) 
OIL IMPORTS 
(N£MILLION) 
OIL AS A% OF 
TOTAL IMPORTS 
1958 163.3 8.9 5.4 
1959 178.4 10.3 5.8 
1960 215.9 11.2 5.2 
1961 222.5 13.3 6.0 
1962 203.2 13.1 6.4 
1963 2Q7.5 15.2 7.4 
1964 253.8 19.3 7.6 
1965 275.3 17.1 6.2 
1966 256.3 3.5 1.4 
1967 223.6 8.8 3.9 
1968 192.6 14.6 7.5 
1969 248.7 15.6 6.3 
1970 378.2 11.0 2.9 
1971 538.2 4.5 0.8 
SOURCES: 1: ANNUAL ABSTRACT OF STATISTICS, 1964, LAGOS. 
2: ECONOMIC INDICATORS, FEDERAL OFFICE OF STATISTICS, LAGOS, 
May 1967 and January 1973. 
The first point to note is the rising cost of oil imports from 
1958 to 1964, as can be seen in the table. In 1965, when the Nigeria 
oil refinery came into operation towards the end of the year, oil imports 
dropped slightly. In 1966, however, when the oil refinery was in full 
operation, oil imports dropped sharply, accounting for only 1.4 per cent 
of total imports. The refinery functioned for only 20 months before 
the Nigerian civil war broke out (July 1967). During the civil war, 
the refinery was damaged and Nigeria once again was forced to import oil. 
Thus, Nigeria's oil import bill rose steeply to £15.6 million in 
1969. At the end of the civil war in January 1970, the refinery was 
quickly repaired and has been functioning normally with the beneficial 
effect of a fall in oil imports in 1970 and 1971. As a result of the 
limited use of refined oil in Nigeria in the late 1960s, the surpluses 
from the Alesa-Eleme refinery have been exported to Niger, Togo, Chad, 
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Dahomey and the United States. In recent years, however, the Nigerian 
refinery capacity of 38,000 barrels per day cannot meet the oil require- 
ments of Nigeria. According to the General Manager of the Nigerian 
Petroleum Refinery Company, Shaw, petrol consumption in Nigeria in 1971 
was about 60,000 barrels a day compared with 40,000 barrels per day in 
1970115 If the consumption of petrol continues to grow as it has in 
the past, Shaw notes that a second refinery would have to be constructed 
to meet the rising demand. In his 1973/74 budget speech to the Nation, 
the head of the Nigerian Military Regime announced that a second refinery 
is to be built to cope with the increased demand for petrol in Nigeria. 
He said that the details of the refinery have been worked out, but its 
capacity, location and the estimated time of commissioning will be 
announced later. 
116 
The discovery of gas and the subsequent production of some of it 
in the oilfields by Shell-BP has stimulated industrial development in 
the oil producing areas. In addition to the generation of electricity 
for the South-Eastern and the Rivers States, the gas from the oil fields 
has been a source of energy for the Trans-Amadi Industrial Estate in 
Port Harcourt, together with the glass factory, the Alcan Aluminium factory 
and the Michelin Tyre factory sited on the Estate. In addition, gas 
has also provided an efficient and economic source of energy for in- 
dustries located in Aba and Ughelli. It must also be added that gas 
is becoming widely used for cooking in most homes, especially in the 
towns. Despite the increasing consumption of natural gas in Nigeria, 
the reserve is so large that very large quantities of natural gas 
produced in association with oilare allowed to flare off because of 
115 
West Africa, 31st March, 1972. 
116 
Daily Times, April 2,1973, Lagos. 
223 
lack of markets. It has been estimated that "more than 700 million 
cubic feet/day of associated gas is now being flared In the Nigerian 
oil fields, of which only minor quantities are sold (by Shell-BP) for 
local industrial use. 
117 
The Nigerian government has shown a great 
interest in the establishment of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) extraction 
plants and a petro-chemical complex which would be linked to associated 
natural gas production. According to the Petroleum Press Service, work 
on a/i'26 million Port Harcourt plant to extract 12,000-15,000 b/d of 
LPG for Nigeria Gas Products is reportedly due to begin this year118 
The plant is to be a joint venture, owned 60 per cent by the Nigerian 
government and 40 per cent by Guadaloupe Gas Products of Houston. It 
has also been revealed that the Federal Ministry of Mines and Power 
has announced the Nigerian government's agreement with Shell-BP for 
the establishment of a liquefaction plant with 800,000 million cubic 
feet a day capacity by 1977 and to be owned 55 per cent by the govern- 
ment and 45 per cent by Shell-BP. 
119 When all these projects come into 
operation, then the valuable asset which is being burnt in Nigerian 
oilfields will be converted into financial resources for the economic 
development of the country. 
It is also worth noting the increased knowledge about Nigeria 
associated with the activities of Shell-BP. The areas in which Shell-BP 
operates are situated in the thick equatorial forests of the Niger Delta. 
Without the search for oil and the subsequent discovery and production 
of oil in these areas', a large part of the Niger Delta could have been 
unknown and uninhabited. By improving inland waterways and building 
new roads and bridges, Shell-BP has thus helped to open up the thick 
117 
Petroleum Press Service, November 1970, p. 406. 
118Petroleum 
Press Service, December 1972, p. 442. 
119The 
Times, June 12,1973, London. 
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forest areas of Nigeria. These facilities have encouraged farm settle- 
ments in areas uninhabited before oil exploration, and more agricultural 
products have been made available to the growing population of Nigeria. 
The search for oil necessitates aerial photography and rigorous geological 
and map surveys. To the extent that Shell-BP has made available to 
the Nigerian government the maps and other results of its geological 
and map surveys, the company has helped to increase people's knowledge 
about Nigeria. Socially too, Shell-BP has also contributed to community 
life in the oil areas. Insofar as small communities in the form of 
villages and small towns have grown up around the oil fields, the 
accommodation provided at low rental costs and the electricity, health 
and recreational facilities provided in these areas by the government 
and Shell-BP have been additional advantages of oil investment. 
THE CONTRIBUTION TO GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
One of the most important contributions of the petroleum industry 
to the Nigerian economy is the substantial payments made to the govern- 
ment by the oil companies in recent years. Revenue from the petroleum 
industry has been growing very r@pidly since 1958, but it was not until 
after 1961 that the revenue from the petroleum industry exceeded 5 per cent 
of the total government revenue. Table 5.15 shows the rise in petroleum 
revenue from the 1961 low level to nearly £28 million in 1967 after which 
period it fell in response to the Nigerian civil war. Petroleum 
revenue substantially increased in 1970 to reach its highest level since 
1958. Table 5.15, however, does not show the true position of petroleum 
revenue in the public finance of the Federal Government since petroleum 
profit tax and excise and custom duties are not included. If the profit 
tax for the period 1968-1971 is added to the above figures, the importance 
of the petroleum industry as a source of substantial revenue cannot be 
doubted. As Table 5.16 shows, the percentage contribution of petroleum 
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TABLE 5.15 
GOVERNMENT'S REVENUE FROM THE PETROLEUMS INDUSTRY 1961-70 (LN'rILLION) 
YEAR 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT 
REVENUE 
PETROLEUM 
a REVENUE 
PETROLEUl 
REVENUE rýS A 
%0 TOTAL 
1961 137.0 4.3 3.1 
1962 148.6 13.1 8.8 
1963 154.4 8.5 5.5 
1964 169.0 9.9 5.8 
1965 192.2 12.8 6.6 
1966 183.2 10.4 5.6 
1967 179.7 27.8 5.4 
1968 159.7 10.6 6.6 
1969 223.5 11.8 5.2 
1970 390.9 34.4 8.8 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW, DECEMBER, 
1970. 
S 
NOTE: a: Excluding petroleum profit tax, custom and excise duties. 
revenue did not only rise from 10.4 per cent in 1968 to 31.7 per cent 
in 1971, but such revenue represented the most important source of govern- 
ment revenue during the period under consideration. 
TABLE 5.16 
GOVERNMENT'S REVENUE FROM THE PETROLEUM' INDUSTRY 1968-1971 (£MILLION) 
PETROLEUM 
REVENUE AS A 
TOTAL GOVERNMENT PETROLEUM ANNUAL % % OF TOTAL 
YEAR REVENUE REVENUE CHANGE REVENUE 
1968 159.7 16.7 - 10.4 
1969 223.5 26.9 61.1 12.0 
1970 390.9 88.0 227.1 22.5 
1971 a 520.0 165.0 87.5 31.7 
SOURCES: 1: INSTITUTE OF PETROLEUM, LONDON. 
2: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORT, 1971. 
NOTE: a; Provisional. 
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Shell-BP have been paying to the Nigerian government, since 1958, 
about two-thirds of the total revenue from the petroleum industry. 
For the period 1958-1964, Shell-BP paid a total of £27.3 million to the 
Nigerian government. 
120 
In recent years, payments to the Nigerian 
government by Shell-BP have been rising as a result of competition 
among-the oil companies for concessions. The increase in the number 
of companies seeking oil concessions has enabled the Nigerian government 
to make the granting of new concessions depend upon the payment of high 
premiums. In 1970, it is estimated that the total payment by Shell-8P 
to the Nigerian government was about £65 million, the breakdown of which 
is shown in Table 5.17. If the estimate in Table 5.17 is correct, it 
would mean that out of a total revenue of L88 million from the petroleum 
industry in 1970, Shell-8P paid E65 million, which would be 73.8 per cent 
of the total petroleum revenue. There is no doubt that Shell-BP has 
been contributing substantially to the Nigerian government's revenue. 
TABLE. 5.17 
SHELL-BP'S PAYMENTS TO THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IN 1970 
TYPE OF PAYIV1ENT 
Royalties 
Petroleum Profits Tax, Concession Rentals & Custom Duties 
Harbour Dues 
TOTAL ESTIMATE 
LMILLI0NS 
20 
39 
6 
65 
SOURCE: SHELL-BP PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY OF NIGERIA LTD., 
SHELL-BP IN NIGERIA, LAGOS (No date) 
Insofar as the government's revenue has been used to finance administra- 
tion and to provide essential social services, such as public health 
120 
L. H. Schatzl, op. cit., p. 244. 
227 
facilities, roads, education and community services, Shell-BP's invest- 
ment in Nigeria has favourably affected the life of many Nigerians 
through the company's contribution towards government revenue. 
CONTRIBUTION TO FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
We have seen that the export of crude oil from Nigeria has been 
rising since the first shipment of crude oil took place in 1958 up to the 
present moment. As shown in Table 5.8, in 1971 when crude oil export 
reached a record level of about £476 million, it represented over 73 per 
cent of Nigeria's total export for the year. Crude petroleum has there- 
fore become Nigeria's most important export and foreign exchange earner. 
However, what is important to Nigeria is not the value of crude petroleum 
export, but the net balance after subtracting all imports associated 
with the petroleum industry. Table 5.18 shows the net contribution of 
the petroleum industry to the Nigerian balance of payments for the 
1963-1969 period. It can be easily seen that, if the values of petroleum 
exports are compared with the net contribution to the Nigerian balance 
of payments during the 1963-1969 period, only £249.2 million out of the 
total export value of £452.5 million was the net addition to Nigeria's 
balance of payments. The remaining 45 per cent of the total export 
value for the 1963-1969 period was spent abroad to pay for imports, 
interests and profits. It is also worth noting that only in one year, 
1969, did the cost of materials acquired abroad and the cost of acquisition 
abroad of sundry services account for less than half of the total value 
of petroleum export during the 1963-69 period. The petroleum industry 
was able to contribute about 55 per, cent of the value of its export to 
the Nigerian balance of payments during the 1963-69 period because of 
the importation of capital to the tune of nearly £109 in addition to 
paying for its imports. There is no doubt that the petroleum industry 
has been very effective in reducing Nigeria's balance of payments deficits 
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TABLE 5.18 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY TO THE NIGERIAN 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (NL'vILLION) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Proceeds from Export Sales 20.1 32.0 68.1 91.9 72.0 37.0 131.0 
Reimbursement of Harbour Dues 0.6 1.0 2.0 2.4 1.9 1 0.2 3.0 
Cost of Materials acquired Abroad -4.2 -11.7 -13.5 -19.5 -17.51 -9.9 -12.7 (C. I. F. ) 
Variation in Materials in 
Transit and in Export Debtors -0.2 - -2.2 -1.01 - 4ý -13.0 -11.8 
Cost of Acquisition abroad of 
Sundry Services -6.4 -12.3 -22.2 -38.5 -31.51 -28.21-44.8 
Variation in Overseas Cash and 
Current Account Balance 1.9 13.9 -1.3 5.9 25.2 - -32.0 
Dividends, Interest, Branch Profits) -19.4 -19.8 -- 
2.5 2.2 4.7 
Imports of Capital ) 21.6 18.4 42.7 20.8 
Net Contribution to Balance 
of Payments 14.3 +25.1 +35.6 +43.4 +48.7 +28.8,1 +53.3 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ESTIMATES OF THE 
OIL SECTOR 1963-1969 (UNPUBLISHED). 
in bad years and even making it possible for surpluses to appear. 
Table 5.19 shows the impact of the petroleum industry on the Nigerian 
balance of payments for the period 1967-1971. The table shows how 
the 
contribution of the petroleum industry to merchandise trade rose 
from 
£54.5 million to a record level of £463.8 million in 1971. The non- 
merchandise trade of the oil sector, which included payments 
for insurance, 
shipping costs, other travel expenses which were paid abroad, represented 
an outflow of funds throughout the period. The oil sector's 
balance 
on capital account, which included such items as direct investment, profits 
repatriation and payments of loan capital overseas, was positive 
for the 
first two years but negative for the last three years, as a result of 
the 
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payments of loan capital overseas, and the repatriation of profits in 
1970 and 1971. The overall balance of the oil sector was positive 
throughout the period, which means that it was the surpluses in this 
sector which helped to ameliorate the balance of payments crisis in 
Nigeria. The 1967-1970 period was a difficult one in Nigeria because 
the country was fighting a civil war and the importation of war equipment 
drained the country of its foreign exchange resources and, as such, 
deficits were accumulatedLin the non-oil sector during the period. 
The oil sector not only helped to reduce the deficits to the minimum 
possible levels, but the sector also enabled Nigeria to have a surplus 
on its balance of payments in 1971. 
The dominant position of Shell-BP in the Nigerian petroleum industry 
is not only reflected in the high level of crude oil production by the 
company, but also in the substantial contribution the company makes to the 
balance of payments. Table 5.20 shows the net contribution of Shell-BP 
to Nigerian balance of payments between 1938 and 1964. Until 1965, Shell-BP 
was the only exporter of crude oil from Nigeria. After deducting the 
cost of raw materials and profits repatriated from export proceeds and 
the inflow of capital, Shell-BP contributed £82.9 million to the Nigerian 
balance of payments over the 1938-1964 period. This amount may be 
considered small with regard to the length of time over which the con- 
tribution was made, but given the relatively low level of petroleum export 
proceeds, there was very little room for improvement. Between 1958 and 
1964, Shell-BP made about 90 per cent of the petroleum industry's con- 
tribution to the Nigerian balance of payments. Since 1965 Shell-BP's 
percentage contribution to the petroleum industry's total 
has been falling. 
Over the 1965-1971 period, Shell-BP contributed about 70 per cent of 
the 
petroleum industry's net contributions to the Nigerian balance of payments. 
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TABLE 5.20 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF SHELL-BP TO NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAY1ENTS (NLrILLION) 
1938'` 
1957 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 TOTAL 
Proceeds from Export - 1.0; 2.7 4.4 11.5 16.7 20.1; 32 88.4 
Sales 
Reimbursement of Har- - - 0.1 0.11 0.4 
ý 
0051 0.6 1.0 2.7 
bour Dues paid in 
Nigeria on behalf i j 
of the Shipper 
Cost of material and -16 -9.6ý -11.6 
p 
-9.1 -6.7 1 -3.6 -7.4 -12.3 -76.3 
Services Acquired 
Abroad 
Net Flow of Privae 25 14 15.7 12.3 6.4 j -3.8 -1.5 - 68.1 
Capital 
et Contribution +9.0 +5.4 +6.9 +7.7 +11.6 +9.8 +11.8 +20.7 +82.9 
to Balance of Pay- 
ments ments 
SOURCE: L. H. SCHATZL, PETROLEUM IN NIGERIA, Oxford University Press, 
London 1969, p. 164. 
NOTE: a: Estimated. 
This trend is likely to continue as other companies discover and increase 
their production and export of crude oil. It must be added, however, 
that most of the new oil companies would be a drain on Nigeria's foreign 
exchange as they import raw materials for their initial operations. As 
Table 5.20 shows, the value of Shell-BP's imports between 1935 and 1960 
was substantially above the company's export of crude oil. It was not 
until 1961 onwards that the value of Shell-BP's exports exceeded the 
company's import-value. There is no doubt, however, that after the 
initial period of high imports by the new oil companies, more will be 
contributed towards Nigeria's balance of payments as imports level out 
and exports increase. 
The effect of the foreign exchange earning capacity of the petroleum 
industry goes beyond a mere contribution to the balance of payments into 
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the favourable effects of a healthy balance of payments on economic 
development. When a country has persistent deficits on its balance of 
payments, the country's ability to import raw materials, intermediate 
and capital goods, and probably food from abroad, is limited. The ensuing 
shortages of raw materials and intermediate goods resulting from a foreign 
exchange bottleneck- will no doubt reduce the level of expansion in the 
economy and hence unfavourably affect economic development. The balance 
of payments problem which Nigeria does not have must be emphasized as one 
of the main reasons why industrial expansion since 1970 has continued until 
now without the necessity of "applying the brake". In addition to providing 
the necessary foreign exchange to finance imports for industrial and agri- 
cultural expansion, development planning is also facilitated through the 
predictability of foreign exchange earnings associated with crude oil 
exports. 
NATIONAL POLICIES FOR THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
The early history of the Nigerian petroleum industry epitomizes all 
the essential features of a beginner negotiating terms with experienced 
international oil companies. At the time the first shipment of crude 
oil took place in Nigeria in 1958, Nigerians had no knowledge of the 
intricacies and complexities of the oil industry. As a consequence, 
until 1967, the payment arrangements negotiated by oil companies were less 
favourable to the Nigerian government than those of the other oil producing 
countries in 'the Middle East. Between 1958 and 1966 payments by the oil 
companies were governed by the Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance of 
1959. 
Under this arrangement, the government shared profits equally with 
the 
oil companies, which are calculated by applying realized prices to 
the 
volume of crude oil produced and exported to obtain the gross proceeds 
before deducting costs. Rentals and harbour dues were calculated 
separately. Also worth noting is that all the initial capital allowances 
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for manufacturing companies were also enjoyed by the oil companies. 
121 
The step towards increased revenue from the oil companies began late 
in 1966 when Decree No. 65 cut the rate at which the oil companies are 
allowed to depreciate their capitalized investment by nearly half. The 
effect of Decree No. 65 was to reduce the profits of the oil companies 
while at the same time increasing the government's revenue from the oil 
industry. The major step, however, was taken in 1967, when Decree No. 1 
imposed the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries' terms on the oil 
companies with only a minor difference, which was that oil companies 
operating in OPEC countries would phase out the 6.5 per cent "percentage 
allowance" discount off posted price by 1972, and the "gravity allowance" 
by 1975. Since Nigeria joined OPEC in 1971, the minor difference ex- 
plained above was of no economic significance. The financial arrange- 
ment under'Decree No. 1 of 1967 involved the setting of a posted price 
on which the calculation of gross proceeds, profits taxes and royalties 
would be based. Under the new arrangement, royalties were to be treated 
as expenses and no tax allowances were to be permitted on royalties as 
was the case before 1967. The effect of Decree No. 1 of 1967 was to 
increase the Nigerian government's revenue from the petroleum industry. 
The introduction of OPEC terms into Nigeria was a result of Shell-BP's 
negotiatioh with the Libyan government in 1965. All the oil companies 
have written into their concession agreements with the Nigerian govern- 
ment the "most favoured nation" clause which makes it obligatory for the 
oil' companies to give terms to Nigeria equal to the most favourable terms 
accorded to any oil producing country in Africa and in the Middle East. 
No sooner did the Libyan government exact further tax concessions from 
121 
See Chapter IV for government incentives to foreign investors. 
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the oil companies than Shell-BP suggested to the Nigerian government 
its desire to apply OPEC terms to Nigeria. As a result of the political 
disturbances in Nigeria at that time, nothing was done until 1967, when 
Decree No. 1, explained above, came into operation. In November, 1967, 
Shell-BP announced a posted price of %/ per barrel for AP 1 340 
crude oil produced in Nigeria. Other oil companies reluctantly followed 
, 
the example set by Shell-BP, although the effect of the new price level 
was; not felt by Nigeria until 1970 when the civil war, which almost 
brought oil production to a halt, came to an end. In 1970, Libya was 
again successful in exacting further tax concessions from the oil com- 
panies and in October 1970, Shell-BP informed the Nigerian government 
of its intention to increase its posted prices by 25 cents. The intended 
increase in posted prices would raise the existing postings of, 2.17 
per barrel for 34° AP1 crude to V2.42, and they 2.03 price for Shell-BP's 
270 medium blend to , '2.28. In 1971 Nigeria joined OPEC and since then, 
OPEC prices have been paid for Nigerian crude oil. 
There are several reasons why Nigerian crude oil was substantially 
priced below crude oil from other producing countries before 1970. The 
first reason is the total lack of knowledge and experience about the 
petroleum industry. Given the fact that Nigerian officials were 
negotiating in a fog of ignorance, there was no yardstick by which a 
more favourable agreement to Nigeria could be reached. The second reason 
is the unfavourbble climatic conditions under which the oil companies 
had to operate. Nigerian crude oil was discovered in the thick, swampy 
uninhabited equatorial forests of the Niger Delta. As a-consequence, 
it was necessary to give the oil companies generous terms in order to 
persuade them to undertake the exceptionally large capital investments 
which the venture demanded. The third reason is the organization of 
the international oil companies. They are vertically integrated, and, 
as a consequence, there is a high degree of discrimination between the 
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posted prices of crude oil used for the calculation of payments to 
the oil producing countries and the selling prices of crude oil in 
importing countries. The vertical nature of the petroleum industry 
ensured that the transfer prices used for the calculation of payments 
to Nigerian governments before 1970 were below those of other oil pro- 
ducing countries. The last reason was the domination of the Nigerian 
petroleum industry before 1960 by three giant international companies, 
Shell, BP and Mobil. These large firms have at their disposal economic 
power far in excess of what the newly independent Nigerian government 
could muster to improve its bargaining position vis-a-vis these companies. 
As Professor Penrose has said "economic power in the widest sense consists 
of the ability significantly to influence the use of resources, the 
distribution of goods, the prices of products, the tastes of consumers, 
the development of new technology, and -the distribution of income". 
122 
Faced with these few powerful oil companies, the post-independent 
Nigerian civilian government had no choice but to give generous con- 
cessions which replaced the problem of grappling with the control of 
the oil companies for the initial problem of consolidating political 
power. 
It is with the hope of breaking the monopolistic power of the few 
oil companies that the Nigerian government was prompted to grant oil 
exploration licences to other smaller companies after 1961. It also 
became very clear to the Nigerian authorities that collective participation 
in the negotiating process is much better and more rewarding than bi- 
lateral negotiations with the oil companies. As a consequence, Nigeria 
joined OPEC in 1971. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
was established in September 1960 by developing oil exporting countries 
122 
E. T. Penrose, The Large International Firm in Developing 
Countries, Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1968, p. 51. 
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to provide a united front in negotiations vis-a-vis the oil companies. 
At the moment there are eleven countries in the Organization, Abu Dhabi, 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Indonesia and Venezuela. At the end of 1972, Nigeria had become the 
sixth largest OPEC producer and its membership of OPEC has been bene- 
ficial. For instance, in April 1971 new agreements for the posted price 
of crude oil was negotiated by OPEC and the posted price of x'/3.21 per 
barrel for 340 APl crude in Nigeria was obtained. Recently, OPEC 
successfully reached an agreement with the oil companies for compensa- 
tion against the devaluation of the dollar and for adjusting oil prices 
in accordance with current parity changes. Explaining the significance 
of the new agreement negotiated in June 1973, a commentator declared, 
"In terms of the dollar, the currency unit in which oil taxes are ex- 
pressed, the accord would give producing states an extra revenue of over 
W1000 million. The estimate is misleading, since the whole objective 
of these negotiations has been to give the 11 members of OPEC, together 
responsible for 85 per cent of world exports, compensation for the 
depreciation in the value of the dollar. For the future, posted prices 
are to be adjusted monthly in the light of the daily movement of curren- 
cies against one another. Under the old Geneva formula, agreed in 
Geneva in January 1972, assessment took place only quarterly and there 
was a time lag before prices were adjusted". 
123 The success of OPEC 
in exploiting monopolistic advantages was based on its enhanced bargaining- 
power brought about by collective and united participation in negotiations 
vis-a-vis individual importing countries and the oil companies. Since 
the importing countries are not united, it was easy for OPEC to isolate 
objecting importing countries from supplies without any retaliation from 
123 
The Financial Times, June 2,1973. 
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other importing countries. In addition, in place of the old buyers' 
market, the crude oil market has become a sellers' market with the much- 
publicized world energy crisis predicted for the turn of the century. 
When a commodity is scarce and has limited substitutes for many uses as 
with the case of crude oil, it commands a high price. Faced with a 
short time horizon before crude oil is depleted in many of the OPEC 
member-countries, and the increasing demand for more crude oil in 
importing countries, the ability to increase prices without any effect 
on the level of demand and on the availability of resources in OPEC 
must be emphasized as one of the main reasons why OPEC has successfully 
exploited its monopolistic position up to now. The above examples of 
price increases since 1971 show how Nigeria has benefited from its 
membership of OPEC. On every occasion, the toughly-bargained agreements 
achieved by Libya and the Gulf States have established a precedent on 
which Nigeria can negotiate. By the and of October 1973, the posted 
price of Nigerian crude oil stood at V/4.287 a barrel. On November 3, 
1973, the price rose to/% 8.310 a barrel. Within a period of three 
years since Nigeria became a member of OPEC, the posted price of Nigerian 
crude oil has increased nearly fourfold. 
PARTICIPATION BY THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IN OIL EXPLORATION 
After Nigeria has increased its knowledge about the complexities of 
the petroleum industry and its operations, there are several alternative 
ways open to the country to exploit its crude oil deposits. Nigeria 
could "(a) nationalize its resource industry by purchasing the assets 
from the foreign owners; (b) negotiate for the creation of a joint venture 
involving both foreign and domestic ownership; (c) invite new foreign 
companies to explore and develop mineral and petroleum resources; 
(d) reserve a portion of mineral reserves for exploitation by state 
enterprises; (e) employ one of several varieties of service contracts 
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with foreign companies to undertake mineral and petroleum development 
for a stake enterprise; or (f) leave ownership and control of resource 
development to international companies ". 
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As will be discussed 
below, Nigeria combined (b) and (d) by obtaining ownership interests 
in existing companies and by establishing a national enterprise to 
search for oil in a reserved portion of the country. 
The hint of the Nigerian government's participation in the oil 
industry was heralded in the Second National Development Plan 1970-74, when 
the government declared that "so far, the Government has not played a very 
active part in the oil industry. In view of the strategic role oil 
is going to play in the nation's economy, a more direct Government 
involvement is now more than necessary. For the sake of national 
security, rational investment decisions and managerial opportunities to 
enable Nigerians to take effective control of the oil industry eventually, 
it has become mandatory that the Government should be directly involved 
in the oil industry. To this end, during the Plan period, Government 
will participate in the three phases of the oil industry, viz., exploration 
and mining, refining, and distribution and marketing. R National Oil 
Corporation together with associated public-owned companies will be 
established for this purpose". 
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During the second year of the Second 
National Development Plan period (1971), the National Oil Corporation 
was established. Earlier in 1969, Decree 51 of November 1969 made 
provision for government participation in exploration, but since no 
further explanation was given, no one took the question of participation 
seriously until the establishment of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC) in 1971. The main purpose of the NNOC is to search for, discover 
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and produce oil in Nigeria. In addition, the Corporation will also 
represent the government in all participation agreements with new and 
old oil companies operating in Nigeria. The first company that NNOC 
took an interest in was the French SAFRAP in which NNOC acquired a 
35 per cent interest in April 1971 before the company was allowed to 
continue to operate in Nigeria. This move by the Nigerian government 
was seen as a retaliation for the French involvement in the Nigerian 
civil war. The participation agreement with SAFRAP stipulated that, 
if and when production reaches 250,000 b/d, NNOC's share should rise to 
reach a maximum of 50 per cent at a level of 400,000 b/d. In September 
1971, NNOC acquired a 33.1/3 per cent interest in AGIP to fulfil AGIP's 
original licensing agreement expressly providing an option for future 
government participation. Between October 1971 and March 1972, when 
several new companies obtained concessions, the majority share interest in 
all discoveries by NNOC was specifically written into all agreements. 
NNOC was to secure 51 per cent share in oil produced by Occidental, 
Japanese Oil Company, Henry Stephenson & Sons, Deminex, Monsato and Delta 
Oil in the areas covered by their licences. As soon as the last of 
I 
these new companies received its licence, it was announced that no further 
oil concessions are to be granted by the Federal Government. All areas 
not covered by existing mining leases and prospecting and exploration 
licences were vested in thle NNOC which retains the right to select oil 
companies to co-operate with it as contractors or minority partners. 
In March, 1972, OPEC met in Beirut to discuss the problem of owner- 
ship interests in oil companies and it was agreed at the meeting 
that OPEC 
members could seek a minimum of 20 per cent equity participation 
from the 
ail companies, if they so desire. On his return to Lagos 
from the OPEC 
meeting in Beirut, the Nigerian Commissioner for Mines and Power announced 
that Nigeria would start immediate negotiations with oil companies prospecting 
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in the country for a minimum 20 per cent participation in all concessions. 
This announcement should not have surprised anyone, since Nigeria had 
already obtained substantial interests in two oil companies already 
producing oil in the country, and also has a major interest in all con- 
cession agreements with seven new oil companies. Apart from the state- 
ment of the Commissioner for Mines and Power, nothing seemed to happen 
for over a year in the negotiations between the Nigerian government and 
the oil companies. Meanwhile, Libya was at first asking for a 51 per 
cent participation agreement with the oil companies, but later 
Colonel Gaddafi was seeking 100 per cent interest in all companies operat- 
ing in Libya. Up to June 1973, no agreement has been reached. Else- 
where in May 1973, Iran reached an agreement with the oil companies which 
gave the companies a 20-year contract for the purchase of "substantial 
quantities" of oil from the National Iranian Oil Company which will provide 
the capital needed for the development of the oil fields. The oil companies 
will become contractors, initially providing the technical staff while 
production operations will be brought under the control of NIOC. 
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In June 1973, it was revealed in the London Times that Nigeria 
has signed a participation agreement with Shell-BP which will give the 
Nigerian government a 35 per cent initial stake in Shell-BP's operations 
in the country. Writing about the significance of the agreement, the 
Times correspondent declared "For the European oil-consuming countries 
the new agreement is important since Nigeria is one of their major suppliers 
of crude. It removes any lingering uncertainties about the future of 
relations between the companies and the local government. The effect 
of this will be to give the thriving oil industry in Nigeria a new lease 
of life. Output is certain to surge ahead again and the atmosphere 
for 
concluding agreements for a new oil refinery and projects to export natural 
126The 
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gas in liquefied form, probably to the United States, is much improved". 
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Shell-BP has established a participation agreement precedent for other 
oil companies operating in Nigeria and in the not distant future Nigeria 
will sign a participation agreement with all the oil companies operating 
in the country. By the time this happens, Nigeria would then have 
achieved a considerable stake in its-petroleum development without the 
trauma that accompanied Algeria's take-over of oil companies. 
There are several reasons why it took Nigeria about fifteen years 
from the time of the first shipment of crude oil in 1958 to acquire owner- 
ship stakes in the Nigerian petroleum industry. The first reason was the 
lack of knowledge, finance and skilled manpower to make any participation 
agreement with the oil companies beneficial to Nigeria. The acquisition 
of ownership interest in existing oil companies requires large financial 
resources to pay for the acquired businesses. In addition to large 
financial resources, skilled manpower is required to carry on the opera- 
tions of the acquired companies. Nigeria, already short of finance and 
skilled manpower for other developmental projects, had to wait until 
LO ere- 
financial resources and skilled manpower available to make the participa- 
h 
tion agreement worthwhile. The second+reason is the organization of 
the petroleum industry. The petroleum industry is vertically integrated 
and as a consequence, the oil companies which produce crude oil, refine, 
distribute and market the final products. Under this circumstance, 
even if a country were able to continue to produce crude oil after 
nationalization, the country might find it difficult to market the oil 
in the buyers' market which operated some few years ago. However, the 
situation has changed and crude oil is in high demand by the importing 
countries and the situation of a sellers' market which now exists will 
ensure that a country can sell its crude oil in the international market 
127The 
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without going through the oil companies. The timing of Nigeria's 
participation in the petroleum industry was based on a carefully calcula- 
ted strategy; so that the ability to exploit the participation to the 
fullest possible advantage of the country would not create a bottleneck 
in other development projects. Since the creation of the National Oil 
Corporation and the acquisition of interests in oil companies operating 
in Nigeria, the National Oil Corporation has accumulated several thousand 
barrels of crude oil and the Nigerian government invited bids for its 
purchase, in October 1973. More than 100 applications were received 
and, early in December 1973, Nigerian officials confirmed the report that 
the Government's National Oil Corporation had accepted a record offer of 
16.80 a barrel for 300,000 barrels a day from an American oil company, 
the Texas-based Coastal States Gas and Oil Corporation, and others. 
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What this means is that while the oil companies will continue to use the 
posted price of V18.310 per barrel to calculate payments made to the 
Nigerian authorities, the crude oil obtained through the ownership stakes 
in the oil companies will be sold in the free market at very high prices. 
FUEL POLICY IN NIGERIA AND THE WORLD ENERGY CRISIS 
Nigeria is lucky in the sense that the country has an abundant supply 
of energy far in excess of its domestic consumption. The four energy 
sources in Nigeria are coal, natural gas, petroleum and hydro-power. The 
existence of these sources of energy has not been matched by a rational 
fuel policy. In the early 1960s, coal and petroleum together accounted 
for over 90 per cent of Nigeria's energy consumption. By 
the and of 1970, 
coal consumption had become negligible, while hydro-power became an 
import- 
ant source of energy. Table 5.21 shows the share of 
the various sources 
128 
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of energy in the energy consumption of Nigeria. Prior to 1966, the two 
main sources of energy in Nigeria were coal and petroleum. After 1966, 
coal became unimportant as a source of energy and as from 1969 onwards, 
hydro-power and petroleum products became the main source of energy. 
TABLE 5.21 
SOURCES OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN NIGERIA (PERCENTAGES) 
SOURCE 1963 
ý 
1964 
1 
196 11 1.966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 a 
Coal 25 24 22 , 17 3 -b -b 2 4 
Hydro-Power 3 3 2 333 19 22 20 
Natural Gas 2 3 6 8 10 9 4 5 7 
petroleum Products 70 70 70 72 84,88 77 71 69 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
SOURCE: CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, ANNUAL REPORTS, 1966-71. 
NOTES: a: Provisional 
b: Negligible. 
The shift from coal to hydro-power was a deliberate policy by the Nigerian 
government to construct a dam for the supply of hydro-power. It is, 
however, doubtful whether this policy was sound, given the circumstances 
at the time when the decision was made. Prior to 1969, Nigerian elec- 
tricity was generated by coal and gas. The other consumer of coal was 
the Nigerian Railway Corporation. Nigeria has abundant supplies of gas 
which is produced in association with crude petroleum. 
As early as 1961, 
it had been established that there exist large quantities of gas 
in Nigeria. 
Despite the existence of large deposits of coal and large quantities of 
gas which could be cheaply used for the generation of electricity, 
both 
for commercial and domestic uses, in 1964 Nigeria embarked on 
the con- 
struction of a £72 million dam on the River Niger at Kainji, some 
64 miles 
north of Jebba. The World Bank and various governments such as 
the Italian, 
Netherlands, U. K. and U. B. A. governments contributed substantially 
to the 
construction of the dam, which was completed in 1969 at a cost of 
LBO million. 
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When the Kainji hydro-electric dam was commissioned on 15th February, 
1969, it immediately became the source for the generation of electricity 
in Nigeria. Coal and gas lost their role and their relative unimportance 
as a source of energy was due to the construction of the Kainji dam. 
The question that readily comes to mind is why the dam was constructed 
at all, when there was, and still is, no other use for the large quantities 
of gas which until now flare away in Nigeria. As a source of energy, 
there was no economic justification for the construction of the dam. At the 
moment, the Kainji dam merely operates to one-third of its designed capacity 
and the much-heralded justification for the construction of the dam - to 
make available for industrial and domestic users a cheap and steady source 
of energy - has not been realized. Far from being a cheap and steady 
source of energy, electricity costs have not only been a major burden to 
industrial and domestic users, but the frequent power cuts and the erratic 
nature of supplies have also damaged industrial and commercial plants and 
made production plans and projections very arduous tasks. The construction 
of the Kainji dam has three immediate consequences: (a) it has led to the 
existence of excess capacity in the dam itself which has resulted in high 
electricity prices, (b) it has depressed the Nigerian coal industry by 
taking away its most important function of generating electricity, and 
(c) it has led to the excessive wastage of the existing large quantities 
of gas which can be used at no cost for the generation of electricity 
which is currently being generated by power from the dam. 
The Kainji dam has been constructed and all that can be done is to 
find ways of utilizing its excess capacity so that cheap and steady supplies 
of electricity can be made available to consumers. As the Nigerian govern- 
meat has indicated, "where economically and politically feasible, export 
Of electricity from Kainji to neighbouring countries will also be promoted'". 
129 
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Rigorous search for consumers outside Nigeria and the persuasion of the 
neighbouring countries to utilize electricity generated by the Kainji 
dam ought to receive more attention than before. The Nigerian coal 
industry is in a depressed state. The only consumer of coal in Nigeria 
is the Nigerian Railway Corporation. Apart from the gross inefficiency 
of the Corporation, its services are so limited that apart from being 
a small consumer of coal, the frequent break-downs of its engines reduces 
the consumption of coal further still. The possibility of increasing 
the domestic consumption of coal is limited and all that can be done is 
to find an export market so that additional foreign exchange can be earned. 
The complete disregard for the use of the large quantities of gas, which 
has been allowed to flare away in Nigerian oil fields, has been the most 
important defect of the Nigerian fuel policy. Until now, only a very 
small proportion of the Nigerian gas is used both by industrial and domestic 
consumers. The few industries which use gas are those located in the oil 
producing areas like the Ughelli glass factory, Lever Brothers Soap factory 
at Aba, the textile mills, Associated Industries and the Nigerian Breweries 
factory, all at Aba; the Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company's refinery at 
Alesa-Eleme in Port Harcourt and the Trans-Amadi Estate. The domestic 
consumers of gas are limited to the few who can afford to buy gas cookers. 
Although the number of domestic consumers is increasing very rapidly, 
despite this fact, the proportion of Nigerian gas consumed domestically 
will still remain very small. At the moment, more than 1000 million 
cubic feet of gas is flared in Nigerian oil fields. Several international 
companies have shown interest in the Nigerian gas and they include such 
companies as the Italian ENI, ELF, Shell-BP, Total, I. C. I. and American 
and Japanese companies. The Nigerian government has received several 
proposals for developing viable liquefied natural gas projects and two 
agreements have been signed with Guadaloupe Gas Products of Houston, Texas, 
and Shell-BP. Further agreements are not likely to be signed until the 
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Nigerian government is satisfied that adequate markets can be obtained for 
the large quantities of gas produced in association with oil. It must 
be added, however, that the signing of agreements does not mean much 
until the contents of the agreements have been turned into feasible end- 
projects. The earlier work begins on the planned projects for liquefaction 
gas plants, the better it will be for Nigeria to be gaining from an important 
source of energy at this period when the world seems to be facing an energy 
crisis. The previous discussions emphasize the basic fact that Nigeria 
has, and produces, more energy than it can consume. This situation is, 
of course, true of other energy producing countries of the world located in 
less-developed areas - as Table 5.22 will show. Table 5.22 shows the 
production and consumption of energy in selected countries. The big 
five, U. S. A., Japan, France, Germany and the U. K. produced 39.6 per cent 
of total world energy in 1967, and by-1970 their share has dropped to 
35.8 per cent. The developing countries, eleven of them, listed in the 
table, increased substantially their share of total production of energy 
between 1967 and 1970. On the consumption side, the big five increased 
their share of world energy consumption from 43.9 per cent in 1967 to 
49.9 per cent. The share of the world energy consumption in the eleven 
developing countries fell between 1967 and 1970. Although energy con- 
sumption in each of the developing countries on Table 5.22 increased 
in 
this period, nevertheless, their share in world energy consumption 
fell 
because the actual energy consumption increase in these countries was 
smaller than in advanced countries. Another important point 
to note is 
the big gap between production and consumption in the 
developing countries 
as shown in the Table. In the big five countries, production was not 
sufficient to satisfy consumption, and, to meet their 
increasing demand, 
they have to resort to imports. In the past, it was not 
difficult to 
get supplies of energy from abroad, but it appears 
that world production 
of energy will be unable to meet demand in the not very 
distant future. 
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This is the situation which is currently being referred to as the "World 
Energy Crisis". 
TABLE 5.22 
ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(QUANTITIES IN MILLION METRIC TONS OF COAL EQUIVALENT AND IN KILOGRAMMES 
PER CAPITA) 
PRODUCTION CONSUMPTION 
COUNTRIES TOTAL TOTAL PER CAPITA 
1967 1970 1967 1970 1967 1970 
Nigeria 22.32 70.80 1.95 2.49 37 45 
Algeria 53.74 66.64 5.06 6.62 386 462 
Libya 108.52 210.22 0.83 1.25 476 646 
Iran 169.71 264.72 11.87 26.91 451 939 
Iraq 78.53 100.42 4.80 5.64 558 597 
Kuwait 153.12 184.08 6.20 7.42 10878 9764 
Qatar 20.12 22.58 0.10 0.15 1314 1873 
Saudi Arabia 169.79 234.57 3.24 7.47 463 965 
Indonesia 36.79 59.05 10.61 13.47 96 111 
Venezuela 251.94 265.19 21.00 25.97 2245 2498 
Abu Dhabi 24.09 49.32 0.10 0.15 705 806 
U. S. A. 1817.90 2053.77 1962.60 2282.32 9880 11144 
Japan 60.50 54.88 225.04 331.90 2253 3210 
France 66.72 59.30 156.89 192.79 3163 3794 
Germany 160.75 174.63 249.76 314.70 4171 5112 
U. K. 179.62 163.55 270.03 299.36 4893 5362 
WORLD TOTAL 5764.09 7000.07 ! 5616.07 6843.25 1644 1889 
SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS, STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK 1971, NEW YORK, 1972. 
The present anxiety about world energy supply in 
the future is brought 
about by the prediction that the world petroleum oil will 
be exhausted by 
the year 2000 at the latest. According to the B. B. 
C. programme entitled 
"The Oil Crunch" of 12th June, 1973, the prediction 
that the world petroleum 
will be exhausted by the year 2000 did not receive attention until 
recently. 
Of the world total energy reserve, Nigeria is estimated 
to have 1.7 per cent 
while Algeria and Libya have 1 per cent and 2.6 per cent 
respectively. 
248 
The rate at which Nigeria exploits its oil is so rapid that the oil wells 
are likely to dry up before the year 2000. It is appropriate to consider 
at this stage whether there is any. justification- for the rapid exploita- 
tion of Nigerian crude oil as at present. As shown in Table 5.22, Nigeria's 
production of energy increased from 22.32 million tons in 1967 to 70.80 
million tons in 1970. Consumption of energy which was only 8.7 per cent 
of total production in 1967 fell to 3.5 per cent in 1970. This means 
there has been a rapid increase in the production and export of energy 
in and from Nigeria. Oil is the major source of energy in Nigeria but as 
previously shown, there are other sources of energy. The rapid increase 
in the production of energy in Nigeria since 1967 is the result of the 
rapid exploitation of Nigerian crude oil. Average daily production of 
crude oil increased from 319,073 barrels in 1967 to over 1 million barrels 
in 1970 and this means that petroleum production trebled between 1967 and 
1970. At the end of 1973 crude oil production in Nigeria was nearly 
3 million barrels per day. 
The rapid exploitation of Nigerian crude oil does not seem to be the 
most desirable economic and energy strategy to follow. The rapid production 
of crude oil means that more money is readily available for the government 
than before, especially now that the price of oil has more than doubled 
during the last year. This availability of money raises many questions: 
(a) Is the country capable of absorbing the enormous capital? (b) what 
plans are there for the absorption of the capital? (c) can the available 
resources be related to the level of economic development in the country? 
(d) can the government leaders be prudent in their expenditure as they 
would be under austerity? The answers to these questions do not seem 
to support the current rapid exploitation of Nigerian crude oil. The 
availability of enormous resources coming from oil has enabled the government 
to pursue some industrial and social projects which are of no economic 
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significance to a large number of Nigerians. The large number of turnkey 
projects which could provide an avenue for corrupt officials to misappropriate 
public funds, and for foreign contractors to dress themselves in bogus 
technical garb in order to swindle the country have been made possible 
by the enormous financial resources emanating from the oil industry. 
Apart from large-scale road-building programmes, there appear to be no 
specific development plans to which financial resources can be diverted. 
The rapid exploitation of Nigerian crude oil and the associated increase 
in government revenue will lead to a criminal waste of resources, where 
there are no specific plans to absorb the available financial resources, 
which will only be regretted when the oil wells dry up. 
There are other aspects of the story which require consideration. 
The rapid exploitation of Nigerian crude oil reduces the thorough considera- 
tion of ways of exploiting the enormous linkage effects of the petroleum 
industry. It has been said earlier that more than 1000 million cubic feet 
per day of natural gas is currently being flared in Nigeria, and that can 
be blamed partly on the rapid production of crude oil. Petroleum is 
known to be capable of yielding over 2000 compounds of petro-chemicals, 
forming over 50 per cent of total organic chemicals production. In 
addition to petrol, diesel and lubricating oil, the following are capable 
of being produced from crude oil: bitumen, petroleum coke, paraffins, 
fertilizers, solvents, protein, drugs, dyes, insecticides, plastics, 
synthetics, nylon and other textiles and detergents. It is also possible 
to carry the effects of crude petroleum further still by developing other 
products from the secondary products. As an example, the following pro- 
ducts can be obtained from bitumen alone: Linoleum, roofing felt, pipe- 
coating, water-proofing, electrical appliances like electrodes and carbon 
carbides, and various forms of electrical insulators. Not only will 
the 
setting up of a petro-chemical complex provide a nucleus for industrial 
development through secondary investments, but more jobs will also 
be 
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provided for a large number of Nigerians. The prospect of setting up 
a petro-chemical complex in Nigeria is very bright, for apart from Nigeria 
being the, second largest crude oil producer in Africa, the other country, 
Libya, which is the leading crude oil producer in Africa, does not seem 
I 
to be interested in exploiting the linkage effects of crude oil. In 
addition, the Nigerian large domestic market will not only provide a 
steady market for petro-chemical products, but it will also be possible 
to export these products to the whole of West and Central Africa. It is 
regrettable that it has taken the Nigerian government so long a time to be 
aware of the numerous advantages of a petro-chemical complex. However, the 
Nigerian government has recently announced the setting up of a petro- 
chemical complex as soon as an agreement is reached with one of the 
companies that have shown interest in the project. It is seriously 
hoped that the petro-chemical complex will be set up as quickly as possible 
so that the various linkage effects of crude oil can be fully exploited. 
There is also the need to speed up the construction of the oil 
refineries scheduled to be commissioned in Benin and Kano in 1977 and 1980 
respectively. Not only will the early construction of the refineries 
help to mitigate refined oil shortages in Nigeria, but the possibility 
of getting higher prices for refined oil exports is also likely to increase 
the foreign exchange resources of Nigeria. Crude oil can be refined in 
Nigeria at a cheaper rate than in most advanced nations because of the 
cheap labour costs and energy supply. Refined oil exported from Nigeria 
will definitely bring more revenue than before since the posted price 
of such oil will be based on the selling price at the consuming destination. 
One of the main problems facing developing oil producing countries is 
how to determine the posted prices of crude oil on which payments to 
these 
countries are based. Since the oil companies are likely to base posted 
prices on transfer prices, oil exporting countries are not likely 
to get 
free market prices from such arrangements. It is, however, very 
difficult 
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to set the posted prices of crude oil on the selling price at the con- 
suming markets since the oil must be refined at a cost before reaching 
the market. If Nigeria refines its crude oil before exporting it, it 
may be easier to set the posted prices. 
Perhaps the most important advantage of a policy of slow exploita- 
tion of crude oil is that Nigeria is likely to gain more by keeping the 
oil in the ground, since oil prices have risen so rapidly in the last 
few years and are likely to rise further still in the future. Between 
November 1967 and April 1971, the price of Nigerian crude oil increased 
by about 50 per cent from/` 2.17 a barrel for 340 APl crude in 1967 to 
N3.21 a barrel in April 1971. Between April 1971 and October 1973, the 
price of Nigerian crude oil rose by 34 per cent amounting to /V 4.287 a 
barrel in November (2nd) 1973. On 3rd November, 1973, the price of 
Nigeria crude oil rose to IV 8.310 per barrel. There is the additional 
%/16.8 a barrel agreement with the Texas-based oil company for the purchase 
of the crude oil accruing'to the Nigerian government from its 35 per cent 
to 51 per cent ownership interests in the oil companies operating in Nigeria. 
In short, the erratic nature of Middle East oil supplies, the tough bargain- 
ing power of Libya and OPEC, and the predicted world energy crisis are 
factors likely to continue to put high premiums on Nigerian crude oil the 
longer it stays in the ground. Though there is no doubt that the quicker 
the oil is exploited for developmental purposes, the more rewarding it 
becomes because Nigeria can earn compound interest on the productive 
activities in which the resources are put, the fact is that the oil 
resources are likely to be wasted and as such, it is better for the oil 
to stay in the ground. In the final analysis, the rate at which Nigerian 
crude oil is produced should be closely related to the rate of economic 
development in the country. When important developmental projects 
which can be of particular relevance to the life of the majority of 
the 
population have been planned and their economic viability determined, 
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if finance is to be the major obstacle to the execution of such projects, 
oil production can then be speeded up to provide the required finance. 
CONCLUSION 
The United Kingdom has been the main source of foreign capital in 
the Nigerian petroleum industry. The U. K. investment undertaken solely 
by Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company amounted to nearly £400 million 
in 1972 and this represented about two-thirds of the total cumulative 
investment in the Nigerian petroleum industry. Shell-BP began the 
search for oil in 1937 and it was not until 1956, when the first oil dis- 
covery was made, that the company was optimistic about the future of the 
petroleum industry in Nigeria. Further discoveries were made, and, by 
1958, the first shipment of oil took place. Shell-BP dominates the 
Nigerian petroleum industry. Apart from being the only crude oil pro- 
ducer in Nigeria between 1958 and 1964, the company also produced about 
77 per cent of the total crude oil produced in Nigeria during the 1958-1970 
period. 
Shell-BP investment in the Nigerian petroleum industry has been bene- 
ficial to Nigeria in many vital respects. Investments by Shell-BP have 
created employment for Nigerians both directly and indirectly, but the 
level of investment created has been very small indeed compared with the 
level of Shell-BP's investments. This is not surprising, since the 
petroleum industry is capital-intensive and as a result only very 
limited 
numbers of people can be employed. In 1972, for example, Shell 
International 
employed 174,000 people in its operations all over the world. 
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When the 
level of this employment is compared with the total operational costs of 
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E4151 million and total revenue of £5743 million, the capital intensity 
of the petroleum industry will be clearly highlighted. Indirectly, 
however; Shell-BP creates employment for a large number of people through 
contracts. Although foreign companies predominate among its contractors, 
nevertheless, Shell-BP offers contracts to a number of Nigerians who 
also employ an army of contractors and labourers. 
Foreign private capital, especially for contracting establishments, 
has also been attracted to Nigeria through the initial investment of 
Shell-BP. Small firms to cater for the needs of the large numbers of 
small towns and communities which have grown up around the oil fields have 
been established in large numbers. In addition, the gas produced by 
Shell-BP has supplied energy to many industries. The Nigerian refinery 
also uses gas as its main energy and since the refinery came into operation 
in 1965, the Nigerian oil import bill has been cut by about 75 per cent. 
Despite these linkage effects of U. K. investments in the petroleum industry, 
_Nigeria will not reap substantial secondary 
benefits from the investments 
until the proposed liquefaction gas plants and the petro-chemical complex 
are commissioned. 
The export of crude oil has the effect of improving the Nigerian 
balance of payments through the foreign exchange provided. Shell-BP 
contributed over two-thirds of the petroleum industry's contribution to 
the Nigerian balance of payments. There is no doubt that the current 
favourable balance of payments enjoyed by Nigeria at the present time is 
due largely to the petroleum industry and to Shell-BP in particular. 
As a source of government revenue, the petroleum industry has been 
the most important. In 1972, the petroleum industry accounted for over 
40 per cent of the government's total revenue and Shell-BP contributed 
more than half. In 1970 over £60 million was paid to the Nigerian 
government by Shell-BP. These revenues provided finance for balancing 
the public budgets and for financing economic development. 
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The knowledge gained from Shell-BP's explorations is of vital 
importance. Exploration requires land and aerial surveys in difficult 
and uninhabited parts of Southern Nigeria. Considerable geographical, 
geological and sociological information is obtained through these activities 
and insofar as this information is made available to the public, Shell-BP 
increases people's knowledge about Nigeria. Shell-BP has also provided 
accommodation, health and recreational facilities for its employees while 
road building, bridge construction and improved inland waterways have 
contributed to economic development in Nigeria. Out of the £4.5 million 
cost of dredging the Bonny Bar to deepen it from 28 feet to 35 feet so 
that larger tankers can use it, shell-BP contributed £1.5 million. 
The contribution of Shell-BP towards improved technology, training and 
education in Nigeria will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Until now, the decision about how fast to exploit Nigerian crude oil 
deposits has been left to the oil companies operating in the country. 
With the recent acquisition of ownership interest in Shell-BP and other 
oil companies by the Federal Government, the Nigerian authorities are 
likely to play a more active role in determining the exploration, production, 
refining, distribution and marketing of Nigerian crude oil. In recent 
years it looks as though the rate at which Nigerian crude oil is being 
exploited is too fast. Given the recent anxiety about the looming world 
energy crisis, there is a necessity for Nigeria to examine very carefully 
its oil strategy both from the global and domestic point of view. In the 
final analysis, the rate at which Nigerian crude oil ought to be exploited 
needs to be related to the rate of economic development in the country, 
for only in this way can unnecessary wastes be avoided and maximum 
benefit 
Possible be derived from oil finances. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL 
SKILLS TO NIGERIA 
This chapter is concerned with how British multi-national companies 
have helped to upgrade technical and managerial skills in Nigeria. 
Attention will also be focussed on the role of British companies in the 
development of technical, scientific and managerial education. 
INTRODUCTION 
The growth of interest in the diffusion of knowledge stems from the 
belief that modern and adapted technologies are important requisites 
for rapid economic development. From the global point of view, the 
enormous resources devoted to the discovery of technical knowledge calls 
for a dynamic policy which will widen the use of that knowledge among a 
large number of people. The distinguishing feature of knowledge also 
supports its widespread acquisition and use: when knowledge is trans- 
ferred from one person to another, or from one sector of an economy to 
another, or even from one country to another, the owner of the knowledge 
is not denied its use as a result of this process of transference. The 
problem of diffusion of knowledge will not arise if it is uniformly 
distributed among people, between the different parts of an economy and 
between countries. However, because of the different rates at which 
technical knowledge is accumulated in different sectors of an economy 
and in different parts of the world, it has been argued that, by exchanging 
technical knowledge, and thus widening its use, may in fact encourage 
specializntion. But the diffusion of technical information or knowledge 
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has much more to it than mere specialization. The transfer of technical 
information within an economy can lead to increased efficiency in pro- 
duction and the introduction of new products, which in turn may allow a 
country to be more competitive in the international market. Also, the 
widening of the use of technical information may reduce the costs incurred 
by a firm or a country in the process of search, by spreading costs over 
a large number of its purchasers. This is essentially an economies-of-scale 
argument. 
At the international level, the transfer of technical information from 
one country to another may not only increase specialization, but it may 
also enable a country deficient in the stock of useful knowledge to gain 
access to the resources of other countries "which enables it to achieve 
high productivity" and thus reduce the "international inequalities in 
productivity". 
131 
From the foregoing discussion, it must have become 
clear that the transfer of technical knowledge can be divided into two 
parts: (a) transfer at the national level, that is, the transfer of know- 
ledge between the different sectors of an economy and (b) transfer at the 
international level, which is concerned with the transfer of knowledge 
between countries. This chapter, as we have pointed out earlier, is 
specifically concerned with the latter part - the transfer of technical 
knowledge between Britain and Nigeria through direct investments. 
The transfer of technology between countries is not new. In the 
Middle Ages the transfer of technology was usually accomplished through 
migration. Thus, the migration of the Huguenots from France to England 
in the Middle Ages quickened the spread of new technologies into 
the woollen 
industry. It is necessary to add, however, that the national governments 
of those days frowned on the migration of skilled men, and 
it was not 
uncommon to legislate against migration. During the nineteenth century, 
131 
K. J. ARROW, Essays on the Theory of Risk-Bearing, North-Holland 
Co., 
Amsterdam 1971, p. 172. 
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however, the transfer of technology at the international level was seldom 
looked on as unusually problematic. The "right" strategy was simply that 
which spread it from country to country. In the early twentieth century, 
it became very clear that no country can be self-sufficient in technical 
knowledge. Countries began to supplement their stock of technology 
with the technology purchased in international markets. Thus, it is 
not uncommon nowadays for countries to rely on the purchase of technical 
know-how from abroad, instead of devoting enormous resources to an already 
discovered knowledge. The economic development of Japan from the period 
of the fail of Tokugawa Shogunate and the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to 
the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 can be described as one of 
complete reliance on foreign technology. 
FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIA THROUGH BRITISH DIRECT INUESTNENT 
If there is one area where there is a general consensus among 
commentators on the theory of international investment, it is in the belief 
that direct foreign investment is an important agent for the transfer of 
technical information. This belief has led many writers on the contributive 
effects of foreign direct investment to emphasize the technical and managerial 
skills associated with such investment. Professor Penrose, for example, 
observes that "there are two types of benefits realized from foreign invest- 
ment; additional supplies of capital, on the one hand, on the other, new' 
techniques of production and management, entrepreneurial skill, new products, 
new ideas ... But it is primarily in the second category of 
benefits that 
the special advantages of direct investment lie. The benefits of 
direct 
foreign investment, when it takes the form of the establishment of new 
foreign firms, the introduction of new technology and the provision of ex- 
perienced managerial and technical services can hardly 
be exaggerated". 
132 
132 
E. T. Penrose, "Foreign Investment and the Growth of the Firm" 
in 
International Investment, edited by J. H. Dunning, Penguin Books 
Ltd., 
Harmondsworth, 1972. 
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In his discussion of the benefits of private foreign investment, G. h. Meier 
notes that "especially significant is the merit that foreign direct invest- 
ment has in carrying with it an integral ingredient of technical assist- 
ance - the managerial and technical knowledge which are usually in even 
shorter supply than capital. As an instrument for transmitting technical 
and organizational change, integrating technical and financial assistance, 
and helping to overcome the skill and management limitations in develop- 
ment, the private foreign investment has a distinct advantage over foreign 
public capital. 
133 
Opinions, however, differ among commentators as to 
the relative importance of transferred technology as a contributive effect 
of direct investment. Some commentators like Behrman134 regard the trans- 
fer of technology as the most important effect of direct investment, while 
others like Jack Baranson regard technology as just another contribution 
the importance of which depends on the area of investment, the type of 
technology transferred and the ability-of the host country to adapt the 
new technology to its new environment. 
Whatever may be the differences of opinion as to the relative 
importance of transferred technology associated with foreign direct invest- 
ment, the fact remains that most writers believe that such direct invest- 
ments are an important vehicle for the transfer of technology. The 
emphasis which most writers place on foreign direct investment as an 
important agent for the transfer of technology to countries stems 
from the 
factLthat direct investments overseas are largely undertaken by private 
companies of developed nations. These private companies are said 
to be 
more favourably placed to transfer technology abroad 
because they are 
big and efficient, possess a large stock of varied technological 
know-how 
and also have access to international markets, capital and 
technology. 
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If one assumes a private ownership of technology, since private-sector companies 
are a going-concern and their knowledge and experience increase from day-to- 
day operations, itseems reasonable to presume that the major mechanism 
for the transfer of technology is through private direct investment. The 
present discussion on the transfer of technology to Nigeria through British 
direct investment will be divided into three sections: (a) R&D perform- 
ance of British companies in Nigeria (b) Licensing agreements between 
British companies operating in Nigeria and their parent companies and 
(c) Learning by doing within and without British companies. 
RESEARCH EFFORTS OF BRITISH COMPANIES IN NIGERIA 
In the absence of large-scale applied research in the public and 
indigenous sectors of the Nigerian economy, the necessary inventions and 
innovations for accelerating the rate of economic development can either 
emanate from the research efforts of British and other foreign companies 
operating in Nigeria or be imported from abroad. Research activities of 
foreign companies in Nigeria are very limited indeed. A large number 
of British companies in Nigeria do not perform any research. There are 
several reasons for this: first, a large number of British companies 
operating in Nigeria are too small to conduct their own research. At 
the end of 1968, there were about 190 British companies with investments in 
Nigeria and, in that year, when total British investment amounted to 
NL261.2 million, 174 companies accounted for £93.6 (sterling) million. 
The remaining £209.4 million (sterling) were concentrated in about ten 
companies in the petroleum industry, banking and 
135 
Of the insurance. 
ten companies responsible for the £209.4 million (sterling) out of 
the 
total British investment in Nigeria in 1965, Shell-BP accounted for over 
90 per cent and it was the only company performing any form of 
R. & D. 
among the ten companies. 
135 
Central Bank of Nigeria's exchange rate in 1968 was N£1 = 
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TABLE 6.1 
NUMBERS AND VALUES OF BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENTS BY FORE, OF ORGANIZATION 
IN NIGERIA AT THE END OF 1968 (£MILLION) 
LARGE INVESTING COMPANIES SMALL INVESTING COMPANIES TOTAL ALL COMPANIES 
NUMBERS VALUE (LMILL. ) NUMBERS VALUE (LMILL. ) NUMBERS VALUE (£ML". ) 
114 86.4 60 7.2 174 93.6 
SOURCE: BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL, 23rd September, 1970. 
Table 6.1 shows the number of British companies responsible for the 
£93.6 million investment in the manufacturing, distribution and agricultural 
sectors. The 114 companies owned by large British companies were respon- 
sible for £86.4 million of the total investment in Nigeria at the end of 
1968. This represented an average investment of £757.890 per company. 
The remaining £7.2 million were invested by sixty subsidiaries, branches 
and associates of small British companies and this represented an average 
investment of £120,000 per company. The average total investment of each 
of the 174 British companies operating in Nigeria at the end of 1968 was 
£537,930. Table 6.1 will tend to suggest that British companies operating 
in Nigeria are very small indeed. The degree of their smallness would 
be even more notable when one realizes that five of the 174 companies - 
the United Africa Company Ltd. (including Unilever), John Holt Limited, 
Nigerian Tobacco Company, Dunlop Ltd. and Cadbury (Brothers) Ltd. accounted 
for over 75 per cent of the total U. K. investment in Nigeria excluding 
oil, banking and insurance investments. It is reasonable, therefore, 
to postulate that, because a large number of British companies 
in Nigeria 
are very small indeed and do not perform a sizeable organized research, 
they do not contribute to new inventions and innovations 
in Nigeria. This 
hypothesis would imply that only large and medium-sized firms are responsible 
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for new inventions and innovations. However, the findings of two major 
studies have emphasized the importance of small firms as innovators. Jewkes 
in his pioneering study of 60 major 20th century inventions showed that a 
large majority were made outside the R. & 0. departments of large firms. 
136 
137 
The United States Department of Commerce study adopted an essentially 
similar view of the importance of private investors and small firms, but 
with less empirical supporting evidence. These two studies can be critic- 
ised on a number of grounds. Jewkes' analysis excluded some important 
corporate inventions from his investigation and, more significantly, 
since 1930, the contribution of large firms has become much more important. 
138 
The U. S. Department of Commerce study lacks empirical evidence to support 
the conclusion reached. In his study of the size of firm, R. & D., 
and innovations, Professor Freeman dame to the conclusion that it is 
reasonable to postulate that small firms may have some comparative advan- 
tage in the earlier stages of inventive work and in the less expensive, 
but more radical innovations, while large firms have an advantage in the 
later stages and in improvement and scaling-up of early break-throughs. 
139 
The conclusions of Jewkes and Professor Freeman do not in any way 
refute the writer's hypothesis about British firms in Nigeria. Inventions, 
whether radical "primary" inventions or secondary "improvement" inventions, 
do not originate in a vacuum. Since very many British companies are by 
nature very small and do not perform any organized research, it is diffi- 
cult to see how they can contribute anything to primary and improved in- 
ventions in Nigeria. 
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The second reason why a large number of British companies operating 
in Nigeria do not perform R. & D. is that many of them do not invest in 
industries characterized by large-scale R. & 0. Science-based and capital 
goods industries such as computers, chemical, electrical, mechanical, air- 
craft, plastics, pharmaceutical industries account for the largest pro- 
portion of R. & D. activities in most countries. Apart from the fact that 
many of these industries are not in existence in Nigeria, those that are 
in existence are in their infancy. As has been shown in Chapter IV, over 
BO per cent of British investment in Nigeria, excluding oil investments, 
is concentrated on consumer goods and the remaining 20 per cent on inter- 
mediate products. Since British companies do not invest in science-based 
and capital goods industries, it should therefore not be surprising that 
they perform limited R. & D. A large majority of British companies in 
Nigeria are conservative and dislike venturing into new and risky under- 
As Arrow takings which may turn out to be very profitable in the end. 
140 
has noted, "any unwillingness or inability to bear risks will give rise 
to a non-optimal allocation of resources in that there will be discrimin- 
P 141 
ation against risky enterprises as compared with the optimum. Risky 
ventures are usually clouded with uncertainty and undertaken in a fog of 
ignorance about their outcomes. "Technological progress", we are told, 
"is in the first instance the reduction in uncertainty". As a consequence, 
"Research and development is thus intimately connected with the problems 
of uncertainty reduction which have been the objects of research in 
mathematical statistics and information theory". 
142 Since British companies 
operating in Nigeria do not move away from their established 
lines of 
production into new and risky ventures, there is very 
limited need for 
140 
More will be said about the business attitudes of 
British investors 
in Chapter VII. 
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them to perform R. & D. 
The last reason why many British companies in Nigeria do not perform 
research is the fact that they rely on their parent companies in the U. K. 
The majority of the firms interviewed considered it an unnecessary duplica- 
tion of resources to maintain two research programmes, in the U. K. and in 
Nigeria. Some firms emphasized the limited nature of their operations in 
Nigeria as not conducive to the performance of a sizable research programme 
in which economies of scale can be achieved. 
As a result of the three reasons given above, a large number of British 
companies in Nigeria do not perform any organized research and the few 
British firms which devote some resources to research do so only in few 
cases where there is a necessity for such organization before products can 
be successfully marketed. 
The few British companies that perform R. & D. are to be found in 
the petroleum, food, tobacco, beverages, chemicals, drugs and medicines, 
soap, perfumes and other toilet preparations, cement and timber industries. 
The most important performer of R. & D. among British companies in Nigeria 
is the UAC group of companies. According to Mr. Buckle of the UAC Group 
in London, UAC research efforts are concentrated on four major areas of 
drugs, food, drink and timber. UAC's research activities in drugs and 
medicines are carried out by Kingsway Chemist in Lagos, where various 
forms of drugs and medicines are prepared, tested and sold. Food products 
are manufactured by the West African Cold Storage Ltd. at Apapa and in 
order to ensure good quality products, research is carried out for testing, 
selecting and combining suitable raw materials for appropriate final products. 
The Group's activities in the Brewing industry are carried out by 
the 
Nigerian Breweries Ltd., and Guinness. (Nig. ) Ltd., both the manufacturers 
of beer and stout. In the timber industry, the African Timber and 
Plywood 
(Nig. ) Ltd. has its research laboratory in Sapele, where, in collaboration 
with scientific workers in England, investigations are carried out 
into 
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how a tree grows, the fundamental properties of wood, the life cycle of 
wood-boring insects; the habits of fungus spores and the precise nature 
of the changes that take place in maturing timber. All these research 
activities have led to improvement in the quality of Nigerian timber and 
also to an increase in the timber species from one in the 1950s to about 
twenty now. 
Lever Brothers (Nig. ) Ltd., a subsidiary of the Unilever Company 
and a member of the UAC group of companies performs intensive research in 
its soap and detergent factories at Aba and Lagos. These research activities 
have not only led to an improvement in the use of Nigerian palm oil for 
the manufacture of soap, they have also enabled a variety of soap and 
detergent products to be offered for sale in Nigeria. Second in import- 
ance among the British companies performing R. & D. in Nigeria is the 
Shell-BP Development Company Ltd. Oil-well drilling requires an intensive 
geological survey of Nigerian soils to discover areas with oil deposits 
potential. The analysis of the Nigerian soils is carried out in Shell-BP's 
geological laboratory, largely staffed by Nigerians. When crude oil has 
been discovered and production begins, the qualities of the crude oil 
from various wells are tested in order to ensure that oils of the same 
quality are mixed together. This function is performed in Shell-BP's 
Production Control laboratory at Warri, which also has a large number of 
Nigerians on its staff. By its research activities in these laboratories, 
the Shell-BP company has provided a training ground for Nigerians to acquire 
various skills in the conduct and analysis of research. 
The Nigerian Tobacco Company has its research laboratory at Ibadan 
where various studies into the growing, curing and blending of tobacco are 
carried out. Studies in the genetics of tobacco plant breeding, and of 
growing and curing practices, are directed towards improving the quality 
of leaf tobacco, and studies of the control of smoke composition through 
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blending, manufacturing processes and the use of filters and flavours are 
aimed at the continual improvement of smoking qualities. The entire staff 
of the laboratory is Nigerian. Other British companies with small 
research programmes in Nigeria include Dunlop, I. C. I., Cadbury Brothers, 
Nicholas, W. J. Bush, Reckitt and Colman, Pinchin Johnson (W. A. ) Ltd., 
Glaxo Laboratories (Nig. ) Ltd., and Tate & Lyle. We have seen in earlier 
sections that only few British companies operating in Nigeria perform 
organized research and that the research activities of these few companies 
are limited in scope, with the result that the research activities of 
British companies have little or no effect on the economy of Nigeria. 
Because there are no indigenous enterprises which can gain from their 
research activities, the benefits originating from such research activities 
are limited to British companies alone. 
LICENSING AGREEMENTS 
If many British companies operating in Nigeria do not perform any 
R. & D., it is not because they are unaware of the financial rewards 
which may arise as a result of successful inventions and innovations. The 
importance of research cannot be over-emphasized as a continuous source 
of new products, processes and techniques. As Behrman tells us, "Research 
is the keystone of growth providing both the new products and the new 
techniques which raise industrial productivity. 
143 
To keep abreast of 
new developments, many British companies operating in Nigeria have relied 
on the results of the research and development activities of 
their parent 
companies in the U. K. by signing licensing agreements. These are agree- 
ments which permit a licensee to manufacture and sell specific products 
which incorporate inventions and processes developed and owned 
by the 
licensor. Thus, the knowledge which is incorporated in the patented 
143 
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product or process and monopolized by the patent holder is passed on to 
the licensee. Usually, the licensor will be required to provide technical 
services and to ensure a continuous flow of information to the licensee. 
The licensee, as well as being charged an amount dependent on the value 
of the agreement, may be required to restrict the sales of the licensed 
products to certain areas, to adhere to certain quality control and packag- 
ing requirements, and to maintain certain levels of production. 
Many British companies operating in Nigeria have signed licensing 
and technical agreements with their U. K. parent companies which have 
resulted in the provision of much information about specifications, pro- 
duct lay-outs, product mixes, designs, trade-marks, formulae, manuals, 
copyrights and manufacturing rights. In return for these services, U. K. 
subsidiaries in Nigeria are obliged to pay royalties to their parent com- 
panies. The table below shows the payments made by Nigerian manufacturing 
firms to U. K. companies for licensing and technical agreements. 
TABLE 6.2 
ROYALTY PAYMENTS BY NIGERIA TO U. K. 1 (L MILLION) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
0.3 0.5 0.7 0.6: 0.5 0.5. 0.7 
SOURCE: SUPPLIED BY THE BOARD OF TRADE, STATISTICS SECTION, LONDON. 
NOTE: 1: Figures do not include allowance for non-response. 
Table 6.2 shows that only a small amount was paid yearly by Nigeria to the 
U. K. for technical and licensing agreements and this is, of course, an 
indication of the limited number of agreements. Given the level of 
industrial development in Nigeria and the fact that until recently, atten- 
tion has been focussed on consumer goods industries, the demand for licensing 
and technical agreements in Nigeria has been low. However, as far as the 
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U. K. licensors are concerned, the money received from licensing agree- 
ments to Nigeria is a windfall arising from their control on patents. 
It is a form of rent for the use of monopolized know-how. There is, 
however, one basic difference between the return on licensing agreements, 
and conventional rent. The first difference is that the licensing of 
an invention does not prevent the licensor from its use, as automatically 
happens with the renting out of a house or any other commodity. 
In addition, it is in the best interest of U. K. parent companies 
to license patented products and processes to their daughter companies 
in Nigeria for two major reasons. The first is that the more they license 
new processes and products to their Nigerian subsidiaries to increase their 
efficiency, the higher the profits these subsidiaries are likely to earn 
and repatriate to the head offices. The second is that whether they 
license patented products and processes to their subsidiaries in Nigeria 
or not, their sales in Nigeria cannot be affected in any way since most of 
them do not export goods to Nigeria and Nigerian subsidiaries of U. K. 
companies produce for the Nigerian domestic market. The main reason why 
most U. K. companies began local production in Nigeria was the tariff wall 
which made export prospects bleak. If U. K. companies enter into licensing 
agreements with their subsidiaries in Nigeria, they will not only be 
help- 
ing to increase the profitability of these companies to their own 
benefit, 
but also the royalties received will be a windfall resulting from their 
monopoly over patented know-how. Although the payments made 
to U. K. 
companies for licensing new processes, techniques and products 
to Nigerian 
companies have not been substantial, nevertheless, British companies operat- 
ing in Nigeria received a large proportion of these since 
it can be 
reasonably assumed that their parent companies are more willing 
to license 
new processes to them than to other rival companies. 
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LEARNING BY DOING THROUGH TRAINING WITHIN AND WITHOUT BRITISH COMPANIES 
_-.. ems. 
There are three main conditions which Chief Awolowo stipulated for 
the admission of foreign investment into Nigeria. "First, the foreign 
investor should undertake to train Nigerians in modern industrial and 
business techniques with a view to their taking over, at an early date, 
the operation and management of the ventures concerned; secondly, he must 
be prepared to admit Nigerian capital into partnership with his own, such 
capital being provided either by the government or any of its agencies, 
or by Nigerian private businessmen; and thirdly, he must agree that if the 
interests of Nigeria so dictate, he will readily and voluntarily surrender 
his shareholding in the venture concerned on payment to him in full of the 
prevailing market value of his shares". 
144 
Of the three conditions listed 
above, only the first condition has been seriously enforced by the Nigerian 
leaders. General education and vocational training are normally regarded 
as the responsibility of the government. The rate at which the demand 
for technical personnel ro-ce in Nigeria during the first decade of the 
post-independence period outstripped the capacity of the Nigerian govern- 
ment to match it with an increased supply both in terms of numbers and 
quality. The efforts of the government have been hampered by the shortage 
of finance and the scarcity of qualified instructors and so the government 
initially resigned itself to providing training in basic skills. Under 
these circumstances, it has been necessary for British and other foreign 
companies operating in Nigeria to train their own personnel for specific 
ptions rather than to poach the few available qualified Nigerians, who 
were needed for public services. To-day, a large number of British 
companies operating in Nigeria have a comprehensive training programme 
for their employees. The essence of training is the acquisition of 
144 
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knowledge through learning by doing. Knowledge arises not only from the 
observations incidental in other activities, but also from deliberate 
seeking, which is essentially what learning by doing entails. As 
Arrow has told us, in learning by doing, "the motivation for engaging 
in the activity is the physical output, but there is an additional gain, 
which may be relatively small, in information which reduces the cost of 
further production". 
145 
By far the most important among British companies with comprehensive 
training programmes for their employees in Nigeria is the United Africa 
Company Group. Having realized the importance of training Nigerians 
both as a sound public relations exercise and the fact that it is cheaper 
to use indigenous personnel than foreign personnel; the UAC Group of companies 
did not wait for the government to exert any pressure before embarking on a 
comprehensive training for its Nigerian employees. The Company first 
envisaged the possibility of setting up its own training schools in Nigeria 
in 1948 but this idea was abandoned until 1952 when the survey of the 
company's requirements for skilled personnel was made. The first training 
school was opened in Burutu in Northern Nigeria in 1954. Other training 
schools were quickly opened subsequently and by the end of 1958, the UAC 
group had five training schools in Nigeria as shown in Table 6.3. The 
Table shows the variety of technical training offered to Nigerians in 
UAC's technical schools in Nigeria. In addition, the UAC were instrumental 
in launching a scheme enabling a number of Nigerians to receive training 
as Deck Officers and Engineering officers on ocean-going ships. The 
scheme is operated in conjunction with the Nigerian Ports Authority, Elder 
Dempster Lines Ltd. and Guinea Gulf Line Ltd. Cadets wishing 
to become 
Deck Officers, after an initial period of six months' training under 
the 
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TABLE 6.3 
THE UAC GROUP TECHNICAL TRAINING SCHOOLS IN NIGERIA, 1958 
LOCATION t''NAIN TRADES CAPACITY OF SCHOOL AND NATURE OF INSTRUCTORS TAUGHT TRAINING 
Burutu Mechanical 90 indentured apprentices (5 yr. 1 European Chief Trades con- course. Instructor 
cerned with 10 trade trainees (2 yr. course)* . 4 African Assistant 
marine and Booster & Evening Classes for up Instructors 
plant engin- to 74 members of existing staff leering per year. 
Mechanical 54 indentured apprentices (3 yrs. 1 European 
Trades for course followed by 2 years in 2 African 
Gener9l Lagos School) Assistants 
Engineering 
Equipment in- 
cluding cater - 
pillar vehic- 
les 
Burutu Handling of 8 deck cadets (8 yr. training 
River Craft leading through quartermaster 
and tows to Rivermaster's Certificate 
Kano Mechanical 85 indentured apprentices (5 yr. 1 European Chief 
& Electrical course) * 1 European, 2 
trades for 24 trade trainees (2 yr. course) African Assistants 
motor vehic- Booster & evening classes for 
les & for up to 32 members of existing 
petrol and staff per year. 
diesel driven 
mobile and 
stationary 
plants 
Aba Motor vehicle 70 indentured apprentices (5 yr. 1 European Chief 
maintenance course). 1 European, 2 
(petrol and 
* 
24 trade trainees (2 yr. course) African Assistants 
diesel) Booster & evening classes for up 
to 32 members of existing staff 
per year. 
Lagos Mechanical 36 indentured apprentices (from 1 European Chief 
trades for Burutu school for last 2 yrs. of 1 African Assistant 
general apprenticeship) 
engineering 18 trade trainees (1-2 yr. course) 
equipment in- Booster & evening classes for up 
cluding cat- to 46 members of existing staff 
erpillar per yeare 
vehicles 
Radio Servi- 16 trade trainees (1-3 yr. course) 1 African 
cin 
Scales and 32 trainees (2 yr. course) * 1 European 
weighing 
Machines 
Cont. /... 
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TABLE 6.3 (Cont. ) 
LOCATION MIN TRADE5 CAPACITY OF SCHOOL AND NATURE OF INSTRUCTORS 
TAUGHT TRAINING 
Sapele General Elec- 15 indentured apprentices (5 yr. 1 European 
trical engin- course). 
eering Booster & evening classes are 
available for existing staff. 
SOURCE: UAC LID., STATISTICAL AND ECONOMIC REVIEW, 22 JANUARY, 1959. 
Nigerian Naval Force, spend six years at sea. Training for Engineering 
Officers consists of a two months' induction course in the dockyards of the 
Nigerian Ports Authority, followed by 2 years' full-time study at technical 
colleges in the United Kingdom; 12 years at sea as apprentice engineers, and 
2 years dockyard training and part-time study. 
The Group is concerned not only with training its technical staff but 
also with management development and training. The UAC Group set up a 
training college in Nigeria to provide a centre similar in principle to 
Unilever's Four Acres in Britain, running courses for the group's Management 
staff. The training college, opened- in March 1961, was formerly at 
Igbobi in Lagos but was moved in 1967 to its permanent site at the Niger 
House in Lagos Island. Originally it involved a capital outlay of X84,000 
and to-day it costs approximately £110,000 a year to run. The college 
has provided courses in specialist and functional subjects, including 
Accounts, Work Study, Marketing, Commercial Management, Industrial Relations, 
Engineering Design and Network Analysis, and it also runs a regular pro- 
gramme of senior staff and Management Development courses. 
By November, 
1969, about 2015 members of the UAC Group staff had attended 
the college 
and by the end of 1972, the total was expected to have exceeded 
3,000. 
In addition, in order to provide an adequate training 
facility for newly- 
recruited graduates from the universities and technical colleges, a 
special 
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UAC Group Management Development Scheme was introduced in 1965, similar 
in concept to UniJ_ver's Management Development Scheme. An average of 
about 20 graduates a year are engaged and trained under this scheme. 
Another important development was the setting-up in 1965 of a manage- 
ment review system which annually assesses each unit's needs in terms of 
its present and projected organization over the ensuing three to five 
years, and considers training plans for individual managers during the 
next twelve months. 
Visits have frequently been arranged for the Nigerian employees of 
the UAC to visit the U. K. for advanced training. These are carefully 
planned according to the nature of each individual's work, and the length 
of time spent in the United Kingdom varies between six months and two years. 
Several hundreds of Nigerian scientists, engineers and managers have come 
to the United Kingdom for training in research and development, in 
refrigeration, product knowledge in the fields of business equipment, 
pharmaceuticals, photographic materials and in electrical and mechanical 
engineering. In addition, many people come for special courses such as 
General Management, Marketing Development, Market and Sales Management, 
Management Services and Negotiating Procedures. In order to enable 
Nigerians to assimilate and acquire the skills and knowledge embodied 
in many of the items of machinery and equipment used in the UAC Group, 
Nigerians have not only acquired on-the-job training, but, prior 
to the 
introduction of new equipment, they are brought to the U. K. 
for training 
in their operation and repairs. For example, a large number of 
technical 
staff in the UAC motor assembly plant at Apapa in Lagos 
have been brought 
to the United Kingdom for training with the British Leyland Motor 
Corporation, the Vauxhall and Lucas manufacturing orgänizations. 
Visits 
to Europe and the U. S. A. are arranged occasionally. 
In addition to the VAC'S central training programmes, 
there are other 
units within the UAC Group which have their own training centres. 
These 
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units include African Timber & Plywood (Nig. ) Ltd., Niger Motors Ltd., 
and UAC (Technical) Ltd., T. & E. Division. The extent of the UAC Group 
training programme in recent years can be viewed from the figures for 1969 
shown in Table 6.4. 
TABLE 6.4 
NIGERIAN STAFF OF UAC UNDERTAKING TRAINING IN 1969 
TYPE OF TRAINING NUMBER 
a) Group staff attending formal courses 
organized centrally by the Group and 
its associated companies 620 
b) Staff attending outside courses 40 
c) Staff undergoing training on the job Exact number not known 
but is extremely high. 
SOURCE: UAC LTD., TRAINING DEPARTIIENT, "TRAINING IN NIGERIA", London, 
1970. 
If one puts the training programme of UAC into money terms, they will 
surely gross up to several thousands of pounds annually. The training 
budget for Nigeria for 1970/71, for example, was about £200,000, according 
to Mr. Arden-Clarke of the UAC Group in London in an interview. This 
amount, however, included the cost of sending Nigerian staff to the U. K. 
but excluded some technical training undertaken by trade investment com- 
panies. 
Another British company which has, through its operations in Nigeria, 
transferred modern technologies and skills to Nigeria is the Shell-BP 
Development Company. Oil exploration is a hazardous and complex task, 
requiring a high level of performance and competency on the part of 
the 
people engaged in it. The standard required of the personnel of oil 
companies has been made much more demanding by the fact that the oil 
industry is capital-intensive employing very advanced technology. 
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In order to meet its demand for competent personnel, the Shell-BP company 
has relied on the importation of foreign personnel to train Nigerians within 
the company and on courses and assignments overseas. Training within 
the company is divided between training on the job, which is a ccntinuous 
process carried out in all departments, and training courses at the com- 
pany's training centres. There are training centres at Ughelli and 
Port Harcourt for technical trainees, and technical and administrative 
courses are conducted in Lagos. The Ughelli Drilling Training Centre 
operates a year-long course of alternating theory and practice, and 
trainees admitted on this course are expected to possess the Higher National 
Certificate, Higher National Diploma, Ordinary Technical Diploma or the 
full Technical Certificate of the City and Guilds of London. Also at 
Ughelli, there is a training centre for future production foremen, instru- 
ment mechanics and other artisans. There are about eighty-eight men 
undergoing various courses at the two training centres at Ughelli. Some 
of these students at the training centres are not employees of the Shell-BP 
company and there is no undertaking that they should work for Shell-BP at 
the end of their training. At the Port Harcourt training centre, courses 
are being conducted along similar lines to those at Ughelli training 
centres for production foremen, instrument fitters and other trades. In 
addition to training within Nigeria, some employees of Shell-BP Development 
Company of Nigeria Ltd. have been sent for training abroad to the Shell 
International Petroleum Company in London and also in the Hague. Some 
employees have been sent to other parts of the world, such as New York, 
Tokyo and some Arab countries, to get themselves acquainted with 
the latest 
developments in the petroleum industry. Shell-BP Company also conducts 
a training scheme for marine deck officers and engineers, and sixteen 
Nigerians are working for their officers' certificates under Shell-BP 
sponsorship. Their training is with Shell Tankers, and they are serving 
their apprenticeship in tankers travelling to various parts of the world. 
275 
Another British company with a comprehensive training programme for 
its employees is the Nigerian Tobacco Company. The company operates a 
training centre at Ibadan where most grades of staff are trained in their 
own particular field and also receive a grounding in the tobacco industry 
as a whole. While the training centre has grown to become the central 
training establishment for the company, it also serve's NTC's associated 
companies in West Africa. Pioneer Tobacco Company of Ghana and Aureol 
Tobacco Company of Sierra Leone sometimes share the training facilities 
provided at Ibadan. These facilities have been considerably expanded 
in recent years. A large number of technical courses have been launched, a 
new Management Course for West Africa has been introduced, and Finance 
Appreciation and Product Appreciation courses have been developed; but 
training is not limited to formal courses at Ibadan. Training on the job 
is a continuing process within the company. For the more advanced or 
specialized training, NTC technicians and managers are sent to England. 
Technical and management training courses are held regularly at the B. A. T. 
Management Training Centre at Chelwood Vachery, a large country house in 
Sussex, England, where nationals from over 50 countries attend courses. 
Several Nigerian employees of the NTC have taken part in these courses 
since the training centre was opened in 1956. Besides other specialist 
courses and conferences, the two main types of training provided at 
Chelwood are the Management Training Course and the Management 
Development 
Programme. The former is a six weeks' introduction to the principles and 
practices of management and the latter, lasting a month, 
is for men of 
greater experience. The average number of nationalities represented 
on these courses is fifteen. Advanced technical training 
is also provided 
to Nigerian employees of NTC on attachment to associated companies 
in some 
other countries where the group operates. 
Other British companies operating in Nigeria 
have some form of training 
programmes for their employees, and these vary from company 
to company. 
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For example, John Holt Ltd., the second largest merchant company in 
Nigeria, relies on three months' on-the-job training for its newly 
recruited managers and after some years of working with the company, 
each manager is sent to Ashbury Management College for a month's training 
in management techniques. Many companies, on the other hand, have not 
only made extensive use of on-the-job training, but a large number of 
top executives in these companies have also been sent to the U. K. for 
advanced management and technical training. It must be added that the 
training programmes carried out by British companies could be very expensive 
and some companies have been spending several thousands of pounds on 
training every year. Dunlop (Nig. ) Ltd. spent about £20,000 on training 
Nigerians in 1971. For the 1972 financial year, the company budget for 
training its Nigerian staff is £35,000. 
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCIENCE, FIANAGEHENT AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION IN 
NIGERIA BY BRITISH COMPANIES 
In addition to providing training within their companies both in 
Nigeria and in the U. K., British companies have also contributed to the 
growth of knowledge and skills, not only by sending their employees to 
Nigerian and foreign institutions of higher learning, but also by granting 
donations and offering scholarships to the Nigerian Universities and schools. 
It is a common practice for Nigerian universities and Polytechnics to 
organize specialized management and technical courses for Nigerian and 
foreign executives. British companies have always sent their executives 
to attend such courses, some of which are expensive. Nigerian and 
foreign 
employees of British firms frequently give lectures in some of the courses. 
The Nigerian Institute of Management also organizes management and marketing 
courses which British companies in Nigeria support by sending 
their employees, 
and also by supplying lecturers. Individual British companies 
have employed 
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the services of Nigerian institutions to design specialized courses for 
their employees. Such courses are tailor-made to the requirements of the 
company employing the services of the institution. In 1969, for example, 
the Group Textiles Division of UAC employed Kaduna Polytechnic to design 
and conduct a special full-time study course in textile technology and 
science for some employees of the Division. 
Scholarships for secondary and university education in Nigeria and 
overseas are annually awarded by British companies operating in Nigeria. 
The United Africa Company Group has done more than any other company in 
this field. The Group awards 15 secondary school scholarships annually 
and, up to the end of 1969, the Group is estimated to have spent £16,650 
at an estimated cost of L90 per annum for a secondary school scholarship. 
Apart from the Group's awards, it is understood that awards are made 
annually by some companies within the UAC Group, including G. Gottschalck 
& Company Ltd., G. B. Ollivant (Nig. ) Ltd., Guinness Nigeria Ltd., and 
Vono Products Ltd. The UAC Group's higher education scholarship scheme 
which provides for awards to suitable candidates for study in various 
institutions of higher learning began in the 1957/58 academic year; by the 
beginning of the 1960/61 academic year, ten scholarships had been awarded 
for courses in the U. K., Nigeria and Ghana. The scheme, which was initially 
administered in London, was transferred to Nigeria in 1964 and since that 
time awards became tenable only at Nigerian Universities. By the and of 
1969,43 University scholarships had been awarded by the UAC Group at an 
estimated cost of £51,600. Generous donations to the Nigerian 
Universities 
have been made by the UAC Group; notable among such donations was a sum 
of ¬61,000 for the building of Trenchard Hall at the University of 
Ibadan. 
Shell-BP Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. has also awarded scholar- 
ships and given donations for the advancement of science education 
in Nigeria. 
The company's scholarship scheme has been expanded, and, 
by 1970,164 
Nigerians holding Shell-BP scholarships were studying in universities 
and 
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technical colleges. Out of these, 78 were studying in Nigeria and 86 
were overseas. 
For many years the company has actively encouraged the development 
of educational facilities within Nigeria and pursues a continuing policy 
of granting donations and offering scholarships to all universities and 
to various schools throughout the country. The Shell Petroleum Company 
Ltd. and the British Petroleum Company Ltd. donated £250,000 each to the 
Federal Government of Nigeria to mark Nigeria's political independence 
on October 1st, 1960. This was intended to extend government facilities 
for training Nigerian technicians. Shell-BP Development Company has also 
given financial aid to the Geology Department of the University of Ibadan, 
to the Petroleum Institute of the University of Lagos, and for the expansion 
of the Yaba Technical Institute in Lagos and Benin University. In September 
197, Shell-BP company also gave £12,000 to the Rivers State for the develop- 
ment of science education. The amount represents the second instalment 
of the £60,000 promised by the company to assist in the payment of six 
science teachers, and the development of science teaching in the State. 
146 
A large number of other British companies operate scholarship schemes and 
make donations to educational institutions for the advancement of technical 
and science education in Nigeria; these include the Nigerian Tobacco 
Company and John Holt Ltd., which have expanded schemes for secondary 
and university education. 
British companies operating in Nigeria have frequently acted as management 
contractors, engineering, construction and management consultants and 
through these functions, they have transferred skills and technology 
to 
Nigeria. The UAC's partnership with Taylor Woodrow 
Construction Group 
brought to Nigeria one of the world's largest building, civil 
and mechanical 
engineering groups. Comprehensive industrial installations - 
power stations, 
refineries, pipelines, docks, tunnels and factories - 
have made an essential 
146 
West Africa, 2.10.72. 
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contribution to the economies of scores of countries, while thousands of 
homes, together with hospitals and hotels, universities and schools, air- 
ports and motorways and whole new town centres have vastly improved their 
amenities. In Nigeria, where Niger House, the UAC Group Headquarters, 
was completed at Lagos in 1967, Taylor Woodrow's contracts through the years 
have included such varied operations as the Law Courts in Lagos, Kaduna 
textile mill and Hamdala Hotel, several hundreds of tarred roads all over 
the country, Port Harcourt's harbour extensions and Alesa-Eleme refinery 
pipeline structures, together with the establishment of plant hire and 
other "support" companies for the construction industry. Richard Costain Ltd. 
a British construction firm, was brought to Nigeria through its partnership 
with Bohn Holt Ltd. Costain has constructed many roads and bridges and 
has also tarred several hundred miles of roads and built houses in Nigeria. 
These British engineering and construction companies, through their opera- 
tions in Nigeria and the employment given to a large number of Nigerians, 
have provided a forum for the acquisition of knowledge and skills in their 
allied industries. 
OBSTACLES TO THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGERIAL SKILLS TO NIGERIA 
BY BRITISH COMPANIES 
This section is concerned with why technology may not flow to Nigeria, 
and, if it does flow, why it may not be properly absorbed or make any 
contribution to the economic efficiency of Nigeria. Even if foreign 
technology does flow into the country, it may be impossible for such techn- 
ology to contribute to the attainment of a high level of economic growth 
unless there exists (a) scientifically and technically qualified manpower 
in large numbers to absorb and adapt the new technology to the environment, 
and (b) a domestic market large enough to absorb the increased supply of 
products resulting from technological innovations. It is therefore clear 
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that the obstacles to the transfer of technology are not simply those 
preventing technology from leaving its sources, but also those which 
reduce its advantages to both the supplier and the recipient. This 
section is concerned specifically with the latter; those which prevent 
maximum advantages to be reaped from transferred technology. The ob- 
stacles which prevent British firms from transferring technology to 
Nigeria will be dealt with in Chapter VII, under the obstacles to foreign 
investment. 
One of the main reasons why technologies transferred to Nigeria 
by British companies may not significantly contribute to economic develop- 
ment in Nigeria is that such technologies may be unusable there. Techn- 
ologies transferred to Nigeria by British companies are developed in a 
socially and physically different environment. The differences in the 
nature of the soils make it impossible for the same type of food crops 
and fruits to exist in both regions. It is only through the exchange of 
goods and services that the crops grown in the tropics can be made available 
to the people of the temperate zones, and vice versa. It is therefore 
clear that it is not easy to transfer the technologies and the sciences 
of agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry, medicine and public health 
practices developed in advanced nations to Nigeria. The same view was 
expressed by Streeten when he declared "the impact of the APE will be 
strongest in those sectors in which the know-how of the foreign firm can 
be applied. Sectors like tropical agriculture, small-scale production, 
traditional crafts, the processing of local raw materials, the use of 
local by-products and subsistence farming have no parallels in advanced 
industrial countries and will therefore remain untouched by foreign 
investment, or may be destroyed by it, except insofar as their 
transformation 
feeds the activities of the international firms". 
147 
Industrial complexes 
147 
P. Streeten, "Costs and Benefits of Multi-national Enterprises 
in 
Less-Developed Countries" in The Multi-national Enterprise, edited by 
J. H. Dunning, Allen & Unwin, London 1971, p. 252. 
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require different climatic conditions in different parts of the world. 
Some machines are designed to function under low temperature conditions 
and above certain degrees of heat they may not function. For this reason, 
machines specifically designed for the U. K. may not function properly 
in Nigeria except after modifications. 
One observable phenomenon, which may serve to confirm the above- 
mentioned facts is that television sets and radiograms which function in 
the U. K. will not work in Nigeria. Also, watches that work in Nigeria 
throughout the year round will not function in the winter in Britain. 
It is therefore clear that the technologies for making radios, television 
sets and other consumer durables for the British market will not, without 
modifications, be appropriate for goods destined for the Nigerian market. 
The above discussion makes one point clear and that is, if technologies 
developed in the U. K. and other advanced nations are to contribute to 
economic growth in Nigeria, there is a need for their adaptation to the 
Nigerian economy. British companies operating in Nigeria are either not 
willing or are unable to adapt their technologies to fit the Nigerian 
environment. The most sophisticated and up-to-date technology is adopted 
by the Nigerian Tobacco Company in its factories at Ibadan, Port Harcourt 
and Zaria. The same feature is the hall-mark of other British companies 
like Lever Brothers, Tate & Lyle, Pilkington Glass Ltd., Dunlop, Cadbury 
Brothers, I. C. I. and other companies in the UAC Group operating in Nigeria. 
This lack of adaptation on the part of British companies has many unfavour- 
able effects on both the Nigerian economy and British companies. 
Firstly, 
the lack of adaptation ensures that capital goods used by 
British companies 
and the technology embodied ih them, as well as the training provided 
to 
Nigerians in the course of operating the machines, are not an effective 
means of transferring technology to Nigeria. Insofar as 
there are no 
parallels to the sophisticated machines used by British companies 
in other 
parts of the Nigerian economy, the knowledge gained 
by an operator in a 
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British company becomes useless once he leaves the company since there 
will be no opportunity for him to put the knowledge into practice else- 
where. Secondly, many of the manufacturing establishments of British 
companies are irretrievably tied to the importation of raw materials for 
processing because the machines chosen are unadaptable to the peculiar 
characteristics of similar local raw materials. Lastly, the basic raw 
materials are exported from Nigeria to the U. K. and other advanced nations 
where scientists and technologists in these countries work on them and 
develop the intermediate raw materials which Nigeria imports for use in 
her industries. The last two factors have had three results: (a) the 
leakage of scarce foreign exchange resources overseas: (b) because foreign 
scientists and technologists develop Nigerian basic raw materials in their 
countries for Nigeria to import as intermediate inputs for industries, 
there is no opportunity for Nigerian scientists and technologists to gain 
experience in the process of adaptation, hence there is a leakage of 
scientific experience abroad; and (c) this lack of regard for the necessary 
modifications in_technology and machinery to suit the Nigerian environment 
explains why some of the poor quality goods manufactured in Nigeria are 
by British companies who produce better quality goods in the U. K. There 
are, therefore, two basic problems facing British companies in Nigeria. 
The first problem is how to sell the inferior goods they produce: because 
Nigerians do not buy the goods British companies produce, as a result 
of their poor quality, and instead buy foreign goods, smuggled into 
the 
country in most cases, there is likely to be excess capacity 
in many 
factories as there will be no need to produce articles that cannot 
be sold. 
This is the case with most British textile plants in Nigeria 
to-day. The 
second problem is that British companies cannot rely on 
their parent companies 
in the U. K. to export goods to Nigeria in order to satisfy 
domestic demand 
because of the high tariff walls erected against imported goods 
in Nigeria. 
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The Nigerian authorities wish to develop domestic industries on a large 
scale, hence they often discourage imports. The above discussions have 
shown quite clearly that if the technologies transferred to Nigeria by 
British companies are to have a significant effect on the development of 
the Nigerian economy, imported technologies need to be adapted and modified 
to fit into the Nigerian environment. 
However, the adaptation and absorption of modern technologies requires 
the existence of skilled manpower, scientifically and technically competent 
to select, investigate, analyse and maintain imported technologies. As 
R. Solow has told us, 'advanced technologies are based, in considerable 
part, on the knowledge of science. Hence to exploit the corpus of informa- 
tion upon which advanced technology rests requires the competence of the 
scientist or the science-trained . engineer". 
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In Nigeria, there is a dearth 
of scientifically and technically experienced qualified manpower. Scientists 
and technicians in the country, until recently, were less than three hundred 
to a million of the population. This state of affairs is in itself a 
reflection of under-development and the meagre resources devoted to research 
and development. The need for Nigeria to conduct more research is great, 
because not only would it be able to build up the urgently required scient- 
ific manpower, but experience gained in the performance of R. & D. may 
also stimulate the quick absorption of foreign technologies. In addition, 
the information collected in the process of conducting R. & D. may be a 
useful source for new discoveries, for as Arrow has said, "Information 
is 
not only the product of inventive activity, it is also an input - 
in some 
sense, the major input apart from the talent of the inventor". 
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Another obstacle to successful adaptation of imported 
technologies 
in Nigeria is the lack of interest on the part of British companies 
to 
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R. Solow, "The Capacity to Assimilate an Advanced Technology", 
American Economic Review, Supplement, 1966, p. p. 91-97. 
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K. J. Arrow, Ibid., p. 154. 
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employ Nigerian scientists and technologists who, in addition to their 
scientific knowledge, can also add their knowledge of the local surround- 
ings to carry out research and development experiments for successful 
adaptations. Despite the fact that there has been a dearth of scientists 
and technologists in Nigeria, in recent years, Nigerian engineering and 
other science graduates have tended to go into teaching in secondary 
schools because they cannot be absorbed in industry. The, explanation 
given by British companies for not employing Nigerian engineering and 
science graduates is that they lack experience. But these science 
graduates cannot get experience without being employed by these companies. 
The few Nigerians employed in some British companies have frequently been 
forced to resign or been dismissed. The dismissal of Nigerian senior 
executives became so frequent in the Shell-BP Development Company Ltd. 
that, in March, 1972, the Nigerian Commissioner for Mines and Power warned 
oil companies to stop dismissing Nigerian senior executives or trying to 
get them to resign "voluntarily". In a circular to all companies and 
marketing firms, the Commissioner pointed out that some of them "have 
openly been flagrantly frustrating government policy on Niger ianisat ion" 
and instructing that no further dismissals of senior Nigerian staff could 
be effected before the Ministry of Mines and Power had considered each 
150 
case, 
In place of Nigerians not employed or sacked, British companies have 
in the past employed expatriates. If these expatriates are qualified 
and have' the necessary experience, the result of their employment on 
Nigeria could have been great since they will be able to impart 
their 
knowledge to Nigerians. But in retrospect, Nigerian officials of 
the 
Ministries of Trade and Industry, and External Affairs, 
have discovered 
150 
West Africa, 24th Narch, 1972. 
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that not only did many of the foreign experts lack the required experience 
but, in most cases, they possessed no academic qualifications in the 
fields in which they were employed as experts. A Nigerian petroleum 
engineer writing about his experience declared that "The service companies 
and oil operators employ a large number of expatriate never-do-wells who 
are negrophobists right to the core! Nigerian engineers, technicians 
and geologists cannot work alongside or sit at table with them. Once 
an expatriate driller in an offshore location used a whip to flog the 
floor men for failing to set or pull slips with rhythmic precision or 
to back up a tool joint in good time. In a contractor's yard at Warri, 
a Nigerian staff member, no matter how highly placed, cannot share the 
same toilet with the expatriates. I was once working on a project with 
an expatriate boss, who was said to be a trained "financial expert" in 
the oil industry. Later it was discovered that the "finance expert" 
was a butcher somewhere in Europe prior to his coming to Nigeria. It 
was also discovered that he had little or no education. But to him, a 
Nigerian professional is of low IQ and is the "son of a bitch". Nigeria 
has more than her fair share of "fake experts" ". 
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The increasing 
discovery of fake experts, who are neither competent nor qualified nor 
interested in training replacements for themselves has led the Nigerian 
government to limit and to screen foreign experts coming into 
Nigeria. 
152 
The expatriates employed by British companies in Nigeria can contribute 
to the transfer of technology to the country by 
(a) training their teams 
of colleagues, (b) by assisting in the achievement of top professional 
standards and (c) by applying their own high skills. 
The expatriates 
151'Foreign 
Experts' rule Nigeria's oil industry, 
Daily Times, 
July 8,1972, Lagos. 
152More 
will be said about the control of expatriates 
coming into 
Nigeria in Chapter VII. 
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can only contribute to the transfer of technology if they have some 
experience and technical know-how in their fields of specialization. 
If, however, some of these expatriates have neither skill nor experience, 
it will be difficult to see what they can usefully transfer to Nigeria 
that will contribute to economic development in the country. 
Another obstacle to the transfer of technology to Nigeria is the 
limited size of the Nigerian market brought about by artificial barriers 
created by regional rivalry. Although Nigeria has a large market, the 
unhealthy rivalry among the regions was an important factor in its 
fragmentation. Considered as an entity, Nigeria, with a population of 
over 60 million people and, steadily rising in incomes, should provide 
a growing market for commodities meant for domestic consumption. However, 
prior to the army take-over of the government of Nigeria, the politically 
independent regional governments within the Federation of Nigeria 
frequently insisted on the location of factories in their regions if goods 
produced by a company located in another region were to be sold there. 
This fragmentation of the Nigerian market meant that a factory located in 
one region can only produce for the inhabitants of that region. The 
scale of production which can be absorbed by each region is therefore 
limited. The inadequacy of demand in the quantitative sense gives rise 
to scale problems. Because demand is small, the scale of production is 
also small, and this gives rise to short production runs and high costs. 
Economies of scale cannot be reaped and the resulting high costs are 
reflected in high prices which further depress demand. 
The excessive 
duplication of production in the fragmented markets means 
that the scarce 
managerial and technical manpower cannot be adequately utilized 
in a 
concentrated form since it might have to go from one region 
to another 
and this might reduce efficiency. The majority of 
the companies inter- 
viewed expressed a growing fear about the effects on 
their operations of 
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the creation of twelve states in Nigeria. Ail these companies have ex- 
pressed the hope that the creation of the twelve states would not lead 
to the creation of twelve fragmented and isolated markets. Closely 
associated with the fragmentation of the Nigerian market is the inability 
of companies located in certain states to employ personnel from other 
states. 
The inability of some British companies located in the Rivers and 
South-Eastern States to employ. skilled personnel from the East-Central 
States has either brought their factories to a halt or substantially 
reduced plant capacity and production. The resulting disadvantages from 
regional rivalry in Nigeria have not only affected British companies operating 
in the country, but they have also put a brake on some of the national 
development projects. The Nigerian iron and steel complex, for example, 
planned for the 1962-1968 period and later incorporated in the Second 
National Development plan 1970-74 has not, up to the present moment, come 
into operation due to the rivalry among regions over its location. The 
problem of market fragmentation therefore requires an urgent solution. The 
Federal Government can provide the necessary leadership in solving the 
problem by declaring the whole country a free zone so that goods, services 
and labour can move beyond States boundaries irrespective of where they 
come from within -the country. 
Another barrier to the transfer of technology is the inadequacy, and 
the erratic supply, of electricity, water and transport and communication. 
The growth of industrial productivity needed to exploit imported 
technology 
and to stimulate a greater inflow of modern technology is 
hampered in 
Nigeria by an acute shortage of water (especially in areas of concentrated 
industrial establishments), an erratic supply of electricity, and 
deficient 
transport and communication facilities. Many industrial machines 
have 
been damaged by the fluctuating voltages of the national power supply 
system for a large number of industries at Ikeja Industrial 
Estate, where 
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there is a large concentration of industries, electricity supply is said 
to be available for only 6 hours in any one day. Incidentally, some 
of these industries run three shifts a day and consequently they either 
have their stand-by generators to rely on or are forced to lay-off their 
employees when power fails. The acute shortage of water needed to keep 
production going in many factories, particulariy in Lagos where they are 
mostly concentrated, have become a perennial problem. Guinness (Nig. ) Ltd. 
for example, requires 30,000 gallons of water hourly to operate satisfactorily 
in order. to meet market demand, but at the moment, it gets only 10 per cent 
of its water requirement from public sources. Industrial establishments 
in many parts of Nigeria have been faced with the twin problems of stagna- 
tion and excess capacity as a result of the problems in the supply of 
electricity and water. Necessarily, an important technology will contri- 
bute to economic growth only if it is exploited to the level where substantial 
advantages can be' derived from it. The Nigerian authorities are aware of 
the acute shortages of electricity and water not only for modern industrializ- 
ing technologies, but also for domestic uses. No one knows why the Nigerian 
government has done nothing about the situation, until recently, despite the 
almost daily criticisms in the national newspapers. It is hoped that with 
the statement of intention to improve the supply of electricity and water 
throughout Nigeria, the teething problems facing industries and domestic 
consumers will be mitigated in the not very distant future. 
Perhaps more important than other obstacles to the transfer of 
techn- 
ology is the fact that the majority of British companies in Nigeria are 
monopolistic and oligopolistic and their relatively secured positions 
may damp down their interest to innovate. From the interviews conducted, 
a large number of British companies operating in Nigeria control 
between 
60 and 100 per cent of the Nigerian market. For a 
large number of 
commodities, British companies are the sole producers. 
From these findings, 
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it is possible to postulate that because British companies control a 
largeproportion of the Nigerian market, there may not be enough pressure 
on them to modernize and innovate. Such a complacent attitude could 
act as an obstacle to the transfer of technology. This postulate ties 
in with the theories of Downie, Carter and Williams and Arrow. For 
Downie' the pressure to innovate is a function of the competitive process, 
153 
Therefore, firms in a competitive market cannot afford to relax or stray 
away from modernizing, rationalizing and innovating to earn enough profit 
in order to stay in business. Carter and Williams have postulated that 
successful and rapidly growing firms are those that innovate. 
154 
Among 
the factors emphasized by them as compelling firms to innovate, competitive 
pressure, they say, is the most important. Arrow puts his case bluntly: 
"The only ground for arguing that monopoly may create superior incentives 
to invent is that appropriability may be greater under monopoly than under 
competition. Whatever differences may exist in this direction must, of 
course, still be offset against the monopolist's disincentive created by 
his pre-invention monopoly profits". 
155 
For Arrow, therefore, the incentive 
to innovate is smaller under monopolistic than under competitive conditions. 
5chumpeter156 and Galbraith, on the other hand, have asserted that 
monopolists and oligopolists are more favourably placed to innovate. The 
reasons given to support the view were that (a) costs of innovating are so 
exorbitant that only large firms can afford them, and (b) for innovation 
to be worthwhile, a firm must have sufficient control over the market in 
order to reap the rewards. Galbraith, in putting the case, declared "thus 
153 
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there can be little doubt that oligopoly, both in theory and in fact, is 
strongly oriented towards change. There can be no serious doubt at all 
that the setting for innovation, which is so favourable in this market 
structure, disappears almost entirely as one approaches the competition 
of the competitive model. 
l5? 
On one hand is the view that the possibility 
of establishing monopoly and oligopoly can lead, and often leads to 
innovative ability: on the other is the opposite view that there are 
situations of monopoly and oligopoly without innovation because there 
is not enough competitive pressure. 
The monopolistic position of many British companies operating in 
Nigeria can largely be explained by their long association with Nigeria. 
As a former colony of the United Kingdom, British companies have been 
operating in Nigeria long before the establishment of the country. In 
fact, it was a group of British companies operating in the country that 
gave it the name "Nigeria". As a result of their long association with 
Nigeria, many British companies have created for themselves a special 
position vis-a-vis other competitors. Their knowledge of the country, 
the people and the market has offered them a unique advantage concerning 
the areas of investment in Nigeria. The knowledge, the experience and 
the wealth accumulated through several decades when there was no rival 
meant that British companies enjoyed absolute cost advantage and economies 
of scale. They created barriers to competition through these advantages. 
However, since 1960, other foreign companies have been coming into Nigeria 
and the monopolistic position of British companies is currently being 
rigorously challenged by American, Dutch and Italian firms. The competitive 
pressure mounted by these new companies from other parts of the world 
has 
acted and is likely to continue to act as an incentive to innovate. 
157 
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The Nigerian Tobacco Company provides a good example of a British company 
that was forced to innovate through competition. Prior to 1964, the 
Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) controlled 100 per cent of the Nigerian 
tobacco market. There were few brands of cigarettes available to customers 
and the quality of the brands was poor. In 1964, Philip Morris, the 
fourth largest U. S. A. tobacco company, came to Nigeria to form a partner- 
ship with the UAC for the manufacture of tobacco products. Shortly after 
Philip Morris started cigarette production, a price war began between the 
company and the NTC. After several price cuts from both sides, the NTC 
decided to concentrate on pleasing its customers through high quality 
products. As a consequence, new brands were introduced, the quality of 
previous cigarettes was improved and Nigerians were rapidly trained to 
replace expatriates in order to reduce the costs of production. At the 
end of 1972, despite the enormous resources devoted to advertising by 
Philip Morris, the NTC still controlled 88 per cent of the Nigerian 
cigarette market. The Nigerian situation seems to support the theories 
of Arrow, Downie and Carter and Williams because those British companies 
that still control over 80 per cent of the market in which they operate, 
like Lever Brothers and Tate & Lyle, have not introduced improved products 
to the Nigerian market in the past decade. It can therefore be reasonably 
argued that once a firm is well established and sees no threat to its 
position through an exposure to fierce competition, it can afford to relax 
and be sluggish in its modernization programmes. This type of complacent 
attitude would be inimical to the transfer of technology. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 
There are two ways by which Nigeria can increase its stock of 
techn- 
ology and improve the existing stock. The first method 
is for Nigeria 
to harness its domestic resources for the improvement and the 
development 
of existing and new technology through a dynamic research and 
development 
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programme. The second method is for Nigeria to rely on the importation 
of foreign technologies. The third alternative is the combination of 
the two methods, that is, while resources could be devoted to R. & D. 
for new and improved technology, domestic efforts can be supplemented with 
foreign technology. 
Anyone believing in self-reliance may argue that Nigeria should rely 
on its own research and development programme for the supply of improved 
and new inventions and innovations necessary for rapid economic develop- 
ment. Although it is a good argument, on the face of it, it cannot be 
carried very far since Nigeria has a very poorly organized research and 
development programme. Very few resources are devoted to organized 
research and development. In this respect, Nigeria is in the same bracket 
as many developing countries which perform little or no R. & D. Table 6.5 
shows the financial resources devoted to science and technology by Nigeria 
and some selected countries. Except in Nigeria and Botswana, the national 
expenditure on science and technology is below 0.5 per cent of the gross 
national product. It has been found that the average expenditure on 
research and development for developing countries is about 0.2 per cent 
of gross national product. 
158 
This figure compares unfavourably with an 
amount which varies from 1.5 per cent to 3 per cent of the gross national 
product devoted to R. & D. by developed countries. 
The meagre expenditure on R. & D. by developing countries has reflected 
itself in the manpower available in these countries for science and techn- 
ology. 
158 
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TABLE 6.5 
NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BY SELECTED COUNTRIES 
COUNTRY DATE NATIONAL EXPENDITURE ON SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 
EXPED I-- 
TURE AS 
AOF 
GNP 
Iran 1966 20-30 Million U. S. N (dollars) 0.3 
Iraq 1966 0.5-0.7 Million U. S. 0.02 
Botswana 1967 317500 Rand 0.8 
Malawi 1967 - 0.35 
Nigeria 1966 9,770,000 £Nigeria 0.6 
Argentina 1966 38,996,000 U. S. if 0.35 
Bolivia 1966 721,000 U. S. 0.24 
Brazil 1966 30,383,000 U. S. i( C. 18 
Chile 1966 512,000 U. S. 0.01 
Colombia 1966 11,835,000 U. S. 0.4 
Ecuador 1966 805,000 U. S. ' 0.08 
Peru 1966 2,795,000 U. S. 0.13 
Venezuela 1966 13,450,000 U. S. , 0.16 
SOURCES: 1. Structural and Operational Schemes of National Science 
Policy, UNESCO 1966: (2) The Promotion of Scientific 
Activity in Tropical Africa, UNESCO 1967: (3) Principles 
and Problems of National Science Policy, UNESCO 1966: 
(4) Meeting of the Inter-American ad hoc Science Advisory 
Committee, General Secretariat of the Organisation of 
American States: (5) Year Book of National Accounts 
Statistics, 1968, Vol. II, U. N. 
Table 6.6 shows the stock of manpower for science and technology in selected 
countries. The figures for Nigeria should be interpreted with caution 
because a large proportion of the country's stock of scientists, engineers 
and technicians in the three eastern states were not included in the figures. 
Despite this limitation, the fact still remains that there is a deficiency 
of science personnel in Nigeria. The large number of scientists, engineers 
and technicians in the U. S. A., Japan, France, Germany and the U. K. shows 
the degree of attention paid to science and technology in these countries. 
What is important, however, is the number of people engaged in research 
and development, for it is this proportion that would determine the number 
of inventions and innovations emanating from research efforts. 
The percentage 
of total stock of scientists, engineers and technicians engaged 
in R. & D. 
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TABLE 6.6 
THE STOCK OF MANPOWER FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
NO. ENGAGED IN r, E-4 
TOTAL STOCK SEARCH & EXPERI- 
FIENTAL DEVELOP- 
kENT 
SCIENT-- 
ISIS & 
SCIENTISTS & AND TECHNI- 
COUNTRY DATE ENGINEERS TECHNICIANS 
ENGINEERS CIANS 
Botswana 1967 180 606 10 6 
Ghana 1966 5137 27893 167 551 
Malawi 1967 1253 5028 14 - 
Nigeria 1969 3964 7000 1723 - 
Argentina 1969 240000 1,500000 10827 6097 
Chile 1969 - - 4904 1329 
Malaysia 1966 9885 14774 348 1011 
Iraq 1969 - -- 116 27 
U. S. A. 1969 1,694300 911700 5355.00 232000 
Japan 1970 - - 286439 80475 
France 1968 190000 534000 55650 79150 
Germany 1969 - - 76332 72885 
U: K. 1968 211231 621860 43588 106426 
SOURCE: STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK 1971, UN, NEW YORK 1972 
in developing countries varies from 1 per cent in Argentina to 5.5 per cent 
in Malaysia. The corresponding percentage for advanced nations varies from 
18 per cent in the U. K. to 34.7 per cent in the United States. Since 
the advanced nations have a larger stock of scientists, engineers and 
technicians than the developing countries, and since a large proportion 
of their stock are engaged in R. & D., it will, therefore, not be surprising 
that 98 per cent of the world R. & D. expenditure outside the socialist 
countries is made in the developed market economies. 
159 The United States 
is said to account for 70 per cent of the world R. & 0. expenditure while 
159 
The'Sussex Group, op. cit. 
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only 2 per cent of the world expenditure on R. & 0., outside the centrally 
planned economies, is made in the less-developed countries. Since 
Nigeria is not one of the few less-developed countries which devote 
substantial amounts to research and development, such programmes in Nigeria 
are very limited indeed. 
Apart from the meagre resources devoted to R. & D. in Nigeria, efforts 
are so badly organized and concentrated that nothing, substantial can be 
achieved. In Nigeria, R. & D. efforts are concentrated in the universities 
and in a few government departments. In 1966, out of the £9.7 million 
devoted to R. & D. in Nigeria, the government was responsible for about 
60 per cent of the total amount. The indigenous firms do not perform 
R. & D., and only a few foreign firms devote resources to organized R. & D., 
and only in cases where there is a necessity for such organization before 
products can be successfully marketed. The concentration of R. & D. efforts 
in the universities and in a few government laboratories and institutes has 
certain consequences. Because a large part of the scientific manpower 
is trained in advanced nations, there is usually a re-orientation of research 
efforts towards problems which are totally irrelevant to Nigeria's environ- 
ment. Also, universities and government laboratories concentrate their 
research efforts, in most cases, on fundamental research, which is research 
undertaken primarily for the advancement of knowledge, and without a 
specific practical application in view. This set-up has resulted in 
marginal "split-over" from research to marketable end products. In few 
instances, however, "short-term and immediate needs require that we con- 
centrate on those aspects of applied research which can clearly show 
quick results in economic development". 
160 These few cases of applied 
research are carried out largely by the Federal Institute of Industrial 
Research at Oshodi in Lagos. Established in 1956, the Institute 
has 
160 
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three main functions: (a) to carry out basic research into the raw 
materials available in Nigeria for use in industry, and the processes 
which can be used most effectively to convert them; (b) to carry out 
pilot-scale trials of processes found in the laboratory to be technically 
feasible; and (c) to calculate by means of large-scale tests or otherwise 
the probable viability of such processes if established on a commercial 
scale. 
161 
Since its establishment, the Institute has investigated over 
forty projects and has published a large number of technical booklets 
summarizing its findings. Despite the intensive activities of the 
Institute, only very minor results have accrued to the Nigerian economy. 
ý 
There are several reasons for this observation. +irst, there is the shortage 
of scientific and technical manpower to investigate a large number of the 
Institute's projects. Since the manpower requirements of the Institute 
cannot be met from domestic sources, the enthusiasm for foreign personnel 
to fill the vacant posts has been suppressed by the inability to pay the 
high salaries which foreign experts demand. As a consequence, a large 
number of research posts in the Institute had never been filled. Follow- 
ing from the first reason is the constraint which the shortage of manpower 
should have on the R. & D. programmes of the Institute. 
As one might have expected, the shortage of manpower should act as 
a limit on the number of research projects undertaken by the Institute 
but instead, the Institute has pursued a large number of projects which 
its limited resources cannot cope with. The ultimate result has been 
that adequate attention and resources cannot be devoted to all the pro- 
jects. The thinly spread 
A 
resources over. a large number of projects n 
is hardly the best way to allocate scarce resources. It is therefore 
not surprising that only little practical result has derived from 
the 
161 
Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and industries, 
1956-579 Lagos, p. 26. 
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research efforts of the Institute. Perhaps the major reason for the 
meagre effects of the Institute's research programmes on the Nigerian 
economy is the complete absence of any effective "coupling" of its 
research with production, marketing and organization activities. Apart 
from the fact that there is no systematic channel of communication 
between the Institute and other research bodies such as the universities 
and government departments, there is also no communication between the 
Institute and its major customers - the private sector and the Development 
Corporations. The results of a research programme can affect the economic 
development of a country only when the new inventions emanating from the 
research programme are put into marketable end products. Since the 
Development Corporations and the private sector are not always aware of 
the activities of the Federal Institute of Industrial Research, it is 
difficult to see how the results of its research programmes can spill 
over into the Nigerian economy. Despite the above-mentioned limitations 
on the activities of the Institute, it must be conceded that the Institute 
is still the most important body conducting R. & D. in Nigeria and also 
responsible for the importation and the adaptation of modern technology 
to the Nigerian environment. As the Director of the Institute, Dr. Akinrele, 
has said, "The Federal Institute of Industrial Research, Oshodi, has 
already demonstrated this role in a number of ways. It has 
(a) success- 
fully imported modern technology, modified and adapted it to the traditional 
process of gari making from cassava. The resultant technology 
has already 
started diffusing back into international technology markets and making 
a glorious impact for the image of the country; (b) exploded the myth 
that 
tropical hardwood timbers are not suitable for pulp and paper-making, and 
(c) established that an adequate weaning food can be produced entirely 
from local vegetable sources. 
162 
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The previous discussions have shown quite clearly that the problem 
of research in Nigeria is not simply one of the infinitesimal level of 
resources devoted to it, but also the problem of organization. However, 
there is an urgent need for Nigeria to devote more resources to R. & D. for 
three main reasons. The first reason is that unless Nigeria performed 
R. & D., there cannot be a reservoir of personnel to select and adapt 
foreign technology to the Nigerian environment. The second reason is that 
the sophisticated technology of the Western World is not particularly 
suitable to Nigeria for Western technology has specific personnel to 
service it. Unless Nigeria performs R. & D., the most appropriate type 
of technology - intermediate technology - required by the country cannot 
be made available. It has already been shown earlier in this chapter 
that British companies, as well as other foreign companies, are not in- 
terested in adapting their technology to fit the Nigerian environment if 
such an adaptation is not needed before products can be adequately marketed. 
However, it is difficult to blame foreign companies operating in Nigeria 
for not adapting their technology to the Nigerian environment if it is not 
in their interest to do so. The adaptation of modern technology to fit 
Nigeria must be achieved by Nigeria herself and thus Nigeria must design 
its own R. & D. The third reason is that, since no indigenous firm 
performs R. & D., the government's R. & D. will not only encourage some 
of the indigenous firms to perform R. & D. in future, but many environ- 
mental and health problems requiring research, which may not appeal to 
the private sector, can be dealt with in the government's research 
establishments. In the final analysis, if Nigeria devotes more resources 
to R. & D., improved and new technologies may result from these increased 
activities with a beneficial effect on the rate of economic development. 
For, as Jack Baranson has said, "investments in new and adapted 
technology 
can serve economic development strategies in a number of ways. New 
technologies afford an opportunity to by-pass historical stages 
in 
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technological development. This may be especially applicable to social 
overhead investments in transportation, communications, and the develop- 
ment of energy resources. For example, new transport technologies 
(hovercraft) may successfully avoid premature investments in roadbeds and 
bridges; new communication techniques (satellite television) may help to 
overcome critical shortages in, teachers and educational facilities, and 
modular design techniques can help overcome the diseconomies of small-scale 
production in a wide range of manufacturing industries. New technologies 
can also find economic use of "national" resources to supply essential 
foods, fibres, energy and housing". 
163 
In order to co-ordinate research efforts in Nigeria, the National 
Council for Science and Technology has been created. The main aim of 
the Council is to conduct research, co-ordinate research of-forts of other 
bodies and to adapt foreign technology to the Nigerian environment. The 
Council has set up various research councils in many fields of science and 
technology, to control, co-ordinate and harmonize research programmes. 
This is aimed at eradicating ineffective prosecution of research projects 
and wasteful deployment of financial resources, The research councils 
set up include the Industrial Research Council, the Medical Research 
Council and the Natural Research Council. In the final analysis, the 
National Council for Science and Technology aims to promote serious 
research into local raw materials to determine their suitability for 
industrial products, and to ensure selective importation of technology 
in such a way that it is capable of being redesigned,, redeveloped and 
adapted to the Nigerian environment. It is much too soon to assess the 
functions and the effectiveness of the Nigerian National Council for 
Science and Technology since it was established just a little over a year 
163 
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ago. The research councils to be set up by the National Council have 
not been completed and the last of the three already created, the Natural 
Research Council, came into being early in 1973. It is hoped, however, 
that the Research Councils will be able to function properly without 
unnecessary executive interference and the bureaucratic defects which 
have been the hall-mark of Nigerian public bodies. 
The Nigerian government has been doing all it can to widen the scope 
of science and technical education in the country. Priorities are being 
given to technical education in particular in the country's educational 
programmes. There were about 17 trade centres and technical colleges 
in the country at the and of 1972 and their scope has been considerably 
widened in recent years. There are also five polytechnics and colleges 
of technology where advanced technical courses are studied. In addition, 
the six Nigerian universities have been considerably expanded and student 
population in the universities has increased from ten thousand in 1969/70 
to nearly twenty thousand in the 1972/73 academic year. Apart from the 
faculties of administration and education, the science faculties are the 
most rapidly expanding areas of Nigerian educational systems. The shift 
in emphasis from ats to science is due to two main reasons. The first 
reason is the government's generous award of scholarships to science 
students. The second reason is that science graduates get higher salaries 
than arts graduates through a deliberate policy by the Nigerian government 
to encourage science education. Higher salaries have in turn acted as 
an incentive to students willing to enter Nigerian universities to pursue 
science subjects. 
TRAINING IN NIGERIA 
The training of Nigerians for their jobs has always been considered 
necessary for increasing efficiency. This being so, many government 
departments and public corporations have their own training programmes 
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for their employees and these departments include the Ministry of Works 
and Survey, the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, the Nigerian Electricity 
Corporation, the Nigerian Railways Corporation, the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Nigerian Ports Authority. In addition to the special training 
centres established to meet the needs of each public corporation and 
Ministry, short courses and seminars have been attended in both Nigeria 
and abroad by the employees of these public bodies. 
In the private sector, only large foreign firms have training programmes 
for their employees. A large number of Nigerian-owned firms and small 
foreign firms have no training programme. In order to meet this important 
gap in the manpower development of Nigeria, in 1971 the Nigerian govern- 
ment established an Industrial Training Fund for the centralized training 
of employees in the country. Decree 47, which established the fund, 
provides that every firm, whether foreign or indigenous, employing twenty- 
five people or more must contribute 3 per cent of its annual payroll or 
1.1/2 per cent of its annual turnover towards the running of the scheme. 
The Decree says, "The fund may be utilized to promote and encourage the 
acquisition of skills in industry or commerce with a view to generating 
a pool of indigenous trained manpower sufficient to meet the needs of the 
economy". 
164 
The scheme is aimed at providing training in all fields, 
especially where there is an acute shortage of skilled manpower. While 
making use of training facilities in existing universities, polytechnics 
and colleges of technology, the scheme also hopes to set up its own train- 
ing centres staffed with efficient and competent experts and personnel. 
The Federal government intends to pay £500,000 to the industrial 
training 
fund to supplement contributions from the private sector. 
1 64 
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With the growing importance of the petroleum industry and the formation 
of the National Oil Corporation, the need to train Nigerians for the 
petroleum industry has become more urgent than ever before. As a first 
step, the Federal Government stipulated in the 1969 Petroleum Decree that 
recipients of mining leases must guarantee that within 10 years of their 
operation in the country they would employ Nigerians in 75 per cent of 
management, professional and supervisory positions, and in 100 per cent 
of all other jobs. In addition, holders of future prospecting licences 
were required to submit a detailed programme for the recruitment and the 
training of Nigerians within the first year of operation. In order to 
carry out the contents of the Petroleum Decree of 1969, the government 
has been putting pressure on existing oil companies to train and employ 
Nigerians, and new oil companies have been made to contribute towards 
the training of personnel for the petroleum industry. As an example, in 
February, 1972, when Henry Stephens & Sons, a wholly Nigerian-owned 
private company, was granted an oil exploration licence, in addition to 
paying a premium of £50,000 to the Nigerian government, the company also 
has to pay a further £15,000 annually in support of petroleum technology 
educational programmes. In April 1972, the Nigerian government signed 
an agreement with the Soviet Union for the latter to assist Nigeria in 
setting up an oil production training centre of £9 million at Warri in 
the Mid-West State. The centre, when completed, will be run by the 
Russian agency, Technoexport, which will provide experts and teaching 
equipment for the centre. The Nigerian government will provide £1 million 
for the initial construction of the centre and it is hoped that when 
the 
centre starts to operate the necessary manpower for the National Oil 
Corporation will be trained and provided by the centre. 
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICIES FOR THE TRANSFER OF TECHNICAL AND iIiANAGERIi L 
SKILLS TO NIGERIA 
The effectiveness of the various channels through which British 
companies transfer technical and managerial skills to Nigeria varies and 
is limited in many respects by some factors. The research efforts of 
British companies are limited in scope and, as a consequence, no radical 
break-through type of innovation characteristic of large and concentrated 
R. & D. can emanate from British companies operating in Nigeria. The 
type of industries where British companies operate in Nigeria - the consumer 
goods industries - are not industries characterized by large-scale R. & D. 
Until such time when British companies invest in science-based and capital 
goods industries, their research activities will be limited in scope and 
so also will the number of innovations resulting from their research efforts 
be small. There are two particular areas of concentrated research where 
Nigeria is likely to benefit in the future. The first is the research 
programme of the African Timber and Plywood Company on the Nigerian timber 
and plywood. Nigeria is rjch in timber but the major disadvantage of 
Nigerian timber is that it is too hard. In order to eradicate this dis- 
advantage, the UAC, through-its company - African Timber & Plywood 
(Nig. ) 
Ltd., began to conduct research into the possibility of cross-breeding 
trees in order to get soft wood timber and the company was successful. 
From 
one hard timber in early in the 1950s, the number of timber species 
has 
grown to over 50 at the present time. The Nigerian government did not 
begin to take an interest in forestry and the various species of wood 
in 
Nigeria until after the success of UAC had been demonstrated. 
The Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry is now responsible for conducting research 
into the development of woods in Nigeria and there is a cross-fertilization 
of ideas, both formal and informal, between the various Ministries and 
the 
African Timber & Plywood (Nig. ) Ltd. The preservation of Nigerian 
forests 
304 
and the development of many timber species have been due, in no small 
measure, to the demonstration by the African Timber & Plywood Ltd. that 
other species of timber can be developed successfully in Nigeria. In 
addition, the research programmes of the African Timber & Plywood Ltd. 
are directed and carried out by Nigerians. If these Nigerians are re- 
quired by the Nigerian government, they can easily be lured away with big 
salaries. If the African Timber & Plywood Ltd. winds up its research 
programmes in Nigeria, there will be no loss suffered by its Nigerian 
employees, since they can easily be absorbed into the research laboratories 
of the various States governments. 
The Shell-BP Company's research programmes are likely to be beneficial 
to Nigeria in future. The newly-created National Oil Corporation has 
as its main functions the searching for and the production of crude oil in 
Nigeria. In order to carry out these functions, the NOC requires experienced 
geologists, technologists, engineers, and scientists to conduct research 
into the soils of Nigeria and to test and control crude oil production, 
among other things. Nigeria is short of these qualified and experienced 
personnel and the only way the NOC can get off the ground is for it to 
poach the Nigerian employees of the oil companies, which it has started 
to do. The experience gained by Nigerians in the research laboratories 
of Shell-BP will not only be useful to the NOC activities in the petroleum 
industry if some of these Nigerians join NOC but their geological knowledge 
can be utilized, to locate other mineral deposits in Nigeria. 
The licensing agreements between parent and subsidiary companies 
are not an important method of transferring technology to Nigeria. 
As 
it has been shown, the number of licensing agreements between 
Nigeria and 
Britain as indicated by royalty payments is limited and small. 
This state 
of affairs should not be surprising, given the low level of 
industrial 
development in Nigeria. As the level of industrial development 
increases 
in the future, so will the number of licensing agreements 
between Nigeria 
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-and Britain increase. While British companies operating in Nigeria will 
continue as before to conclude licensing agreements with their U. K. parents, 
there is a need for Nigerians to shop around the world before concluding 
agreements. What the level of industrial development in Nigeria at the 
moment requires is intermediate technology end as a consequence, licensing 
agreements conducted ought to be those designed to meet this requirement. 
By shopping around, not only are Nigerians afforded the opportunity to 
select the best and the most appropriate technology, but they may well 
conclude some of the agreements at low bargaining prices. However, the 
ability of Nigerians to do this depends on the existence of experienced 
and competent Nigerian scientists and technicians who can analyze, select, 
investigate and master new techniques quickly. It must be added that 
Nigeria does not have many competent and experienced scientists and 
technicians at the moment. This is, of course, a reflection on the meagre 
R. & D. programmes of Nigeria and the lack of opportunities for Nigerian 
science graduates to acquire the much-needed experience. In order to 
tackle these problems, not only should more resources be devoted to R. & D, ý 
but increased opportunities must exist for the accumulation of experience. 
The Nigerian Institute of Industrial Research could have provided limited 
places for the acquisition of knowledge and experience, but, since the 
authorities are not prepared to provide the necessary finance for the 
employment of personnel, there is very little the Institute can do about 
it. The short-sightedness of the Nigerian authorities is also reflected 
in the recent expansion of university and science education in Nigeria. 
At the end of 1973, there were over 20,000 students in Nigerian universities. 
The question that readily comes to mind is, where and 
how thesestudents will 
be employed when they graduate. Even when the student population 
of 
Nigerian universities was less than 10,000, there were many qualified 
graduates unemployed and now the number has doubled 
in less than five years. 
Large-scale graduates unemployment is increasingly 
becoming a very serious 
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possibility. In addition to the student population in Nigerian universities, 
it is estimated that over 3,000 qualified Nigerian graduates, a third of 
whom have higher degrees, are in the United States. They cannot go back 
to Nigeria because there are no jobs for them. Despite the bleak prospects 
for employment among Nigerian graduates, the Nigerian authorities are plann- 
ing to establish more universities in the country in the future. It must 
be added, however, that a policy of educational expansion, be it of science 
or arts, not tailored to meet the specific needs of the country, is fraught 
with all sorts of dangers, of which social unrest, violent demonstrations, 
and the creation of a pool of criminals, are but a few. 
The most effective channel through which British companies have trans- 
ferred technology and managerial skills to Nigeria is the training provided 
to Nigerians in and out of Nigeria. Learning by doing has been seriously 
favoured 'by most British companies as an important method for acquiring 
skills. By establishing training centres with alternating courses at the 
centres and practice at establishments, and the continuous large-scale 
on-the-job training offered to Nigerians, British companies have helped 
to upgrade the level of technical and managerial skills in Nigeria. The 
management courses and training provided to Nigerians, in England and 
elsewhere, have been beneficial to Nigeria in many respects. The most 
competent Nigerian managers in the country to-day are those employed by 
British companies. Not only are some of them visiting professors in 
Nigerian universities, but also the Nigerian Institute of Management, 
designed to upgrade managerial skills through publications and journals, 
is dominated by Nigerian managers in British companies. In additiong 
some of the Nigerian managers employed in British companies act as 
consultants, investigating major problems for the Nigerian public 
institutions. 
The contributions of British companies to the development of science 
and managerial education in Nigeria have been beneficial 
to a large number 
307 
of Nigerian educational institutions and students. The major criticism 
of British companies in this respect is the training of Nigerians at 
institutions of higher learning in Nigeria and abroad without employing 
them at the end of their courses. What is the point in training people 
if there is no opportunity for putting their knowledge to the benefit of 
the society? If British companies can give direct donations to the 
universities instead of awarding scholarships to students themselves, a 
better utilization of the donations may result in the provision of improved 
facilities, such as libraries, books, accommodation, food and laboratory 
equipment for existing students. 
CONCLUSION 
British direct investment has, so far, been the most effective method 
of transferring technical and managerial skills to Nigeria. Although 
British companies have transferred technology to Nigeria through various 
channels, learning by doing has proved to be the most effective channel. 
The various channels through which British companies transfer technology to 
Nigeria have been frequently obstructed by factors which have reduced the 
contributions of the transferred technology. The most important obstacles 
are the inability of British companies to adapt their technology to the 
Nigerian environment, the employment of fake experts, deficient infra- 
structure in Nigeria, the relatively secure positions of British companies 
vis-a-vis other competitors and the dearth of scientifically and technically 
qualified manpower in Nigeria. The shortages in the supply of scientists 
and technicians are the result of the meagre R. & D. programme executed 
in the country. The non-availability of a central body to co-ordinate 
research efforts has also meant that no adequate control has 
been exercised 
on the selection and the importation of foreign technology. 
Whenever the 
government wanted to undertake new projects, it had frequently gone abroad 
in search of technical partners, who have acted as management contractors 
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and management agencies. The results of such marriages have been to provide 
opportunities for corrupt officials to mis-appropriate public funds, and 
for foreign contractors to charge exorbitant fees for turnkey projects, 
which, up to the present, moment, have represented a criminal waste of 
public funds. Most of the British companies interviewed have justifiably 
emphasized their disapproval of many of the unscrupulous management con- 
tractors employed by the Nigerian government as representing a threat to 
their operations in Nigeria. The bad publicity given to turnkey projects 
has reduced their number in recent years. The Nigerian authorities have 
taken the useful step of establishing the National Council for Science 
and Technology, which, in the future, will screen all foreign technologies 
imported into the country and encourage their adaptation to the Nigerian 
environment. Perhaps more important than these functions is the fact 
that the Council will carry out organized R. & D. activities. The inability 
of British companies as well as other foreign companies to. transfer techn- 
ology to Nigeria in a comprehensive way stems from the fact that these 
companies concentrate on' consumer goods and produce a limited range of 
products. Under these circumstances, it is to be expected that foreign 
companies operating in Nigeria will not undertake major R. & u. projects 
geared towards the development of technologies suited to Nigerian condi- 
tions. It is in this context that the R. & D. programmes undertaken by 
the National Council for Science and Technology become very important. 
In addition, attention can be specifically focussed on intermediate and 
labour intensive technologies which foreign companies have taken no 
in- 
terest in developing. 
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CHAPTER VII 
OBSTACLES TO BRITISH INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA 
This chapter is concerned with those factors which may limit the 
economic efficacy of existing British direct investment in Nigeria and 
with showing why more British capital may not flow to Nigeria. The 
obstacles to British investment can be divided into two broad groups: 
(a) there are those obstacles associated with the attitudes and business 
practices of British investors which may provoke unfavourable reactions 
from other foreign investors and the Nigerian Government and these could 
act as a deterrent to both existing and future investments; and (b) there 
are those obstacles associated with Nigeria, ranging from political 
instability and poor infrastructure to government economic policies. It 
ought to be emphasized that the division of obstacles into two groups 
becomes blurred where one development leads to chain reaction that may 
act as an obstacle to investment. If, for instance, British companies 
prefer foreign personnel to indigenous personnel, the Nigerian government 
may pass legislation restricting the employment of foreigners, and this 
may provoke British companies into designing ways of beating the legis- 
lation. This attempt by British companies to neutralize the effect of 
the government's legislation may be discovered by the Nigerian 
immigration 
officials, and this may further provoke a restriction on the 
issue of entry 
permits to British nationals willing to come to Nigeria. This may, 
in 
turn, lead to the rejection of visa applications from genuine 
investors. 
Before discussing the obstacles, it is perhaps worthwhile 
to enumerate the 
greater advantages which British companies enjoy over other 
foreign companies. 
THE MAJOR ADVANTAGES BRITISH COMPANIES ENJOY IN NIGERIA 
British investors have several advantages over their 
European and 
North American rivals, first of which is the language. 
English is the 
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medium of expression in Nigeria and as a consequence, British investors 
who come to Nigeria can easily understand the peoib and be understood. 
This is not the case with other European investors who cannot speak 
English. This being so, Nigerians in general, both in private and 
public organisations, prefer to do business with the British. The 
second advantage is distance. The American and Canadian investors who 
can speak English come from greater distances than the British. The third 
advantage is the Nigerian legal system which is similar in almost every 
respect to the British legal system. This is because the Nigerian system 
was inherited from the British and also because most of the architects of 
the post-independence laws were trained in England. The similarity between 
the two ensures that British companies have an easy understanding of 
Nigerian company laws since laws governing their activities in Nigeria are, 
in most cases, verbatim copies of similar English laws. The last advant- 
age is the fact that most Nigerian "top people" and businessmen have their 
bank balances in London. These people also often spend their annual holi- 
days in England. These two factors facilitate easy and quick transactions 
with the British. 
The four advantages listed above derive in part from the long associa- 
tion between the United Kingdom and Nigeria, which dates back to the period 
when Nigeria was a colony of Britain. In its appraisal of the importance 
of these advantages, the Confederation of British Industries declared, 
"It must be appreciated that the British start with enormous advantages. 
The Nigerians have inherited our language and much of our education and 
legal system. The Nigerians respect our institutions and the British 
way of life. They are friendly, hospitable, warm-hearted and 
humourous, 
qualities to which British visitors and residents respond readily. 
The 
Mission was told repeatedly that the Nigerians prefer to 
deal with the 
British whenever they can, because of this feeling of mutual understanding 
and confidence". 
165 
The advantages listed above confer on 
British investors 
165B. 
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rare opportunities which are rapidly being wasted by the business attitudes 
of British companies - as will be explained below. 
THE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF BRITISH FIRMS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
ýý 
The business attitudes and practices of British companies operating 
in Nigeria have no doubt acted as an important impediment to British 
investment in the country. British companies are over-cautious and lethargic 
in their investment programmes. They loathe the idea of being "first" 
in many fields of industrial activities even in cases where the Nigerian 
public corporations and governments are prepared to form partnerships with 
them and to provide the risk capital. Examples of the over-cautiousness 
and conservative attitudes of British companies abound in number, but two 
examples will suffice to emphasize the main line of argument. The first 
example concerns the British Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers 
(APCM), who were invited by the Nigerian Federal Government in 1950 to 
participate in a joint-venture to establish a local cement plant at 
Nkalagu in Nigeria. After two years of negotiations and surveying, APCM 
declined the government's invitation. The Nigerian government then went 
to Europe and America to search for a partner and, after nearly three 
years of searching, F. L. Smidth of Denmark was recruited as a technical 
partner. In 1957, the Nigerian Cement Company, a joint-venture of' the 
Nigerian government and F. L. Smidth, was formed to operate a factory at 
Nkalagu. Once the cement factory at Nkalagu was commissioned, 
the British 
Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (APCM) were faced with the problem 
of how to protect its Nigerian market. As a consequence, the 
APCM which 
had earlier rejected a joint-venture with the Nigerian government set up 
a syndicate with the Western Nigeria Development Corporation 
to establish 
the West African Portland Cement Company, which began operating a cement 
factory at Ewekoro, Abeokuta in 1961. By the end of 1961, 
there were 
two cement factories in Nigeria; one operated by F. L. Smidth and 
the Nigerian 
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government at Nkalagu, and the other by the British' Associated Portland 
Cement Manufacturers and the Western Nigeria Development Corporation at 
Ewekoro in Abeokuta. 
There were two reasons why the APCM rejected the first offer of a 
joint-venture with the Nigerian Government. Firstly, there was the 
APCM's desire to continue to supply the Nigerian market from its effi- 
cient factories in England. While the APCM would be able to enjoy econom- 
ies of scale in its factories in England, this would not be likely to 
be the case at the initial stage of operating a new factory in Nigeria. 
The Nigerian government, on the other hand, was not interested. in the 
economies of scale argument of the APCM. The main concern of the govern- 
ment was to start cement production in Nigeria. There was therefore a 
clear divergence of interest between the Nigerian government and the 
APCM. The second reason was the APCM's belief that the Nigerian market 
was not large enough for a cement factory, and also the APCM's objection 
to Nkalagu as the site of the factory on the grounds that it would be 
difficult to supply the Lagos-Ibadan area from Nkalagu. The APCM has 
been proved wrong by the inability of the seven cement factories now in 
existence in Nigeria to meet the demand of the Nigerian market. In 
addition to the two factories at Nkalagu and Ewekoro, five more cement 
factories have been established since 1962, but the demand for cement 
remains insatiable. The above example shows how a new company, 
F. L. Smidth, was brought into Nigeria as a result of the attitude of 
the APCM. 
The second example concerns Dunlop, which came to Nigeria 
in 1960, 
shortly after the arrival of Michelin, to begin discussions with 
the 
Nigerian government about the possibility of setting up a 
tyre factory 
in the country. Not long after Nigeria broke diplomatic relations 
with 
France over the atomic tests in the Sahara, Dunlop was asked 
to go ahead 
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with its project by the Nigerian government. However, instead of 
going ahead with the project, now that the threat of Michelin had been 
turned aside Dunlop did not show any interest. It was not until 
March 1961 when the French Company, Michelin, had quietly and cunningly 
obtained the backing of the Eastern Regional government and announced the 
commencement of a tyre factory in port Harcourt did Dunlop become aware 
of the reality of the situation. Faced with the prospect of being 
shut out of the Nigerian market by a tariff wall, Dunlop launched a tyre 
factory at Ikeja in October 1961, despite a statement by one of the com- 
pany's directors in the FBI's mission to Nigeria in 1960 that the Nigerian 
market could only support one tyre factory, 
166 
The two examples show how British companies had enabled other competitors 
to gain earlier footholds in the Nigerian market. Whereas the profit- 
ability of the cement companies was not affected by the existence of two 
or more cement factories, Dunlop was not able to make profits at the 
early stage of its operation in Nigeria. Despite the existence of tariffs 
to shield off imports, the existence of two tyre factories to serve Nigeria 
was enough to reduce the profitability of Dunlop. It is also worth 
noting that the ability of the APCM and Dunlop to start domestic produc- 
tion in Nigeria, after they had already rejected an offer and permission 
from the Federal Government of Nigeria, was due to the existence of auto- 
nomous Regional Governments. Presumably, if all the Regional Governments 
of Nigeria were to have a central body negotiating joint-ventures with 
foreign investors, the APCII and Dunlop could have been shut out of the 
Nigerian market for good. 
The complacent attitudes of British investors have not only opened 
the Nigerian market to other European and American investors, but 
the 
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Federation of British Industries, Nigeria, An Industrial 
Reconnaissance, London 1961, p. 12. 
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fact that British investors have let the Nigerian authorities down on 
a number of occasions makes them unattractive as partners in joint- 
ventures. It is clear that only if ventures are truly worthwhile for 
all parties will British companies take part, but the fact remains that, 
even when British companies obtained permission to set up wholly-owned 
establishments, they tended to sit back until other foreign competitors 
had launched their own ventures. In recent years, there does not seem 
to have been any radical change in the attitudes of British investors 
towards investment in Nigeria. During his visit to the U. K. in June 
1973, at a luncheon given by the Lord Mayor of London, General Gowan, 
the Nigerian Head of State, made a categorical reference to the lethargic 
and complacent attitudes of British investors. In an obvious reference 
to Britain, General Gowan spoke with regret of the "overcautiousness of 
some foreign investors, particularly those with historical connections 
with us, who know us well and who ought to be able to appreciate our 
bona fide aspirations". 
167 
The risk-aversion attitudes of British companies in Nigeria are 
based on three main factors. The first is underestimation of the size 
of the Nigerian market. The second factor is fear about the long-term 
political stability of Nigeria, and last is the inability of the companies 
to predict how government policies towards foreign investment will change 
in future. Given these uncertainties, British companies have always 
preferred projects with short-term pay-offs to long-term projects. It 
must be added, however, that the risk aversion attitudes of British 
companies are likely to change in future as Nigeria becomes more industrial- 
ized. At present, the leading role of the British as Nigeria's most 
important foreign investor is yielding quite dramatically to the aggressive, 
pushful challenges and the willingness to take risks of the 
American, Dutch, 
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French and Italian investors who continue to expand existing businesses and 
explore new possibilities. 
POSITION WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 
The general attitudes of some British companies to their Nigerian employees 
have been, and will continue to be, a major obstacle to their invest- 
ment in Nigeria. Some British managers employed by British companies 
operating in Nigeria frequently treat their Nigerian employees contempt- 
uously. Dismissals and threat of dismissal, assault on employees and 
discrimination in the distribution of' amenities are additional factors 
which have led to tensions between some British companies and their 
Nigerian employees. While only very few British companies are engaged 
in these practices, the fact that such companies are usually exposed in 
the press tends to exaggerate matters out of all proportion. It is true 
that a large number of British companies, especially in the UAC Group, 
frequently receive popular acclamation in the National Press, but there 
is the tendency in Nigeria to regard these companies as exceptions whenever 
a few bad cases are exposed. It should be added, however, that most of 
the practices listed above were widespread during the first few years of 
Nigeria's independence and that they have almost disappeared now. 
Necessarily, the success of British companies in Nigeria depends on a 
relationship between the companies and Nigerians based on mutual trust 
and respect. Given the fact that Nigeria was a colony of Britain for 
a number of years, a large number of British in Nigeria, shortly after 
the country obtained independence were used to giving instructions and 
being obeyed. After independence, the relationship started to change; 
Nigerians wanted to be treated as equals by their previous bosses. 
Under these circumstances, tensions between some Nigerians and 
their 
British employers were bound to develop. In the course of 
time, a 
stable and friendly relationship developed between British companies 
and 
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their Nigerian employees and at present, British companies are among 
the best employers in Nigeria. 
There is, however, still one aspect of the attitudes of British 
companies which has received a bad press and official condemnation in 
Nigeria, and this is the practice of creating top positions for Nigerians 
without giving them the accompanying responsibilities and authority. The 
occupation of top management positions without the accompanying respons- 
ibility and authority has frequently been referred to in Nigeria as 
"window-dressing". The knowledge and the feeling that Nigerians employed 
in top management positions by British companies were not being given 
the authority and responsibilities commensurate with their positions became 
widespread in the late 1960s. The pressure on foreign companies to 
indigenize their personnel began shortly after political independence in 
1960. By the end of 1965, almost all the junior management positions 
were occupied by Nigerians but the majority of the top and middle manage- 
ment positions were occupied by expatriates. The Nigerian government has 
always believed that one of the main benefits of foreign investment is 
the creation of employment opportunities for Nigerians, and if the 
employment thus created is taken by foreign personnel, Nigeria would not 
be reaping the benefits. This belief re-inforced by the availability 
of highly qualified Nigerian personnel, competent and capable of holding 
responsible positions, prompted the Nigerian government to intensify 
the 
pressure on foreign companies to employ Nigerians at middle and 
top 
management levels. As a consequence, an increasing number of Nigerians 
began to be promoted and employed in middle and top management positions. 
They soon discovered that zpart from an increase in their salaries 
(when such 
promotions are accompanied by an increase in salaries, which 
in some cases 
did not happen), their middle and top management positions often 
carried 
no higher responsibility or authority than those of junior management 
positions. "One of the factors which tend to reduce 
the benefits of 
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industrialization in Nigeria is the employment of a large number of 
foreign nationals who receive considerable sums in form of salaries and 
allowances. In order to reduce this 'earnings leakage', Government 
will intensify its efforts to ensure, not only that high-level 
Nigerian personnel are employed by private industry, but also that they 
are given responsibilities commensurate with their training and experience. 
Hitherto, many firms have placed a good number of Nigerians in manage- 
ment positions. But it is widely known that many of these indigenous 
'managers' are not given management functions to perform, and are in effect 
little more than glorified clerks put up for "window dressing". 
168 
There are two main reasons why companies engage in this practice. 
Firstly, a British company may promote a Nigerian to a middle management 
position without the commensurate salary but with the commensurate respons- 
ibility in order to avoid any increase in the company's wage bill. Since 
some of these promotions to middle management positions are not accompanied 
by a reduction in the number of expatriates, the tendency not to pay high 
salaries becomes very strong. The second reason why Nigerians employed 
in top management positions are not given the commensurate authority and 
responsibility may be (a) to avoid the excessive use of power which is 
very common among top Nigerians and (b) to prevent Nigerians from knowing 
the major secrets of their companies, especially in circumstances where 
relationships are based on "mutual suspicion". When Nigerians are employed 
in middle and top management positions, they seldom take important decisions, 
the power to do so normally being vested in a British manager, who may 
be "under" the Nigerian manager. This situation is neither good 
for 
Nigeria, nor rewarding to British companies engaged in such practices. 
A large number of Nigerians apply for positions in the private sector and, 
as such competition is very keen; this ensures that only the most competent 
and qualified Nigerians are employed in British companies. 
If these 
highly qualified and competent Nigerians are not used to 
their full capacity, 
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then it follows that the human resources of Nigeria are being grossly 
underutilized. The policy of "window dressing" among some British 
companies is detrimental to their business interests in several ways. 
Firstly, Nigerians holding top positions without the commensurate 
authority and responsibility become suspicious of their British colleagues 
and co-operation becomes difficult. This is one of the main reasons why 
the relationship between top Nigerian managers and British managers in 
many British companies operating in Nigeria is based on "mutual suspicion". 
Secondly, collective responsibility becomes difficult to enforce as Nigerian 
managers tend to take an independent line on major issues, disassociating 
themselves from certain decisions of the company, especially when adverse 
results become publicised. Thirdly, negotiations with the Nigerian 
authorities become difficult as Nigerian managers stand aloof and fail 
to show their companies the various tactics they could adopt to get what 
they wanted. This is also the main reason why malpractices in some British 
enterprises are readily leaked to the Nigerian authorities and to the 
Nigerian Press as Nigerian employees are always prepared to speak against 
a company in which they regard themselves as "strangers". Of all the 
Nigerian and top managers employed by one big British company interviewed 
between 1971 and 1972, a majority of them had nothing good to say. This, 
however, was not the case with the Nigerian managers employed by the UAC 
and the NTC, a majority of whom were prepared to associate themselves with 
their companies and to defend them against "external" forces, whether 
Nigerian or foreign. The foregoing discussions have highlighted 
the 
necessity for many British companies to take their Nigerian managers 
into 
their confidence for it is only by doing so that a genuine relationship 
based on mutual trust and confidence can develop. 
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THE MAJOR BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
Among the major obstacles to British investment in Nigeria are the 
barriers to entry which established firms erect against new and potential 
investors. The barriers to potential British investors could emanate from 
three sources: (a) from already established British firms; (b) from 
established foreign firms and (c) from joint-ventures between British or 
other foreign firms and the Nigerian governments. According to Joe Bain, 
three types of barriers exist for new entrants. They are 
"1. Product differentiation advantages of established 
over potential entrants; 
2. Absolute cost advantages of established over potential 
entrant firms; 
3. Advantages of established over potential entrant 
firms due to economies of large scale firms". 
169 
The barrier advantages listed above may accrue to an established firm as 
a result of its control over the sources of raw materials, the preference 
of buyers for its brands, control of distribution outlets, control over 
superior product designs and production techniques, cheap and easy access 
to bank loans and overdraft and large-scale advertisement. 
These advantages are real enough to prevent a potential competitor 
from entry into an industry as the following examples will show. In 
Nigeria, Lever Brothers, a subsidiary of British Unilever, is the major 
soap and detergent producer. Apart from the company's large-scale 
advertisements, which have made the brands a house-hold word, Lever Brothers' 
exclusive dealing which involves the cutting off from suppliers of a 
customer who sells another company's soap products has made 
it impossible 
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For other companies to break into the market. In the tobacco industry, 
the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) controls about 88 per cent of the 
Nigerian market. In addition to the NTC's control over the sources 
of raw materials, excessive branding and advertising supported by ex- 
clusive dealings and control over distribution outlets have made it im- 
possible for other companies to break into the Nigerian tobacco industry. 
An attempt by a joint-venture between the UAC and Philip Morris to break 
into the tobacco industry in 1964 met with fierce competition, which later 
resulted in price wars. In the end, Philip Morris was forced to con- 
centrate its operations in the North-Western half of Nigeria not fully 
served by the NTC. The large-scale advertising by Philip Morris in an 
attempt to get a larger share of the Nigerian tobacco market reached its 
height in 1971, when the leading Negro soul singer, James Brown, was 
brought from the U. S. A. to boost the company's sales. Despite all the 
efforts, Philip Morris controls only 10 per cent of the Nigerian tobacco 
market. 
Another important barrier to potential investors is the prohibition 
by the government of new entrants into an industry. The prohibition 
may result from the government's desire to check and prevent over-saturation 
in certain fields of industrial activities or to protect a joint-venture 
in which the government has a stake. Another obstacle associated with 
the government's prohibition is the use of cunning, unscrupulous methods 
to get permission to establish in certain industries at the expense of 
other competitors. One of the leading British investors in Nigeria said 
in an interview that "competition with other companies willing to establish 
the particular industry we are interested in and getting it through un- 
scrupulous methods" is one of its major obstacles to investment. 
However, 
it should be pointed out, as the petroleum industry has shown, 
that it is 
in the best interest of Nigeria to ask for bids from as many companies 
as 
possible when an industry is to be established. By so 
doing Nigeria can 
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strike'a favourable bargain in dealings with these powerful multi-national 
companies. 
THE MAJOR OBSTACLES ASSOCIATED WITH NIGERIA 
Investors have usually been wary about the recipients of international 
investment, especially when such investment takes place in a less-developed 
country. Reasons for this wariness have been summarized into four groups 
by the American Department of Commerce as follows: "(a) the imbalance 
and dislocation in trade and currency relationships leading to controls 
over the amount of and purposes for which capital may be invested and the 
rate at which earnings and capital may be repatriated; (b) economic 
nationalism in the under developed countries accompanied by unfavourable 
reactions on the part of the public and domestic business, and by an in- 
creasing stringency and number of controls by governments over the entry 
and conduct of foreign investments; (c) insecure and unstable political 
and social conditions which cause uncertainties and lack of confidence 
on the part of investors; (d) low levels of economic development as 
reflected in inadequate basic facilities, shortage of trained labour, 
lack of allied industries, and shortage of local venture capital". 
170 
The four factors listed above have frequently been mentioned by British 
companies as limiting their investments in Nigeria. It is necessary to 
point out, however, that these factors not only act as obstacles to 
foreign investment in Nigeria, but they also act as constraints on economic 
development. Some of the obstacles already mentioned in Chapter 
VI and 
at the beginning of this thesis, in Chapter I, include poor and 
insuffi- 
cient health facilities, bad and narrow roads, inadequate and erratic 
170 
Dept. of Commerce, "Study of Factors Limiting American 
Private 
Foreign Investment", Washington, D. C. July 1953, reproduced by 
C. M. Meier & R. E. Baldwin in "Economic Development", Wiley & Sons, 
New York, 1963, p. 423. 
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supplies of water and electricity, housing shortages and exorbitant rents, 
poor and inefficient post and telecommunications systems and the administra- 
tive laxity of the civil servants. 
Over the past decade, political instability has been the major 
obstacle to British investment in Nigeria. Beginning with the elections 
of 1963 and the coup and counter coup of 1966, Nigeria was plunged into 
a civil war and between 1967 and 1970 murder, looting, arson, theft and 
other criminal offences were committed not only by Nigerians against 
Nigerians, but also by Nigerians against foreigners and their businesses. 
Apart from the four Italian oil men killed during the civil war, British 
enterprises were the major casualties of the Nigerian political instability. 
The installations of Shell-BP were damaged and the company's activities 
were completely halted for eleven months during the 1968-69 period. 
Large-scale damages to properties and businesses owned by the UAC, Lever 
Brothers, John Holt, the CDC, and the Nigerian cement company added up 
to several thousand pounds. Not only were expansion programmes by British 
companies put off but new British investors were reluctant to invest in 
Nigeria out of fear for the safety of their lives. Although things 
returned to normal, the aftermath-effects of the civil war were still 
much in evidence. One British company said in an interview that its 
matchet factory in Port Harcourt was still at a standstill (August 1972) because 
the River State would not allow the Ibo employees of the factory to return, 
even though the State lacks the necessary manpower for the factory. 
However, confidence has returned with the and of the civil war and 
the 
ensuing boom. With the division of Nigeria into twelve States and 
the 
lessons to be learnt from past mistakes political chaos 
is likely to 
become a thing of the past. Economic policies of Nigeria 
have frequently 
been resented by foreign investors, because they are a function of economic 
nationalism, social and political unrest and balance of payments 
considera- 
tion. Economic policies in Nigeria can be categorised 
in many forms: 
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"manipulation of foreign exchange rates to discriminate against remission 
of profits, royalties, or other income on foreign investments; against 
repatriation of capital; and against imports of primary or semi-processed 
171 
materials required for production deemed 'non-essential' by the authorities". 
The above mentioned regulations were brought about as a result of social 
and political unrest, and the balance of payments considerations during 
the Nigerian civil war when the government needed large funds to prosecute 
the war, and also to prevent a balance of payments crisis. It can be 
argued therefore that, given the circumstances under which these economic 
policies were pursued, they were sound. Before the beginning of hostilities 
in Nigeria, foreign companies were allowed to repatriate all their profits. 
After 1964, a restriction was imposed on the repatriation of profits. 
Between 1965 and 1967, foreign companies operating in Nigeria could 
repatriate their profits, but only with the permission of the Central Bank 
of Nigeria. There was a complete ban on the repatriation of profits 
between 1968 and 1970. Since the end of the civil war and the resumption 
of petroleum exports on a large scale, the Nigerian Government has relaxed 
its foreign exchange regulations and British companies, as well as other 
foreign companies, have been allowed to repatriate some of their profits, 
capital and royalties. It should be added that unlike the 1960-1964 
period when foreign companies could repatriate all their profits, the amount 
of profits they can now repatriate in any one year is announced in 
the budget 
speech. This amount is determined by the foreign exchange resources avail- 
able. As an example, during the 1973/74 financial year, foreign companies 
were allowed to remit arrears of dividends in 1971 in full, and 
25 per cent 
of dividends in 1972. 
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Peter Gabriel, "The International Transfer of Corporate Skills", 
Harvard University Press, 1967, p. p. 15-16. 
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The economic policies now being rigorously pursued by the Nigerian 
government include regulations to prevent the dismissal of labour, 
indigenisation or the insistence on local participation and the restrictions 
on the employment of expatriates. The dismissal of Nigerians by foreign 
companies has been dealt with in Chapter VI. The regulations embodied 
in indigenisation will be dealt with at a later part of the chapter. 
Before dealing with the restrictions on foreign personnel, it is necessary 
to refer briefly to the Companies Decree of 1968. Promulgated on 
16th October, 1968, the main provision of the Companies Decree is the 
incorporation in Nigeria of all companies operating in the country. The 
Decree also stipulated that foreign-owned companies not prepared to in- 
corporate in Nigeria should wind up. The main aim of the Decree was that 
of regulating the activities of foreign companies, while at the same time 
forcing them to identify themselves with Nigeria. The Decree has had 
very little effect on British companies operating in Nigeria as most of 
them were already incorporated in the country. As an example, only three 
out of over twenty companies within the UAC Group were affected by the 
Decree. -The CDC, however, was seriously affected as its operations 
in 
Nigeria were undertaken by the CDC of the U. K. The problem has already 
been resolved as the CDC's operations in Nigeria are now vested in the 
CDC (Nigeria) Ltd.; a wholly independent subsidiary. 
The practice of limiting the employment of foreign personnel 
in 
Nigeria, as well as in many less-developed countries, has 
been widely 
criticised. As far as Nigeria is concerned, one important aspect of 
the 
matter has never been adequately considered, and that 
is the fact that 
foreign firms are always allowed to employ foreign personnel 
at the early 
stages of their operations in the country. It 
is only after sufficient 
time has elapsed for Nigerians to have gained enough experience 
and so 
attain good posts that limitations on the employment of 
foreign personnel 
are imposed. No one argues that foreign personnel should 
not be employed; 
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Nigeria has always welcomed foreign personnel in those fields of activities 
where there is a deficiency of qualified and experienced Nigerians. 
The Expatriate Quota Division of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs 
was designed to give foreign firms permission to recruit foreign personnel 
required for their operations when such personnel as required cannot be 
recruited in Nigeria. However, it must be conceded that some foreign 
firms - British and others - have often preferred foreign personnel to 
Nigerians, even though the latter may be as equally qualified and experienced 
as the former. The preference of British companies, as well as other 
companies, for expatriates has led them to design various methods of beating 
the Expatriate Quota System of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. The discovery of such illicit practices has led to the tightening 
up of the granting of entry permits to British nationals who want to go 
to Nigeria. When the rigorous screening processes of applicants for 
entry permits were combined with the administrative incompetence of the 
Nigerian Embassy officials in London dealing with passports, entry permits 
and visas, the result has often been long delays. The problem was 
acute enough to warrant the CBI Mission to Nigeria drawing the attention of 
the Nigerian Government to it. "... But you will, we hope, soon clear 
away some of the more venatious of them such as entry permit delays, which 
give the visitor such a bad impression before he has even left London". 
172 
One of the main attractions of international investment in Nigeria is 
the employment it is likely to create for the nationals of the country. 
The Nigerian Government is not prepared to accept any policy that will 
reduce this contributing effect "One of the reasons for encouraging private 
investment (foreign and indigenous) is the expectation that investment 
activities will generate employment opportunities for Nigerian nationals. 
The Government cannot therefore continue to tolerate a situation 
in which 
172CB1, 
"Nigeria 1970", London (no date) p. 67. 
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high-level Nigerian personnel educated and trained at great cost to the 
nation, are denied employment in their own country by foreign business 
establishments" . 
173 
The CBI's Mission to Nigeria in 1970 seemed to 
agree with the Nigerianisation of employment as the statement below will 
show. "..... It follows that we recognise and sympathise with the aspira- 
tions of our host country and its wish to determine its own independent 
destiny. We believe for example that your policy of the Nigerianisation 
of employment is entirely right - in any case expatriates are expensive". 
174 
There is no doubt, however, that British companies operating in 
Nigeria will be able to employ management and technical personnel from 
abroad, provided they can make a strong case for their employment. What 
the Nigerian Government is not likely to accept is the employment of 
expatriates in positions which can be suitably filled by Nigerians. Such 
employment not only reduces the opportunities for Nigerians to acquire 
experience, but it may represent a substantial foreign exchange leakage 
overseas. In addition, it must be emphasized that the major problem 
facing Nigeria at the present time is large-scale unemployment. Not 
only is there a large pool of unskilled labour in Nigeria, but the number 
of qualified unemployed has risen very sharply in the last five years, 
and it is still rising. The number of qualified Nigerian graduates 
overseas is estimated to be over 12,000, out of which three thousand 
are in America. 
175 
In Nigeria itself, the large number of graduates 
turned out by the country's six universities are finding it 
increasingly 
difficult to get employment. As the problem of unemployment 
becomes 
more accentuated, so also will the rigour with which the ban on 
the 
employment of foreign personnel is enforced. 
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DECREE NO. 4: NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION (NEP) DECREE 
Apart from the Nigerian civil war, the most hotly and seriously 
debated aspect of the post-independent Nigeria has been the recent 
Decree No. 4- The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree - promulgated 
on the 23rd February, 1972. The Decree raised many fundamental questions 
about Nigerian participation in commerce and industry to the extent that 
group discussions and seminars have been held on the major issues. It. 
is perhaps true to say that the Decree even raised more fundamental 
questions about the role of foreign investment in Nigeria up to the 
point of provoking comments from international newspapers. 
THE MAIN PROVISIONS OF DECREE NO. 4 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, which has been heralded as 
being the most radical step towards the indigenisation of the Nigerian 
economy ever taken by any post-independent Nigerian Government, was 
promulgated in February 1972. In an article on the Decree, a correspondent 
declared, "The decree was significant because it was the first time that 
the Nigerian Government had ever tried to intervene in the fast-growing 
jungle of private commerce and business, with its mushroom growth since 
the Nigerian civil war, where Nigerians were already running small scale 
enterprises alongside a vast army of foreigners including Lebanese, Syrians, 
and Greeks and even Britishers left behind after the tidal wave of 
There are two main reasons for the Decree. colonialism had passed". 
176 
Firstly, to speed up the complete control of small businesses by Nigerians. 
Nigerians "were already well on the way to capturing the small business 
sector in their country when the Federal Government decided 
in March 1972 
to hurry the whole process along by promulgating the Nigerian 
Enterprises 
Promotion Decree" , 
177 
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The Times, London, October 1,1973. 
177 
The London Times, op. cit. 
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Secondly, to force foreign investors out of the consumer goods industries 
into intermediate and capital goods industries. As has been shown in 
Chapter IV, over 80 per cent of British investment in the manufacturing 
industry is concentrated on consumer goods. Other foreign investors 
also concentrate their investments in manufacturing on consumer goods. 
This state of affairs arose in response to the wish of the post- 
independence Nigerian government to develop import substitution industries. 
As more foreign investors come to Nigeria to invest in consumer goods 
industries, the Nigerian Government decided it was time to develop inter- 
mediate and capital goods industries. In addition, Nigerians have now 
gained enough experience to be able to operate successfully in consumer 
goods industries. 
The main provisions of Decree No. 4 are the exclusive reservation 
for Nigerians of the twenty-two enterprises listed in Schedule 1 and the 
partial barring to aliens of another thirty-three enterprises listed in 
Schedule 2. As specified in the Decree: "(1) All enterprises specified 
in Schedule 1 of this Decree are hereby subject to the provisions of this 
Decree, exclusively reserved for Nigerian citizens or associations, and 
accordingly - (a) as from the appointed day, no person, other than a 
Nigerian citizen or association, shall be the owner or part owner of any 
such enterprise on or after the date of commencement of this Decree shall 
be established in Nigeria. ....... All enterprises specified 
in Schedule 2 
of this Decree are hereby, subject to the provisions of this Decree, 
barred to aliens, and accordingly, no alien shall, as from the appointed 
day, be the owner or part owner of any such enterprise - 
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SCHEDULE 1 
ENTERPRISES EXCLUSIVELY RESERVED 
1. Advertising agencies and public relations. 
2. All aspects of pool betting business and lotteries. 
3. Assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, television sets, 
tape recorders and other electric domestic appliances. 
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks. 
5. Blocks, bricks and ordinary tiles manufacture for building. 
6. Bread and cake making. 
7. Candle manufacture. 
8. Casinos and gaming centres. 
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment. 
10. Clearing and forwarding agencies. 
11. Hairdressing. 
12. Haulage of goods by road. 
13. Laundry and dry-cleaning. 
14. Manufacture of jewellery and related articles. 
15. Newspaper publishing and printing. 
16. Ordinary garment manufacture not combined with production of 
textile materials. 
17. Municipal bus services and taxis. 
18. Radio and television broadcasting. 
19. Retail Trade (except by or within the departmental stores and 
supermarkets. 
20. Rice milling. 
21. Singlet manufacture. 
22. Tyre retreading. 
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SCHEDULE 2 
ENTERPRISES BARRED TO ALIENS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS 
ITEM LIST OF ENTERPRISES 
1. Beer brewing. 
2. Boat building. 
3. Bicycle and motorcycle tyre manufacture. 
4. Bottling soft drinks. 
5. Coastal and inland waterways shipping. 
6. Construction industries. 
7. Cosmetics and perfumery manufacture. 
8. Departmental stores and supermarkets. 
9. Distribution agencies for machines and technical equipment. 
10. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, tractors and spare 
parts thereof or other similar objects. 
11. Estate agency. 
12. Fish and shrimp trawling and processing. 
13. Furniture making. 
14. Insecticides, pesticides and fungicides. 
15. Internal air transport (Scheduled and charter services). 
16. Manufacture of bicycles. 
17. Manufacture of cement. 
18. Manufacture of matches. 
19. Manufacture of metal containers. 
20. Manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar articles. 
21. Manufacture of soaps and detergents. 
22. Manufacture of suitcases, briefcases, handbags, purses, wallets, 
portfolios and shopping bags. 
23. Manufacture of wire, nails, washers, bolts, nuts, rivets and other 
similar articles. 
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SCHEDULE 2 (Cont. ) 
ITEM LT T OF ENTERPRISES 
24. Paper conversion industries. 
25. Passenger bus services (inter state). 
26. Poultry farming. 
27. Printing of books. 
28. Production of sawn timber, plywood, veneers and other wood 
conversion industries. 
29. Screen printing on cloth, dyeing. 
30. Slaughtering, storage, distribution and processing of meat. 
31. Shipping. 
32. Travel agencies. 
33. Wholesale distribution. 
(a) where - 
(i) the paid-up share capital of the enterprise does not 
exceed £200,000, or 
(ii) the turnover of the enterprise does not exceed £500,000, 
whichever the Board considers to be appropriate and 
applicable in relation to such enterprise; and 
(b) if the paid-up share capital exceeds £200,000 or the said turnover 
exceeds £500,000 (whichever is appropriate and applicable), where 
the equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in 
the enterprise is less than 40 per cent, and no alien enterprise shall 
be established, on and after the date of commencement of 
this Decree, 
as respects any of the said enterprises, or continue 
to be operated 
otherwise than as permitted under this Decree*" 
178 
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Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, Lagos, 
28th February, 1972, No. 10, Vol. 59, p. p. A13-A14. 
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The Decree also established the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board 
to advise the Federal Commissioner for Industries on clearly defined 
policy guide-lines for the promotion of Nigerian enterprises and to see 
that the provisions of the Decree are carried out and obeyed. As a 
watch-dog for the Board in each state, a Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Board was also created for every state to see that all alien enterprises 
affected by the Decree comply with its provisions. Inspectors of enter- 
prises were selected from the Federal Public Service to inspect Buildings, 
premises and businesses in order to determine whether the provisions of 
the Decree were being circumvented or /and breached. 
In addition, a fine of E7,500 or 5 years' imprisonment, or both, 
for any breach of the provisions of the Decree was provided. Perhaps 
more important from the point of view of foreign investors is the ability 
to seek exemptions from the provisions of the Decree. As stipulated in 
the Decree "The Commissioner may, without prejudice to the powers exercis- 
able under Section 5 above and subject thereto, with the prior approval 
of the Federal Executive Council, by an order published in the Federal 
Gazette exempt any existing enterprise from all or any of the provisions 
of this Decree and may (subject as aforesaid and with such approval) 
impose in relation to any exemption such conditions as he may think 
fit". 179 The foregoing discussion is in essence a brief summary of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 1972. 
Shortly after the end of the Nigerial civil war in January 
1970, the 
Military Government made it abundantly clear that it intends 
to increase 
Nigerian participation in the national economy. In the Second 
National 
Development Plan, 1970-74, the emphasis was on increased ownership 
by 
Nigerians of the resources of the Nigerian economy. 
11 
.... lt 
is vital, 
therefore, for Government to acquire and control on behalf of 
the Nigerian 
society, the greater proportion of the productive assets of 
the country. 
179 
Op. cit., p. A. 16. 
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To this end, the Government will seek to acquire, by law if necessary, 
equity participation in a number of strategic industries that will be 
specified from time to tire. In order to ensure that the economic 
destiny of Nigeria is determined by Nigerians themselves, the Government 
will seek to widen and intensify its positive participation in industrial 
development". 
180 
Throughout the whole document, words and phrases like 
"control", "self-reliance", "participation" and "economic independence" 
appeared with such frequency that foreign observers were led to describe 
the policy measures as economic nationalism. The Federal Government, 
however, gave some justifications for its policy. "Experience has shown 
through history, that political independence without economic independence 
is but an empty shell. The validity of this statement derives from the fact 
that the interests of foreign private investors in the Nigerian economy 
cannot be expected to coincide at all times and in every respect with 
national aspirations. It will be naive, indeed dangerous, to hope that 
in the process of industrial development, a set of national objectives 
will automatically be achieved by their mere declaration. A truly 
independent nation cannot allow its objectives and priorities to be dis- 
torted or frustrated by the manipulations of powerful foreign investors". 
181 
The announcement in June 1971 of the government's intention to indigenise 
certain sectors of the private sector and the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree that followed in 1972 should be regarded as a continuation 
of the government's desire to carry out one of the strategic aims of the 
Second Development Plan which seeks within rational limits to indigenise 
ownership, management and employment in certain areas of the 
Nigerian 
economy. "Those who have studied the Second National Development 
Plan 
can testify that the Enterprises Promotion Decree is in line with the 
180 
Second National Development Plan 1970-74, Federal Ministry 
of Information, Lagos, 1970, p. 289. 
181 
Second National Development Plan, p. 289. 
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objectives of economic nationalism that is aimed at supplementing the 
political autonomy of Nigeria with the economic independence that would 
make Nigerians masters in their own home, and architects of their 
economic destiny". 
182. 
Foreign reactions to the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
have been mostly unfavourable and critical of the Nigerian Military 
Government to a level that brought forth a sharp rebuke from the permanent 
secretary, Federal Ministry of Economic Development and Reconstruction, 
who declared: 
"It is instructive to observe the orchestrated reaction of 
the foreign press particularly the British Press to the 
indigenisation policy and other recent measures of the 
Federal Government. Predictions about the political future 
of the country have been pumped out at an increasing rate by 
these journals reminiscent of their activity during the civil 
war. These reactions clearly show that the actions of the 
Federal Government to adjust the economic situation to the 
advantage of its national is not viewed with favour. Even 
diplomatic envoys have been known to make unprecedented 
pronouncements on the provisions of internal legislation. 
The whole thing is aimed at shaking national confidence and 
seeks to obtain through any disorder which may ensue what 
could not be obtained through diplomatic representations and 
other forms of persuasion. If we do not wish to see the 
failure of our policies, then we shall have to close ranks 
and not allow any divisive tendencies to be exploited in the 
183 
interest of foreigners". 
The Nigerian Embassy in Bonn was forced to protest to the West Germany 
newspaper, "Die Welt"y over its reporting of the Decree. 
The newspaper 
was headed " Africanisation Decree also in Nigeria - Lagos offends 
foreign 
investors 
- projects endangered". 
182 
Professor Gani Jawando, The Philosophy behind Indigenisation 
Decree, 
Daily Times, April 18,1972, Lagos. 
183 affect national growth? J. J. Ebong, How does indigenisation policy 
A paper presented to the 10th Annual National Management Conference 
at 
Ibadan, March 1972. 
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The adverse foreign publicity accompanying the publication of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree was based on the misconception that 
the Decree was a form of nationalisation. The Nigerian government has 
never believed in nationalisation and the statements made by the late 
Prime Minister in 1964 were still much applicable to the country. 
"Believing, as we do, in an economy in which free enterprise and private 
capital can play their full part, " the late Prime Minister said to the 
House of Representatives, "we welcome the investment of private foreign 
capital in productive areas of the economy, and we recognise that the 
investor is entitled to look for a reasonable return from his invest- 
ment". The Prime Minister continued, "We acknowledge the role which 
foreign firms have played over the years in building up the nation's commerce 
and, in more recent years, 'by their contribution to the establishment of 
many industries. We have never concealed our belief that Nigerian 
enterprise and Nigerian capital must play an ever increasing part in 
the economic life of the nation. It must be obvious that no Nigerian 
can be content so long as any major sector of the economy is controlled 
by foreigners. But we are ialists and we say that so long as there is 
a dearth of Nigerian capital, so long must there be opportunity 
for 
foreign capital in Nigeria. We do not seek the withdrawal of 
foreign 
capital from any area of the economy before Nigerian enterprise 
is able 
to replace it. When the time for withdrawal has come, due notice will 
be given". 
184 
If anything, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree 
is a mere interpretation of the speech made in 1964 
by the late Prime 
Minister, in the light of economic development in Nigeria 
in 1972. 
Two important points are also worthy of note. 
The first point is 
that Decree No. 4 of 1972 is not a nationalisation 
decree. Added to this 
184 
West Africa 18/4/64. 
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is the complete freedom of foreign investors affected by the Decree to 
repatriate the proceeds of businesses sold should they decide not to 
invest in other areas of the economy not affected by the Decree. The 
Decree is emphatically not an attempt to deprive foreign investors of 
their businesses which they have in most cases taken several years to 
build up. The second important point to note is the length of time 
given to affected foreign investors to design ways of adapting to the 
provisions of the Decree. It was in June 1971 that the Military 
Government first gave an indication of its intention to indigenise some 
sections of the Nigerian economy. When the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree No. 4 was promulgated in February 1972, foreign investors 
operating in Nigeria were not shocked by the central issue of indigenisa- 
tion but were relieved of the anxiety about which areas would actually 
be affected when Schedules 1 and 2 were published. It should be added also 
that Decree No. 4 will not take effect until April 3,1974, which means 
foreign investors affected have over two years in which to reorganise their 
businesses so that they do not conflict with the provisions of the Decree. 
Apart from the ability of foreign investors aggrieved by the provisions 
of the Decree to seek exemptions, the two points discussed above are 
indicative of the sincerity of the Nigerian Authorities in reducing to 
the minimum the disruptions that may accompany the adaptation of companies 
to the provisions of the Decree, and to give foreign investors a fair deal. 
Equally important and internationally recognised is the fundamental right 
of a national government to make laws and regulations within its national 
boundaries designed specifically to confer advantages on its nationals 
vis-a-vis foreigners. The economic and social histories of England and 
many other European countries abound with examples of laws and regulations 
designed to confer advantages on the nationals of these countries vis-a-vis 
their foreign competitors. Notable examples in the case of 
England would 
be the Mercantilist Laws of the 16th and 17th centuries which conferred 
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exclusive trading and shipping rights on the British vis-a-vis other 
nationals. In recent years, many developed countries of Europe and Asia 
have been very reluctant to allow foreign investments in certain sectors 
of their economies. Thus, until 1972, for example, many sections of 
the Japanese economy were exclusively reserved for the Japanese businessmen 
and barred to foreign investors. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree, when viewed against the background of international economic 
policies, transcends the boundary of economics and enters equally into the 
political, social and national security fields. 
Just as the reactions of the foreign Press have been unfavourable and 
unrealistic about Decree No. 4, so also have the reactions of some Nigerians 
been favourable and unrealistic. Dressing themselves in bogus patriotic 
garbs, they argued that Decree No. 4 did not go far enough; they insisted 
that the Decree ought to embrace more industries. Patriotism has never 
and can never be a useful alternative to a sound economic policy. A 
government whose economic policies hinge upon patriotism is likely to face 
the detestable consequences of frustration and failure. A closer look 
at the enterprises listed in Schedule 1, which are exclusively reserved 
for Nigerians shows that the majority of them require simple technical 
and managerial know-how which Nigerians can easily acquire and many of 
them have actually acquired. As a consequence, and as can be expected, 
a large majority of firms operating in the areas of activities 
listed 
in Schedule 1 are Nigerian-owned. What Decree No. 4 aims 
to do as far 
as the activities listed in Schedule 1 are concerned is simply 
to quicken 
the pace at which Nigerians take over the remaining part of 
the activities 
still in foreign hands. Predominant among the foreign companies operating 
in the areas of activities exclusively reserved 
for Nigerians by Decree No. 4 
are Syrian, Greek, Levantine, Lebanese and other Arab companies. 
Most 
of these companies are engaged in retail trade and can 
be found in the 
major cities of the Federation operating their small shops. 
These retail 
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trading companies will have to sell their stocks, order no more and then 
move their capital into those areas of activities not reserved exclusively 
for Nigerians, or repatriate their capital into their respective countries. 
As for British companies operating in Nigeria, very few of them are 
in those areas exclusively reserved for Nigerians. The two leading British 
merchant firms, the UAC and John Holt, withdrew from retail trade in the 
early 1960s and concentrated on wholesale trade. Apart from the retail 
trade carried out in John Holt's West African Drugs Company and in UAC's 
Kingsway stores and G. B. Ollivant, in Lagos, British companies have moved 
out of retail trading. In addition, John Holts' Haco Company -a 
manufacturer of candles, some few companies assembling electrical goods and 
appliances, a few others engaged in running advertising agencies and public 
relations businesses, must be added to the list of the few British 
companies that will cease to exist as a result of the enterprises exclusively 
reserved for Nigerians. The Commonwealth Development Corporation (N. ) Ltd., 
which is likely to be affected because one of its subsidiaries in the 
Northern Nigeria, Northern Nigeria Investment Limited, a joint-venture 
between the CDC and Northern Nigerian States' governments, has invested a 
larger part of its resources in enterprises exclusively reserved for 
Nigerians. Since exemptions can be sought from the provisions of the 
Decree, the CDC(N) Ltd. has started negotiations with the Nigerian 
government to present its case for exemption to be granted to its 
Northern 
Nigerian subsidiary. It is very unlikely that other British companies 
affected by Schedule 1 provisions will try to seek exemptions. 
The thirty-three enterprises listed in Schedule 2 which are 
barred 
to foreigners under certain conditions are enterprises requiring 
more 
capital, advanced technology, management and technical 
know-how than 
those exclusively reserved for Nigerians. Despite 
these requirements, 
Nigerians have got a very good foot-held in a large number of 
activities 
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listed in Schedule 2, but it must be conceded that foreign companies pre- 
dominate, especially in those activities requiring large G, pital outlay 
and advanced management and technical know-how. A large number of 
British companies will be affected by the provisions of Schedule 2 of the 
Decree. They include such big companies as the UAC, John Holt, Elder 
Dempster Lines Ltd., I. C. I., all the British Paint companies operating in 
Nigeria, Unilever and Richard Costain Ltd. However, there are still 
some areas of activities not covered by the Decree in which British companies 
are operating, and such companies include the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC), 
Pilkington Brothers Ltd. and Tate & Lyle. There are two ways open to British 
companies affected by Decree No. 4 to adapt to its provisions: firstly, 
they can offer their shares to the Nigerian public until 40 per cent of 
their equity is in Nigerian hands. This is all that is required from 
British companies operating enterprises listed in Schedule 2 since most 
of them have paid-up share capital and turnover in excess of the £200,000+ 
and £500,000 respectively stipulated in the Decree. Those companies with 
£200,000 paid-up capital or less will have to expand their businesses 
above the £200,000 level before offering 40 per cent equity shares to 
Nigerians. Alternatively, they could sell their businesses and re-invest 
in other parts of the economy not embraced by the Decree. So also, the 
second alternative for British companies whose paid-up capital exceeds 
E200,000 but do not want to offer 40 per cent of their equity to Nigerians, 
is to sell their businesses and re-invest in other fields if they choose 
to do so or repatriate their capital to the U. K. It is not possible 
at the moment to predict how large a number of British companies will 
adapt to the provisions of the Decree. In the interview conducted 
in 
1972, many British companies explained that they would require clarifica- 
tion of some points before they would know what to do. 
They were however, 
not prepared to say which points needed clarification in 
the Decree. 
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others were still undecided as they explained that they would have to 
wait until 1974 before knowing what to do. It must be added that there 
was great anxiety all round. In the final analysis, it appears that 
. what most 
British companies affected by Decree No. 4 want is a reassurance 
from the Nigerian government about their future in Nigeria should they 
decide to expand existing businesses or move into new areas of activity 
in order to obey the provisions of the Decree. 
In recent months, there has been a spurt of activities both by foreign 
and Nigerian companies as a result of Decree No. 4. A large number of 
foreign companies such as the Union Trading Company, Nigerian Bottling 
Company, Leventis Motors, Aluminium Manufacturing Company, Associated 
Industries, Berec (Nigeria) Ltd., the United Africa Company Ltd. and 
John Holt Ltd., to mention a few, have floated shares and these have been 
bought by individual Nigerians and associations. Some of these foreign 
companies, especially the UAC and John Holt, had already been offering 
shares to the Nigerian public long before the promulgation of the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree in February 1972. Nigerian businessmen have 
also been taking an advantage of the chances created by the Decree to 
invest and establish companies for the purchase of expatriate businesses 
affected. In Kano State, for example, seventy-two new indigenous 
companies, with a total share capital of 0 million have been established 
since the publication of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. 
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The real effects of Decree No. 4 cannot be fully appreciated and analysed 
until several months after the Decree has taken effect. What can 
be 
said with every degree of certainty is that there is a great apprehension 
among British companies operating in Nigeria, and in 
the immediate future, 
the economic effects of the Decree are likely to be 
detrimental to the 
Nigerian economy for the reasons to be analysed below. 
185 
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Shortly after the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree in February 1972, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria's ex-President, at 
the quarterly luncheon of the Nigerian Guild of Editors in Lagos, criticised 
the "woeful inexperience, culpable incompetence, gross inefficiency and 
unwarranted ministerial interference" of the Nigerian nationalised industries. 
He criticised the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree as a phase of national- 
isation and would like to see statutory corporations and ancillary concerns 
run by management agencies on a commercial basis "If we nationalise indis- 
criminately- we shall be obliged to experience disappointments as other 
nations who were pressured into nationalising their enterprises by 
186 
doctrinaire idologists and armchair eggheads". Earlier, Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, one of the architects of Nigeria's independence had written on 
the gross inefficiency of Nigeria's public corporations: "With very few 
exceptions, Nigeria's public corporations are veritable hotbeds of criminal 
waste of natural and human resources. This is due mainly to fraud, 
corruption, and unspeakable inefficiency on the part of the Nigerians and, 
sometimes, non-Nigerians, who manage these corporations"* 
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As said 
earlier, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree is not a nationalisation 
decree and the above quotations from Nigeria's most popular politicians 
are designed to show some of the characteristics of the Nigerian society 
to-day. 
Three conditions have been emphasized by Dr. Adedeji, the Federal 
Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction as necessary for 
successful indigenisation. The first is the need for the emergence of 
a high breed of Nigerians 'ready to take risks. Second, 
there should be 
concentration on productive rather than speculative investment. 
The 
third is the necessity for ploughing back profit rather than 
indulging 
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in conspicuous consumption. In short, successful indigenisation requires 
the existence of people with management and technical know-how and high- 
calibre entrepreneurs, capable and competent, able and willing to take 
risks and expand production into new fields. The majority of Nigerian 
entrepreneurs lack business acumen and their general attitudes with 
regard to investment are negative to industrial development. The 
preference for short-lived speculative investments where profits are pro- 
bably surer and quicker rather than for taking risks by investing in 
productive ventures with long gestation periods are attitudinal traits 
widespread among Nigerian businessmen. The ploughing back of profits 
is necessary for future expansion and diversification into other areas. 
A large number of Nigerian businessmen prefer to lavish their profits 
on women, expensive foreign-made cars, foreign holidays and estate develop- 
ments. The character and the attitudinal traits of many Nigerian 
businessmen make it almost certain that most of the businesses they will 
take over from foreign investors affected by Decree No. 4 will be short- 
lived. 
Managerial incompetence and lack of technical know-how are two further 
obstacles to the success of Decree No. 4. As Chief Awolowo has observed, 
"Excessive. waste of resources, due to injudicious investment arising from 
lack of technical and managerial incompetence on the part of Nigerian 
private businessmen, abound everywhere" 9188 Professor 
Gani Jawando was 
also equivocal about the ability of Nigerian businessmen to 
take the oppor- 
tunities created by Decree No. 4. "Much as one would have wished 
it 
otherwise, we should face up to the fact that there is no guarantee whatsoever, 
especially in view of what we already know, that some of our 
indigenous 
businessmen would not let us down in future. We can only pray 
that the 
majority would be much more patriotic, and that they would 
think first 
188 
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about the national welfare before pursuing their selfish ends", the professor 
declared. 
189 
One of the immediate likely effects of Decree No. 4 is that some of 
the sectors of the Nigerian economy may stagnate. Indigenisation is a 
mere transfer of existing enterprises from foreign to local entrepreneurs and 
in that sense, it cannot lead to the expanson of existing units or the 
creation of additional units. Owing to the character traits of many 
Nigerian businessmen, most of the enterprises bought from foreign investors 
are likely to be short-lived. Nigerian businessmen are status oriented 
not achievement oriented. They take long leisure time-offs, an indication 
of high status in Nigeria, with the result that adequate attention to 
supervising their businesses receives secondary attention. The desire 
for high profits leads in most cases to shoddy, and trashy products which 
cannot find a steady market. The resulting effect being the closing 
down of businesses after some few years of operation. Decree No. 4 
is also likely to lead to disinvestment as foreign investors aggrieved 
by the new regulations repatriate their capital overseas and slow down 
the rate of expansion in other fields. 
It is necessary to emphasize the huge amount of capital required to 
purchase foreign-owned business affected by the Decree. Chief Fajemirokun, 
the President of the Nigerian Associations of Chamber of Commerce, Mines 
and Industries, said early in 1973 that the Federal Military Government 
needed more than £250 million to aid indigenous businessmen to 
take over 
foreign-owned companies affected by the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion 
Decree. 190 The Managing Director of the Nigerian Industrial Development 
Bank (NIDB) Mr. Dantyan refuted Chief Fejemirokun's estimate on 
the ground 
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that even though "the exercise will involve plenty of money", no one can 
really say how much would be needed for the take-over. 191 The Federal 
Government estimated that £100 million would be needed for the smooth 
take-over of the businesses affected. 
192 
The extravagant consumption 
patterns of some Nigerian businessmen make it certain that many of them 
would require financial help to buy foreign-owned companies affected. 
Instructions have already gone to the commercial banks that they should 
help indigenous businessmen to buy businesses affected by the Decree. 
Also, the Nigerian Government's compulsory take-over of 40 per cent equity 
share in three foreign-owned commercial banks, two of which are British, 
with effect from January 1,1973 was directed towards influencing, among 
other things, the loans-policy of these banks. In addition, the Nigerian 
Bank for Industry and Commerce was established to start operating on 
April 1,1973, with an initial capital of £31 million contributed as follows: 
Federal Government 60 per cent; Central Bank 20 per cent; the commercial 
banks 20 per cent. The bank was established purposely to aid Nigerian 
businessmen and institutions in buying from aliens small and medium-size 
businesses. 
By the end of 1974 when foreign-owned businesses would have been 
taken over by Nigerians under the provisions of Decree No. 4, the Federal 
Military Government would have spent over £100 million in aiding Nigerian 
businessmen. The question that easily comes to mind is: how much 
has been 
spent to make life convenient for the lower classes? The answer 
to this 
question can easily be deduced from an observation of a lecturer at 
Keele 
University who in September 1973 was on a visit to Nigeria. 
In the con- 
versation, the lecturer who has spent over nine years in Nigeria previously 
told the writer that grumbling on a wide scale is the main 
feature of the 
191 
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Nigerian society at the present time. Apart from the dangerously 
inadequate water and electricity supply and poor health facilities, which 
many millions of Nigerians have resigned themselves to, bad roads, lack of 
employment opportunities and roaring inflation abound everywhere throughout 
the Federation. What is even more puzzling is the fact that at a time 
when the world press and the Nigerian Press are immersed in the euphoria 
about Nigeria's oil boom and prosperity, millions of Nigerians, especially 
in the rural areas, are finding it extremely difficult to get the three main 
meals a day. The writer's foremost objection to the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree is the fact that it represents nothing but an upper class 
policy which is sure to increase the dangerously wide gap between the rich 
and the poor in Nigeria. Those Nigerians who have amassed wealth during the 
Nigerian civil war through corruption and smuggling have been provided with 
an opportunity to increase their dubious wealth. The enterprises affected 
by Decree No. 4 will necessarily be bought by rich Nigerians and therefore, 
the Decree can be viewed as a measure for the redistribution of wealth to 
Nigerians who are already rich. 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree is likely to result in un- 
employment and social discontent. There is a deep-seated anxiety among 
Nigerian employees of the businesses to be taken over by Nigerian business- 
men as to their future. Although a large number of foreign companies are 
bad employers and pay ridiculously low wages, Nigerian employers are likely 
to be worse. At present, wages paid in a large number of Nigerian-owned 
companies are below those paid in foreign-owned companies. Added to that 
are the twin diseases of favouritism and the demand for money before 
employment, which are prevalent in the Nigerian society. One would 
have 
expected a Decree which gives so much to the Nigerian businessmen 
to contain 
codes of conduct about wages, employment, quality of products, annual 
holidays 
and hours of work, but the absence of such codes of conduct 
is an important 
gap in the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. 
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Tax evasion is a chronic and common disease among Nigerians in 
general but it is worse among Nigerian businessmen. Many of them do not 
keep accounts so that it is difficult to assess the profitability of their 
businesses. Also, many of them engage in other profitable activities which 
are neither registered for tax purposes nor regarded as taxable activities 
by the Nigerian governments. Such activities include housing businesses, 
transport operation and retail trade. As a consequence, a large number 
of Nigerian landlords and transporters who are mostly businessmen operating 
other enterprises and retail traders, both men and women, make thousands 
of pounds every month on which no tax is paid. Salary-earners bear the 
brunt of the Nigerian tax system; a junior clerk earning E20 a month pays 
about £2 in tax and another £2 towards a provident fund, leaving him only 
£16 for the month, while a retail trader who makes over £1,000 in a month 
pays no tax. Given the tax evasion ability of Nigerian businessmen, the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree is likely to result in a decrease 
in the government's revenue emanating from the businesses bought over from 
aliens. 
It is certain that the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree will create 
a foreign exchange problem for Nigeria as foreign entrepreneurs embark 
on transferring the proceeds from the sale of their businesses to their 
countries. Unless the Nigerian government sees that the repatriation of 
capital is well spaced and effectively co-ordinated, in the short-run, 
Decree No. 4 is likely to lead to a foreign exchange bottleneck which can 
precipitate a balance of payments crisis. The latter, in turn, can and 
will slow down the rate of economic development. It is being argued 
that 
in the long run Decree No. 4 will have a favourable effect on 
the Nigerian 
balance of payments as Nigerian businessmen take over foreign-owned 
busi- 
nesses and will not need to repatriate profits abroad. 
This argument 
is based on the assumption that those Nigerians who will 
take over from 
foreign investors enterprises affected by Decree No. 
4 are patriotic, high- 
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calibre businessmen who will not attempt to beat Nigeria's foreign 
exchange regulations to have their money in foreign banks nor extravagantly 
lavish their money on foreign holidays, expensive foreign cars and goods. 
From what has been said about Nigerian businessmen, and in the absence 
of any code of conduct to curb malpractices, it is difficult to imagine 
how they will contribute favourably to Nigeria's balance of payments as 
a result of Decree No. 4. One can only hope that Nigerian businessmen 
will allow the national interest to override their fetish selfish interests 
so that they can contribute favourably to the country's balance of payments 
in the long run. 
There is the likelihood that the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
will have an unfavourable effect on foreign investments in the country. 
Apart from the fact that existing investments may be adversely affected 
as foreign investors wind up their businesses to repatriate their capital 
to their countries of origin, new and prospective investors are likely to 
be discouraged. As for British investors already in Nigeria, one can sum 
up their feelings with two statements made in interviews. "What we are 
anxious about is how it (Decree No. 4) is going to be implemented for it 
is this that is going to determine whether investment will be put off", 
said the representative of one of Nigeria's leading foreign investors. 
"Much as we would like investment to continue as before I am afraid that 
the indigenisation decree will put off many foreign investors". The 
latter statement echoed the feelings of a large number of British companies 
interviewed. Since the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree has not yet 
taken effect it is impossible therefore to know whether British companies 
will actually curtail their investments as they have indicated 
in interviews. 
While the Decree may discourage new investors, its effect on already 
established British investors in Nigeria is likely to be marginal. 
Given 
the large domestic market of Nigeria and the rapidly growing 
income levels, 
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unlimited opportunities exist for foreign investors in those activities 
not covered by Decree No. 4. Provided British investors as well as other 
foreign investors are assured of the safety of their investments in other 
fields, they are likely to push ahead with their investment programmes. 
In conclusion, there can be no doubt about the intention of the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree to increase the participation by 
Nigerians in their economy by reserving for them certain fields of activities 
which they are capable of managing, and by enforcing participation in more 
sophisticated fields controlled by foreigners, which Nigerians have not 
got sufficient technical and management know-how to control on their own. 
Although foreign investors may not like the limitations imposed on them 
by Decree No. 4, it ought to be realised, however, that the threats posed 
to the national and economic security of a country whose economy is con- 
trolled by foreigners are real enough to call for the type of regulations 
envisaged by the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. In the final 
analysis the aims of a National government and those of foreign investors 
are not always complementary and, in most cases, are incompatible for, 
while the former strives to increase the welfare of its people, the latter 
are preoccupied with how to increase the rate of return on capital invested. 
It is however, questionable whether the Decree would increase the welfare 
of many Nigerians. As the Decree only involves the take-over of existing 
businesses by Nigerians, new employment opportunities are not likely to 
result. In addition, new and improved products and better services are 
not likely to accompany the implementation of the Decree either. 
What 
would most likely emerge, given the attitudinal and character 
traits of 
many Nigerian businessmen, are shoddy products, unemployment, and 
inefficient 
management of the businesses taken over. Perhaps the most 
detestable aspect 
of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree is the concentration of economic 
Power in few, selfish and extravagant hands. The 
latter in turn will widen 
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the enormous gap between the rich and the poor and increase the already 
noticeable tension between the two classes. 
If the Nigerian government wants maximum benefit to accrue to the 
mass of the people from the opportunities created by Decree No. 4, certain 
measures require urgent attention. Firstly, a code of conduct rigorously 
enforced to regulate Nigerian business practices on matters like wages, 
holidays, employment, the quality of products and services ought to be 
formulated as a deterrent for the malpractices of some Nigerian businessmen. 
Secondly, there should be a compulsory registration of all foreign businesses 
taken over to help the government in the collection of taxes. This should 
be accompanied by a declaration by their Nigerian owners that the business 
will not be wound up within the next ten years of their purchases without 
the permission of the Federal Commissioner for Industries. This will dis- 
courage speculative investors. Thirdly, the Nigerian government should 
intensify its management and technical training programmes so that the 
vacuum left by the departing foreign managers and technicians can be easily 
filled with little disruption to the economy. The training programmes of 
the Industrial Training Fund and the Federal Administrative College should 
be broadened and widened, while occasional management courses should be 
designed for Nigerian entrepreneurs. Lastly, the Nigerian government should 
evolve a clear policy on foreign investment so that foreign investors 
may know which areas to invest in and how long they could operate 
in 
the areas before the insistence on domestic participation. 
This will go 
a long way to reduce the anxiety of foreign investors and convince 
them 
that the intention of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree is not to 
drive them out of Nigeria but "to get the talented 
foreigner out of petty 
trading into large-scale manufacturing where he can still retain 
control and 
make good profits while gradually passing on his skill 
to Nigerians". 
193 
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CONCLUSION 
The advantages conferred on British investors by the long association 
between Britain and Nigeria are substantial enough to stand British investors 
in a better stead vis-a-vis other competitors in Nigeria. Although 
British investors have exploited these advantages in the past, the existence 
of a number of obstacles created by British investors themselves, as wel 
as by Nigeria, is constantly reducing their ability to gain substantially 
from the advantages. The attitudes of British investors to their invest- 
ment programmes and to the Nigerian society are a great impediment to their 
investment in Nigeria. The lethargic, conservative and overcautious 
attitudes of British investors have not only enabled other foreign 
competitors to be invited to Nigeria, but they have also shaken the Nigerian 
authority's confidence in their reliability. British companies should 
strive to pursue aggressive investment programmes and take their Nigerian 
employees into their confidence in order that they may retain their leading 
position among foreign investors in Nigeria. While the economic policies 
regarding the restriction on the repatriation of profits, the employment 
of expatriates and indigenisation can be defended on the grounds of social 
and political expediency, the same cannot be said about administrative 
delays and insufficient infrastructure. The damage done by these obstacles 
to the Nigerian economy is real enough to warrant their immediate removal 
with an ultimate beneficial effect on economic development and the inflow 
of foreign capital. 
350q 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the limitations imposed on this study by the non-availability 
of some statistics, certain specific conclusions on the role of British 
direct investment in the economic development of Nigeria can be reached. 
As a first step, it is desirable to point out that the effect of British 
direct investment depends, to a large extent, upon the fields of activity 
into which it flows. As we have pointed out in Chapter II, British 
direct investment was not widely diversified throughout the Nigerian 
economy during the period covered by this study. A sectoral analysis 
of investment showed that over 95 per cent of the total direct investment 
was concentrated in petroleum extraction, distribution and manufacturing. 
Investments in petroleum extraction accounted for over two-thirds of 
British direct investment during the 1955-1972 period. Until after 1968, 
the retail trade and distribution sector was the second most important 
absorber of British capital investment. The fall in the profit margins 
of the British merchant firms brought about by fierce competition from 
Nigerian distributors and foreign manufacturers, and the political pressure 
applied together with the incentives for industrialisation provided by 
the Nigeri an government, encouraged the redeployment of capital from 
distribution into manufacturing on a large scale after 1969. As a 
consequence, the manufacturing sector became the second most important 
absorber of British capital investment from 1969 onwards. Perhaps 
the 
most important sectoral feature of British direct investment 
between 1955 
and 1972 was the insignificant proportion of the total investment con- 
centrated in the agricultural sector. The existence of a 
large number 
of peasants in the Nigerian agriculture made the plantation system which 
is most suitable for foreign investors uneconomic and 
incompetetive. 
In addition, the policy of the British Colonial Government, 
which prohibited 
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the ownership of land in Nigeria by foreigners, and the repressive 
pricing policy of the Nigerian Marketing Board were enough to make 
direct investment in Nigerian agriculture both impossible and unattractive 
to British investors. Therefore British firms were willing to undertake 
direct investments only in those few cases where the domestic production 
of raw materials could serve as input for industries and so offer them 
substantial advantages, as with palm oil and rubber plantation investments. 
As a result of the low level of direct investment, the contribution of 
British direct investment to Nigerian agriculture has been largely in- 
direct; the research into crop diseases; the making available to farmers 
of the results of such research and the granting of loans and credits to 
farmers; the supply of agricultural implements and the purchase of agri- 
cultural products for use in industries. 
THE OVERALL BENEFITS OF BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT TO THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 
From the sectoral distribution of British direct investment in 
Nigeria, certain specific areas of contribution can be identified. 
British direct investment has made some net addition to capital formation 
during the period under consideration. Between 1955 and 1963, only a 
marginal contribution was made to capital formation since buildings, civil 
engineering works, land and agricultural development, mainly undertaken 
by the Nigerian Government and private Nigerians, accounted for over 
80 per cent of the total capital formation during the period. Since 
1964, 
investments in plant, machinery'and equipment, largely financed by 
foreign- 
owned companies have become the most important constituent of capital 
formation. Investments in plant, machinery and equipment rose 
from 
27.7 per cent of the total capital formation in 1964 to 
53.7 per cent 
in 1972. However, since there were many foreign and indigenous 
investors 
responsible for the investments in plant, machinery and equipment, 
the 
contribution of British direct investment to capital 
formation can best 
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be visualized by the level of capital inflows. Between 1962 and 1967, 
British capital inflows, of which over 90 per cent werenetained earnings, 
accounted for 8.8 per cent of the total capital formation during the period 
and this tends to emphasize the limited nature of the contribution. 
Although, since 1970, there has been a substantial increase in British 
direct investments, the contribution to capital formation is still likely 
to be marginal since there has been a substantial increase in investments 
all round. 
British direct investments have made only marginal contributions to 
employment in Nigeria. In 1972, the total number of Nigerians employed 
by British companies was about 50,000, a drop in the ocean out of a work- 
ing population of nearly 30 million. The proportion was in fact only 
0.17 per cent of the working population. The limited employment created 
by British direct investment was due to the following reasons: (a) the 
concentration of direct investment in the petroleum industry, which is by 
nature very capital-intensive; (b) the concentration of investments in other 
sectors on capital-intensive projects and (c) the adoption of labour-saving 
techniques in some sectors. Notwithstanding the low level of employment 
directly generated, it must be conceded as R. S. May has concluded that 
British direct investment "has made an important contribution to the 
extension of wage employment in Nigeria". 
194 Although British direct 
investment accounted for only 3.3 per cent of the total wage employment in 
Nigeria in 1972, such a proportion cannot be dismissed as insignificant 
since the public sector accounted for nearly 80 per cent of the 
total. 
Therefore, British direct investment generated around 16 per cent of the 
total wage employment in the private sector. 
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In its contributions to the transfer of technology and to government 
revenue, British direct investment has been of particular importance to 
Nigeria. British direct investment has served as an instrument for the 
transfer of technology which was most significant in the manufacturing 
and the petroleum industries. Not only did British direct investment 
lead to the upgrading of human skills, but the transfer of modern 
technologies to Nigeria also provided the opportunities for the acquisi- 
tion of new skills through learning by doing. It must be added, however, 
that the concentration of British direct investment on petroleum extraction, 
distribution and consumer goods, the last two sectors of which are not 
researchoriented, necessarily reduced the research and development activities 
of British companies in Nigeria. The fact that the majority of British 
companies have no research establishment in Nigeria needlessly reduces the 
opportunity for Nigeria to gain the much-needed research and development 
experience. 
The contributions associated with British direct investment have been 
the most important component of the Nigerian government's revenue during 
the 1955-1972 period. In a country where a large majority of indigenous 
businesses keep no account to facilitate tax assessment, and tax evasion 
is acute and widespread, tax incidence in Nigeria falls very heavily on 
salary earners and foreign companies, who usually keep accounts. As a 
consequence, British companies contribute a substantial portion of 
the 
Nigerian government's revenue. It is the petroleum industry, 
however, 
which bears the brunt of the government's taxation policy. 
In 1971, for 
example, nearly 32 per cent of the Nigerian government's revenue emanated 
from the petroleum industry. Shell-BP has always been 
the major contributor 
towards the petroleum revenue because of its dominant position 
in the 
Nigerian petroleum industry. In 1970, for example, out of 
the £88 million 
revenue from the petroleum industry, it is estimated 
that Shell-BP contri- 
buted L65 million which was not only 73.9 per cent of 
the petroleum revenue, 
354 
but also 16.6 per cent of the total Nigerian government's revenue for 
the year. In addition, the personal income tax payments of British 
companies' employees were also an important source of public finance. 
As a source of foreign exchange, British direct investment, excluding 
the investment in the extraction of crude oil, has a "once and for all" 
effect. Apart from the net addition to Nigeria's foreign exchange when 
the initial investment took place, British direct investment has not been an 
important source of foreign exchange. During the 1961-1968 period, the 
net capital inflow to Nigeria emanating from British direct investment 
amounted to £142.3 million. Out of this amount, unremitted profits were 
£125.6 million. This means that retained earnings accounted for 88.3 per 
cent of the total net capital inflow during the period, and that during 
this nine-year period, the net addition to Nigeria's foreign exchange 
resources added up to £16.7 million. The low level of contribution to 
the foreign exchange resources of Nigeria is likely to continue as British 
investors resort more to internal financing for their expansion programmes. 
It follows from the above discussion that if the inflow of capital 
associated with British direct investment was not an important source of 
foreign exchange, then the foreign exchange earnings associated with 
British direct investment's exports must be substantially greater than the 
cost of imports before such investment could make a significant contribution 
to the Nigerian balance of payments. Apart from petroleum investment, 
British direct investment was concentrated on goods and services meant 
for domestic consumption and as such, was not a source of foreign exchange. 
But such direct investment was a source of balance of payments problem 
for Nigeria, since it entailed a substantial amount of 
imports which was 
not matched by a corresponding amount of generated exports. 
As shown in 
Chapter VI, exports of crude petroleum by Shell-BP exceeded 
its imports 
by only £12.1 million during the 1938-1964 period. 
Although crude oil 
export began to exceed the imports associated with petroleum 
production in 
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1961, it was not until after 1964 that the value of such exports was 
substantial enough to swamp the effect of the substantial imports associa- 
ted with British direct investment in other sectors. It is, therefore, clear 
that between 195.5 and 1964, British direct investment did not contribute 
favourably to Nigeria's balance of payments. 
The above conclusion does not, however, agree with the one reached by 
may on the effects of British direct investments on the Nigerian balance of 
payments during the 1953-1963 period. May concluded that "direct invest- 
ment by overseas companies has helped Nigeria's Balance of Payments very 
considerably. 
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May arrived at his conclusion by considering the exports 
associated with direct investments, of which tin and crude oil were the 
only two. He then asserted that a substantial amount has been saved 
rrom import substitution in Nigeria. He compared capital inflow with 
the value of Nigerian exports and in the end, noted that the profits of 
U. K. companies were "moderate" and as such, could not and did not create 
any balance of payments problem for Nigeria. May's analysis of the 
contribution of direct investment to Nigeria's balance of payments was 
based on the equation : CO =E+C+S- Rp ...... 
(1) 
where CB is the contribution to balance of payments 
E is the value of exports associated with investment 
C is capital inflow 
S is the saving on import substitution 
and Rp is the repatriated profits. 
Thus, during the 1953-1963 period E+C+S> Rp, 
hence British direct investment contributed considerably to the 
Nigerian balance of payments. 
Gay's analysis can be criticised on a number of points. 
The first criticism 
is the omission of vital statistics from his analysis. 
It is true that 
195 
R. S. May, op. cit. 
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British direct investment gave rise to tin and crude oil exports but, 
during the 1953-1963 period, such exports were marginal since the agri- 
cultural sector accounted for over 90 per cent of the Nigerian total 
exports during the period. But, even if the value of tin and crude 
oil exports were substantial during the period, what is important from 
the point of view of balance of payments contribution is the net foreign 
exchange earnings, after deducting the imports associated with exports. 
May's failure to consider the imports associated with tin and crude oil 
export is an important gap in his analysis. 
The second criticism of May's analysis is his treatment of the 
effect of import substitution on Nigeria's balance of payments. May 
asserted that the savings from a reduction in imports associated with 
import substitution industries were a benefit to the Nigerian balance 
of payments. As has been shown in Chapter IV, import substitution in 
Nigeria, far from being beneficial to the Nigerian balance of payments 
has created foreign exchange problems in two ways. Firstly, there is 
the substantial imports of raw materials and capital goods associated 
with import substitution which could not be paid for by the exports of 
manufactures. Secondly, the dissatisfaction with the import substitution 
goods has resulted in a high level of smuggling in Nigeria, which has 
also leaked Nigerian foreign exchange overseas. 
196 
In addition, the problem of estimating the foreign exchange savings 
associated with import substitution is enormous since the domestic production 
of goods in itself g3nerates a demand which has nothing to do with imports. 
As a consequence, a comparison of the increase in domestic production 
and import levels cannot be regarded as a reliable indication of what will 
happen to imports in the absence of domestic production. But 
domestic 
196 
See Chapter III for the foreign exchange cost of smuggling 
Nigerian primary products overseas. 
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production, through its income effect, can have a worsening effect on 
the balance of payments. An increase in domestic production will 
necessarily increase the wages and salaries of employees, which will, in 
turn, leak foreign exchange resources overseas through an increase in the 
demand for imports and an increase in the amount of salary expatriates 
repatriate to their countries. 
197 
Also interesting is May's treatment of the effects of profits 
repatriated on the Nigerian balance of payments. The earnings of British 
investment in Nigeria (excluding oil and except for 1963, insurance) 
according to May, averaged only 6.4 per cent on a total net asset value 
of investments over the period 1958-1963. This low level of profit 
was enough for May to conclude that "in view of the moderate profit rate 
achieved, the size of current payments in respect of direct investment 
has not been a problem item in Nigeria's Balance of Paymentd. 
98 It has 
been shown in Chapter II that as long as companies use transfer prices to hide 
the level of their profits in order to avoid public outcry when published 
profits are high, 
199 
and to avoid tax payment, the profits shown by 
companies on their profit and loss account are likely to be low. 
The difference between the writer's and May's estimate of the effect of 
direct investment on the balance of payments is clear-cut. The writer's 
estimate is based on the equation: 
CB =E+C+S- Rp -W-I... (2) 
where W is the foreign exchange leakage as a result of expatriates 
sending some parts of their wages and salaries 
home, 
I is the value of imports associated with direct investments 
197 
The proportion of their salaries which expatriates are allowed 
to 
send home is estimated as a percentage of their salaries, which 
falls or 
rises with a decrease or an increase in their total earnings. 
198 
R. S. nay, op. cit. 
199 
See E. T. Penrose, "Foreign Investment and the Growth of 
the Firm", 
Economic Journal, June 1956, for the reaction of Australia to 
the high 
profit made by General Motors-Holden's Ltd. 
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and CB9 E, C, S AND Rp having the same identity 
as in equation (1) 
Thus, the contribution to balance of payments is positive if 
E+C+S>Rp+W+I 
During the 1953-1963 period, E+C+S< Rp +W+I 
and therefore, the balance of payments effect of British direct investment 
on Nigeria was negative. Since 1965, however, the crude oil exports of 
Shell-BP have been large enough not only to pay for the imports associated 
with British direct investments in other sectors, but also to make a substan- 
tial net contribution to foreign exchange reserves of Nigeria. Therefore, 
between 1965 and 1972, British direct investment made a favourable contri- 
bution to the Nigerian balance of payments. 
British direct investment has also made some contribution to the 
Nigerian Gross Domestic Product. In 1962-63, for example, mining, manu- 
facturing and distribution contributed 2 per cent, 5.8 per cent and 
12.2 per cent respectively to the GDP. The proportions have increased 
to 18.5 per cent, 8.5 per cent and 11.5 per cent respectively in 1971-72. 
Since British companies predominate in these three sectors, the contribution 
of British direct investments to Nigerian GDP in 1971-72 could be of the 
order of 19 per cent. 
200 In addition, although British direct investment 
as a proportion of total foreign investment in the manufacturing sector 
has been falling since 1960, nevertheless British direct investments 
were, in large part, responsible for the rapid and substantial growth and 
the diversification of industrial production during the 1955-1972 period. 
THE LIIIITMTIONS OF DIRECT INVESTMENT 
British direct investment would have contributed more to economic 
development in Nigeria were it not for the following limitations. 
The 
200 
This estimate is based on the assumption that 
British companies were 
responsible for over two-thirds of mining's contribution 
to the GDP and 
one-third of the contributions of manufacturing and 
distribution sectors. 
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first is that associated with the high import-content of most of the 
direct investments. Excessive dependence upon imported raw materials 
and capital goods should be emphasized as one of the main features of 
British direct investments, and this explains why, during the 1960-1971 
period, capital goods and raw materials accounted for nearly 60 per cent 
of the Nigerian total imports. On average, more than 65 per cent of 
the value of British direct investment's manufacturing output is accounted 
for by the cost of imported raw materials and capital goods. The corres- 
ponding proportion for the Nigerian economy as a whole is 45 per cent. 
201 
As a second limitation, apart from mining investment, British direct 
investment was concentrated on the production of goods and services for 
domestic consumption, and not for export. When the first and the second 
limitations are combined, two further results come out quite clearly and 
these are (a) the limited nature of the linkage effects of British direct 
investment, and (b) the constraint imposed on the foreign exchange resources 
of Nigeria through an over-dependence on imports which could not be matched 
by export earnings. 
The third limitation is the concentration of direct investment in 
the manufacturing sector on final products. During the period under 
consideration, over 80 per cent of British manufacturing investment was 
concentrated on final consumption goods. This means that the linkage 
effects of such investment were invariably very limited. The inter- 
mediate goods sector even now accounts for only 18 per cent of the 
Nigerian industrial production, while the capital goods sector accounts 
for 23 per cent. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the 
third 
limitation is that British direct investment has not helped much in the 
deepening of the Nigerian economy. Until such time when 
the end uses 
of goods associated with British direct investment are not 
for consumption, 
201 
P. C. Asiodu, op. cit. 
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but to serve as input for industry, British direct investment will not 
have substantial linkage effects and contribute to the deepening of the 
Nigerian economy. 
The last limitation is the specificity of certain direct investments. 
This prevented the maximum utilization of the resources under the control 
of British companies to the greater advantage of Nigeria. An instance 
of this particular case is the petroleum industry; Shell-BP undertook 
the major investments for the sole aim of supplying crude oil to the 
international market, thus neglecting the possibility of a petro-chemical 
complex and the economic use of the natural gas produced in conjunction 
with crude oil. In 1970, over 700 million cubic feet/day of associated 
gas were flared in the Nigerian oil fields and the amount has increased to 
over 1000 million cubic feet/day recently. In an editorial headed 
"Making use of our Gas Resources", the Nigerian Daily Times notes that 
"over 1000 million cubic feet of gas associated with oil-production is 
now being burnt daily at the well heads in the oil-producing areas", 
while "importations of gas run into about NL15 million a year". 
202 The 
gas flared by Shell-BP must have represented a substantial loss of revenue 
to the Nigerian economy. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U. K. AND NIGERIAN GOVERNMENTS' POLICIES TOWARDS 
BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA 
Nigeria has, over the period under consideratiob, adopted an open- 
door policy towards foreign investments and deliberately encouraged 
direct investments by various incentives such as tax holiday, accelerated 
depreciation, initial investment allowances and tariff protection. 
Given 
the limitations associated with British and other 
foreign investments in 
Nigeria, some of the incentives were neither necessary nor 
effective. 
202 
West Africa, 29 October, 1973. 
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Excessive tax concessions to foreign investors not only deprived the 
Nigerian Government of substantial revenue, but they also encouraged 
capital-intensive production techniques as capital equipment could be written 
off during a short period of time. Presumably, if the incentives to 
foreign investors had taken the form of wage subsidies, more Nigerians 
could have been employed. 
The effectiveness of the various incentives was never investigated 
and, as a consequence, a large number of the incentives were often a case 
of giving something for nothing. As an example, the tax incentives were 
so ridiculously generous that they not only allowed foreign investors to 
write off their capital equipment within 2-5 years of their purchase, but 
they also allowed some companies who made substantial profits during 
their early years of operation to get away completely untaxed. In addi- 
tion, two further features of the government's incentives policy, which 
were very unsatisfactory were (a) the differences in the period for which 
tax relief is granted to investors, and (b) the differences in the level 
and amount of relief granted to investors in the same industry. If 
differences were to exist, and they should in fact exist, then the import- 
ance of such differences ought to be investigated and demonstrated. One 
could conclude that the Nigerian Government's policies are unsatisfactory as 
the policies have (a) not been important in attracting foreign investors and 
(b) have offered unnecessary protection to inefficient firms at 
the expense 
of the more efficient ones. 
Given the fact that a large number of British investors in Nigeria were 
former exporters to the Nigerian market, and were also existing 
investors 
diversifying to related and new lines of profitable productive activities, 
the non-existence of many of the allowances could 
have had little or no 
effect on their investment programmes. In actual 
fact, there was a general 
consensus among the British companies interviewed 
that only two of the 
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government's incentives were considered important and these were (a) the 
accelerated depreciation allowances and (b) tariff protection. According 
to P. C. Asiodu, the rapid growth in industrial production in Nigeria 
during the past decade was due to the size of the Nigerian market giving 
rise to a high level of investment opportunities to meet increasing demand 203 
Asiodu's conclusion seems to tie with the findings of R. S. May and with 
the results of the interview of 37 British companies conducted by the 
writer on the motivation to invest in Nigeria in which 38 per cent 
emphasized the inherent strength of the Nigerian economy and the long- 
term prospects for industrial investments. It is likely, therefore, 
that the most important incentive for foreign investment in Nigeria is 
the existence of profitable opportunities resulting from the rapidly 
growing market of Nigeria. 
It is in the light of the natural market incentive of Nigeria 
that the government's industrial policy and incentives ought to be 
re-appraised to halt the generous hand-out to investors, both Nigerian 
and foreign alike. It must be added, however, that a large number of 
infant industries in Nigeria require tariff protection at the early stages 
of their development. Once these industries are well-established, the 
government should be able to remove the tariffs gradually, for the sake 
of increased efficiency. Over and over again, British companies 
inter- 
viewed emphasized the need for tariff protection. The problem associated 
with tariff protection is that once introduced, protected 
industries tend 
to want it to stay on for ever. Yet, it can be demonstrated 
that ex- 
cessive protection tends to be detrimental to the national economy 
of the 
country offering the protection. As Harry Johnson 
has shown, tariff 
protection, even when accompanied by technical progress, can 
reduce the 
203 
P. C. Asiodu, "Industrial Policy and Incentives 
in Nigeria", 
NJESS, July 1967. 
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country's real income by increasing the resources shifted towards the 
industry where the progress occurs. This can happen through the excess 
cost of additional protected production of import substitutes which may 
more than absorb the increase in potential output per head 
? 04 This, of 
course, has been the case with the Nigerian textile industry. Shielded 
from international competition, the high cost of textile production and 
the resulting high prices for final textile products have made it impossible 
for the Nigerian textile industry to sell the goods it produced. In 
addition, tariff protection can result in the production of inferior and 
shoddy goods which can neither get into the domestic market nor into foreign 
markets. 
Two further points are also worth noting. Firstly, tariff protection 
for infant industries in developing countries is based on the premise 
that these countries do not have at their disposal the modern production 
technology which can enable them to compete on an equal footing with 
developed countries. It seems therefore that tariff protection for firms 
from advanced societies, who have access to the most modern forms of techn- 
ology, may represent an unnecessary subsidy, and that may be detrimental 
to the welfare of the developing country offering the protection. Secondly, 
tariff protection has been so widely offered. by many developing countries 
that foreign investors have had to take more important factors into 
consideration before deciding whether or not to invest in a particular 
country. Such important factors include the availability of supplementary 
and co-operating factors like labour, land and domestic capital, 
the nature 
and the resources endowment of the country, the forms and characteristics 
of economic and social institutions and the level of 
development in the 
economy. While these factors seem to be more important 
in attracting 
204 
H. Johnson, "The Possibility of Income Losses from 
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foreign investment than tariff protection, Nigeria cannot unilaterally 
remove the tariff protection offered to firms without putting itself at 
a disadvantage vis-a-vis other developing countries who still retain the 
protection. The developing countries, when attracting foreign investment 
do not collude to offer uniform incentives to prospective investors. 
Instead, there is usually a cut-throat competition in offering generous 
incentives, which, on the aggregate, makes nearly all of them worse off. 
There seems to be no easy solution to this problem because there does 
not exist an organisation which can foster the collusion. Even if there 
were such an organisation, its efficiency and effectiveness would depend 
on (i) a general consensus by developing countries to honour agreements and 
(ii) a uniform distribution of gains among developing countries. While 
such an organisation exists for petroleum investments (the OPEC), and has 
enjoyed a measure of success, it is doubtful whether an organisation com- 
prising all the developing countries will be able to achieve as much as 
the OPEC. Until such time when the developing countries will agree 
among themselves to remove the unnecessary subsidies offered to foreign 
firms, Nigeria will just have to behave like others in formulating its 
incentive policies. However, the advantage conferred on Nigeria, where 
foreign exchange is not a constraint, must ensure that foreign investments 
are not admitted on any term and that more fundamental contributive factors 
are taken into account when granting concessions to foreign investors. 
In the final analysis, while new industries require tariff protection at 
the early stages of their establishment, the Nigerian authorities should 
review the cases of each industry from time to time, in order 
to reduce 
tariffs when appropriate so as to increase industrial efficiency 
through 
exposure to foreign competition. 
As for the British government's policies, they have 
had little or no 
effect on the flow of investments to Nigeria. Nigeria, 
being a member of 
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the Commonwealth is in the Sterling Area and until 1965, the British 
Government has not objected to direct investments in this area. When 
the British Government has regulated the supply of currency available 
for direct overseas investments, usually during periods of balance of 
payments crises, the effect on Nigeria has been marginal because most 
British firms rely on internal financing for their expansion. In 
addition, the Lagos Stock Exchange, although young, provides an oppor- 
tunity for raising additional capital through share issues. The commer- 
cial banks, the most important of which are British (Barclays and Standard) 
have offered, and will continue to offer generous loan facilities to 
British f irms. 
THE FUTURE ROLE OF BRITISH DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
OF NIGERIA 
The main conclusions of this study are (a) that British direct invest- 
ment has been beneficial to the Nigerian economy by making a positive 
contribution to economic development; (b) that the contribution was made 
possible largely by the petroleum investments; (c) that the level, kind 
and extent of contributions were determined and limited in various ways 
by the nature of some investments, by the industry where they took place, 
by the end uses of final products and by the type of market the investments 
serviced, and (d) that the effects of the limitations can be ameliorated 
by a change in the investment strategy of British investors and by parti- 
cular government policies. 
It would be interesting to consider the conclusions of 
this study in the 
light of the future role of British direct investment in Nigeria. 
If 
anything, this study emphasizes the basic fact that British 
direct invest- 
ment has not helped much to solve the major problems 
facing Nigeria at the 
present time. The first is how to feed the rapidly growing population 
adequately. The second is how to employ the large pool of 
healthy but 
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unemployed labour which could be a threat to economic order. The last 
problem is how to redistribute the national income and wealth of the 
country so as to bridge the enormous gap between the rich and the poor. 
While British direct investment has contributed both directly and in- 
directly to food production and employment in Nigeria, such contributions 
have been marginal, given the nature and the extent of the problems. But 
it must be added that British direct investment has not contributed to 
a reduction in inequality; it has in fact helped to create a class of 
satellite bourgeoisie, thus only increasing the number of the few vultures 
among myriads of sparrows. It is necessary to add, however, as 
Professor Seers has said that "If one or two of these central problems 
have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be 
strange to call the result 'development', even if per capita income doubled. 
This applies, of course, to the future too. A 'plan' which conveys no 
targets for reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality can hardly be 
considered a 'development plan", 
205 
It must be emphasized that it is not the duty of British direct in- 
vestors or any other foreign investor to solve the problems facing Nigeria. 
As we have pointed out in Chapter II on the motivation to invest in Nigeria, 
not one British company mentioned as its aim the desire to solve Nigerian 
problems. There is clearly a divergence of interests between a foreign 
investor and the national government of a country receiving that investment. 
On one hand is the aim of the foreign investor to get as high a return 
as possible on his capital, and on the other, is the aim of 
the recipient 
of investment to utilize the inflow of capital to solve problems of poverty, 
unemployment and so on. The existing divergence of 
interests clearly shows 
205D. 
Seers, "The Meaning of Development", Institute of 
Development 
Studies, Sussex University, 1970, p. 5. 
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that the Nigerian Government cannot rely on foreign investment to solve 
the problems facing the country. If Nigeria is interested in development, 
then it must be done by Nigerians. As a consequence, Nigerians can 
only rely on foreign investment playing a subsidiary role in the economic 
development of their country. 
The functions which foreign investors can perform in their subsidiary 
role include feasibility studies, project evaluations, the supply of techn- 
ology and the provision of management services. All these functions can 
best be performed through collaboration, which may take the form of joint- 
ventures, management contracts, and technical co-operation. The major 
advantages of foreign collaboration are flexibility, cheapness and effi- 
ciency in stimulating domestic production. These advantages have been 
turned into reality in many developing countries. "The main advantage 
of foreign collaboration has been to increase rapidly the production of 
items covered by the agreements, and to bridge the technological gap 
between India and advanced countries. Foreign collaboration has been 
one of the main factors leading to the rapid diversification of the 
industrial structure of India...... The main cost to India has been the 
remittance of royalty payments". 
206 The rapid pace of industrial 
development in many Latin American countries, especially, Argentina and 
Brazil, is due, in no small measure, to collaboration between these 
countries and the United States. 
207 
In the final analysis, foreign 
collaboration seems likely to offer more benefits to Nigeria than the 
random inflow of foreign investment since the Nigerian Government will 
only seek collaboration in projects necessary for the rapid economic 
development of the country. 
206 
T. A. Litvak and C. J. Maule, editors, Foreign Investment: 
The Experience of Host Countries, Praeger Publishers, 
New York 1970, p. 299. 
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See F. J. Tickner, Technical Co-operation, Hutchinson, 
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P. Gabriel, The International Transfer of Corporate Skills, Harvard 
University Press, 1967. 
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